企业人力资本投资风险研究

企业作为以盈利为目的的组织形态,在知识经济与市场经济有效结合的情况下,如何在技术水平发展的同时增加企业人力资本存量,获得高效人力资本投资收益对企业的发展至关重要,而当前企业对人力资本的盲目投资也给不少企业造成了一定的损失,所以,企业如何在进行人力资本投资的过程中有效的规避风险,将会帮助企业获得更高的收益,进而形成科学、健康的发展。     

企业人力资本投资风险初探

知识经济时代,知识和技术成为社会发展的重要力量,人力资本随之成为重要的战略资源。因此,深入研究如何识别和有效防范人力资本投资风险对企业具有重大的现实意义。本文在对企业人力资本投资风险综合分析的基础上,对于如何有效的控制人力资本投资风险进行了初步的研究,并提出了一些应对措施,为其他企业提供可借鉴之处。     

企业人力资本投资风险规避对策分析

人力资本投资风险问题是人力资本投资理论的重要内容和前沿研究领域之一.本文通过对企业人力资本投资存在的风险隐患进行分析并在此基础上对规避人力资本投资风险提出了相关政策建议.     

企业人力资本投资风险规避对策分析

人力资本投资风险问题是人力资本投资理论的重要内容和前沿研究领域之一。本文通过对企业人力资本投资存在的风险隐患进行分析并在此基础上对规避人力资本投资风险提出了相关政策建议。     

企业人力资本投资风险防范

企业获得人力资本最主要的途径就是进行人力资本投资。但任何投资都有风险,人力资本投资也不例外。提高人力资本投资的成功率,防范人力资本投资风险已成为是企业人力资源管理的一项重要目标。通过对人力资本投资风险的分析,提出了防范企业人力资本投资风险几点措施,对于经济全球化形势下正在成长的我国企业来讲具有广泛的现实意义。     

浅析企业人力资本投资风险的防范

在市场经济高速发展的同时，企业的管理者逐渐意识到人力资本是重要的资源，培养和开发优秀的人才，将会给企业带来巨大的经济效益。人力资本投资在企业人力资源管理中的地位将越来越重要，需要管理者从经济学的视角，根据人力资本的特点充分的分析和了解人力资本投资的经济实效性。由于人力资本投资的不确定性和长期性，使人力资本投资的风险较大，本文提出了相关防范建议。     

浅析企业人力资本投资风险的防范

人力资本投资在企业人力资源管理中的地位越来越重要，管理者开始用经济学的视角，根据人力资本的特点分析和了解人力资本投资的经济实效性由于人力资本投资的不确定性和长期性使得人力资本投资的风险较大，基于此，本文提出若干防范措施，以期企业取得更好的投资回报率     

企业人力资本投资研究

随着人力资源管理在我国的发展与完善,国内的企业家越来越重视对人力资本的投资,人力资本投资已经成为企业人力资源管理的重要组成部分。人力资本投资的成败直接关系到企业的可持续发展。人力资本具有能动性、不可转让性、社会性等区别于其他投资的特性,以及企业与员工自主性的影响,导致人力资本投资存在较大的风险。本文从各类型企业人力资本投资现状出发,分析企业人力投资风险的内在原因和外在来源,总结现今人力资本投资风险所带来的影响,并有针对性地提出防范、规避风险的有效对策。     

浅谈人力资本投资风险

人力资本投资具有不同于物质资本投资的特殊性，研究根据投资主体与客体的一致性与否分析了其可能的风险类型，从投资本身、人为因素、文化因素角度探讨了风险成因。可以采取人员素质测评、投资成本收益分析、信息服务、薪酬制度及加强道德建设的措施对可分散风险进行防范。     

企业人力资本投资风险防范分析

在知识经济时代,企业的管理者开始意识到对人力资本投资在现代人力资源管理中的地位越来越重要,管理者开始利用经济学的视角,本文根据人力资本的特点分析人力资本投资的风险,并针对这些风险,提出企业防范风险的措施,从而提高企业人力资本投资的回报.     

