试论政府采购领域中商业贿赂的表现形式及对策

本文主要提出政府采购领域商业贿赂的表现形式,分析其存在的原因,并进一步提出相应的对策。     

试论商业贿赂的财务表现形式、资金来源和承载平台

所谓商业贿赂是指经营者以排斥竞争对手为目的,为使自己在销售、购买商品或提供服务等业务活动中获得利益,而采取在交易之外以回扣、促销费、宣传费、劳务费、报销各种费用、提供境内外旅游等各种名义,直接或间接向交易相对人及其代理人提供某种利益,从而实现交易的不正当竞争行为.     

政府采购中反商业贿赂的前提

治理政府采购领域商业贿赂必须依靠科学、合理有效的制度，根据马克思主义的基本哲学观点，科学合理的制度规则必须是根据客观规律制定的，必须是客观规律的反映，所以建立治理政府采购领域商业贿赂的制度，必须要正确解读政府采购活动的规律，把握政府采购领域商业贿赂的规律是反政府采购领域商业贿赂的重要前提。     

医药购销领域商业贿赂的现状与治理对策

从调查的情况来看,医药购销活动中的商业贿赂行为具体体现在产、销、医三个环节：     

试论反商业贿赂的法律对策

在中国，商业贿赂作为一种“潜规则”，长期游离于执法部门的视野之外，严重危害国家的政治肌体、经济肌体，已引起党中央、国务院的高度重视，“要认真开展治理商业贿赂专项工作，坚决纠正不正当交易行为，依法查处商业贿赂案件”。因而，正确分析商业贿赂的法律构成要件，正视目前国内反商业贿赂的立法状况，结合国外成功立法经验，提出治理商业贿赂的法律对策是非常必要的。     

经济学视角下商业贿赂成因及治理探析

笔者基于经济学视角对商业贿赂盛行的原因进行剖析,构建了相应的博弈决策模型,并针对模型进行分析:一方面利用经济学中成本收益理论构建了行贿主体行为决策博弈模型和受贿主体行为决策博弈模型;另一方面,将经济学中寻租理论引入到商业贿赂成因和治理的探析中,从而提出治理商业贿赂的有效路径以及相对应的可以采取的对策.     

中国如何反商业贿赂?

6月15日，中国公安部在北京召开全国公安机关打击商业贿赂犯罪专项工作电视电话会议，中国掀起打击商业贿赂犯罪的一个高潮。     

高校商业贿赂成因探究

近年来,高校经济犯罪呈上升趋势.商业贿赂事件也尤为突出.本文试图从权力架构、法律供给和文化影响等层面,对高校商业贿赂成因进行解读,为今后的预防和治理提供多种可能的路径.     

浅析商业贿赂的特点与对策思考

在商业活动十分繁荣的现代社会,随着市场化进程加快,竞争日益激烈,商业贿赂在一些行业和领域滋生蔓延,这已成为商业交易活动中的一个突出问题,关于商业贿赂特点、对策思考、监督方式等操作性问题尚缺乏探讨.本文尝试就此发表自己的看法,以期时理论研究和司法实务能有所裨益.     

预防重大工程建设领域商业贿赂的思考

近年来,在政府重大工程建设中,暴露出一些问题,尤其是商业贿赂案件增多,需引起政府及相关部门的高度重视,并积极预防和解决。 一、重大工程建设领域中存在的主要问题 1．招投标环节不严密。重大工程建设采用招投标方法,能有效防止因国有投资主体或某些主要领导指定特定施工单位而出现的商业贿赂问题,但由于招投标实施过程不够严密,漏洞较多,致使有些人从中钻空子,甚至有的搞虚假招标,外招内定;     

政府采购专家资源的整合与管理

现行政府采购制度引进专家评审机制,实现了政府经济支出行为的程序化和规范化。政府采购评审专家代表政府依法行使采购项目评审权利,对政府采购专家资源进行有效整合与管理成为政府采购活动中关键的一环。本文分析了我国政府采购专家资源的现状及存在问题,提出了组建专家库的方法和评审专家在项目前、中、后期的合理应用,并给出专家的考核管理办法。     

Avoiding commercial piracy

In this paper we analyse the roles of the government and an incumbent in preventing the entry of a pirate, who tries to avoid being caught. The framework of analysis used is a sequential duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with price competition. We find that both the government and the incumbent have key roles in preventing the entry of pirates. We show that the government will not help the incumbent to become a pure monopolist, even if it installs an antipiracy system. It will let the pirate enter either as a follower or a leader, or encourage the incumbent to set a low enough price to successfully deter the pirate from entering the market, depending on its technology for monitoring commercial piracy. Finally, we find that the pirate decides to become a leader to avoid being caught by the incumbent and the government.     

