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1.
Prabal Ray Chaudhuri 《Economic Theory》1997,10(2):335-360
Summary. We consider a generalized assignment model where the payoffs depend on the number of matchings that take place. We formulate
a simple non-cooperative game and look for subgame perfect equilibrium of this model. Existence is established for a wide
class of games. We also look at a refinement criterion which, for the standard assignment model, selects the -optimal outcome as the unique equilibrium. We then apply these concepts to a model of technology transfer between domestic
and foreign firms.
Received: June 24, 1994; revised version October 12, 1995 相似文献
2.
In-Uck Park 《Economic Theory》1998,11(2):413-426
Summary. In a novel formulation of revealed preference analysis, Green and Osband [8] show that for expected-utility maximizers, acts
partition the state-simplex into linear polyhedral blocks. The question naturally arises whether this characterization distinguishes
expected utility theory from non-expected utility theories. This paper investigates the weighted utility theory of Chew [2]
and shows that the corresponding partition is systematically different from the expected utility theory: the boundaries of
the partition blocks are quadratic rather than linear. This result contains useful empirical contents.
Received: May 15, 1995; revised version: November 22, 1996 相似文献
3.
Summary. We show that when bankruptcy, subject to penalties, is allowed, it is possible to prove the existence of equilibrium in a model with a continuum of states without imposing any assumptions on ex-post endowments.Received: November 20, 1995; revised version: September 16, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
4.
Axiomatic characterizations of the Choquet integral 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. The Choquet integral is an integral part of recent advances in decision theory involving non-additive measures. In this article
we present two new axiomatic characterizations of this functional.
Received: January 27, 1997; revised version: April 28, 1997 相似文献
5.
Paulo Klinger Monteiro 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):221-227
Summary. In this paper I prove that a quasiconcave separable utility function defined on an atomless space is concave.
Received: August 11, 1997; revised version: October 2, 1997 相似文献
6.
Julio Dávila 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):213-223
Summary. It is shown in this note that in an incomplete markets economy with uncountably many states of the world there may be uncountably
many isolated equilibria as well as uncountably many non-isolated equilibria. Moreover, both subsets can be simultaneously
of second category. Therefore, none of the subsets can be considered negligible with respect to the other, neither from a
cardinality point of view nor from a topological one. Unfortunately, this fact prevents from claiming that these economies
may have “typically” determinate equilibria – even though uncountably many of them – as would have been desirable for comparative
statics exercises.
Received: May 19, 1995; revised version: March 24, 1997 相似文献
7.
Summary. We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents,
maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by
optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.
Received: October 23, 1995; revised version: June 25, 1997 相似文献
8.
Summary. In the social learning model of Banerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] individuals take actions sequentially
after observing the history of actions taken by the predecessors and an informative private signal. If the state of the world
is changing stochastically over time during the learning process, only temporary informational cascades – situations where
socially valuable information is wasted – can arise. Furthermore, no cascade ever arises when the environment changes in a
sufficiently unpredictable way.
Received: December 5, 1996; revised version: February 11, 1997 相似文献
9.
Summary. This article characterizes all of the continuous social welfare orderings which satisfy the Weak (resp. Strong) Pareto principle
when utilities are ratio-scale measurable. With Weak Pareto, on both the nonnegative and positive orthants the social welfare
ordering must be representable by a weakly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function while on the whole Euclidean space
the social welfare ordering must be strongly dictatorial. With Strong Pareto, on the positive orthant the social welfare ordering
must be representable by a strictly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function but on the other two domains an impossibility
theorem is obtained.
Received: July 31, 1995; revised version August 7, 1996 相似文献
10.
Leonidas C. Koutsougeras 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):563-584
Summary. We introduce a new core concept, called the two-stage core, which is appropriate for economies with sequential trade. We
prove a general existence theorem and present two applications of the two-stage core: (i) In asset markets economies where
we extend our existence proof to the case of consumption sets with no lower bound, in order to capture the case of arbitrary
short sales of assets. Further, we show that the two-stage core is non empty in the Hart (1975) example where a rational expectations
equilibrium fails to exist. (ii) In differential information economies where we provide sufficient conditions for the incentive
compatibility of trades. Namely, that no coalition of agents can misreport the true state and provide improvements to all
its members, even by redistributing the benefits from misreporting.
Received: December 20, 1995; revised version: December 6, 1996 相似文献
11.
Rafael Tenorio 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):247-260
Summary. I study a multiple unit auction where symmetric risk-neutral bidders choose prices and quantities endogenously. In the model,
bidders (a) may place non-linear valuations on the auctioned units, and (b) bid for several units at the same price (“lumpy”
bids). I characterize quantity-symmetric and strictly monotone-increasing price equilibria for discriminatory and competitive
auctions, and show that (i) if quantity strategy profiles are equal across auctions revenue- equivalence holds, (ii) expected
revenue is higher if bidders bid for the entire supply rather than for shares of it, and (iii) equilibrium allocations may
fail to be Pareto-optimal.
Received: April 14, 1995; revised version: September 3, 1997 相似文献
12.
