Entry into Banking Markets and the Early-Mover Advantage

Using a sample for 1972–2002 with over 10,000 bank entries into local markets, we find a market share advantage for early entrants. In particular, the earlier a bank enters, the larger is its market share relative to other banks, controlling for firm, market, and time effects, with a market share advantage for early movers between 1 and 15 percentage points, depending on the order of entry. The strongest early-mover advantage is for banks that were in our sample in 1972 and survive into the 1990s. Moreover, early entrants appear to have such hold in the market by strategically investing in larger branch networks. Even controlling for the potential survivorship bias, we find that a bank's share decreases by 0.1 percentage points for a change in its order of entry from n th to ( n + 1)th. High growth markets show a smaller difference between late and early movers, consistent with a larger fraction of consumers yet to be locked in with a bank in these markets.     

Informational Frictions and Commodity Markets

This paper develops a model with a tractable log‐linear equilibrium to analyze the effects of informational frictions in commodity markets. By aggregating dispersed information about the strength of the global economy among goods producers whose production has complementarity, commodity prices serve as price signals to guide producers' production decisions and commodity demand. Our model highlights important feedback effects of informational noise originating from supply shocks and futures market trading on commodity demand and spot prices. Our analysis illustrates the weakness common in empirical studies on commodity markets of assuming that different types of shocks are publicly observable to market participants.     

Entry Decisions and Adverse Selection: An Empirical Analysis of Local Credit Markets

During the last decades there has been a widespread relaxation of legal entry barriers into the banking industry, with potential benefits for financial integration and competition. Obstacles to banks geographical and business expansion have been removed and branching has been substantially liberalized. This paper analyses the determinants of entry decisions into local credit markets using a unique data set before and after deregulation of the Italian banking industry. We estimate an entry model à la Poisson and find evidence that spreads between loan and deposit rates drive entry only for newly chartered banks, but does not affect the decision to open branches of banks operating in other markets. Branching by outside banks is instead positively correlated with business opportunities in the provision of financial services which do not require the acquisition of substantial proprietary information. Both these results are consistent with the hypothesis that in credit markets incumbents have an informational advantage over new entrants.     

Informational Black Holes in Financial Markets

We show that information aggregation in primary financial markets fails precisely when investors hold socially useful information for screening projects. Being wary of the Winner's Curse, less optimistic investors refrain from making financing offers, since their offers would be accepted only when a project is unviable. Their information is therefore lost. The Winner's Curse and associated information loss grow with the number of informed market participants, so that larger markets can lead to worse financing decisions and higher cost of capital for firms seeking financing. Precommitment to ration fundraising allocations, collusive club bidding, and shorting markets can mitigate the inefficiency.     

Trade Credit and Informational Asymmetry

Commonly used trade credit terms implicitly define a high interest rate that operates as an efficient screening device where information about buyer default risk is asymmetrically held. By offering trade credit, a seller can identify prospective defaults more quickly than if financial institutions were the sole providers of short-term financing. The information is valuable in cases where the seller has made nonsalvageable investments in buyers since it enables the seller to take actions to protect such investments.     

Informational Frictions and the Credit Crunch

In this paper, I estimate the magnitude of an informational friction limiting credit reallocation to firms during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis. Because lenders rely on private information when deciding which relationship to end, borrowers looking for a new lender are adversely selected. I show how to separately identify private information from information common to all lenders but unobservable to the econometrician by using bank shocks within a discrete choice model of relationships. Quantitatively, these informational frictions appear to be too small to explain the credit crunch in the U.S. syndicated corporate loan market.     

Disruption and Credit Markets

We show that over the past half-century, innovative disruptions were central to understanding corporate defaults. In a given year, industries experiencing abnormally high venture capital or initial public offering activity subsequently see higher default rates, higher segment exits by conglomerates, and higher yields on bonds issued by the firms in these industries. Overall, we find that disruption is a broad phenomenon, negatively affecting incumbent firms across the spectrum of age, valuation, and levers, with the exception of very large and low-leverage firms, in line with our central hypothesis.     

Recent Developments in Credit Markets

We summarize recent developments in the credit derivative markets. We show the role of dependence between individual debtors in portfolio derivatives in a study of implied correlation. The risk of changing dependence structures between stock and bond markets becomes evident in an example of capital structure arbitrage. How credit derivatives can introduce new risks is illustrated by the example of “overlay” in basket derivatives.     

Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets

A major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowersexercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihoodof repayment is enhanced. One partial solution is peer monitoring:having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrowerbe required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt.Peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financialperformance of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and of similargroup lending programs elsewhere. But peer monitoring has acost. It transfers risk from the bank, which is in a betterposition to bear risk, to the cosigner. In a simple model ofpeer monitoring in a competitive credit market, this articledemonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvementin borrowers' welfare.     

