Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Regulation

The recent crisis has brought to the fore the cyclical properties of banking regulation. Countercyclical buffers and enhanced capital requirements meant to stabilize banks’ balance sheets across the cycle are not costless, and a delicate balance needs to be reached between providing incentives to generate value and discouraging excessive risk taking. The paper develops a model in which, in contrast with Modigliani–Miller, outside equity and capital requirements matter. It analyses banking regulation in the presence of macroeconomic shocks and studies the desirability of self‐insurance mechanisms such as countercyclical capital buffers or dynamic provisioning, as well as “macro‐hedges” such as CoCos and capital insurance.     

Capital changes at large affiliated banks

The federal bank regulators imposed numerical capital guidelines in December 1981. If these guidelines are binding, then banking organizations may respond to the costs of regulation in various ways. If the regulations are not binding, then further reliance may be placed on market discipline. This study develops two models of changes in the equity capital to assets ratio of large banks affiliated with bank holding companies—a regulatory model in which capital regulations are a binding influence and a market model in which financial markets influence capital ratios. The two models are examined empirically through a disequilibrium framework and maximum likelihood estimation techniques. The results suggest that most banks are predominantly influenced by regulatory forces. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Florida State University     

Banking industry volatility and banking crises

While studies using balance sheet information of banks and macroeconomic indicators to forecast banking crises are prolific, empirical research using market information of banks is relatively sparse. We investigate whether banking industry volatility, constructed with the disaggregated approach from Campbell et al. [Campbell, J.Y., Lettau, M., Malkiel, B.G., Xu, Y., 2001. Have individual stocks become more volatile? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk? The Journal of Finance 56, 1–43] using exclusively publicly available market information of banks, is a good predictor of systemic banking crises in the analyses including data from 18 developed and 18 emerging markets. We find that banking industry volatility performs well in predicting systemic banking crises for developed markets but very poor for emerging markets, which suggest that the impact of market forces on the soundness of the banking system might be different for developed and emerging markets. We also find that those macroeconomic and banking risk management indicators have different impact on the probability of banking crises. Therefore, the traditional cross-country results of the studies on banking crises need to be interpreted cautiously.     

Loan-loss experience and risk-taking behavior at large commercial banks

Net loan chargeoffs and nonperforming loans reflect realized credit risks for banks. These risks arise from either external factors such as depressed economic conditions (e.g., the energy and farm belts of the United States in the 1980s) or internal factors such as poor lending decisions (including fraudulent ones) or both. For large commercial banks in 1987, we find that almost 94 percent of the variation in loss rates within regions was due to banks having different loss rates on the same types of loans. Our regression results indicate that loan-loss rates in 1987 were positively associated with loan rates, volatile funds, and loan volume from the preceding three years. In contrast, banks with adequate capital in the preceding three years tended to have lower loss rates.     

The financial distress pricing puzzle in banking firms

This paper examines whether the financial distress pricing puzzle observed for non-financial firms is also observed for financial firms and how this puzzle differs according to the extent of short-sale constraints. By using the eight distress measures developed for financial firms, we find that there is a strong negative relation in the cross-section between financial distress and subsequent bank stock returns, regardless of adjustment for risk. However, this distress pricing puzzle is statistically significant only for high short-sale constrained banks, but not for low short-sale constrained banks. Thus, short-sale constraints are at least one non-risk attribute that causes the distress pricing puzzle for financial firms. We also find that despite its simple form, compared to the other complex distress measures, non-performing loans (NPLs) are the most informative in predicting future bank stock returns as well as bankruptcy and failure.     

Asset prices and banking distress: A macroeconomic approach

This paper links banking with asset prices in a dynamic macroeconomic model, to provide a simple characterization of financial instability. In contrast with historical bank runs, recent banking crises were driven by deteriorating bank assets. Hence, in contrast with bank run models, this paper focuses on the interaction of falling asset prices, bank losses, credit contraction and bankruptcies. This interaction can explain credit crunches, financial instability, and banking crises, either as fundamental or as self-fulfilling outcomes. The model distinguishes between macroeconomic and financial stability. Its simplicity helps understand balance sheet effects and delivers closed-form solutions without resorting to linearization. For instance, the critical threshold beyond which an asset price decline triggers financial instability can be related explicitly to the structural parameters of the economy.     

Credit to government and banking sector performance

The impact of credit to government on three aspects of banking sector performance – its deepening over time, profitability, and efficiency – is examined for 142 countries. Country regressions suggest a sizeable negative effect of credit to government on bank deepening in developing countries, but no impact in advanced economies. Bank regressions find that credit to government raises the profitability but reduces the efficiency of banks in developing countries; in advanced economies, there appears to be no impact on profitability but a positive one on efficiency.     

The determinants of reputational risk in the banking sector

What determines reputational loss following operational losses in banking? The purpose of this paper is to empirically address this question. We estimate the reputational risk for a large sample of banks in Europe and the US between 2003 and 2008. We have two main results. First, we provide evidence that there is the probability that reputational damage increases as profits and size increase. Second, we show that a higher level of capital invested and intangible assets reduce the probability of reputational damage.     

The paradoxes of risk management in the banking sector

This paper uses empirical evidence to examine the operational dynamics and paradoxical nature of risk management systems in the banking sector. It demonstrates how a core paradox of market versus regulatory demands and an accompanying variety of performance, learning and belonging paradoxes underlie evident tensions in the interaction between front and back office staff in banks. Organisational responses to such paradoxes are found to range from passive to proactive, reflecting differing organisational, departmental and individual risk culture(s), and performance management systems. Nonetheless, a common feature of regulatory initiatives designed to secure a more structurally independent risk management function is that they have failed to rectify a critical imbalance of power - with the back office control functions continuing to be dominated by front office trading and investment functions. Ultimately, viewing the 'core' of risk management systems as a series of connected paradoxes rather than a set of assured, robust practices, requires a fundamental switch in emphasis away from a normative, standards-based approach to risk management to one which gives greater recognition to its behavioural dimensions.     

