Formal and Informal Markets for Water: Institutions, Performance, and Constraints

Water markets—either formal or informal—can be anefficient method for reallocating scarce water supplies. Atthe same time certain constraints can raise the transactioncosts of trading water. This paper reviews the conditions necessaryto establish successful water markets, identifies potentialproblems, and offers mitigating strategies. It also uses examplesof several informal and formal water markets already in operationto illustrate these problems and the solutions to them.      

Between the State and the Market: Can Informal Insurance Patch the Safety Net?

Most households in low-income countries deal with economic hardshipsthrough informal insurance arrangements between individualsand communities rather than through publicly managed programsor market-provided insurance schemes. Households may, for example,draw on savings, sell physical assets, rely on reciprocal giftexchanges, or diversify into alternative income-generating activities.These mechanisms can be highly effective in the right circumstances,but most recent studies show that informal insurance arrangementsare often weak. Poor households, in particular, have substantialdifficulties coping with even local, idiosyncratic risks. Publicpolicy can help reduce vulnerability by encouraging private,flexible coping mechanisms while discouraging those that arefragile or that hinder economic and social mobility. Promisingpolicies include creating self-regulating workfare programsand providing a supportive setting for institutions workingto improve access to credit, crop and health insurance, andsafe and convenient saving opportunities.      

Infrastructure Privatization and Regulation: Promises and Perils

Infrastructure is crucial for generating growth, alleviatingpoverty, and increasing international competitiveness. For muchof the twentieth century and in most countries, the networkutilities that delivered infrastructure services—suchas electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railroads,and water supply—were vertically and horizontally integratedstate monopolies. But this approach often resulted in extremelyweak services, especially in developing and transition economiesand especially for poor people. Common problems included lowproductivity, high costs, bad quality, insufficient revenue,and shortfalls in investment. Over the past two decades manycountries have implemented far-reaching institutional reforms—restructuring,privatizing, and establishing new approaches to regulation.This article identifies the challenges involved in this massivepolicy redirection within the historical, economic, and institutionalcontext of developing and transition economies. It also reviewsthe outcomes of these policy changes, including their distributionalconsequences—especially for poor households and otherdisadvantaged groups. Drawing on a range of international experiencesand empirical studies, it recommends directions for future reformsand research to improve infrastructure performance.      

Choosing a System of Unemployment Income Support: Guidelines for Developing and Transition Countries

Mounting evidence suggests that excessive job protection reducesemployment and labor market flows, hinders technological innovations,pushes workers into the informal sector, and hurts vulnerablegroups by depriving them of job opportunities. Flexible labormarkets stimulate job creation, investment, and growth, butthey create job insecurity and displace some workers. How canthe costs of such insecurity and displacements be minimizedwhile ensuring that the labor market remains flexible? Eachof the main unemployment income support systems (unemploymentinsurance, unemployment assistance, unemployment insurance savingsaccounts, severance pay, and public works) has strengths andweaknesses. Country-specific conditions—chief among themlabor market and other institutions, the capacity to administereach type of system, and the size of the informal sector—determinewhich system is best suited to developing and transition countries.      

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND COMMERCIALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE: The Effect on the Poor

Do the economic gains brought by technological innovation andcommercialization in agriculture work their way through to thepoor? The prevailing optimistic view is that they do. But thisview is not universal: some hold that these forces for changecan interact with, or even induce, institutional and marketfailure, with adverse consequences for the poor. Adherents of the pessimistic view point to real-world instancesin which the poor have failed to reap the benefits, or evenhave lost, from the technological change or commercialization.Where these effects have occurred we find that they are mostlyattributable to inelastic demand or adverse institutional features;often, when technology or commercialization has been blamedfor the decline in income of the poor, other—not necessarilyconnected—policies have in fact been responsible for thedamage. This article contends that the optimistic view is, by and large,correct: normally, technology and commercialization stimulateagricultural growth, improve employment opportunities, and expandfood supply—all central to the alleviation of poverty.The evidence does not offer much encouragement to an extensionof this view—that through "social engineering" the benefitsfrom technology and commercialization can easily be targetedtoward the poor; the limited opportunities for such targetingshould of course be seized.      