Catastrophic Risk and Credit Markets

We provide a model of the effects of catastrophic risk on real estate financing and prices and demonstrate that insurance market imperfections can restrict the supply of credit for catastrophe-susceptible properties. Using unique micro-level data, we find that earthquake risk decreased commercial real estate bank loan provision by 22% in California properties in the 1990s, with more severe effects in African–American neighborhoods. We show that the 1994 Northridge earthquake had only a short-term disruptive effect. Our basic findings are confirmed for hurricane risk, and our model and empirical work have implications for terrorism and political perils.     

Information Sharing in Credit Markets

We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market, and to advances in information technology; such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants. In addition, information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market. These predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market.     

Dynamic Asset Allocation and the Informational Efficiency of Markets

Markets have an allocational role; even in the absence of news about payoffs, prices change to facilitate trade and allocate resources to their best use. Allocational price changes create noise in the signal extraction process, and markets where such trading is important are markets in which we may expect to find a failure of informational efficiency. An important source of allocational trading is the use of dynamic trading strategies caused by the incomplete equitization of risks. Incomplete equitization causes trade. Trade implies the inefficiency of passive strategies, thus requiring investors to determine whether price changes are informational or allocational.     

Futures Markets and Informational Efficiency: A Laboratory Examination

Through the use of laboratory market methodology, the effect of a futures market on the time path of asset prices is studied and competing models of asset pricing are analyzed. With replication of market conditions, the predictions of a rational expectations equilibrium model are relatively accurate whether or not futures markets are present. However, the presence of futures markets increases the speed with which an efficient equilibrium is achieved. While this more rapid adjustment can increase the variance of spot market prices as they move to equilibrium, this increased variance reflects efficiency gains due to better information.     

中国保险资金直接入市的必要性和可行性分析

随着中国加入WTO的步伐加快，中国保险业面临着越来越严峻的经营危机，从而中国保险资金直接入市将成为当前化解中国保险业经营危机的有效途径。     

对银行业市场进入壁垒的分析与思考

市场进入壁垒的构成以及程度大小是重要的产业结构特征，可以影响产业的市场结构、竞争程度以及市场效率，影响进入这个市场的企业的各种行为。本文主要分析了银行业市场进入壁垒的类型以及影响，对我国银行业市场进入壁垒的设定以及降低提出了自己的看法。     

Interest Rates in Trade Credit Markets

All things equal, interest rates should increase with the borrower's risk. And yet, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) cannot find such a positive relation in a broad sample of trade credit contracts. We shed some light on this puzzle by arguing that competition between informed and uninformed suppliers weakens the link between the trade credit cost and the borrower's creditworthiness. Our model implies that trade credit rates are more likely to increase with the borrower's risk if suppliers are less profitable, have high cost of funds, or sell inputs to firms plagued by moral hazard and financial distress.     

Agency Theory and Entry Barriers in Banking

Agency theory suggests that, in imperfect labor and capital markets, managers will seek to maximize their own utility at the expense of corporate shareholders. Indicators of such managerial behavior may include expense preferencing in which some factor costs are elevated above optimal levels needed for efficient production or avoidance of optimal risk positions that maximize wealth opportunities for stockholders. This study of more than 6400 banks finds that recent reductions in legal entry barriers have generated results generally consistent with agency theory with a lowering of noninterest operating expenses, increased employee productivity, increased acceptance of portfolio risk, and greater dividend rates to shareholders.     

Asset Measurement in Imperfect Credit Markets

How should a firm measure a productive asset used as collateral? To answer this question, we develop a model in which firms borrow funds subject to collateral constraints. We characterize the qualities of optimal asset measurements and analyze their interactions with financing needs, collateral constraints, and interest rates. Because of real effects, complete transparency would reduce contracting efficiency and, hence, the measurement must be suitably adapted to credit conditions. The optimal measurement is asymmetric and reports precise information about high collateral values if credit frictions are low, but the reverse if credit frictions are high. Tighter credit market conditions may lead to more opaque measurements and increased investment, in the form of inefficient continuations.     

从花旗银行在中国市场的作为看中资银行入世后的竞争策略

通过对花旗银行的“国际惯例”本土化策略分析，指出不能一味推崇“国际惯例”，一些适合中国本土的东西有必要继续发扬光大；通过分析花旗银行的客户竞争、资产业务竞争、中间业务竞争、企业品牌形象的打造及其在中国市场的逐步资本渗透等种种行为，一方面向读展示外资银行的全方位市场攻略。同时，也预示了即将到来的强大竞争压力。     

Financial Markets Where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices

We model a financial market where some traders of a risky asset do not fully appreciate what prices convey about others' private information. Markets comprising solely such “cursed” traders generate more trade than those comprising solely rationals. Because rationals arbitrage away distortions caused by cursed traders, mixed markets can generate even more trade. Per‐trader volume in cursed markets increases with market size; volume may instead disappear when traders infer others' information from prices, even when they dismiss it as noisier than their own. Making private information public raises rational and “dismissive” volume, but reduces cursed volume given moderate noninformational trading motives.