The impact of board capital and board characteristics on firm performance

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of board capital on the relationship between CEO duality, board dependence, managerial share ownership and performance. We argue that board capital (the ability of board members to perform manager-monitoring activities and to provide advice and counsel to management) varies across board members. Highly qualified board members will be better at monitoring management and constitute a more valuable resource for firms. Based on a sample of U.S. companies listed in the Compustat S&P 500 and using both resource dependence and agency theories, we predict and find that CEO duality and board dependence negatively affect performance and that board capital mitigates the negative effects. We also predict and find that managerial share ownership positively affects performance and that board capital strengthens this positive relationship. The results are consistent with the view that firms benefit from board capital in terms of outside directors' ability to monitor managers and provide advice and counsel to managers.     

Executive compensation and competition in the banking and financial sectors

This paper studies the effect of product market competition on the compensation packages that firms offer to their executives. We use a panel of US executives in the 1990s and exploit two deregulation episodes in the banking and financial sectors as quasi-natural experiments. We provide difference-in-differences estimates of their effect on (1) total pay, (2) estimated fixed pay and performance-pay sensitivities, and (3) the sensitivity of stock option grants. Our results indicate that the deregulations substantially changed the level and structure of compensation: the variable components of pay increased along with performance-pay sensitivities and, at the same time, the fixed component of pay fell. The overall effect on total pay was small.     

Allocation of decision rights and the investment strategy of mutual funds

The literature suggests that while decentralized decision making can allow for greater specialization in an organization, it heightens the cost of coordinating decisions. The mutual fund industry—in particular, sole- and team-managed balanced funds—provides an ideal setting to test the specialization versus coordination trade-off, as information on decision structures and fund actions is easily obtained. We show that sole-managed balanced funds, with centralized decision rights, exhibit significant market timing that requires reallocation across asset classes. However, consistent with coordination difficulties between managers specializing in particular asset classes, no market timing is evident in team-managed balanced funds. Team-managed funds exhibit greater returns from specialization, in the form of better security selection performance than sole-managed funds. These results hold cross-sectionally and for funds that switch management structures. The overall returns across different management structures are similar, indicating a market equilibrium. Investor flows reward market-timing performance for sole- but not team-managed funds.     

Relative Target Setting and Cooperation

A large stream of work on relative performance evaluation highlights the benefits of using information about peer performance in contracting. In contrast, the potential costs of discouraging cooperation among peers have received much less attention. The purpose of our study is to examine how the importance of cooperation affects the use of information about peer performance in target setting, also known as relative target setting. Specifically, we use data from an industrial services company where business unit managers need to share specialized equipment and staff with their peers to manage bottlenecks in their capacity. We construct several empirical proxies for the costs and benefits of information about peer performance and examine their effects on target setting. We find robust evidence that the sensitivity of target revisions to past peer performance is higher when peer group performance has greater capacity to filter out noise but lower when the importance of cooperation among peers is greater.     

Respondable risk and incentives for CEOs: The role of information-collection and decision-making

This paper examines the incentive provision when the agent can respond to risk by exerting effort to collect information about the underlying state and making corresponding decisions. Such effort is shown to be more valuable in a riskier environment and incentives can increase with “respondable” risk. The relation between incentives and risk is more positive when the agent's effort is more effective in collecting information or in acting upon it. Using data on chief executive officers (CEOs), I find that incentives for CEOs increase with industry-wide risk, a measure of respondable risk. The positive relation diminishes when the CEO is less able to collect information or is less effective in acting upon it.     

Dynamic forecasting behavior by analysts: Theory and evidence

We develop a multi-period learning model to examine the relation between analysts’ forecasting behavior and their performance. In a competitive market for banking services, the surplus and the analyst's payoff, which is determined through bargaining, are convex in her reputation. The convexity of her payoff structure and the presence of employment risk lead to a U-shaped relation between the analyst's forecast boldness and prior performance and a positive relation between forecast boldness and experience. We find support for these predictions in our empirical analysis. Significant underperformers (outperformers) face higher (lower) employment risk and are more likely to issue bolder forecasts.     

Is rising RTS a figment of poor data?