Shouyong Shi 《Economic Theory》1997,10(1):99-133
Summary. This paper examines the relationship between specialization and the use of money in two versions of the search-theoretic
monetary model. The first version establishes a surprising result that specialization is more likely to occur in a barter
economy than in a monetary economy. The result is reversed in the second version where a different specification of preferences
is adopted to limit the scope of barter. This contrast between the results provides a concrete illustration of the general
argument that money encourages specialization only when it enlarges the extent of the market.
Received: January 31, 1995; revised version August 12, 1996 相似文献
13.
Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Summary. This paper studies the impact of uncertain demand on firms’ capacity decisions when they operate in an oligopolistic environment.
We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of Nature is going to
realize, and output levels in the second, knowing which state is realized. We prove the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium at which firms are in excess capacity compared with the capacity they would choose in the Cournot certainty equivalent
game.
Received: May 17, 1996; revised version July 31, 1996 相似文献
14.
Recursive utility and preferences for information 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Costis Skiadas 《Economic Theory》1998,12(2):293-312
Summary. This paper presents an axiomatic foundation for recursive utility that captures the role of the timing of resolution of uncertainty
without relying on exogenously specified objective beliefs. Two main representation results are proved. In the first one,
future utility enters the recursion through the type of general aggregators considered in Skiadas (1997a), and as a result
the formulation is purely ordinal and free of any probabilities. In the second representation these aggregators are conditional
expectations relative to subjective beliefs. A new recursive representation incorporating disappointment aversion is also
suggested. The main methodological innovation of the paper derives from the fact that the basic objects of choice are taken
to be pairs of state-contingent consumption plans and information filtrations, rather than the temporal (objective) lotteries
of the existing literature. It is shown that this approach has the additional benefit of being directly applicable to the
continuous-time version of recursive utility developed by Duffie and Epstein (1992).
Received: February 18, 1997; revised version: July 18, 1997 相似文献
15.
Ning Sun 《Economic Theory》1999,13(3):735-742
Summary. This note introduces a new concept of core –open core, using which it shows a quasi-equilibrium existence result in an economy where consumers' preference relations are assumed
to be lower semi-continuous, but not necessarily to have open lower sections nor to be open valued, such as the lexicographic
ordering. As an application, a competitive equilibrium existence result without non-satiation assumption is proved.
Received: October 28, 1996; revised version: November 4, 1997 相似文献
16.
P. Jean-Jacques Herings 《Economic Theory》1997,10(2):361-367
Summary. An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S Theorem is given involving only Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and some elementary
calculus. A function is explicitly given such that a fixed point of it yields an intersection point of a balanced collection
of sets together with balancing weights. Moreover, any intersection point of a balanced collection of sets together with balancing
weights corresponds to a fixed point of the function. Furthermore, the proof can be used to show -balanced versions of the K-K-M-S Theorem, with -balancedness as introduced in Billera (1970). The proof makes clear that the conditions made with respect to by Billera can be even weakened.
Received: January 22, 1996; revised version June 9, 1996 相似文献
17.
Ashvin Varada Rajan 《Economic Theory》1997,10(2):373-379
Summary. We present a unified mathematical framework within which, among others, pure exchange economies with a finite set of agents,
as well as those with a continuum of traders may be studied simultaneously. We prove that the reasoning presented by Balasko
(1975) on the equilibrium set for finite economies generalizes very naturally to our setting. His results may therefore be
recovered as a special case of those presented in this note.
Received: April 9, 1996; revised version August 19, 1996 相似文献
18.
Carmen Herrero 《Spanish Economic Review》2002,4(1):19-40
We face the problem of allocationg a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked
preferences. We survey the three different cases studied in the literature: the pure distribution case, the redistribution
case, and the gerneral case. The so called general case provide with a natural framework to analyze the idea of path-independence. In this framework, we explore the existence of
rules fulfilling this property. Our first result is negative: a strong version of this property cannot be fulfilled together
with efficiency. Nonetheless, some restricted versions of the path-independence property are compatible with interesting properties,
in particular no manipulability, and no envy. We then identify two solutions satisfying this sort of property: the equal distance
rule, and a new extension of the uniform rule. 相似文献
19.
Summary. Consumption fluctuations in a simple 2-D addiction model are investigated. The behavioural equations of the model are suggested
by a related ‘rational addiction’ model of Becker and Murphy [2]. Our model generates erratic, seemingly unpredictable consumption
patterns of the addicted persons. The occurence of chaos is proven by locating a so called horseshoe map in the phase space.
Received: April 4, 1994; revised version March 25, 1996 相似文献
20.
Summary. In this paper the alternating offer model with an exogenous risk of breakdown is taken to explicitly model the bargaining process underlying the variable threat game (Nash, Econometrica, 1953). A modified version of the variable threat game without commitment is also analysed within a dynamic context. The limit set of subgame perfect equilibria is characterized in both dynamic versions. The analysis gives rise to different results than in the two standard models. By making additional assumptions the original results can be regained, indicating that these are implicitly present in the standard analysis.Received: August 29, 1995; revised version: November 11, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献