Crisis, Adjustment, and Reform in Thailand's Industrial Firms

New data on Thailand's industrial firms shed light on the originsof the East Asian financial crisis and on the response of themanufacturing sector to the structural adjust-ment program supportedby the international financial institutions. Before the crisis,Thai firms had declining profitability, but they neverthelessmaintained high levels of investment, often in domesticallyoriented areas (notably the auto sector). Thai firms financedthese investments with short-term borrowing from financial institutions,which in turn borrowed short term on foreign markets. That only40 percent of firms provided audited financial statements totheir banks meant that the financial sector had poor informationfor assessing the true riskiness of these investments. The financialstructure was thus vulnerable even to small shocks. How well did the adjustment program deal with the crisis? Thaifirms had difficulty increasing their exports quickly becauseof investment in the wrong sectors, a decline in regional demand,and bottlenecks that included red tape and poor customs administration.Because of the poor export response, the brunt of adjustmenthad to come through compression of demand and of imports. Inretrospect, the macroeconomic program— which assumed quickexport recovery— was too tight.      

Social Risk Management: A New Conceptual Framework for Social Protection, and Beyond

This paper proposes a new definition and conceptual framework for Social Protection grounded in Social Risk Management. The concept repositions the traditional areas of Social Protection (labor market intervention, social insurance and social safety nets) in a framework that includes three strategies to deal with risk (prevention, mitigation and coping), three levels of formality of risk management (informal, market-based, public) and many actors (individuals, households, communities, NGOs, governments at various levels and international organizations) against the background of asymmetric information and different types of risk. This expanded view of Social Protection emphasizes the double role of risk management instruments—protecting basic livelihood as well as promoting risk taking. It focuses specifically on the poor since they are the most vulnerable to risk and typically lack appropriate risk management instruments, which constrains them from engaging in riskier but also higher return activities and hence gradually moving out of chronic poverty.     

住房公积金与家庭风险金融资产投资——基于2013年CHFS的实证研究

作为我国重要的住房保障制度,住房公积金对家庭风险金融资产投资的影响鲜有研究。本文基于中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)数据,采用probit和tobit模型,检验住房公积金对家庭风险金融资产投资的影响。实证结果表明,住房公积金能显著提高有房家庭风险金融资产投资的可能性和投资比重,但是对无房家庭的风险金融资产投资则无显著影响。研究其影响机制发现,住房公积金会提高家庭可支配收入、增加户主风险偏好,从而促进家庭风险金融资产投资。本文研究结论对完善住房公积金制度、引导居民家庭合理投资风险金融资产和实现多渠道增加居民财产性收入有借鉴意义。     

Insights on Development from the Economics of Happiness

The literature on the economics of happiness in developed economiesfinds discrepancies between reported measures of well-beingand income measures. One is the so-called Easterlin paradox:that average happiness levels do not increase as countries growwealthier. This article explores how that paradox—andsurvey research on reported well-being in general—canprovide insights into the gaps between standard measures ofeconomic development and individual assessments of welfare.Analysis of research on reported well-being in Latin Americaand Russia finds notable discrepancies between respondents’assessments of their own well-being and income- or expenditure-basedmeasures. Accepting a wide margin for error in both types ofmeasures, the article posits that taking such discrepanciesinto account may improve the understanding of development outcomesby providing a broader view on well-being than do income- orexpenditure-based measures alone. It suggests particular areaswhere research on reported well-being has the most potentialto contribute. Yet the article also notes that some interpretationsof happiness research—psychologists’ set point theory,in particular—may be quite limited in their applicationto development questions and cautions against the direct translationof results of happiness surveys into policy recommendations.      

房价预期与城镇居民家庭股市参与——理论探讨与微观经验证据

本文基于中国家庭金融调查数据,通过构建理论模型和实证检验分析了房价预期与家庭股市参与的关系,考察了行为金融偏差在房价预期影响股市参与过程中的作用,并根据背景风险、社会网络和户主特征进行异质性分析。结果表明:(1)房价上涨预期通过降低居民家庭的股票收益率预期和增加住房资产,进而降低居民家庭的股市参与概率和参与程度;(2)“心理账户”以及“有限关注”的存在显著弱化了房价上涨预期对家庭股市参与的负向作用;(3)房价上涨预期对股市参与概率和参与程度的负向作用在收入风险更高、健康状况更差、社会网络水平较低以及受教育程度偏低的家庭中更大。因此,稳定房价预期能够通过提升家庭股市参与,进而从需求角度促进股票市场的健康发展。     