While using detailed firm-level data from the private business sector, this study identifies two empirical puzzles: (i) returns-to-scale (RTS) parameter estimates rise at higher levels of data aggregation and (ii) estimates from the firm level suggest decreasing returns to scale. The analysis shows that, although consistent with rising estimates, neither entry/exit nor the Basu-Fernald [Returns to scale in U.S. production: estimates and implications. Journal of Political Economy 105, 249-283) aggregation-bias effect drives this result. Rather, rising and too low RTS estimates seem to reflect a mixture of random errors in factor inputs at the firm level. It turns out, in fact, that a 7.5-10 percent error in labor (hours worked) can explain both puzzles.     

Managerial risk-reducing incentives and social and exchange capital

This study investigates the impact of managerial risk-reducing incentives on the firm's social and exchange capital. Using CEO inside debt holdings to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with more inside debt holdings are likely to invest more in building social capital, which targets broader society and potentially offers anti-risk protection advantages, to shield the value of their inside debt. However, our results further show that managerial risk-reducing incentives have no impact on firms' exchange capital, suggesting the need to recognize the difference between social and exchange capital. These findings corroborate the view that CEOs invest in social capital as a risk management strategy. Furthermore, this paper presents an understanding of the role that institutional investors play in moderating the impact of managerial risk-reducing incentives on social capital. Our results suggest that institutional investors constrain CEOs that have greater inside debt incentives from investing in social capital. However, they are still willing to increase the investment in social capital for risk management purposes when firm risk is high.     

The Performance Effect of Feedback Frequency and Detail: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Customer Satisfaction

This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of nonfinancial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800 professionals receive. Contrary to what we would expect if these professionals conformed to the model of the Bayesian decision maker, more (and more frequent) information does not always help improve performance. In fact, we find that professionals achieve the best outcomes when they receive detailed but infrequent (monthly) feedback. The treatment groups with frequent feedback, regardless of how detailed it is, perform no better than the control group (with monthly and aggregate information). The results are consistent with the information in the latest feedback report being most salient and professionals in the weekly treatments overweighting their most recent performance, hampering their ability to learn.     

Post-merger restructuring and the boundaries of the firm

We examine how firms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions using plant-level data. We find that there is extensive restructuring in a short period following mergers and full-firm acquisitions. Acquirers of full firms sell 27% and close 19% of the plants of target firms within three years of the acquisition. Acquirers with skill in running their peripheral divisions tend to retain more acquired plants. Retained plants increase in productivity whereas sold plants do not. These results suggest that acquirers restructure targets in ways that exploit their comparative advantage.     

The Moderating Effect of Relative Performance Evaluation on the Risk Incentive Properties of Executives’ Equity Portfolios

We offer evidence that the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEOs’ incentive contracts influences the effect of risk‐taking incentives on both the magnitude and composition of firm risk. We find that, when the incentive design lacks RPE features, the incentive portfolio vega motivates CEOs to increase total risk through the systematic component because it can be hedged. In contrast, when the incentive design includes RPE features, CEOs prefer idiosyncratic risk because RPE filters out the systematic component of firm performance. We also document that the use of RPE reinforces the incentive portfolio vega's effect on the total risk.     

An empirical analysis of the factors impacting discount rates: Evidence from the U.S. Marine Corps

This analysis examines the impact of age, race, marital status, number of dependents, education, rank, years of service, and occupational code on personal discount rates. The study focuses on 3241 Marine Corps officers/enlisted personnel between 1992 and 1997 who separated from the Marine Corps through the VSI program (an annuity payment) or the SSB program (lump-sum payment). The analysis finds that, although the degree of statistical significance varied between the officer model and the enlisted model, holding other factors constant, females and individuals with more years of service or education were less likely to take the lump-sum payment, and that blacks and individuals with more dependents were more likely to take the lump-sum payment. Across all demographic factors, enlisted personnel had statistically significantly higher average discount rates than officers, as is consistent with prior studies. The estimated personal discount rates averaged 14.9% for officers and 24% for enlisted Marines. This study contributes to the literature in that it is the only study to examine the Marines during this time period. Many of the results can be generalized to the civilian sector to assist in formulation of savings/retirement policies.     