技工短缺的企业人力资本投资及其风险分析

技工短缺近年来成为困扰我国制造业发展的“瓶颈”，对技工的人力资本投资不足是造成技工短缺的关键原因。现代社会知识更新换代快，对工人进行不断的甚至是终身的培训是必不可少的，一个人更多的技能是在工作岗位上学到的。因此，企业的在职培训尤为重要。然而，南于我国企业重视在职培训的力度不够，造成了企业真正需要的技能人才供给不足的现象。目前我国企业职工教育经费投入占职工工资总额的比例约为1．4％，未达到国家规定的最低比例1．5％。造成这种     

The complementarity of human capital and language capital in foreign direct investment

Integrating the literature on language-MNEs (multinational enterprises) in international business and economic theory of human capital (HC), we establish an analytical framework to systematically examine how HC and language capital (LC) jointly determine foreign direct investment (FDI). We contend that the extent to which MNEs can leverage HC in a host country for FDI depends on LC. Based on an extensive bilateral dataset covering 3315 country pairs during 1995–2008, we reveal clear evidence on the moderating role played by LC in HC-FDI relationship and such evidence is robust to different measures used for different variables, the inclusion of more control variables and different samples.     

社会资本对农村家庭人力资本投资行为影响的实证分析

基于苏北农村的抽样调查,本文在控制了苏北农村家庭的年收入、未婚子女数量等变量之后,利用Eviews6.0的多元线性回归分析,考察了苏北农村家庭的社会资本对其人力资本投资状况的影响作用.研究发现,苏北农村家庭的社会资本对其人力资本投资具有不可忽略的作用,但并不具有非常积极的作用,具体表现为:家庭结构社会资本时家庭人力资本投资具有一定的促进作用,但作用的力度并不理想;而家庭认知社会资本与家庭人力资本投资却具有反向作用.     

对外投资的财务风险管理与资本成本决策探析

从对外投资所承担的任务和目标来看,其财务风险管理较之一般产业公司的财务风险管理更重要也更具有挑战性.一个公司的资本成本应该是一种包含各种动态变化因素在内的综合成本.在很大程度上,资本成本决定着公司的一项重大资本投资决策是否正确.如果一项投资能够收回资本成本,那么对财产、设备,或另一家公司的投资决策就是明智的.     

浅析我国民营企业人力资本开发

人力资本是一个企业发展的“引擎”,但是从民营企业人力资本开发的现状来看,很显然人力资本这个“引擎”没有得到很好的开发。本文从人力资本的特性这个角度,探讨了民营企业人力资本开发的对策。     

The composition of international capital flows: risk sharing through foreign direct investment

Evidence on international capital flows suggests that foreign direct investment (FDI) is less volatile than other financial flows. To explain this finding I model international capital flows under the assumptions of imperfect enforcement of financial contracts and inalienability of FDI. Imperfect enforcement of contracts leads to endogenous financing constraints and the pricing of default risk. Inalienability implies that it is not as advantageous to expropriate FDI relative to other flows. These features combine to give a risk sharing advantage to FDI over other capital flows. This risk sharing advantage of FDI translates into a lower default premium and lower sensitivity to changes in a country’s financing constraint.The model offers the new implication that financially constrained countries should borrow relatively more through FDI. This is because FDI is harder to expropriate and not because FDI is more productive or less volatile. Using several creditworthiness and country risk ratings to measure financing constraints, I present new evidence linking FDI and financing constraints. Moreover, numerical simulations of the model generate stronger serial correlation for FDI than for other flows into developing countries. This corroborates the view that non-FDI flows are more short-term and more likely to change direction.     

关于设立外资商业企业问答

1、目前可否设立外资商业企业?根据《外商投资商业领域管理办法》．取消了不允许设立外商独资商业企业的限制．从2004年12月11日起．允许设立外资商业企业。     

广东人力资本投资与经济增长关系的实证分析

本文从实证的角度分析了人力资本投资对广东经济增长的影响,认为广东经济增长方式目前仍是物质资本拉动型,而不是人力资本拉动型.据此提出加强广东人力资本投资促进经济增长的对策.     