The Politics of Russian Enterprise Reform: Insiders, Local Governments, and the Obstacles to Restructuring

Russia and other countries in the Commonwealth of IndependentStates that have implemented voucher privatization programshave to account for the puzzling behavior of insiders—manager-owners—who,in stripping assets from the firms they own, appear to be stealingfrom one pocket to fill the other. This article suggests thatasset stripping and the absence of restructuring result frominteractions between insiders and subnational governments ina particular property rights regime, in which the ability torealize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity. Asthe central institutions that govern the Russian economy haveceded their powers to the provinces, regional and local governmentshave imposed a variety of distortions on enterprises to protectlocal employment. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, this articlesconsiders three sets of institutional changes:; adjustmentsto the system of fiscal federalism by which subnational governmentswould be allowed to retain tax revenues generated locally; legalimprovements in the protection of property rights; and the provisionof mechanisms for restructuring and ownership transformationin insider-dominated firms. The aim of these reforms would beto change the incentives that local governments, owners, andinvestors face; to convince subnational governments that a moresustainable way of protecting employment lies in protectinglocal investment; to raise the cost of theft and corruptionby insiders and local officials; and to allow investors to acquirecontrolling stakes in viable firms.      

DEVELOPMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE SOCIAL RATE OF DISCOUNT

This article examines the role of the discount rate in makingdecisions that will have significant implications for the environment.The authors begin by providing a rationale for discounting ingeneral and by describing the main factors that determine thediscount rate. These factors—the private and social ratesof time preference, the opportunity cost of capital, risk anduncertainty, and the interests of future generations—allhave an environmental dimension. The article goes on to examinethat dimension and to explore the connections between the choiceof the discount rate and environmental concerns, such as excessiveexploitation of natural resources, inadequate investment inconservation, and insufficient attention to the irreversibleloss of certain environmental resources. The authors conclude that, in general, environmental concernsare not best addressed by lowering the discount rate—anaction that might have both benefits and costs for the environment.A more promising course would be to incorporate a criterionof sustainability into certain aspects of decisionmaking. Howsuch a criterion could be made operational is touched upon butnot developed in this article.      

INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND COMMODITY-LINKED FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This article provides a framework for appraising new financialinstruments and evaluating the extent to which they can helpalleviate problems of incomplete credit markets and contingentclaims markets in developing countries. Although the issuesinvolved apply to any new financial instrument, we give particularattention to commodity-linked securities because many developingcountries specialize in producing a handful of primary commoditiesand are therefore exposed to substantial commodity price risks.The article looks at the supply of, demand for, and pricingof commodity-linked securities and discusses some issues thataffect their use by developing countries: their special legalstatus as sovereign debt; their feasibility (since to becometruly effective they will require liquid secondary markets);and the construction of an optimal portfolio of external debtobligations. It also discusses the potential for new financialinstruments—particularly commodity-linked securities—asa tool for risk management in developing countries.      

Protecting the Vulnerable: the Tradeoff between Risk Reduction and Public Insurance

In a risky world should governments provide public goods thatreduce risk or compensate the victims of bad outcomes throughsocial insurance? This article examines a basic question indesigning social protection policies: how should a governmentallocate a fixed budget between these two activities? In thepresence of income and risk heterogeneities a simple publicinsurance scheme that pays a fixed benefit to all householdsthat suffer a negative shock is an effective redistributionalinstrument of public policy. This is true even when a well functioningprivate insurance market exists, and so the role of public insuranceis not to correct a market failure. In fact, the existence ofa private insurance market means that the public system hasdesirable targeting properties—all but the poor and high-risktake up private insurance. The provision of public goods thatreduce risk for all should therefore be complemented with publicinsurance that (automatically) benefits those who are especiallyvulnerable.     

