Why Do Vacant Houses Sell for Less: Holding Costs,Bargaining Power or Stigma?

This article introduces Nash bargaining into a search model to identify various channels through which vacancy affects selling price and liquidity in the resale market for houses. The model shows the various vacancy effects in the form of greater seller holding cost, lower seller bargaining power and unobserved negative attributes or stigma. We use a 20‐year data series on house transactions to test for these effects in a simultaneous model of price and liquidity, using the long data series to allow for variation across market phases. The robust vacancy effects on price and liquidity across all market phases primarily reflect greater seller holding cost and diminished bargaining power. Repeatedly, vacant houses also exhibit significant stigma effects in the rising market but not in stable or declining market phases. At the same time, vacant houses enjoy stronger shopping externality effects from surrounding houses for sale than do their occupied counterparts.     

Effects of Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Labor Demand Shocks on the Housing Market

This article shows that macroeconomic uncertainty affects the housing market in two significant ways. First, uncertainty shocks adversely affect housing prices but not the quantities that are traded. Controlling for a broad set of variables in fixed‐effects regressions, we find that uncertainty shocks reduce both housing prices and median sales prices in the amount of 1.4% and 1.8%, respectively, but the effect is not statistically significant for the percentage changes of all homes sold. Second, when both uncertainty and local demand shocks are introduced, the effects of uncertainty on the housing market dominate that of local labor demand shocks on housing prices, median sale prices, the share of houses selling for a loss and transactions. The aforementioned effects are largest for the states that exhibit relatively high housing price volatilities, suggesting real options effects in the housing market during the times of high uncertainty.     

Foreclosure Discount: Definition and Dynamic Patterns

The lack of a consistent definition of foreclosure discount gives rise to discount rates that vary from nonexistent to sizeable across locations and time. We define the foreclosure discount as the discount of the real estate owned (REO) sale price relative to a normal‐sale estimated market value. With a dataset of 1.34 million REO sale transactions, across 16 CBSAs between 2000 and 2012, we find three noteworthy empirical findings. First, a high REO sale concentration in a market increases the foreclosure discount. Second, foreclosure discount is negatively related to recent house‐price appreciation. Third, the often reported high foreclosure discount for lower value properties is likely due to property condition.     

Dual Agent Distortions in Real Estate Transactions

This article investigates price distortions in dual agent real estate transactions. Consistent with the literature, we find that, on average, dual agent has a null effect on sale price. However, dual agent distortions on sale price emerge after controlling for the ownership of the property. Dual agent is associated with a 6.35% price premium on agent‐owned properties, but a 25.10% price discount on government‐owned properties and a 5.14% discount on bank‐owned properties. In addition, market conditions also play an important role in such price distortions.     

To Sell or Not to Sell: Measuring the Heat of the Housing Market

Combining list‐price, sale‐price and time‐on‐the‐market data, we estimate an index that summarizes housing market conditions and that has a direct economic interpretation. The index measures seller's bargaining power in a structural search model of home seller behavior. Structural estimation uncovers an analytical relationship between reduced form coefficients of hedonic and marketing‐time equations and structural parameters. Thus, the index can be estimated using individual‐level or aggregate data. Using housing transactions data from the Washington, D.C., area, we show that index trends coincide with the up and downturns in home appreciation rates and with popular perceptions about the “heat” of the market.     

Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands

This article assesses the predictive power of variables that measure market tightness, such as seller's bargaining power and sale probabilities, on future home prices. Theoretical insights from a stylized search‐and‐matching model illustrate that such indicators can be associated with subsequent home price appreciation. The empirical analysis employs listings data on residential units offered for sale through a real estate broker in the Netherlands and for certain U.S. regions. Individual records are used to construct quarterly home price indices, an index that measures seller's bargaining power and (quality‐adjusted) home sale probabilities. Using conventional time‐series models we show that current sale probabilities and bargaining power can significantly reduce home price appreciation forecast errors and help to predict turning points in local area housing markets. The measures and approaches in this article help to demonstrate ways in which researchers and practitioners can leverage listings data to gain knowledge about the current and future state of the housing market.     

A Model of Time‐on‐Market and Real Estate Price Under Sequential Search with Recall

This article develops a model and provides a closed‐form formula to uncover the theoretical relationship between real estate price and time on market (TOM). Our model shows a nonlinear positive price‐TOM relationship, and it identifies three economic factors that affect the impact of TOM on sale price. We demonstrate that conventional metrics for real estate return and risk, which are borrowed in a naïve fashion from finance theory, do not account for marketing period risk and tend to overestimate real estate returns and underestimate real estate risks. Our model provides a simple way to correct such bias. This theory helps to explain the apparent “risk‐premium puzzle” in real estate.     

