Managerial Conservatismand Rational Information Acquisition

Managerial behavior that is rational and profit-maximizing sometimes will seem to be overly conservative. If the valuation of innovations contains white noise and the status quo would be preferred to random innovation, then any innovation that does not appear substantially better than the status quo should be rejected, for reasons arising from regression toward the mean. The more successful the firm, the higher is the optimal acceptance threshold and conservative bias. Other things equal, more successful firms will spend less on research, adopt fewer innovations, and be less likely to advance the industry's best practice.     

Managerial Incentives for Takeovers

The paper studies managerial incentives in a model where managers choose product market strategies and make takeover decisions. The equilibrium contract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under either quantity or price Competition. This result contrasts with previous findings in the literature, and hinges on the fact that when managers are more aggressive, rival firms earn lower profits and thus are willing to sell out at a lower price. However, as a side effect of such a contract, the manager might undertake unprofitable takeovers.     

基于不对称信息的工程监理激励机制研究

我国工程监理行业经过了二十多年的发展已经取得了不小的成就,但在实际操作运行过程中由于信息不对称现象的存在,从而产生很多问题,限制了监理的功能发挥。信息不对称情况下,业主在工程监理过程中承担着监理方带来的道德风险,而这种道德风险则可以通过激励机制和监督机制来解决。     

上市公司管理层股权激励研究的近期进展

基于坚实的理论基础和丰富的数据支持,有关管理者股权激励问题的研究获得迅速发展。对股权激励问题开展研究不仅有助于更有效合理地设计管理层股权激励契约、缓和委托代理问题,还有利于充分揭示股权激励实施过程中可能产生的负面影响。本文对近年来海外研究上市公司管理层股权激励的进展进行综述,主要包括管理层股权激励的理论基础、股权激励的业绩效应、股权激励对公司盈余管理,以及股东价值和债权人价值的影响等方面的内容,以期为我国加强这方面的研究与实践探索提供参考。     

Antitrust Compliance: Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behavior

This article analyzes a manager's incentives to establish and sustain an illegal collusive agreement if her firm is subject to profit shocks, if her utility function is concave in profits (e.g., because of risk aversion), and if she incurs opportunity costs (e.g., by violating a social norm). The model supports the empirical observation that if collusion is to be established and sustained in a state with low profits, then this state must be quite persistent. It also indicates that compliance with antitrust laws can be ensured best by combining a zero tolerance policy with a strategy of forgiveness. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

上市公司管理层股权激励研究的近期进展

基于坚实的理论基础和丰富的数据支持,有关管理者股权激励问题的研究获得迅速发展。对股权激励问题开展研究不仅有助于更有效合理地设计管理层股权激励契约、缓和委托代理问题,还有利于充分揭示股权激励实施过程中可能产生的负面影响。本文对近年来海外研究上市公司管理层股权激励的进展进行综述,主要包括管理层股权激励的理论基础、股权激励的业绩效应、股权激励对公司盈余管理,以及股东价值和债权人价值的影响等方面的内容,以期为我国加强这方面的研究与实践探索提供参考。     

Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives

We posit that the value of a manager's human capital depends on the firm's business strategy. The resulting interaction between business strategy and managerial incentives affects the organization of business activities. We illustrate the impact of this interaction on firm boundaries in a dynamic agency model. There may be disadvantages in merging two firms even when such a merger allows the internalization of externalities between the two firms. Merging, by making unprofitable certain decisions, increases the cost of inducing managerial effort. This incentive cost is a natural consequence of the manager's business-strategy-specific human capital.     

企业扩张、激励不足与管理层在职消费

管理层获取私人收益的动机是影响企业投资决策行为的重要因素。以我国上市公司高管薪酬制度改革为背景,考察了企业扩张行为对管理层在职消费的影响及其可能引发的后果。研究发现,企业扩张与管理层在职消费显著正相关,并且随着企业扩张程度的增大,管理层在职消费占其总收益的比重提高;进一步地,当管理层货币薪酬低于同行业-规模可比公司管理层薪酬水平中位数时,管理层通过企业扩张获得的在职消费越多,并且负向的同行薪酬差距越大,企业扩张与管理层在职消费的正向关系越显著。研究结果表明,管理层通过企业扩张增加了在职消费,改变了自身的报酬结构,在避免引起公众非议及薪酬管制的同时确保了自身收益的增加及持续增长,而薪酬激励不足引发的不公平感知及攀比心理进一步增强了管理层借企业扩张获取在职消费的动机。     

Implicit Contracts, Managerial Incentives, and Financial Structure

This paper examines how managers may be given incentives to exert effort, and to implement efficient implicit contracts with workers. Under certain assumptions, this can be achieved by tying managerial compensation to shareholder value. However, if reputation effects are weak, it is more efficient to adopt an incentive scheme in which the manager is punished by outside investor intervention when performance falls below a critical level, and otherwise retains control, receiving a fixed reward. The required form of outside intervention can be implemented through a financial structure combining hard debt with a dispersed ownership structure.     

