Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Initial Public Debt Offerings

Debt initial public offerings (IPOs) represent a major shift in a firm's financing policy by both extending debt maturity and altering the public-private debt mix. In contrast to findings for seasoned debt offerings, we document a significantly negative stock price response to debt IPO announcements. This result is consistent with debt maturity and debt ownership structure theories. The equity wealth effect is negatively related to the offer's maturity, and positively related to the degree of bank monitoring. We find that firms with less information asymmetry and firms with higher growth opportunities experience a less adverse stock price response.     

University of Texas Roundtable on LP Perspectives on the State of Private Equity

In this wide‐ranging discussion among four limited partner investors in private equity, the LPs commented on the rates of return they expect from PE, the fees they pay their general partners, and the length of their time commitments to PE investments. After noting the enormous growth in the value of assets under private management, and the reduction in public equity investment by many large institutional investors, each of the four LPs said that their institutions expected to maintain or continue to increase their proportion of portfolio investment in PE. The LP panelists were virtually unanimous in expecting PE rates of return in the 9%‐11% range, as compared to 7%‐8% for public equities. The panelists also seemed to agree that although committing to PE investments for terms longer than the traditional seven to ten years could result in higher returns and lower costs, they were reluctant to make such commitments because they valued the financial flexibility afforded by shorter holding periods. Several LPs claimed that their institutions were scrutinizing the explicit and implicit fees charged by the GPs, and the level of fees was encouraging LPs to co‐invest in deals alongside the GPs. And in response to a closing suggestion that the recent flurry of IPOs could signify the beginning of a major reversal away from private capital, another LP expressed strong doubt, noting that “the private ownership model has clearly shown superior governance, and greater ability to manage leveraged capital structures and create value than public companies over the long term.”     

Earnings Virality

We examine the determinants and market consequences associated with earnings announcements going viral on social media, a phenomenon we label “earnings virality.” Using a comprehensive panel of historical Twitter data, we find that the typical earnings announcement receives relatively little social media coverage, but others go viral on social media, quickly reaching the feeds of millions of people. We find that viral earnings announcements generally have Twitter content that is more extreme in tone and contains less unique content. Further, earnings virality is positively associated with revenue surprises, investor recognition, retail investor ownership, and retail investor trading around the announcement. Earnings virality appears to be detrimental to markets, as it coincides with lower market liquidity and slower price formation. Overall, our evidence suggests that user-driven dissemination through social media platforms, when amplified and taken to extreme levels, may be harmful to markets.     

Individual Large Shareholders,Earnings Management,and Capital‐Market Consequences

Using a large hand‐collected sample of all blockholders (ownership ≥ 5%) of S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we first document significant individual blockholder effects on earnings management (accrual‐based earnings management, real earnings management, and restatements). This association is driven primarily by these large shareholders influencing rather than selecting firms’ financial reporting practices. Second, the market's reaction to earnings announcements suggests that investors recognize the heterogeneity in blockholders’ influence on earnings management. The results highlight the highly individualized effects of blockholders and a mechanism through which shareholders impact reported earnings.     

Market response to dividend change announcements: unregulated versus regulated US firms

This paper attempts to determine whether there is a significant difference in how the stock market responds to dividend change announcements of regulated (both utilities and financials) versus unregulated firms and, if so, which factors cause this difference. An analysis of dividend change announcements of US firms over the period 1962–2016 shows that the market response is larger for unregulated than for regulated firms, but this difference is statistically significant only for dividend increases (not for dividend decreases). Further, cross-sectional analysis indicates that, for dividend increases, the difference between regulated and unregulated firms increases with diffused ownership and informational asymmetry. When both these factors are controlled for, the difference between regulated and unregulated firms becomes statistically insignificant. Thus, the evidence suggests that the significant difference in market response to dividend increases of regulated versus unregulated firms can be explained by differences in diffused ownership and informational asymmetry. There seems to be no intrinsic difference between regulated and unregulated firms in the market response to dividend decreases.     

