货币、财政和宏观审慎政策的协调搭配研究

本文通过构建包含多部门和多元宏观政策的DSGE模型,对货币政策、财政政策和宏观审慎政策的最优反应规则及其协调组合问题进行了分析。分析结果显示:(1)从社会福利最大化的角度,货币政策可继续盯住通胀和产出的稳定,政府支出和税收政策可分别重点盯住产出稳定和债务稳定,而宏观审慎政策则可重点关注以信贷利差和信贷波动为代表的关键金融变量;(2)货币政策、财政政策和宏观审慎政策,通过合理的搭配和组合使用,能比任何单一政策工具都具有更好的经济金融稳定效应;反之,政策之间的不协调将显著削弱彼此的调控效应,加大经济和金融波动,从而导致显著的社会福利损失;(3)从多种政策协调搭配产生“合力”的内在机制来看,财政政策主要通过增加对产出、通胀、就业和债务等变量的稳定效应,对货币政策产生额外助力,而宏观审慎政策则主要通过稳定金融体系和降低金融风险对货币政策产生助力。上述结论表明,在多种经济金融政策并存的情况下,基于良好设定的政策规则,同时加强政策各部门之间的协调合作,是确保多元政策产生积极合力的重要基础。     

Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion

This paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate: lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing. To isolate the coordination channel from lenders' joint reaction to new information, we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers. We show that lenders, while learning nothing new about the firm, reduce credit in anticipation of other lenders' reaction to the negative news about the firm. The results show that public information exacerbates lender coordination and increases the incidence of firm financial distress.     

A dynamic theory of multiple borrowing

Multiple borrowing—when borrower obtains overlapping loans from multiple lenders—is a common phenomenon in many credit markets. We build a tractable, dynamic model of multiple borrowing and show that, because overlapping creditors can impose default externalities on each other, expanding financial access by introducing more lenders can backfire. Capital allocation is distorted away from the most productive uses. Entrepreneurs choose inefficient endeavors with low returns to scale. These problems are exacerbated when investments become more pledgeable or when borrowers have access to more lenders, explaining why increased access to finance does not always improve outcomes.     

Revenue Sharing versus Expenditure Sharing in a Federal System

Problems of intergovernmental policy coordination can take many forms and are becoming increasingly important with continuing economic integration. In this paper we focus on the fiscal competition problem where the non-cooperative choice of taxes and transfers among governments typically leads to a suboptimal outcome. We look at the effect of two widely used corrective policies: revenue sharing and expenditure sharing (or intergovernmental matching grants). Our main result is that these two corrective policies have opposite effects depending on the form of competition between governments, namely whether governments compete in taxes or expenditures. More precisely, for any form of competition, revenue sharing is desirable exactly when expenditure sharing is not and vice versa. The implication is that the choice of the optimal corrective policy requires a complete understanding of the underlying non-cooperative behavior among governments. Our second main result is that neither revenue sharing or expenditure sharing can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium among governments, although all governments would benefit from one of these two corrective policies. Central intervention is therefore inevitable unless governments can pre-commit to the optimal corrective policy before setting their fiscal policies.     

Implicit benefits and financing

Social relationship and business connections create implicit benefits between borrowers and lenders. We model how implicit benefits and repayment enforcement costs influence credit allocation, cost, and renegotiation. The optimal solution illustrates that financing with implicit benefits may achieve lower financing costs, higher managerial effort, and better outcomes for both borrowers and lenders. This result is consistent with the continuing expansion of alternative financing despite formal financial intermediation, the rise of corporate insider debt, and joint ownership of debt and equity. The growing size and complexity of projects and changes in community relationships can explain expansion of financing with standard intermediation.     

Firm-level political risk and debt choice

We examine the effect of firm-level political risk on debt choices and find: (i) firms with higher political risk display a preference for private debt over public debt; (ii) the magnitude of this preference varies with the aggregate policy uncertainty; (iii) politically risky firms indeed receive less favorable terms in the bond market. To explain such findings, we show that private lenders have several advantages in serving politically risky borrowers. First, to the extent that lenders cannot perfectly foresee the adoption of new government policies, private lenders' expertise in implementing the reorganization process is important to limit their potential loss. Second, politically risky borrowers must undertake significant operation adjustments facing rising policy uncertainty. Private lenders can gather accurate information and closely monitor these adjustments. Last, as the severity of political risk varies with aggregate policy uncertainty, there exists an implicit contract between a borrower and its relationship bank, whereby a borrower accepts less favorable terms during normal times in exchange for the bank's support during difficult times. Taken together, this study advances our understanding of how cross-sectionally heterogeneous political risk influences corporate debt choice.     

