Subsidization and Choice in the Group Health Insurance Market

This study investigates the effect of group health insurance plan choice on insurance unit price. The empirical findings suggest that the unit price of insurance, as measured by the ratio of the premium to expected indemnity benefits, is lower in group plans that offer employees a choice of different insurance options and require a premium contribution than it is in plans lacking at least one of these two features. The analyses suggest that lower unit prices are related to an increase in indemnity benefits and that the reduction in the unit price is greater for lower risks. The findings indicate that although subsidization of high risks by low risks occurs with group health insurance, the degree of subsidization is less when employees are offered a choice of health insurance plans.     

“Understanding Relationships Using Copulas,” by Edward Frees and Emiliano Valdez,January 1998

Presenteeism occurs when employees are present at the workplace but cannot perform at their best because of ill-health or other reasons, while absenteeism occurs when employees are absent from the workplace. Although absenteeism is important, researchers now say presenteeism can be more costly to businesses and may be responsible for as much as three times the health-related lost productivity as compared to absenteeism and may cost the U.S. economy as much as $150 billion per year. Given the cost of absenteeism and presenteeism, one of the objectives of this article is to provide actuaries with the techniques and insights needed to design disability insurance policies that take into account the dynamics of absenteeism and presenteeism. To this end we develop a simple multistate sickness-disability model of the evolution of an employee’s health over time. We assume employees receive sick pay, the size of which depends on their health state, and there is a government-sponsored unemployment insurance program. In our model it is possible for employees in good health to avoid work by staying home, which is called shirking. To reduce shirking, the employer decides to check the health status of a certain percentage of employees who “call in sick.” Given the sick-pay structure, the probability of a health check, and the existence of unemployment insurance, employees develop rational strategies about whether to engage in shirking, absenteeism, or presenteeism. These strategies are captured in a set of Volterra integral equations. We use these Volterra integral equations to show how the employer can design a disability insurance plan that can incentivise employees to eliminate shirking and to act in a manner that will maximize the employer’s expected profits.     

Why small businesses don't have health insurance: results of a Florida survey

While most of the insured population has health insurance under an employer-sponsored group plan, the majority of the working uninsured are employed by small firms. Increasing the number of small firms that provide health insurance plans to their employees is important for decreasing the number of uninsured. This article summarizes the results of a survey designed to study characteristics of the firms that do not have health insurance, the obstacles to their getting insurance, and small business owners' interest in having a group health plan.     

The Impact of the Health Insurance Market on Small Firm Employment

Small firms that offer health insurance to their employees may face variable premiums if they hire employees with high expected health costs. To avoid expensive premium variability, small firms may attempt to maintain a workforce with low expected health costs. This results in employment distortions. I examine the magnitude of these employment distortions using the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey and the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. Based on the underwriting behavior of insurance companies in 1988, I classify medical conditions into three categories: conditions that led to denial of coverage; conditions that led to exclusion restrictions; and, conditions that led to higher premiums. In 1987, I find that insured small firms were less likely to employ workers with families that had conditions that led to higher premiums than insured large firms. However, in 1996, possibly due to the passage of small group health insurance reforms that restrict insurers' ability to exclude or deny coverage, insured small firms were less likely to employ workers with denial conditions compared to insured large firms. These results suggest that the pattern of employment distortions in insured small firms is consistent with the evolving small group health insurance market.     

Consumer-centered vs. job-centered health insurance

Most employees and their dependents in the United States have health insurance provided by the employer or labor-management health and welfare fund. In this system, employees and their families lose their health insurance when the breadwinner loses his or her job while, at the same time, a Medicaid beneficiary can lose Medicaid eligibility by getting a job, even a poorly paid one. Most health insurance pays the doctor on the basis of fee-for-service and the hospital on the basis of cost-reimbursement, rewarding both with more revenue for providing more and more costly services. The insured employee has little or no incentive to seek out a less costly provider. There are no rewards for economy in this system. It should be little wonder, then, that health care costs are out of control. There are alternative financing and delivery systems with built-in incentives to use resources economically, but, the author of this article asserts, their ability to compete and attract patients with their superior economic efficiency is blocked by many laws and government programs. The author believes that the most effective and acceptable way to get costs under control, and at the same time achieve universal coverage, would be through a system of fair economic competition. He discusses his Consumer Choice Health Plan proposal and describes how one of the main barriers to competition is today's system of job-linked health insurance.     

Let's put consumers in charge of health care

Businesses spend billions on health insurance. And what do they get for their money? A lot of unhappy employees. Workers fret about the quality of the care they receive, the burden of their out-of-pocket expenses, and the gaps in their coverage. For businesses, health care has become a lose-lose proposition: They pay way too much, and they get way too little. The problem is that the health care industry has been shielded from consumer pressure--by employers, insurers, and the government. As a result, costs have exploded even as choices have narrowed. But if companies embrace a new model of health coverage--one that places control over both costs and care directly into the hands of employees--the competitive forces that spur productivity and innovation in consumer markets can be loosed upon the inefficient, tradition-bound health care system. Moving to consumer-driven health care requires that companies revamp their health benefits in six ways: Give employees incentives to shop intelligently; offer a real choice of insurance plans; charge employees prices that accurately reflect the company's costs; let providers set their own prices; adjust payments for each enrollee based on need; and provide relevant information. Putting consumers in charge of health care may seem like a radical approach. But individuals are highly motivated to educate themselves about their health, their insurance, and their care, and they want to seek the most value for their money. Promoting that economic dynamic--the same that fuels consumer markets everywhere--is the best way to enhance the health care industry's productivity and quality.     