Competition in the economic crisis: Analysis of procurement auctions

We study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms׳ bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions. Using data from Austrian construction procurements, we estimate bidders׳ construction costs within a private value auction model. We find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1.5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis, markups of winning bids decrease by 3.3 percentage points. We also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger. These two pieces of evidence point to pro-cyclical markups.     

Pre-commercial procurement,procurement of innovative solutions and innovation partnerships in the EU: rationale and strategy

We discuss public procurement instruments for acquiring innovation, focusing on the European Pre-commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships. We analyse, in particular, how firms’ innovation incentives are affected by: (i) economies of scope and externalities between R&D and large-scale production; (ii) the degree of specificity of the innovation; (iii) the presence of Small and Medium Enterprises in the market and the level of market competition; (iv) the risk of market foreclosure and supplier lock-in. Our study contributes to the literature on incentives in demand-side innovation policy by tapping into the contractual design features and by offering relevant implications for academics and policy-makers.     

Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement

We consider a model of cost-based procurement in which the principal faces Knightian uncertainty about the agent's preferences for cost reduction. We show that a particularly simple incentive scheme—a menu comprising a fixed-price contract and a cost-reimbursement contract—minimizes the maximum expected payment, where this maximum is taken over the set of possible agent preferences. For some parameters of the problem, a range of alternative incentive schemes also satisfy this criterion. We show that the simple incentive scheme is not weakly dominated by any of the alternatives: there does not exist an alternative mechanism for which the expected payment is no higher for all realizations of the agent's preferences and strictly lower for some realization.     

Peaking of fiscal sizes of government

Transfers, spending, and tax revenue peaked as percentages of the gross national product (GNP) in most OECD countries during 1972–1992. The evidence suggests that a number of countries pushed transfers close to or perhaps beyond sustainable limits imposed by the Laffer curve. Namely: (i) stylized calculations of Laffer limits suggest peak fiscal sizes in the range of observed peaks in the countries with the greatest peak sizes; and (ii) the countries with the greatest peak sizes had the greatest declines in fiscal sizes from peaks until 1992.     

The law of small numbers: investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

A commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts. However, restricted auctions are frequently used among EU member states to procure small contracts. In this article, we investigate this paradox. Using an original data set of 180 contracts used by a local public buyer of social housing between 2006 and 2009, we show that limiting competition may enable economies to be made on transaction costs while the most efficient bidders still come forward, and that abuses such as corruption or favouritism do not result. To our knowledge, this article is the first to shed light on the advantages of using restricted auctions when tendering small simple contracts.     

A positive theory of government debt

A government that cannot commit to future policy choices faces a trade-off that explains the level of debt. On the one hand, there is an incentive to increase debt and delay taxation, so as to reduce current distortions. On the other hand, inflating current prices lowers the real value of nominal debt and so there is a motive to reduce it now. The size of long-run debt will depend on the interaction of these two opposing incentives. The critical determinant is the willingness of households to substitute away from goods being taxed by inflation. Numerical simulations show that the model matches some qualitative and quantitative properties of U.S. policy variables, including the fact that wars are frequently financed with a mix of instruments. The theory interprets the unusual post-World War II inflation and fast liquidation of accumulated debt as being due to higher long-run debt and expenditure in the period leading up to the war.     

The (in) effectiveness of procurement auctions in the public sector

This article studies procurement auctions in the public sector using game theoretical tools. The article shows that when participants in an auction are agents with low abilities (low type), as is common in the public sector, they place the same contract request. As a result, the auction mechanism will rarely produce real competition, thus making this mechanism, which limits bidders to those already within the system, ineffective for use in the public sector job market.     

Determinants of adaptation costs in procurement: an empirical estimation on Italian public works contracts

It is widely agreed that rules governing public procurement should be designed to achieve value for money. However, in the public works sector, ‘…?the good being procured is usually complex and hard to be exactly specified ex ante, …?[and] alterations to the original project might be needed after the contract is awarded. This may result in considerable discrepancies between the lowest winning bid and the actual costs that are incurred by the buyer’ (Bajari et al., 2006). There is now a wide body of literature focusing on cost escalation during the execution of contracts and their estimates reveal that it can be often quite large. This article is aimed at offering an empirical test of the determinants of adaptation costs in the public works procurement. Using a detailed data set on Italian public works contracts, we run an empirical analysis, grounded on the main conclusions reached in the literature, to test for the main drivers of adaptation costs.