Art in Africa: Hedonic price analysis of the South African fine art auction market, 2009–2014

Real asset markets are characterized by illiquidity and heterogeneous assets, presenting challenges to price estimators. Use of a new dataset of 7,553 auction fine art lots brought to market in South Africa, for 2009–14, allows us to examine the full sales hedonic price estimator over a wide set of characteristics. Results validate full sale hedonic pricing: Identities of artists, medium and genre, dating characteristics, and physical characteristics of artwork are significant. External validity of hedonic pricing is supported by out-of-sample price prediction for 40 individual artists. Auction house catalogue presentation of art work also proves correlated with realized auction prices. Art as an asset finds support: art prices move countercyclically with GDP and domestic equity markets, pro-cyclically with off-shore equity markets, implying a risk diversification role. JEL Codes: D1, L8. Keywords: hedonic price equation, art market, South Africa Word Count: 9467 (including all Tables, Figures, References).     

Dynamic price dependence of Canadian and international art markets: an empirical analysis

Although the market for Canadian paintings is now of substantial magnitude, with several works having recently been sold for well over a million dollars, it remains true that with very few exceptions, the works of Canadian painters are bought and sold only in Canada and seem to be held only by Canadian collectors. This market can thus be viewed as largely local, and it is therefore not clear whether there should be any linkage between price movements for Canadian art and those for the mainstream international market in old master, impressionist, and modern art. This article investigates the presence and nature of such time series dependence econometrically, both in terms of long-term trends as reflected in the co-integrating relationship between Canadian and the international market, and in terms of short-run co-movements as represented in correlations. The possibility that the local market ??follows?? the international one is also considered through an analysis of Granger causality. For Canadian art prices, we use a new hedonic index that has been computed using an updated version of the dataset of Hodgson and Vorkink (Can J Econ 37:629?C655, 2004), while for the international prices, we use an index provided by Mei and Moses (Am Econ Rev 92:1656?C1668, 2002).     

Has Canadian house price growth been excessive?

The dramatic rise in the ratio of Canada's average house price to average rent has led to speculation that there is a bubble in the Canadian housing market. Others have argued, however, that the currently high level of house prices may be rationalized by the low cost of financing, given the decline in interest rates over the last two decades. In this article, we assess these arguments through the lens of a simple asset pricing model applied to city‐level data. We quantify the extent to which excess growth in Canadian house prices depends on the nature of the current regime governing real interest rates, expectations of rent growth in different cities and variations in property taxes.     

异质信念资产定价研究

从随机游走、行为金融到混沌,从现代资产定价理论、行为资产定价理论到异质信念资产定价理论,3种学说和3种定价理论同时存在干当今资本市场的研究中,它们分别从不同方面、不同视角解释了资产价格的波动。本文的研究理清了3种重要定价理论之间的关系：理性与有限理性,线性与非线性,价格波动的外在机制与内在机制,为人们进一步研究资产定价理论提供了清晰的脉络。     

A nonparametric kernel regression approach for pricing options on stock market index

Previous options studies typically assume that the dynamics of the underlying asset price follow a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) when pricing options on stocks, stock indices, currencies or futures. However, there is mounting empirical evidence that the volatility of asset price or return is far from constant. This article, in contrast to studies that use parametric approach for option pricing, employs nonparametric kernel regression to deal with changing volatility and, accordingly, prices options on stock index. Specifically, we first estimate nonparametrically the volatility of asset return in the GBM based on the Nadaraya–Watson (N–W) kernel estimator. Then, based on the N–W estimates for the volatility, we use Monte Carlo simulation to compute option prices under different settings. Finally, we compare the index option prices under our nonparametric model with those under the Black–Scholes model and the Stein–Stein model.     

Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels

A pay-as-offered or discriminatory price auction (DPA) has been proposed to solve the problem of inflated and volatile wholesale electricity prices. Using the experimental method we compare the DPA with a uniform price auction (UPA), strictly controlling for unilateral market power. We find that a DPA indeed substantially reduces price volatility. However, in a no market power design, prices in a DPA converge to the high prices of a uniform price auction with structural market power. That is, the DPA in a no market power environment is as anti-competitive as a UPA with structurally introduced market power.     