Model of associativity in the production chain in Agroindustrial SMEs

This research aims to propose a model of associativity in the productive chain of the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MIPYMES) of citrus agroindustrial in the north of the state of Veracruz, Mexico; With the purpose of explaining the extent to which direct actors, support services, environment, relations and government policies determine the associativity in the production chain. The problem that originates this investigation is the lack of knowledge about the operation of the agro-industrial citrus MIPYMES in this area of the country. The result of this research is a model that represents the operation of these companies in associativity with the productive chain considering the elements that form it, proposing alternatives to generate a greater cooperation or coalition of the companies that interact to obtain mutual benefits.     

Structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance: The link between managerial ownership and corporate performance

This paper presents a parsimonious, structural model that isolates primary economic determinants of the level and dispersion of managerial ownership, firm scale, and performance and the empirical associations among them. In particular, variation across firms and through time of estimated productivity parameters for physical assets and managerial input and corresponding variation in optimal compensation contract and firm size combine to deliver the well-known hump-shaped relation between Tobin's Q and managerial ownership. To assess the effectiveness of standard econometric approaches to the endogeneity problem, we apply those remedies to panel data generated from the model. The unfortunate conclusion is that, at least in the ownership-performance context, proxy variables, fixed effects, and instrumental variables do not generally provide reliable solutions to simultaneity bias.     

Powerful CEOs,cash bonus contracts and firm performance

We investigate whether powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) influence the conditions of their cash bonus contracts. Specifically, we examine (i) the association between CEO power and the proportion of ex-ante cash bonus to base salary (bonus ratio), (ii) the association between CEO power and the relative use of non-financial to financial performance targets in cash bonus contracts, and (iii) the performance consequences of incorporating non-financial targets in cash bonus contracts. Results show that powerful CEOs are associated with greater ex-ante bonus ratios and higher proportions of non-financial performance targets compared to less powerful CEOs. Furthermore, the use of quantitative and corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related non-financial performance targets is positively associated with subsequent firm performance, and the use of undefined non-financial performance targets is negatively associated with subsequent firm performance. These results are robust to alternative econometric specifications and variable definitions.     

Dynamic market entry and the value of flexibility in transitional international joint ventures

The purpose of this study is to formalize the optimal choice of market entry strategy for an individual multinational enterprise (MNE) from a dynamic perspective. It is argued that incorporating a suitable treatment of irreversibility, uncertainty and flexibility related to an MNE's investment decision gives further insights into the expansion, dissolvement, and optimal timing of international joint ventures (IJVs). In most cases, the initial entry strategy serves as a platform allowing the firm to make subsequent investments to exploit host-country advantages and capabilities. We allow for this by taking a three-step expansion strategy explicitly into account. The evolutionary process of the value of the foreign direct investment can be interpreted as a compound complex chooser option. The results suggest that uncertainty, size of equity share and future investment/divestment opportunities play an important role when it comes to transit from export to the first phase of the foreign direct investment commitment. The paper underscores the importance of modeling the dynamics of market entry and helps to refine the application of real options in the alliance context by providing a closed-form solution in continuous time to value the overall strategic flexibility.     

Manufacturing labor in the Central Region of Mexico. An estimation by great division

The production performance and its effects in the generation of formal employment in the Central region of Mexico are analyzed at the major division level of manufacture. The most dynamic activity divisions of the manufacturing industry are identified and, by estimating a function of employment with panel data for each of the nine major divisions of manufacture, it is reported that the activity divisions: I. Food products, beverages and tobacco, II. Textiles, clothing and leather industry, III. Timber industry and wood products and IX. Other manufacturing industries show high employment income elasticity (0.716, 1.035, 0.781 and 0.94). Furthermore, the divisions that comprise the more technical branches, with greater innovation processes and high levels of export, such as division VIII. Metal products, machinery and equipment, show lower elasticity.     

On Quality and Variety Bias in Aggregate Prices

How do product variety and quality affect the aggregate price bias? We develop a general equilibrium model that accounts for the joint interaction of product quality and variety. Our findings show that the aggregate price bias is procyclical and the contribution of product variety is persistent whereas the contribution of product quality becomes countercyclical in the medium to long run. We show that accounting for product quality and variety has critical implications on the measure of cyclical fluctuations. Measurements of cyclical fluctuations derived using the consumption deflator, which abstracts from changes in product quality and variety, underestimate the variables' true volatility.