产业政策与企业资本结构调整速度

本文以2006-2015年我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,在“十一五”与“十二五”产业规划所处的时间区间内,考察了产业政策对企业资本结构调整速度的影响以及作用路径。结果显示,产业政策与企业资本结构调整速度显著正相关,且分别在非国有、小规模和融资约束较严重的企业中更加显著。区分调整方向后发现,产业政策能提高资本结构向上调整的速度,但只有重点产业政策能提高固定资产比例较低的企业向下调整的速度。基于作用路径的分析发现,产业政策提高了企业选择增加债务的方式来调整资本结构的概率;重点产业政策提高了特定类型企业以增加权益方式向下调整资本结构的概率。上述结果表明,产业政策主要通过债务融资方式影响资本结构调整速度,而只有受到重点产业政策支持的特定类型的企业能够通过权益融资方式提高资本结构调整速度。     

Designing domestic institutions for international monetary policy cooperation: A Utopia?

In a wide variety of international macroeconomic models monetary policy cooperation is optimal, non-cooperative policies are inefficient, but optimal policies can be attained non-cooperatively by optimal design of domestic institutions/contracts. We show that given endogenous institutional design, inefficiencies of non-cooperation cannot and will not be eliminated. We model the delegation stage explicitly and show that subgame perfect, credible contracts (chosen by governments based on individual rationality) are non-zero, but are different from optimal contracts and hence lead to inefficient equilibria. Optimal contracts require cooperation at the delegation stage, which is inconsistent with the advocated non-cooperative nature of the solution. A general solution method for credible contracts and an example from international monetary policy cooperation are considered. Our results feature delegation as an equilibrium phenomenon, explain inefficiencies of existing delegation schemes and hint to a potentially stronger role for supranational authorities in international policy coordination.     

Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans

We examine the consequences of existing regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate-to-distribute (OTD) market. The information asymmetries in the OTD market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders. We find, using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization, that the quality of loan origination varies inversely with the amount of regulation: more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality. We interpret this result as a possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators’ capital structure can mitigate moral hazard. In addition, we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have ‘skin in the game’ and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviate the moral hazard problem in this setting. Finally, having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with higher quality loans, suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent. Overall, our evidence suggests that market forces rather than regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the OTD market. The findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender regulations which fail to align lenders’ incentives with the investors of mortgage-backed securities.     

宏观审慎政策协调能否抑制国际性银行危机传染？——基于跨境金融关联视角的实证研究

本文基于跨境金融关联视角对宏观审慎政策能否抑制国际性银行危机传染这一重要的理论与实践问题进行了实证研究。选取亚洲金融危机和全球金融危机时期遭受冲击的10个代表性国家作为样本,构建Logit模型和多元回归模型探讨本国及具有金融关联的国家协调实施宏观审慎政策对本国系统性银行危机传染的影响。研究表明,具有金融关联的国家出现金融危机会显著增加本国系统性银行危机的发生概率,具有金融关联的国家实施宏观审慎政策对本国信贷的影响比对房价的影响更明显,本国及具有金融关联的国家协调实施宏观审慎政策会显著降低本国系统性银行危机的发生概率。在调整银行危机指标及考虑贸易关联和流动性风险的影响后,研究结果依然保持稳健。本文的研究结论揭示了加强宏观审慎政策协调有助于维护全球金融稳定,对于中国政策当局强化宏观审慎管理具有极其重要的政策含义。     

Sticking points: common‐agency problems and contracting in the US healthcare system

We propose a “common‐agency” model for explaining inefficient contracting in the US healthcare system. Common‐agency problems arise when multiple payers seek to motivate a provider to invest in improved care coordination. We highlight the possibility of “sticking points,” that is, Pareto‐dominated equilibria in which payers coordinate around contracts which give weak incentives to the provider. Sticking points rationalize three hard‐to‐explain features of the US healthcare system: widespread fee‐for‐service arrangements; problematic care coordination; and the historical reliance on single‐specialty practices to deliver care. The model also analyzes the effects of policies promoting more efficient contracting between payers and providers.     

金融政策竞争中性与民营企业融资纾困——来自突发公共卫生事件的准自然实验

本文以新冠肺炎疫情这一突发公共卫生事件为准自然实验,选择疫情前后我国债券市场数据,研究金融政策竞争中性原则实现情况及其途径。研究发现,相比国有企业,民营企业融资成本在疫情期间明显降低,金融政策的竞争中性得到进一步体现;那些为供应链上下游提供商业信用支持的民营企业,其融资成本降低幅度更大。同时,疫情期间一些应急性融资工具也向民营企业倾斜,更有利于降低民营企业的融资成本。进一步检验发现,供应链上下游受影响程度越严重、为上下游提供的商业信用期限越长,民营企业的融资成本降低幅度越大;疫情期间的金融政策并没有导致民营企业出现“脱实向虚”现象,反而降低了其金融化水平、提升了资金使用效率。研究结果显示,对民营企业不愿贷、不敢贷的现象并不等于金融政策存在非竞争中性,而是源于金融机构在执行层面的顾虑,我国应对突发公共卫生事件推出的金融政策有效缓解了信贷市场执行层面的这一顾虑。本文研究结论从金融政策竞争中性出发,为给民营企业营造公平竞争环境提供了有益启示。     