An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.      

Art Auctions and Art Investment in the Golden Age of British Painting

We analyse the evolution of the price of paintings in London auctions with a unique data set of over 200,000 sales in the period 1780–1840. We build a price index for the representative painting through hedonic regressions controlling for the characteristics of auctions and paintings and for the artists’ fixed effects. The emergence of an efficient secondary art market was an important opportunity for portfolio diversification. Estimating a CAPM model for art investment suggests that British paintings could deliver a higher return compared to imported paintings and an attractive source of diversification relative to the contemporary stock market. This contributed to increase the demand for British art and, possibly, to promote the innovations of its Golden Age. While the representative painting of the British school was initially undervalued, new British painters reached foreign prices by the beginning of 1800s.     

Pricing and capacity provision in electricity markets: an experimental study

The creation of adequate investment incentives has been of great concern in the restructuring of the electricity sector. However, to achieve this, regulators have applied different market designs across countries and regions. In this paper we employ laboratory methods to explore the relationship between market design, capacity provision and pricing in electricity markets. Subjects act as firms, choosing their generation capacity and competing in uniform price auction markets. We compare three regulatory designs: (1) a baseline price cap system that restricts scarcity rents, (2) a price spike regime that effectively lifts these restrictions, and (3) a capacity market that directly rewards the provision of capacity. Restricting price spikes leads to underinvestment. In line with the regulatory intention both alternative designs lead to sufficient investment albeit at the cost of higher energy prices during peak periods and substantial capacity payments in the capacity market regime. To some extent these results confirm theoretical expectations. However, we also find lower than predicted spot market prices as sellers compete relatively intensely in capacities and prices, and the capacity markets are less competitive than predicted.     

Two-period trading sentiment asset pricing model with information

We present a dynamic asset pricing model with investor sentiment and information, which shows that the investor sentiment plays a systematic and important role in the asset prices and the information is gradually incorporated into prices. The model has an analytical solution to the sentiment equilibrium price. We find that sentiment trading quantity not only increases the market liquidity, but also causes the asset prices' overreaction if the intensity of sentiment demand is more than a constant value. Therefore, the continuing overreactions result in a short-term momentum and a long-term reversal. The model could offer a partial explanation to some financial anomalies such as price bubbles, high volatility, asset prices' overreaction and so on.     

The Role of Market Sentiment in Asset Allocations and Stock Returns

Abstract

The authors investigate the role of mutual fund flows in incorporating market sentiment into asset prices. They show that retail investors adjust their investments among mutual fund categories in response to changes in market sentiment. Consistent with sentiment-induced price pressure through fund flows, they further find that firms favored by mutual funds, such as large-cap, dividend payers, and firms with high institutional ownership are sensitive to market sentiment. The authors construct a pricing factor representing sentiment risk and find that the sentiment factor is significant in standard asset pricing models and robust to various sorting procedure.     

Efficient ‘myopic’ asset pricing in general equilibrium: A potential pitfall in excess volatility tests

Excess volatility tests for financial market efficiency maintain the hypothesis of risk neutrality. This permits the specification of the benchmark efficient market price as the present discounted value of expected future dividends. By departing from the risk neutrality assumption in a stripped-down version of Lucas's general equilibrium asset pricing model, I show that asset prices determined in a competitive asset market and efficient by construction can nevertheless violate the variance bounds established under the assumption of risk neutrality. This can occur even without the problems of non-stationarity (including bubbles) and finite samples. Standard excess volatility tests are joint tests of market efficiency and risk neutrality. Failure of an asset price to pass the test may be due to the absence of risk neutrality rather than to market inefficiency.     

Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study

We use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects the behaviour of market entrants. Standard economic arguments suggest that the licence fee paid at the auction will not affect pricing since it constitutes a sunk cost. This argument is not uncontested though, and this paper puts it to an experimental test. Our results indicate that an auction of entry licences has a significant positive effect on average prices in oligopoly but not in monopoly. These results are consistent with the conjecture that entry fees induce players to take more risk in pursuit of higher expected profits. In oligopoly, entry fees increase the probability that the market entrants coordinate on a collusive price path. In monopoly, taking more risk does not make sense since average prices are already close to the profit-maximizing price.     