The Incentives for Innovative Activity in the Managerial Firm

This paper discusses the incentives for innovation by a manager‐led firm. In particular, it is investigated how remuneration practices influence the choice of a risky project. In the first place, a dynamic model with uncertainty is used to determine the optimal employment level with exogenous growth and risk. In the second part of the paper, growth and risk are explained by R&D expenditures. Optimal investment expenditures for R&D are derived for (i) the profit‐maximizing firm and (ii) the managerial firm, where the manager receives a fixed salary as well as a variable share of profits. If risk neutrality is assumed, then no difference exists. However, if risk aversion is considered, the managerial firm will invest more into R&D than the owner‐led company. Size‐related salaries are an additional reason for higher expenditures of R&D by managers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于信息熵赋权的经营业绩指标评价模型

根据评价者需要，选取若干企业(或上市公司)作为被评价系统，建立一种企业经营业绩评价系统的多级多指标决策模型。该模型是在数理统计意义下将每个指标值进行标准规范化处理，用低级指标值通过信息熵自动赋权严生高一级指标值逐级递推，最后给出每个企业相对被评价系统的“理论分布得分”及“直观比较得分”。     

Information Management and Incentives

We ask how the incentives of an agent are affected by an information management system that lets the agent receive information about the performance of a colleague before (“transparent firm”) rather than after he provides effort (“nontransparent firm”). Transparency is detrimental for incentives if the performance of the colleague provides information on the relative impact of the agent’s effort on his success probability. The findings imply that firms in which comparisons between employees play a minor role for compensation are transparent. Firms in which they play a major role sometimes choose to be nontransparent despite the flexibility gains transparency provides.     

But Is It Myopia? Risk Aversion and the Efficiency of Stock‐Based Managerial Incentives

This paper points out that stock incentives do not lead to myopia unless they result in more emphasis on the short-term than would occur under an optimal contract. It shows that myopia findings relative to the standard used throughout the literature (first-best efficiency) are often reversed when evaluated relative to the relevant standard of optimal contracting. Results reported by the previous literature to be myopia often in fact have excessive emphasis on the long-term. The paper solves in closed-form for the region in parameter space which gives rise to these reversals and shows that it can be arbitrarily large .     

基于绩效评价的员工激励研究

当前,人力资源管理的战略导向性愈益明显。由于人的复杂性、社会分工的加深和交易的频繁性,激励机制设计一直是信息经济学和人力资源管理实践关注的重要问题。本文在分析经典代理模型基础上,逐步释放假设,分别基于客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价分析了企业最优激励的选择。研究结论认为,企业在实践中要综合考虑客观绩效评价和主观绩效评价的结果来设计激励制度,正式契约可以通过前者来降低由关系契约产生的额外激励成本和违约风险,关系契约则通过后者减少正式契约产生的激励扭曲问题。     

基于模糊综合评价的国有企业薪酬激励研究

国有企业薪酬管理存在着基础薄弱、政企不分、薪酬水平偏低等一系列问题,导致员工工作积极性不高。本文利用多级模糊综合评价方法对国有企业员工绩效进行评价,根据员工绩效评价等级来确定薪酬活动范围,并试着探索建立一种更加灵活的薪酬管理制度——同岗不同酬,实现国有企业的有效薪酬激励。     

Customer Information Sharing: Strategic Incentives and New Implications

We study oligopolistic firms' incentives to share customer information about past purchase history when firms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer considers the product offerings as complements or substitutes. We show that both the incentive to share customer information and its effects on consumers depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complementary and substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences. This paper has important implications for merger analysis when the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another firm's customer lists. Our analysis also suggests a new role of middlemen as information aggregators.     

基于web的招聘信息采集方法研究

怎样可以快速获取到各大门户招聘网站最新的招聘信息,为在校大学生提供有力的就业帮助是一个值得我们关注的问题。因此,本文通过对大学生就业信息来源途径以及网页结构特点进行了分析研究和对比,从而提出了基于web的信息招聘信息采集系统思路。     

Providing Managerial Accounting Information in the Presence of a Supplier

Abstract

This paper identifies a novel effect which is crucial for the design of a management accounting information system. In contrast to prior literature, we explicitly model the firm's relationship to a supplier. We show that in addition to the previously identified trade-off – benefits of more information versus indirect or direct (agency) costs of information acquisition – another effect occurs: the input price effect. This effect influences the optimal design of the management accounting information system and changes the regimes where information acquisition is optimal for the principal. Also, in case of endogenous input prices we demonstrate that – perhaps surprisingly – paying an information rent to the agent can be beneficial because it works as a commitment towards an over-charging supplier to exploit the input price effect.     

Information Acquisition and Choice Under Uncertainty

This paper presents a model where individuals have imperfect information and there is an opportunity cost of learning. It shows that the endogenous decision to collect costly information before taking an action has a systematic effect on choices. More precisely, consider two alternatives with ex ante identical expected payoff but different variances. The model predicts that, after the learning process is stopped, a majority of individuals will select the alternative with largest payoff-variance. The result persists when agents have multiple sources of information. Applications to entrepreneurial investments, composition of advisory committees, and judicial decision-making are discussed.