成长性、代理冲突与公司财务政策

本文基于成长性、代理冲突与公司财务政策之系统关联的多维视角分析,着眼于将成长性差异作为一个关键变量时,考察其是否可以成为影响公司代理冲突及其治理与公司财务政策选择的一个重要基础。本文理论分析表明:作为一种制度环境———尤其是作为新兴/转轨经济国家行业与公司的典型特征,成长性差异显著影响公司财务政策;公司治理与公司业绩的关系受制于成长性的高低,成长性通过投资决策、融资选择与股利政策等关键财务政策的中介作用影响公司治理与其价值的相关性;在财务政策中投资决策更具有基础性,融资政策与股利政策都基于提高投资效率而进行选择,将成长性差异影响与公司投资决策相结合、或在公司的投资等关键财务政策的研究和实践之中深入考量成长机会影响,将使得代理冲突及其公司治理更具有针对性和有效性;高成长性可以成为公司治理环境改善的一种有效基础,深入关注(高)成长性的显著"公司治理效应",可以为公司代理冲突及其治理、以及其投融资选择等关键财务政策提供更为清晰的决策信号。     

Asymmetric Information,Managerial Opportunism,Financing, and Payout Policies

We examine corporate issuance and payout policies in the presence of both adverse selection (in capital markets) and managerial opportunism. Our results establish the importance of the locus of decision control in the firm. When shareholders determine policies, debt financing is always optimal in the presence of either adverse selection or managerial opportunism. However, when both of these problems are simultaneously present, equity issuance can become an optimal signaling mechanism. Shareholders' most preferred signaling mechanism is restricting dividends, followed by equity financing, and finally underpricing securities. When managers determine policies, a reversed hierarchy may be obtained.     

Determinants of corporate cash policy: Insights from private firms

We provide one of the first large sample comparisons of cash policies in public and private U.S. firms. We first show that despite higher financing frictions, private firms hold, on average, about half as much cash as public firms do. By examining the drivers of cash policies for each group, we are able to attribute the difference to the much higher agency costs in public firms. By combining evidence from across public and private firms as well as within public firms across different qualities of governance, we are able to reconcile existing mixed evidence on the effects of agency problems on cash policies. Specifically, agency problems affect not only the target level of cash, but also how managers react to cash in excess of the target.     

去产能政策与融资租赁

本文对去产能政策和融资租赁之间的因果关系和内在机理进行了深入研究。基于2007—2016年中国上市公司的融资租赁交易数据的实证分析发现,去产能政策推动了融资租赁规模的扩张,而融资租赁规模的扩张又反过来削弱了去产能政策的效果,但程度有限。进一步分析表明,去产能政策从需求和供给两方面推动了融资租赁的扩张:去产能政策限制了产能过剩企业从银行等主流融资渠道获得长期资金的能力,这一方面激发了这些企业对融资租赁等融资方式的需求,另一方面也增强了银行通过融资租赁进行监管套利的动机。在党的十九大提出的“经济高质量发展”的背景下,本文发现有助于制定更加科学有效、与金融体系相互协调的产业政策。     

Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus

We study a credit market in which multiple lenders sequentially offer financing to a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post single offers involves a loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives if lenders offer menus of contracts. This result challenges the approach followed in standard models of multiple lending. From a theoretical perspective, we offer new insights on equilibrium robustness in sequential common agency games.     

Optimal fiscal policy under multiple equilibria

We study optimal fiscal policy in an economy where (i) search frictions create a coordination problem and generate multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria and (ii) the government finances the provision of a public good by taxing market activity. The government must choose the tax rate before it knows which equilibrium will obtain, and therefore an important part of the problem is determining how the policy will affect the equilibrium selection process. We show that when the equilibrium selection rule is based on the concept of risk dominance, higher tax rates make coordination on the Pareto-superior outcome less likely. As a result, taking equilibrium-selection effects into account leads to a lower optimal tax rate.     

中国公立医院改革历程的公共政策评估

20世纪60年代,中国曾被看作世界上拥有最全面医疗保障的国家。但随着社会主义市场经济的深入,劳保医疗制度、公费医疗制度为主的医疗保障体系逐渐瓦解,政府逐渐减少了在医疗卫生方面的投入,公立医院由原来的政府主导逐渐转变为"自负盈亏",造成公立医疗机构公益性的逐渐缺失。本文以公共政策分析理论和方法为分析视角,对新中国成立以来中国公立医院改革的主要政策及其改革历程进行梳理、总结,对涉及的主要公共政策的演变趋势和实施效果进行了综合性评估,以期对新医改进程中的问题提供借鉴。     

How corporate governance affects payout policy under agency problems and external financing constraints

This paper analyzes the effect of corporate governance on the payout policy when a firm has both agency problems and external financing constraints. We empirically test whether strong corporate governance would lead to higher payout to minimize agency problems (outcome hypothesis), or to lower payout to avoid costly external financing (substitute hypothesis). We find that firms with higher (lower) external financing constraints tend to decrease (increase) payout ratio with an improvement in their corporate governance. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that the relation between payout and corporate governance is reversed depending on the relative sizes of agency and external financing costs.