Accounting for quality differences in human capital and foreign direct investment

This paper empirically investigates how cross-country differences in the quality of human capital, as they are captured by the conventional measures of international test score differences, influences the patterns of foreign direct investment. Using panel data covering 32 countries during the period between 1985 and 2004, this paper finds that a host country's quality of educational attainment plays an independent role in attracting foreign direct investment. In particular, the quality of human capital influences horizontal foreign direct investment, even after accounting for the roles of skill and factor endowments, trade costs, investment costs, and country-size and income effects.     

The structure of the investment networks of venture capital firms

Venture capital firms are linked together in a network by their joint investments in portfolio companies. Through connections in that network, they exchange resources with one another. The most important of those resources are the opportunity to invest in a portfolio company (good investment prospects are always scarce), the spreading of financial risk, and the sharing of knowledge. All venture capitalists operate in very uncertain environments, none more so than the one confronting high innovative venture capitalists, HIVCs,¹ that specialize in investing in high innovative technology companies. The most uncertain of all their investments is a high-technology start-up with nothing more than a product in the head of the founder. There is uncertainty about the talent of the entrepreneur, the market need for the product, the development of a saleable product, the raising of second-round financing for working capital and expansion; the manufacturing of the product, competitors' responses, and government policies such as capital gains tax and ERISA rules, to name some of the major components. It is a formidable list. Indeed, it is hard to name a segment of any other industry that bears more uncertainty than HIVCs.A venture capital firm copes with uncertainty by gathering information. This research shows that the amount of coinvesting by a firm depends on the degree of uncertainty it faces. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the degree of coinvesting.By examining how venture capital firms were connected by their joint investments, it was found that the top 21 HIVCs comprise a tightly coupled network. And of that group, none is more tightly bound than the nine HIVCs located in California. In contrast, the group of top 21 firms that invest mainly in low innovative technology companies, LIVCs, is more loosely bound. HIVCs are more tightly bound together because they shoulder more uncertainty and therefore have a greater need to share information with one another.The practical implications of this study are as follows: Venture Capitalists. It is vital to be well-connected to other venture capital firms. They are important sources of information and investment opportunities. For HIVCs, the California group is central in the network, so links to them are valuable. Communications in a tightly coupled system are swift, so it is likely that information is disseminated very quickly among members of the group. It probably facilitates the setting of a market rate for venture capital. A disadvantage of a tightly bound system is that information flowing among the members has a redundancy and sameness about it, so to ensure a supply of fresh information, members should have as many links as possible to other organizations and individuals besides venture capitalists. Entrepreneurs. When entrepreneurs submit a proposal for funding to venture capital firms, they can assume that news will spread fast to other firms. Thus, they should not use a bird-shot approach; rather, they should select their targets with rifle precision. The proposal should be submitted to a few firms that are known to specialize in the type of product or service that the entrepreneur is planning to make. Entrepreneurs should be concerned about more than the price of the deal. When the top 61 firms invest in a portfolio company, they bring information, contacts, and “deep pockets” to the companies in which they invest. Those factors are significant in nurturing a growing company. Policy Makers. The networks of HIVCs and UVCs are quite different. The HIVCs cluster around oases of high-technology entrepreneurship in the northeast and California, whereas the LIVCs are more evenly spread throughout the U.S.A. HIVCs are located almost exclusively in the so-called “bi-coastal regions of prosperity.”This study found cliques among the venture capital firms. But it found no evidence that the top 61 firms exclude other venture capital firms from their coinvestments of first-rounds of capital. More research is needed before conclusions can be drawn about the power and influence of the top firms. Researchers. In a recent article, Granovetter (1985) suggests that if we are to explain economic behavior, we must understand the networks in which transactions are embedded. This research shows that the networks formed by the syndicated coinvestments of venture capital firms may help us to explain their behavior. A general model for coinvestment networks that is developed in this article is applicable to analysis of syndicated coinvestments not only of venture capital firms, but of investors and lenders in general.