哈萨克斯坦新《转移价格法》对石油公司国际原油销售的影响及对策研究

为了更好地规范哈萨克斯坦国际业务中涉及的贷款、采购服务和原油销售等进出口业务,2010年6月30日,哈萨克斯坦政府修订了《转移价格法》。新《转移价格法》将被监管的主体扩大至＂哈萨克斯坦境内发生的与国际交易相关的交易＂公司;要求公司定期提供交易监督报表,签订《转移价格协议》;取消了修订前允许商品销售价格与市场价格偏离10的规定。新《转移价格法》与旧法相比,包含很多积极的改变和修订,但也存在一些问题。例如,新《转移价格法》对转移价格和关联关系的认定有待商榷,将管理范围拓展到哈境内的交易有失公平,市场价格的确定过于简单等。新《转移价格法》对石油公司的国际原油销售带来很大的财税风险。因此,石油公司应规范销售业务流程,严格要求买方提供销售费用证明文件;及时准确报送原油销售报表和相关销售费用证明文件,接受政府监督;加强公司内部审计和外部咨询,确保销售证明文件合法合规。     

Optimal Selling Mechanism,Auction Discounts and Time on Market

This article examines the optimal selling mechanism problem in real estate market using mean‐variance analysis and downside risk analysis. When sellers can choose between accepting the first offer above a reservation price or auctions (waiting an optimal and fixed time), sellers having higher risk aversion choose auctions and wait a fixed time while sellers having lower risk aversion choose an optimal reservation price and wait a random time. Positive auction discounts are compensated by reduced risks, and there exists a connection between liquidity risk and conditional auction discount. More (Fewer) sellers will choose to sell their houses through auctions in a hot (cold) market or when holding cost increases (decreases). When sellers choose auctions, sellers having higher risk aversion who have lower holding cost wait longer and obtain higher sale price. Loss‐averse sellers unanimously choose the mechanism of setting an optimal reservation price.     

The Disciplining Effect of Concern for Referrals: Evidence from Real Estate Agents

Real estate agents rely on clients for referrals to generate future business; this article examines whether concern for referrals disciplines agents. We compare results for sellers who move to another area (and are less likely to provide referrals) with results for sellers who remain in the area (and are more likely to provide referrals). We find that moving‐away sellers’ houses have a higher sale rate, sell faster and sell for less (even after controlling for moving‐away sellers’ greater impatience). We also provide evidence that the disciplining effect of concern for referrals is stronger for agents who place a greater value on reputation. Finally, among sellers who are better at evaluating and monitoring agents, we see less of the high sell rate, low sale‐price effect.     

The Gender Gap in Real Estate Sales: Negotiation Skill or Agent Selection?

This study examines differences in net selling price for residential real estate across male and female agents. A sample of 2,020 home sales transactions from Fulton County, Georgia, are analyzed in a two‐stage least squares, geospatial autoregressive corrected, semi‐log hedonic model to test for gender and gender selection effects. Although agent gender seems to play a role in naïve models, its role becomes inconclusive as variables controlling for possible price and time on market expectations of the buyers and sellers are introduced to the models. Clear differences in real estate sales prices, time on market and agent incomes across genders are unlikely due to differences in negotiation performance between genders or the mix of genders in a two‐agent negotiation. The evidence suggests an interesting alternative to agent performance: that buyers and sellers with different reservation price and time on market expectations, such as those selling foreclosure homes, tend to select agents along gender lines.     

Do House Price Levels Anticipate Subsequent Price Changes within Metropolitan Areas?

This research examines the relationship between hedonically controlled housing price levels and subsequent changes in those prices across locations within MSAs. Are areas with a high price relative to an “imputed rent” paying for higher appreciation? In an efficient market (e.g., Gordon Growth Model), as fundamentals (impute rent) differ across locations and change over time, anticipation of these should generate a positive correlation between (residual) price levels and subsequent price changes. We undertake these tests in four different MSAs using a panel of repeat‐sale house price indices that have been scaled to price levels with the hedonic attributes of the house and ZIP code. In three markets we find that identical houses in higher priced ZIP codes subsequently appreciate faster. In one market we find that there is little statistical difference.     

Variation Across Price Segments and Locations: A Comprehensive Quantile Regression Analysis of the Sydney Housing Market

Standard house price indices measure average movements of average houses in average locations belonging to an average price segment and hence obscure spatial and cross‐sectional variation of price appreciation rates even within a single metropolitan area. This article combines penalized quantile regression techniques with the hedonic imputation approach to reveal such kind of variation. The method is applied to house transactions from Sydney between 2001 and 2014. The analysis finds significant variation across sub‐markets over time and in particular during the boom‐and‐bust cycle peaking in 2004. Appreciation rates were highest for suburban, low‐priced and lowest for inner‐city, high‐priced houses.     