Market-to-book ratios,equity retention,and management ownership in Finnish initial public offerings

Using a sample of Finnish initial public offerings, we find that the fraction of equity retained by the original shareholders is significantly positively related to the market-to-brook ratio. The result is consistent with the Leland and Pyle (1977) hypothesis suggesting that the original shareholders can signal the quality of their firm by their willingness to retain equity. Moreover, we find that management ownership's association with relative firm value is significantly positive at low ownership levels but insignificant at high ownership levels. This gives some support for the agency hypothesis which suggests that corporate value is a function of managerial equity ownership.     

产权、所有权安排与融资偏好

成熟市场的企业,由于技术和信息不对称方面的原因,更偏好于债权融资,而不是股权融资.在中国资本市场存在严重信息不对称的情况下,我国企业仍十分偏好于股权融资.这种选择基本上是经营者基于保持控制权的自利性考虑.其根源在于国有产权主体的抽象化、由此导致的失控的所有权安排、股权投资主体控制权的丧失以及债权投资主体拥有的状态依存控制权的威慑.     

Private company finance and financial reporting

This article provides a comprehensive assessment of private firms’ financing sources and their relation with financial reporting practices. We consider debt financing (bank financing, leasing, and government guarantees), equity financing (family ownership, government ownership, employee ownership, and private-equity financing), and trade credit (supplier credit and factoring). Our primary conclusions are that there is significant heterogeneity in the way in which private companies are financed that is influenced by their specific business contexts, and that this heterogeneity in financing is associated with differential demand for and supply of financial reporting.     

Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt

We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency cost of debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower cost of debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and debt claimants. This suggests that bond holders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests.     

Managerial succession and firm performance

We examine CEO turnover and firm financial performance. Accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate prior to CEO turnover and improve thereafter. The degree of improvement is positively related to the level of institutional shareholdings, the presence of an outsider-dominated board, and the appointment of an outsider (rather than an insider) CEO. Turnover announcements are associated with significantly positive average abnormal stock returns, which are in turn significantly positively related to subsequent changes in accounting measures of performance. This suggests that investors view turnover announcements as good news presaging performance improvements.     

Institutional Ownership and the Dynamics of Trading Volume around FFO Announcements

We examine the effect of institutional ownership on abnormal trading volume around the announcement of funds from operations (FFO) by real estate investment trusts (REITs). Our central thesis is that abnormal trading volume is lower for the more informed institutions vis a vis non-sophisticated retail investors/institutions. We find a negative relationship between ownership by pension funds and abnormal trading volume around quarterly FFO announcements. However, ownership by the other types of institutions is unrelated to abnormal trading volume. Consistent with the view that some institutional investors are more informed than individual investors and therefore respond less to end of year announcements, we find that higher ownership by investment advisors is associated with lower levels of trading volume around end of year FFO announcements. Lastly, we find no evidence of institutional sell-offs associated with announcements of less than expected FFO.     

Earnings Announcements, Asymmetric Information, Trades and Quotes

This paper empirically analyses trades and quotes around the times of 37 earnings announcements in the Paris Bourse. We find that trading volume is larger on announcement days, spreads are wider after announcements, and the permanent positive (resp. negative) price impact of purchases (sales) is greater around announcements. While the findings pertaining to the spread and the permanent impact of trades are consistent with the view that earnings announcements correspond to an increase in information asymmetries, the result that trading volume is larger suggests that other effects are at work.     

On the Good News in Equity Carve-Outs

The announcement of the sale of equity in a wholly owned subsidiary of a corporation is received by the market as good news about the value of the existing equity in the parent corporation. This is in stark contrast to announcements of other forms of public equity financing. We show that the apparent inconsistency between the market response to equity carve-out announcements and other forms of equity financing can be easily understood in the Myers and Majluf (1984) framework. It is shown that firms that resort to an equity carve-out will be firms that, on average, are being undervalued by the market.     

Debtor-in-possession financing and the resolution of uncertainty in Chapter 11 reorganizations

This paper investigates the use of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing by firms reorganizing under Chapter 11. A model is developed in which there is asymmetric information between the creditors of a distressed firm and its management. In this context, it is demonstrated that reliance on DIP financing resolves informational asymmetries regarding the true economic value of distressed firms. The model's conclusions are empirically supported in the paper and by results of extant research. The signaling role of DIP financing is evidenced both by the positive stock price reaction to DIP announcements and the fact that firms employing DIP financing have more successful reorganizations.     