Multiple banking relationships: Do SMEs mistrust their banks?

This paper focuses on the determinants of the use of multiple banking relationships by SMEs. We exploit the results of an original survey conducted on a sample of French SMEs in December 2012. We first provide evidence that access to multiple banking relationships is influenced by firms’ characteristics. We find that larger, high-performing and innovative firms are more likely to develop multiple banking relationships. More originally, relying on the management literature, we also highlight the explanatory power of trust from the perspective of the CEO: when the CEO mistrusts the firm’s main bank, the firm will be more likely to engage in multiple banking relationships.     

Telecom microfinance banking versus commercial banking: a battle in the financial services sector

Journal of Financial Services Marketing - The purpose of the study is to compare the growth rate of commercial banks with microfinance banks, under the shadow of financial exclusion, and to provide...     

The impact of the banking sector on economic structure and growth

In this paper, we study the impact of banking sector development on changes in economic structure and growth. We argue that banking sector development has differential effects on industrial sector development and agricultural sector development. We test whether economic structure and growth foster banking sector development. To test our hypotheses, we construct a panel sample of all countries in the world during 1960–2016. We find that banking sector development has a negative effect on agricultural sector development but exerts no effect on industrial sector development. The negative effect of banking sector development on agricultural sector development is only observed for countries with high degrees of banking sector development. Our results further show that agricultural sector development exerts a negative effect on banking sector development while industrial sector development has a positive effect on banking sector development.     

The impact of banking sector stability on the real economy

This article studies the relationship between the degree of banking sector stability and the subsequent evolution of real output growth and inflation. Adopting a panel VAR methodology for a sample of 18 OECD countries, we find a positive link between banking sector stability and real output growth. This finding is predominantly driven by periods of instability rather than by very stable periods. In addition, we show that an unstable banking sector increases uncertainty about future output growth. No clear link between banking sector stability and inflation seems to exist. We then argue that the link between banking stability and real output growth can be used to improve output growth forecasts. Using Fed forecast errors, we show that banking sector stability (instability) results in a significant underestimation (overestimation) of GDP growth in the subsequent quarters.     

Shadow banking,insurance and financial sector stability

Motivated by the recent financial crisis and the near collapse of the insurance giant American International Group (AIG), we empirically study the link between the insurance sector, the size of the shadow system and financial stability across countries. Using the Z-score as a measure of financial stability and the ratio of insurance assets to GDP for 26 countries during the period 1998–2011, this paper shows that: (i) the insurance sector is negatively and significantly related to financial stability, and that (ii) using the shadow banking system as a channel, the insurance sector is detrimental to financial stability for countries with a high level of shadow banking assets.     

Parliamentary election cycles and the Turkish banking sector

This paper analyzes the effects of parliamentary election cycles on the Turkish banking system. Using annual bank-level data representing all banks in Turkey during 1963–2007, we present evidence of meaningful differences in the structure of bank assets, liabilities and financial performance across different stages of the parliamentary election cycle. However, we find that government-owned banks’ behavior does not meaningfully differ from that of either domestic and foreign-owned private-sector banks before, during or after elections. Our estimates also show that government-owned banks underperform both domestic and foreign-owned private-sector counterparts.     

Efficiency of the Polish banking industry: Foreign versus domestic banks

The present paper investigates the efficiency of the Polish banking industry between 1997 and 2001. Our preferred methodology is Data Envelopment Analysis, which allows us to distinguish between cost, allocative, technical, pure technical, and scale efficiency. Additionally, we perform a number of tests to investigate whether domestic and foreign banks come from the same population. Finally, we attempt to shed light on the determinants of efficiency. Our results indicate that bank efficiency has not improved during the years analyzed. Whereas greenfield banks have achieved higher levels of efficiency than domestic banks, foreign banks that acquired domestic institutions have not succeeded in enhancing their efficiency.     

Banking regulation and the output cost of banking crises

Using a cross-section time-series of 47 banking crisis episodes in 35 industrial and emerging market economies between the 1970s and 2003, this study analyses the relationship between banking regulation and supervision, and the severity of banking crises measured in terms of the magnitude of output loss. The empirical results show that countries that provide comprehensive deposit insurance coverage and enforce strict bank capital adequacy requirements experience a smaller output cost of crises. Restrictions on bank activities also influence the severity of crises. The results, however, do not suggest that there is a significant impact of bank supervision. In addition, there is no robust evidence that the magnitude of the output cost of crises depends on the extent of banks’ financial intermediation.     

The profitability of small single-market banks in an era of multi-market banking

This paper examines the relationship between the profitability of small single-market banks and the presence in the market of large banking organizations and banking organizations that operate primarily outside of the local banking market. We find that, in rural banking markets, the profitability of small single-market banks is significantly related to the presence of both large and small primarily-out-of-market banks. We also find that an increased presence of large or small primarily-out-of-market banks in rural banking markets reduces the positive effect of an increase in concentration on small single-market bank profits. This finding is consistent with theoretical predictions reported in the recent literature and has important implications for antitrust policy. In urban banking markets, we find little evidence of any relationship between the profitability of small single-market banks and the presence of large or primarily-out-of-market banks.