Principles of Financial Regulation: A Dynamic Portfolio Approach

Economists seeking explanations for the global financial crisisof 1997–99 are reaching consensus that a major factorwas weak financial institutions, which resulted in part frominadequate government regulations. At the same time many developingcountries are struggling with an overregulated financial system—onethat stifles innovation and the flow of credit to new entrepreneursand that can stunt the growth of well-established firms. Inparticular, too many countries are relying excessively on capitaladequacy standards, which are inefficient and sometimes counterproductive.The author argues that financial systems can be reformed successfullyusing a "dynamic portfolio approach" aimed at managing the incentivesand constraints that affect not only financial institutions'exposure to risk but also their ability to cope with it. Thearticle sets out general principles of financial regulationand shows how the dynamic portfolio approach can help countriesdeal with the special problems that arise during the transitionto a more liberalized economy as well as those that arise indealing with a financial crisis similar to the 1997 crisis inEast Asia.      

Hedging Housing Risk in London

This paper investigates the benefits of allowing households to compensate the portfolio distortion due to their housing consumption through investments in housing price derivatives. Focusing on the London market, we show that a major loss from over-investment in housing is that households are forced to hold a very risky portfolio. However, the strong performance of the London housing market means that little is lost in terms of expected returns. Even households with limited wealth are better off owning their home rather than renting and investing in financial assets, as long as they are willing to face the financial risk involved. In this context, access to housing price derivatives would benefit most poor homeowners looking to limit their risk exposure. It would also benefit wealthier investors looking for the high returns provided by housing investments without the costs of direct ownership of properties. Comparisons with French, Swedish and U.S. data provide a broader perspective on our findings.     

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE: A SURVEY

For many developing countries, alternative forms of externalfinance—all forms of finance that are not guaranteed byor mediated through the public sector—have become increasinglyimportant as traditional financing to the public sector hasebbed. Yet a survey of the literature reveals few recent analyticalinsights about alternative financing, which includes foreigndirect investment, project lending, portfolio investment, closed-endequity funds, private nonguaranteed debt, licensing, joint ventures,quasi-equity contracts, and other forms of private, nonrecourselending to private borrowers. The literature offers little solidguidance for distinguishing between alternative and traditionalfinancing with respect to country risk, for establishing themost appropriate and efficient incentive structures and restrictionsin the host country, or for identifying the optimal financingmodes for international firms investing in developing countries.This gap in the analytical literature has important implicationsfor policy formulation. It is not always clear whether a countryis developing incentives and establishing safeguards (for ensuringadherence to project performance requirements) that are mosteffective in attracting alternative forms of finance.      

Counting the World's Poor: Problems and Possible Solutions

As recent discussions have made clear, the apparent lack ofpoverty reduction in the face of historically high rates ofeconomic growth—both in the world as a whole and in specificcountries (most notably India)—provides fuel for the argumentthat economic growth does little to reduce poverty. How confidentcan we be that the data actually support these inferences? Atthe international level, the regular revision of purchasingpower parity exchange rates plays havoc with the poverty estimates,changing them in ways that have little or nothing to do withthe actual experience of the poor. At the domestic level, theproblems in measuring poverty are important not only for theworld count but also for tracking income poverty within individualcountries. Yet, in many countries, there are large and growingdiscrepancies between the survey data—the source of povertycounts—and the national accounts—the source of themeasure of economic growth. Thus economic growth, as measured,has at best a weak relationship with poverty, as measured.      

REFORMING FINANCE IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIALIST ECONOMIES

Financial reforms initiated in most transitional socialist economiesdo not yet adequately provide many of the financial servicesassociated with market-oriented financial systems. Such services—mobilizingresources, selecting firms and allocating capital, monitoringfirm managers, and facilitating the management of transactionsand risk—are a necessary condition for economic reformto improve living standards. This article envisages four central strategies to guide reformof the financial sector: • Building an infrastructure based on clear and enforceableproperty rights, modern accounting and auditing standards, reliablepayments systems, sound prudential and enforcement regulations,and professionals trained in finance • Ending the shell game of trying to hide the losses ofstate-owned enterprises, and separating government decisionsto finance "priority" firms from the allocation decisions ofindependent financial institutions • Privatizing some financial institutions early—althoughnot necessarily precipitously—in concert with the privatizationof firms and supervisory capabilities, meanwhile cleaning upbank loans to maximize the chances that firms and banks willsucceed as private entities • Improving the tax system and stressing a prudent interestrate policy to reduce uncertainty, distortions, and excessiverepression of the financial sector.