Culture, infrastructure and international health benefits delivery

When selecting a health insurance carrier for international employees, it is advantageous to recognize that valid assumptions made when selecting domestic benefits simply do not apply in the international realm and can lead to costly errors. This article examines some scenarios and cultural anomalies that invalidate commonly accepted domestic health insurance practices. It explores strategies for simplifying benefit design, providing access to quality care abroad, assessing costs, minimizing overseas risks and understanding the cultural impact on health care delivery.     

Self‐Funding of Health‐Care Plans by Small Firms: Risks and Reforms

Small employers that offer health insurance have usually offered fully insured products through traditional health plans. Recently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has created new requirements for fully insured products that will entice more small firms to fund their own health‐care benefits. However, self‐funding poses significant risks to these small firms, their employees, and state exchanges. To mitigate some of these risks within current political realities, we recommend advance disclosures—to small firms of material changes in their stop‐loss policies, and to their employees that premium subsidies are available only on ACA exchanges. We also suggest strengthening Small Business Health Options Program exchanges by broadening the availability of subsidies and building partnerships with brokers. Finally, we recommend an expanded role for brokers and third‐party administrators in helping small firms improve their choice of health‐care insurance.     

我国城镇职工基本养老保险可持续发展的研究

运用因子分析法,选取了13个影响城镇职工基本养老保险可持续发展的指标,并建立综合评价模型,对我国各地区城镇职工基本养老保险的可持续发展程度进行定量分析与综合评价,最后总结出经济发展情况、人口年龄结构、养老保险基金来源渠道与养老保险内部负担等四个指标体系对我国城镇职工基本养老保险的可持续发展产生重要的影响,并据此提出相关的政策建议。     

Health plan termination--bankruptcy--automatic stay--COBRA. In re Health Management Limited Partnership

Even though an insurer provided telephone notice of termination of a group health plan's insurance coverage for failure to pay the required premium on the same day the employer filed a bankruptcy petition and gave written notice after the petition was filed, it did not violate the bankruptcy code's automatic stay provision. This is because a special payment plan provided for an extended grace period and automatic termination upon failure to pay the premium in full by the end of that period, and the final due date was before the debtor filed the petition. Thus, termination occurred automatically before the bankruptcy petition was filed. The insurer is not the plan administrator and is not obligated to provide COBRA notice to the debtor's employees, especially since the employees could not elect to continue coverage under a group health plan when the insurance coverage had been terminated. An employee's right to elect to continue coverage under the employer's group plan presumes there is coverage available to continue.     

中国长期护理保险财政负担能力研究

本文通过测算城乡居民和城镇职工长期护理保险需求,构建医疗保险精算模型,对中国长期护理保险财政负担能力展开研究。结果发现:依托城乡居民医疗保险建立的长期护理保险会增加财政支出,但是支出规模在可控范围内;依托城镇职工医疗保险建立的长期护理保险会威胁职工医疗保险统筹基金的安全,因而不可持续,但是该问题可以通过改革职工医疗保险个人账户来解决;中国长期护理保险应该采用“个人缴费+医疗保险基金补助+财政补助”的模式,且个人缴费最高不超过15%;中国长期护理保险财政负担水平总体较低,财政有能力维持长期护理保险的运行。对此,我国应尽快正式建立全国性的长期护理保险制度和财政对长期护理保险的投入机制。     

Financing long-term care: employee needs and attitudes, and the employer's role.

Because of increasing life expectancies, high costs for nursing home and home health care, declining levels of informal family care, and the stated policy of the federal and state governments to foster self-reliance, individuals are increasingly exposed to the risk of financial ruin from long-term care (LTC) expenses. Yet, because of psychological barriers and aversions, particularly to thinking about residing in a nursing home, most individuals have not purchased LTC insurance. Hence, it may be the responsibility of employers to provide education to employees about LTC and to sponsor either individual or group plans of LTC insurance. Educational efforts may be particularly effective at the time of retirement when employees are in a more serious mood to consider the contingencies of retired life. A formal and perhaps more economical response for employers would be to offer combined life annuity and LTC insurance benefits through the retirement plan, provided certain regulatory and tax barriers can be removed.     

The Effects of Offering Health Plan Choice Within Employment-Based Purchasing Groups

Employers may offer employees a choice of health plans either to promote competition among plans or to better cater to employee preferences for different types of products. This article examines whether the relationship between the availability of choice and insurance costs and coverage are consistent with these models of employer behavior. The results indicate that employers who offer choice have lower average premiums, primarily because employees are enrolled in less generous plans, and cover a greater proportion of workers than those who do not. The results are consistent with employers offering choice to accommodate diverse worker preferences.     

