美国银行破产若干法律问题探究及启示

近些年来,我国有关部门正在加紧对银行破产进行立法的制定工作,中国人民银行已将《金融机构破产条例》正式纳入行政立法规划。美国是世界上银行业最发达的国家之一,银行业的不断发展也促使了美国银行法制的完善。它山之石,可以攻玉,本文通过对美国银行破产法律制度的介绍和分析,希望能够对我国的银行破产立法有所启示。     

The spread of deposit insurance and the global rise in bank asset risk since the 1970s

We construct a new measure of deposit insurance generosity for many countries, empirically model the exogenous international influences on the adoption and generosity of deposit insurance and use a novel econometric method to explore the causal chain from the expansion of deposit insurance generosity to increased overall lending, increased lending to households, increased banking system leverage, and more severe and frequent banking crises. Greater deposit insurance generosity robustly produces greater overall lending relative to bank assets and more lending to households relative to both bank assets and GDP, and results in higher banking system leverage. Our estimates, however, are not conclusive regarding whether greater deposit insurance generosity resulted in greater total loans relative to GDP or in more frequent or severe banking crises.     

Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations

The 2007–2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy. We provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. In our model the banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard, which implies that the social benefits of bank monitoring must for incentive reasons be shared between depositors and banks. Consequently, socially too few deposits are made in equilibrium. Deposit insurance – or, equivalently, bank recapitalization – corrects this market failure. We find that deposit insurance should be funded not by banks or depositors but out of general taxation. The optimal level of deposit insurance varies inversely with the quality of the banking system. Hence, when the soundness of the financial sector is uncertain, governments should consider supporting deposit insurance schemes and undertaking subsidized recapitalizations.     

Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis

We test whether income from nontraditional banking activities contributed to the failures of hundreds of U.S. commercial banks during the financial crisis. Estimates from a multi-period logit model indicate that the probability of distressed bank failure declined with pure fee-based nontraditional activities such as securities brokerage and insurance sales, but increased with asset-based nontraditional activities such as venture capital, investment banking and asset securitization. Banks that engaged in risky nontraditional activities also tended to take risk in their traditional lines of business, suggesting that deregulation was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for bank failure during the crisis.     

BANK FAILURE AND CONTAGION EFFECTS: EVIDENCE FROM HONG KONG

In this paper the influence of three Hong Kong bank failures on stock prices of the colony's banking industry is examined. As deposit insurance is nonexistent in Hong Kong, the world's fourth-largest financial center, an interesting environment is provided for testing contagion effects of bank failure on other healthy financial institutions. By examining contagion effects in an environment void of explicit deposit insurance, this study should provide interesting insights into the resiliency of modern-day financial markets. In turn, insights should also be provided into debates concerning the role and reform of deposit insurance and the rationale for regulation of the financial services industry in general. The results indicate that unexpected bank failure causes significant negative stock price reactions within the banking industry; yet, some banks are less affected than others.     

Corporate Control,Portfolio Choice,and the Decline of Banking

In the 1980s, U.S. banks became systematically less profitable and riskier as nonbank competition eroded the profitability of banks' traditional activities. Bank failures rose exponentially during this decade. The leading explanation for the persistence of these trends centers on fixed-rate deposit insurance: the insurance gives bank equityholders an incentive to take on risk when the value of bank charters falls. We propose and test an alternative explanation based on corporate control considerations. We show that managerial entrenchment played a more important role than did the moral hazard associated with deposit insurance in explaining the recent behavior of the banking industry.     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.     

A New Development Database. Deposit Insurance around the World

In the past two decades, in a series of banking crises aroundthe world, banks have become systematically insolvent. Thesecrises have occurred in developed and developing economies alike.To make such financial system breakdowns less likely and tolimit their costs if they occur, policymakers feel the needfor financial safety nets. These include such policies as implicitor explicit deposit insurance, a lender of last resort functionof the central bank, bank insolvency resolution procedures,and bank regulation and supervision. Of these policies, explicitdeposit insurance has been gaining popularity in recent years.Since the 1980s the number of countries with explicit depositinsurance schemes almost tripled, with most OECD countries andan increasing number of developing economies adopting some formof explicit depositor protection. In 1994 deposit insurancebecame the standard for the newly created single banking marketof the European Union. Establishing an explicit deposit insurancescheme became part of the generally accepted best practice advicegiven to developing economies.     