Managerial Motives and Merger Financing

We examine how managerial motives influence the choice of financing for a sample of 209 completed mergers from 1981–1988. Our evidence indicates that bidding firm management is more likely to finance mergers with cash when target firm ownership concentration is high, preventing the creation of an outside blockholder. This suggests bidding firm managers prefer to keep ownership structure widely diffused to reduce external monitoring. We also find that bidding firm management is more likely to finance mergers with stock when the variance of bidding firm's stock return is high. This suggests managers of risky firms prefer leverage‐reducing transactions to reduce their personal risk.     

EQUITY VALUATION EFFECTS OF WARRANT-DEBT FINANCING

Stock price reactions to warrant-debt unit financing announcements are examined and a significant two-day average abnormal return of ?1.32 percent is found. The negative average abnormal return is similar to that observed for convertible debt financing announcements in previous research. Warrant-debt financing decisions result in large increases in capitalization; on average, issuers' long-term debt increases by 84 percent, and common shares outstanding increase by 18 percent assuming full exercise of the warrants.     

Execution in an aggregator

An aggregator is a technology that consolidates liquidity—in the form of bid and ask prices and amounts—from multiple sources into a single unified order book to facilitate ‘best-price’ execution. It is widely used by traders in financial markets, particularly those in the globally fragmented spot currency market. In this paper, I study the properties of execution in an aggregator where multiple liquidity providers (LPs) compete for a trader’s uninformed flow. There are two main contributions. Firstly, I formulate a model for the liquidity dynamics and contract formation process, and use this to characterize key trading metrics such as the observed inside spread in the aggregator, the reject rate due to the so-called ‘last-look’ trade acceptance process, the effective spread that the trader pays, as well as the market share and gross revenues of the LPs. An important observation here is that aggregation induces adverse selection where the LP that receives the trader’s deal request will suffer from the ‘Winner’s curse’, and this effect grows stronger when the trader increases the number of participants in the aggregator. To defend against this, the model allows LPs to adjust the nominal spread they charge or alter the trade acceptance criteria. This interplay is a key determinant of transaction costs. Secondly, I analyse the properties of different execution styles. I show that when the trader splits her order across multiple LPs, a single provider that has quick market access and for whom it is relatively expensive to internalize risk can effectively force all other providers to join her in externalizing the trader’s flow thereby maximizing the market impact and aggregate hedging costs. It is therefore not only the number, but also the type of LP and execution style adopted by the trader that determines transaction costs.     

Does a Parent–Subsidiary Structure Enhance Financing Flexibility?

I examine whether firms exploit a publicly traded parent–subsidiary structure to issue equity of the overvalued firm regardless of which firm needs funds, and whether this conveys opposite information about firm values. Using 90 subsidiary and 37 parent seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements during 1981–2002, I document negative returns to issuers but insignificant returns to nonissuers in both samples, and insignificant changes in combined firm value and parent's nonsubsidiary equity value in subsidiary SEOs. Firms issue equity to meet their own financing needs. My evidence contrasts with previous studies and suggests that parent–subsidiary structures do not enhance financing flexibility.     

The effect of ownership structure on firm performance: Additional evidence

This article examines the effect of ownership structure on corporate performance, using stock returns as a measure of performance. Based on the 1988–1992 sample period, we find that the level of insider ownership is positively related to stock returns. This result suggests that as managers' equity ownership increases, their interests coincide more with those of outside shareholders. But we also find that the square of the level of insider ownership is inversely related to stock returns, indicating that excessive insider ownership rather hurts corporate performance probably due to the problem associated with managers' entrenchment. Finally, we find that stock returns are positively related to institutional ownership, indicating that institutional owners are active in monitoring management.     

Institutional Ownership and the Liquidity of Common Stock Offerings

This paper investigates the extent to which institutional ownership of equity affects the market's response to announcements of new issues of common stock. We find that the absolute magnitude of the share price reaction is negatively related to the level of institutional ownership in the announcing firm. These results are consistent with the argument that the information acquisition activities of institutional investors reduce preannouncement information asymmetries between managers and the capital market.