Institutional Investment,Asset Illiquidity and Post‐Crash Housing Market Dynamics

We examine institutional investors’ entry into the equity side of the single‐family detached housing market using an asset illiquidity framework. We find that institutional investors purchased owner‐occupied houses after the real estate crisis for approximately 6.3–11.8% less than owner‐occupiers. The large discount was in addition to distressed sale and cash purchase discounts which, when combined, highlight the low liquidation value for owner‐occupied housing. The results suggest that asset illiquidity is an important cost of leverage in the owner‐occupied housing market.     

Is Selection Bias Inherent in Housing Transactions? An Equilibrium Approach

We develop an equilibrium model for residential housing transactions in an economy with houses that differ in their quality and households that differ in their planned holding horizon. We show that, in equilibrium, a clientele effect persists, with long‐horizon buyers overwhelmingly choosing higher quality properties and short‐horizon buyers settling for lower quality properties. This clientele effect creates a sample selection bias: the properties that are on the market are predominantly of lower quality. Since these are the preferred choice of short‐horizon buyers, they demonstrate a faster turnover. Both the clientele effect and the selection bias are more pronounced with an increase in the variance of house quality and in the variance of the planned holding horizon. Our theoretical model supports empirical evidence on the existence of such bias in home price indices and explains it by the differences in ex ante holding horizons.     

The Impact on Housing Values of Restrictions on Rights of Ownership: The Case of an Occupant's Age

With the exception of anecdotal information, little is known about the specific effects on the value of a house because its ownership is restricted to people older than a certain age. This article provides an empirically-derived assessment of the impact on the selling price of single-family residences when their ownership is age restricted. To determine the effect on the sales price of age-restricted houses, a standard hedonic pricing model is applied to a sample of 371 sales transactions drawn from a suburban area of a large city. The results indicate that an age restriction placed on houses decreases their value by 6%. This finding may be of interest to local land-use regulators, developers who are considering developing age-restricted houses and appraisers who wish to make value adjustments to these homes.     

Speculators and Price Overreaction in the Housing Market

This paper investigates the role of speculators in the housing market, specifically their contribution to price overreaction through positive feedback trading (or momentum trading). We exploit a unique data set of condominium transactions in a residential real estate market where transaction traits associated with short‐term speculation can be identified. In the cross‐section of housing projects, a 10‐percentage‐point increase in trading activity following a strong short‐run market price rise predicts a negative subsequent monthly price change of 0.5% at the project level. Moreover, the price reversal effect associated with the momentum trading by short‐term speculators is two to three times stronger, and holding such trading constant, momentum trading in general has little additional impact. Our findings further suggest that momentum trading by short‐term speculators contributes to price overreaction largely in submarkets with lower information efficiency.     

The Economics of Style: Measuring the Price Effect of Neo‐Traditional Architecture in Housing

Vintage effects have received considerable attention from economists in the context of house prices. Although strongly related, the impact of architectural building styles on prices has not been studied yet. Using a cross‐sectional hedonic price analysis including building styles of recently developed homes in the Netherlands we find a significant price premium for housing with neo‐traditional architecture. Extensive intervention by local authorities on the supply side of the housing market seems the most probable explanation of this effect. The decreasing price premium over time reflects the impact of supply restrictions on price, but also indicates that style does matter.     

Fact‐Finding Effectiveness: Evidence from New York State Fact‐Finding Effectiveness

In a collective‐bargaining environment characterized by increasing fiscal and taxpayer pressures, this article examines the continued viability of fact‐finding as a dispute‐resolution mechanism in New York State's public sector. This is an important question because fact‐finding is the final dispute‐resolution procedure for most unionized employees in New York and many other states. Whether fact‐finding effectiveness was measured by the proximity of fact‐finder recommendations to the final settlement or by outright acceptance of the fact‐finder report, regression results show that New York fact‐finding has successfully met the challenges of the intensified environmental pressures in the 1990s. No significant decline was found in its ability to move parties toward the compromise outcome. Part of the fact‐finding's continued success can be attributed to the policy shift by New York's Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) in 1991 in the role of the fact‐finder from an accommodative to a more adjudicative function. The well‐reasoned adjudicative fact‐finding report has more potential to bring public pressure to bear on the extreme positions of the parties. Mediation was better left to the professional PERB mediators. Finally, it also was found that fact‐finders who were full‐time neutrals were more effective under this more adjudicative style.     

Relational configurations with information intermediaries: The effect of firm‐investment bank ties on expected acquisition performance

Recognizing information‐related problems in acquisition transactions, we study how the characteristics of acquiring firms' relationships with information brokers or intermediaries like investment banks affect firms' access to acquisition‐related information, thus influencing expected acquisition performance. We propose that relational configurations that enhance the intermediaries' ability and willingness provide the most beneficial and appropriate information to acquiring firms. We find that acquirers' expected acquisition performance increases with the number of prior transactions with investment banks but decreases when relationships with banks become exclusive. Further, the positive effect of number of prior transactions becomes even stronger for less related acquisitions. Our study provides insights on the beneficial performance implications of competition in multiple but nonexclusive relationships with information intermediaries such as investment banks. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.