The shifting value of federal deposit insurance: Implications for reform

This research examines the relationship between the value of federal deposit insurance and bank size. We conclude that the value of deposit insurance has often been greater for the largest bank-holding companies since 1981. This differential is consistent with the notion that largest banks have greater ability to circumvent regulatory and/or market discipline. The source of this differential appears to be due to holding less capital rather than greater asset risk. Insurance costs net of the value of deposit insurance are also relatively lower for the largest banks and have become more so since 1981. These results suggest that recent proposals to improve the deposit insurance system should be evaluated based on their ability to effect even-handed discipline throughout the banking industry to eliminate and forestall further creation of this large institution bias.     

Stealing Deposits: Deposit Insurance,Risk‐Taking,and the Removal of Market Discipline in Early 20th‐Century Banks

Deposit insurance reduces liquidity risk but can increase insolvency risk by encouraging reckless behavior. Several U.S. states installed deposit insurance laws before the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and those laws applied only to some depository institutions within those states. These experiments present a unique testing ground for investigating the effect of deposit insurance. We show that deposit insurance removed market discipline constraining uninsured banks. Taking advantage of World War I's rise in world agricultural prices, insured banks increased their insolvency risk and competed aggressively for deposits. When prices fell after the war, the insurance systems collapsed and suffered high losses.     

Bank credit default swaps and deposit insurance around the world

We investigate the impact of deposit insurance schemes on banks' credit risk – a predictor of failure and a key element in the current financial crisis. Unlike most studies, which use balance sheet measurements of risk, we adopt a forward-looking and market-based measure of bank credit risk: the credit default swap (CDS) spread. We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance systems have higher CDS spreads, supporting the “moral hazard” view. The results suggest that deposit insurance design features that lessen the adverse impact are risk-adjusted premium, coinsurance systems, government-established systems, “risk-minimizing” systems, and systems with dual-funding sources. Full coverage appears to stabilize bank risk only during the financial crisis period. More stringent bank regulation, such as capital adequacy regulation and independent supervision, could reduce the undesirable impact of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance seems to help stabilize volatile markets, as evidenced during the financial crisis and in countries with greater market volatility. In addition, we find that the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank credit risk is more pronounced for banks with low asset quality and low liquidity.     

The distributional impact of foreign deposits on federal deposit insurance premia

Rapid growth of deposits in U.S. foreign bank branches and current U.S. government policies have combined to create a new inequality in the deposit insurance system. Our research shows that smaller banks are substantially subsidizing the insurance costs of the larger, multinational institutions. When insurance premiums are viewed in the context of an implicit tax, it is highly regressive with the wealth transfer growing over time. Recent reform proposals do not fully address important international influences and therefore underestimate the scope of the problem.     

Bank capital buffer and portfolio risk: The influence of business cycle and revenue diversification

The relationship between macroeconomic developments and bank capital buffer and portfolio risk adjustments is relevant to assess the efficacy of newly created countercyclical buffer requirements. Using the U.S. bank holding company data over the period 1992:Q1–2011:Q3, we find a negative relationship between the business cycle and capital buffer. Our results offer some support for the Basel III agreements that countercyclical capital buffer in the banking sector is necessary to help the performance of the real economy during recessions. We find a robust evidence of inverse relationship between business cycle and bank default risk. Our analysis provides evidence of diversification benefits. The probability of insolvency risk decreases for diversified banks and banks with high revenue diversity achieve capital savings.     

Deposit Insurance Reform in Japan: Better Late Than Never?

Introduced in 1971 as a response to the intensification in competition in the deposit-taking sector induced by the adoption of a program of liberalization and globalization, the deposit insurance system in Japan has since undergone a number of significant changes to accommodate developments in the local financial sector. The pace of such reform accelerated markedly in recent years to help stabilize the Japanese financial system in the face of systemic risk, be it due to the failure of the housing loan companies (the jusen) or other major institutions, such as Yamaichi Securities and the city bank Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. The evolution of local deposit insurance arrangements to cope with such events is explained here and an assessment of the policy responses is provided. The part played by deposit insurance in alleviating the pressures currently experienced by the Japanese banking sector also is addressed. Finally, the extent to which the Japanese authorities have learned from the U.S. experience with deposit insurance is examined.     