Das Hamburger Beihilfemodell – Ein Vergleich der internen Renditen von GKV und PKV

At the beginning of their career civil servants in Germany can choose between the social health insurance system and a private plan combined with a direct reimbursement of the government up to 80%. Most civil servants chose the latter, also because they have to cover all contribution payments to the social system themselves, while normal employees get nearly 50% from their employers. The state of Hamburg decided to change the system by paying a share of the contributions if civil servants choose the social plan. Using a comparison of internal rates of return in both schemes, we show that this celebrated reform will not change the decision calculus for the average civil servant household and will probably thereby increase the adverse selection of high risk cases towards the social health insurance.     

统筹城乡基本医疗保险体系实现路径分析

统筹城乡医疗保险体系是完善我国医疗保障体系的重要组成部分。在阐明研究背景同时,系统分析了三大保险体系存在的各类问题,并提出了统筹、整合现有医疗保险体系的系统思路,即通过起步阶段、整合过渡阶段和目标实现阶段三个步骤,以逐步整合资源,建立起多层次城乡统筹的医疗保险体系,提升全民的医疗福利待遇和水平。     

An Analysis of the Effect of Tax Policy on Health Insurance Purchases by Risk Group

There is an extensive body of literature dealing with the welfare loss associated with generous levels of health insurance as a function of the tax subsidy. The theoretical discussion in this study considers the effect of the tax subsidy on pooling within plans, and suggests the hypotheses that the tax subsidy will have a disproportionately positive effect on the likelihood that a high‐risk worker will be eligible for and participate in employment‐based coverage, while the effect of the tax subsidy on plan generosity will be greatest for low‐risk employees. If coverage of high‐risk individuals enhances social welfare, this result may offset, at least in part, the welfare loss associated with generous plans. Data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey are used to test these hypotheses. The results provide evidence that the subsidy works to expand risk pools in the employment‐based health insurance market.     

Betriebliche Altersversorgung durch Direktversicherungen: Eine finanzwirtschaftliche Analyse aus Arbeitnehmerund Eigentümersicht

Corporate pension schemes are part of the total remuneration of employees. In this paper we analyze the?Direktversicherung“ — a life insurance on behalf of the employee paid for by the employer — from the viewpoints of shareholders and employees alike. Firstly we examine, what implications this life insurance contract has on the cash flows to shareholders and employees. Social security payments and tax payments on individual and company level are accounted for. Secondly, we deduce possible substitution quotas q: We ask, what insurance premium the employer can afford to pay at most in place of a given amount of salary, without penalizing his shareholders. Next we deduce the minimum insurance premium an employee has to ask for to replace a given part of his salary in order not to worsen his financial position. From the findings, we conclude that a corporate pension scheme via the?Direktversicherung“ has the potential to lead to a win-win situation, with both parties better off than before. Our findings are also interesting for insurance companies offering those contracts to employers.     

Limiting the ACA's Threats to Small Group Health Insurance Markets

We identify three threats to small group health insurance markets that may result from the 2014 implementation of certain provisions in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). First, small employers with predominantly low‐income employees may tend to opt out of small group markets because their employees will be better off with subsidized individual coverage. Second, small employers with employees of heterogeneous income levels will have strong incentives to offer coverage that is either “unaffordable” or fails to provide “minimum value” in order to preserve the availability of government subsidies for their low‐income employees. Finally, small employers that continue to offer group plans will face increased incentives to self‐insure those plans, further contracting small group markets and subjecting them to adverse selection. Collectively, these forces may destabilize small group markets and increase the ACA's fiscal cost. We therefore conclude by offering various reforms aimed at offsetting these risks and preserving the viability of small group markets.     

微观经济个体参保行为对医疗费用支出的影响效应研究

本文根据2016年中国家庭追踪调查数据,运用面板数据回归方法和倾向得分匹配法(PSM)研究微观经济个体参保行为对医疗费用支出的影响。研究表明,城镇职工医疗保险参保行为显著提高了医疗总费用和自付费用,城乡居民医疗保险参保行为对降低医疗总费用和自付费用具有一定的积极作用,新农合参保行为显著降低了医疗总费用,对自付费用的降低具有一定的积极作用。运用PSM法解决内生性问题和消除选择性偏差后得到的净效应结果与上述发现基本一致。参保行为与医院等级的交互分析表明,选择社区诊所等基层诊疗机构就诊可显著降低医疗总费用和自付费用,选择综合医院就诊则显著提高医疗总费用和自付费用。此外,参保行为对医疗费用支出的影响具有个体和区域异质性。据此,建议增强基层医疗卫生服务能力,进一步提高统筹层次,推进公共卫生服务均等化。     

How aware are employees of their benefits? Findings from two companies

This study examines benefit awareness of employees in two companies. Contrary to previous research, the results show that employees are generally accurate in their perceptions of the benefits available to them. However, the results also show a lack of awareness of unemployment insurance and disability insurance as benefits. In addition, employees were somewhat uncertain regarding costs of benefits to employers. These findings suggest that employers should monitor employee awareness of benefits and target communications to specific problem areas.