Market behavior in bid,offer, and double auctions: A Reexmination

This study examines the robustness of the previously observed [Smith (1964)] differences in market behavior between double auctions (both buyers and sellers may enter price quotes), bid auctions (only buyers may enter price quotes), and offer auctions (only sellers may enter price quotes). Based on the results of twenty-one market experiments, we find little support for the a priori hypothesis that bid auction prices tend to be greater than double auction prices which tend to be greater than offer auction prices.     

Auctions as coordination devices

This paper develops an economic argument relating auctions to high market prices. At the core of the argument is the claim that market competition and bidding in an auction should be analyzed as part of one game, where the pricing strategies in the market subgame depend on the bidding strategies during the auction. I show that when there are two licenses for sale the only equilibrium in the overall game that is consistent with the logic of forward induction is the one where firms bid an amount (almost) equal to the profits of the cooperative market outcome and follow a cooperative pricing strategy in the market game resulting in high prices. With three or more licenses the auction format co-determines whether or not the forward induction argument works.     

Asymmetric Demand Information in Uniform and Discriminatory Call Auctions: An Experimental Analysis Motivated by Electricity Markets

We study experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty, motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two auction institutions. In our treatment condition some sellers have less information than in our baseline conditions. In both conditions transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, under asymmetric information discriminatory auctions are significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower prices and less volatility.     

Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction

One of the main elements of the recent reform of electricity trading in the United Kingdom is the change from a uniform price auction in the wholesale market to discriminatory pricing. We analyze this change under two polar market structures (perfectly competitive and monopolistic supply), with demand uncertainty. We find that under perfect competition there is a trade-off between efficiency and consumer surplus between the two auction rules. We also establish that a move from uniform to discriminatory pricing under monopoly conditions has a negative impact on profits and output (weakly), a positive impact on consumer surplus, and ambiguous implications for welfare and average prices.     

The unsupportable support price: an analysis of collusion and government intervention in paddy auction markets in North India

This paper uses auction theory, incorporating buyer asymmetry, to analyse the structure of a small market for parmal paddy in North India and to assess the implications of alternative government policies. Our results suggest that two buyers collude in this market; we are able to quantify the extent to which prices are depressed as a consequence. Such collusion probably characterizes many small grain markets in India. Government intervention in grain markets in India is pervasive, and has in recent years led to its acquiring excessive food stocks and an unwillingness to enforce the support price. Using simulations, we demonstrate that while reducing the support price for paddy may not have the desired effect of reducing government purchases, a decrease in the percentage that millers are required to sell as levy to the government will.     

Financial Returns and Price Determinants in the Australian Art Market, 1973–2003*

In this study, 37 605 paintings by 60 well-known Australian artists sold at auction over the period 1973–2003 are used to construct a hedonic price index. The attributes included in the hedonic regression model include the name and living status of the artist, the size and medium of the painting and the auction house and year in which the painting was sold. The resulting index indicates that returns on Australian fine-art averaged 7 per cent over the period with a standard deviation of 16 per cent. The hedonic regression model also captures the willingness to pay for perceived attributes in the artwork, and this shows that works by McCubbin, Gascoigne, Thomas and Preston and other artists deceased at the time of auction, works executed in oils or acrylic, and those auctioned by Sotheby's or Christie's are associated with higher prices.     

Information Markets and the Comovement of Asset Prices

Traditional asset pricing models predict that covariance between prices of different assets should be lower than what we observe in the data. This paper introduces markets for information that generate high price covariance within a rational expectations framework. When information is costly, rational investors only buy information about a subset of the assets. Because information production has high fixed costs, competitive producers charge more for low-demand information than for high-demand information. The low price of high-demand information makes investors want to purchase the same information that others are purchasing. When investors price assets using a common subset of information, news about one asset affects the other assets' prices; asset prices comove. The cross-sectional and time-series properties of comovement are consistent with this explanation.