差别化存款保险费率与银行风险承担——基于我国农村银行的经验证据

本文拓展了Freixas and Rochet(2008)的理论模型,证明存款保险差别化费率机制对银行风险承担具有抑制作用,在此基础上选取我国农村银行为研究对象,运用2015—2019年某省119家法人投保机构进行实证检验。研究发现:引入差别化费率设计显著降低了农村银行的风险承担;这一作用存在异质性,对于自身风险承担水平较低、资产规模较大的农村银行来说,抑制作用更为明显。进一步研究发现,差别化费率机制在一定程度上缓和了农信社改制短期内对农商行风险可能造成的不利影响。本文结论对加强存款保险制度的早期纠正功能、防范化解金融风险以及深化农村金融机构改革具有一定的理论意义和参考价值。     

Foreign exchange exposure: Evidence from the U.S. insurance industry

We study the foreign exchange exposure of U.S. insurers. The evidence shows that no systematic difference exists in the currency risk profiles of life and non-life segments within the insurance industry. This suggests that life and non-life insurers have similar risk exposure management strategies arising from similar risk pooling and financial intermediary functions. The empirical results reveal that a sizable proportion of U.S. insurers are exposed to foreign exchange movements against the seven largest U.S. trade partners in insurance services (U.K., Japan, Switzerland, Netherlands, France, Germany and Canada). Significant operational and size effects are also documented and we find that the frequency of foreign exchange exposure increases with time horizon.     

What’s the contingency? A proposal for bank contingent capital triggered by systemic risk

Contingent capital (coco) automatically recapitalizes the banking system during financial crises if the trigger mechanism is properly designed. We propose a dual trigger mechanism based on: (1) aggregate systemic risk in the banking system, measured using CATFIN, and (2) the individual bank’s contribution to overall systemic risk, measured using delta CoVaR. The dual trigger is highly correlated with system-wide insolvency risk and prices systemic risk. We set different triggers for banks, insurance companies and broker-dealers. Using the 99% cut-off, systemic coco issued by Lehman and Bear Stearns would have been triggered in November 2007, months prior to their actual demise.     

Financial regulation in Japan: a sixth year review of the Financial Services Agency

The paper provides a critical review of the Financial Services Agency (FSA) of Japan since its establishment in June 1998 (as the Financial Supervisory Agency) to June 2004. During the six year period, the FSA faced the challenge of addressing severe insolvency problems in banking as well as life insurance industries. The paper argues that the initial separation of the supervisory role (in the Financial Supervisory Agency and the Financial Reconstruction Commission) and the policy planning role (in the Ministry of Finance) was useful in the sense it allowed the FSA to have a firm stance on the insolvency problem that was partially created by the failure of the past financial regulatory policy. Even after the creation of the FSA, the Bank of Japan remained as another bank supervisor. This seems have made the central bank reluctant in relaxing monetary policy out of the fear that such loose monetary policy would actually discourage re-organization of banking industry. This suggests a problem of having the central bank as a bank supervisor. For the life insurance companies, the FSA (both old and new) has not been successful in intervening (using prompt corrective action) before the failures. Finally, the paper also points out the important role of the leadership at the FSA that shapes the financial regulation, and suggests a problem of appointing a politician to this role.     

Leaving the darkness: The emergence of shadow banks

This paper studies the interaction between bank capital regulation, moral hazard and co-existence of traditional and shadow banks. Bank managers can choose between traditional banking and off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles (SPV), in a setup with deposit insurance and moral hazard. We first show that in the absence of SPV intermediation, capital requirements are ineffective at preventing the moral hazard problem originated by deposit insurance. We find that shadow banks can improve financial stability, when there is full information sharing. Finally, we analyze the case of neglected tail risk. We find that under such circumstances, the SPV will increase financial risk by exposing the system to extreme events.     

存款保险、市场竞争与银行经营稳健性

本文基于银行存款市场空间竞争模型,探讨存款保险制度的实施效果和福利效应,及其与市场竞争政策的交互作用。研究表明,政府隐性担保尽管能够保障存款人利益,但会降低存款人对银行经营稳健性的要求,使得银行追求高风险高收益资产从而降低经营稳健性;而市场化的存款保险制度通过费率与风险挂钩的激励机制,能够有效提升银行经营稳健性,同时避免过高政策成本负担,实现较高的社会福利水平。随着市场竞争强化,引入风险差别费率保险制度,在提升银行经营稳健性和增进社会福利方面的效果逐渐增强。模型分析表明,当长期允许机构自由进出市场时,政府强化竞争政策短期可能降低银行的经营稳健性,但长期内高风险银行逐渐退出市场而更有效率的低风险银行进入市场,这种柔性市场退出机制使得银行业整体经营稳健性增强。因此,在金融市场中强化竞争政策,推行并完善当前市场化的风险差别费率存款保险制度,长期内有助于在保护存款人利益的同时,提升银行稳健性和社会福利。