Escaping financial crises? Macro evidence from sovereign wealth funds' investment behaviour

This paper investigates the determinants of the investment activity of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) at a macro level, with special emphasis on the possible reaction to a financial crisis in a potential target economy. The analysis relies upon a specially built proprietary database, which encompasses 1,903 acquisition deals spanning the period 1995–2010 and involving 29 out of the 79 existing SWFs. According to a three-step modelling approach, we find that this class of investors prefers to invest in countries with a higher degree of economic development, larger and more liquid financial markets, institutions that offer better protection of legal rights, and a more stable macroeconomic environment. Most importantly, and in stark contrast with the existing empirical literature on other major institutional investors, SWFs seem to engage in ‘contrarian’ investment behaviour, i.e. increasing their acquisitions in countries where crises hit. The results are shown to be valid if we consider both the likelihood of a country being the target of SWFs' investments and the amount SWFs choose to invest in each country. Capital flows stemming from SWFs' acquisition activity worldwide may therefore have a stabilizing effect on local markets during periods of financial turmoil, protecting the targeted countries from foreign shocks instead of propagating them globally.     

Sovereign Wealth Funds: Investment and Governance Practices

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are large, growing, and concentrated investment vehicles, with a current estimated value of U.S. $3 trillion. The combination of low transparency and government ownership has raised questions about political agendas, national security, and transfers of technology. In this article the authors report on the current status of SWFs in terms of investments, regulation, governance, and transparency of activities. They also review some recent studies on SWF investments and their impact on financial markets.     

Capability and need: A framework for understanding why states create sovereign wealth funds

Over the past half‐century, roughly one‐quarter of states in the international system have created sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). As a case of sovereign states investing public wealth mostly in private markets across borders, it is not altogether clear why SWFs have proliferated to this extent. What explains their spread in recent decades? In this paper, I build on a multidisciplinary literature that conceives of SWFs as a type of insurance against external risk and argue that middle economic powers that are highly exposed in global trade and capital markets are the states most likely to establish these institutions. Such states possess both the capability to create an SWF of a size sufficient to insure against risk and the need for the insurance function of a SWF by virtue of their relatively vulnerable position in the global economy. To evaluate my argument, I rely on a data set consisting of all states in the international system from 1950 to 2012 including the 48 SWFs created during that period. I find that middle economic powers with high degrees of trade and capital openness are the states most likely to create SWFs.     

Sovereign wealth funds investment effects on target firms' competitors

We investigate the impact of sovereign wealth funds acquisitions (SWFs) on the performance of target firms' competitors. We find a positive and significant impact of SWFs acquisitions on target firms' competitors. This means that market participants anticipate value creation in the targets competitors, due to likely expected restructuring activities. Further analysis shows that relatively large rivals, low leveraged rivals, rivals with highly correlated returns with those of their corresponding targets, rivals in less competitive industries show higher abnormal returns upon the acquisition announcement. Our results question the rationality of protectionism as legal barriers to sovereign wealth funds cross-border investments.     

Do investment determinants and effects vary across sovereign wealth fund categories? A firm-level analysis

This paper investigates whether determinants and effects of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) investment vary across types of funds. To address this issue, we classify SWFs based on their scope and the origin of wealth. We find that saving and reserve funds and non-commodity funds pick better-performing firms. Furthermore, effects vary among SWF categories. In fact, saving and reserve funds assume a passive role in managing investments, unlike multi-objective and development funds which have detrimental effects on the target companies. As a whole, these findings confirm that heterogeneity of SWFs in terms of how they target firms and activism matters.     

Sovereign wealth fund governance and national culture

As sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are owned and directed by sovereign governments which often have non-economic strategic motives and concomitant lack of transparency, there is much confusion, suspicion, and concern regarding the purpose of their investments. Strategic or non-economic motives for SWF investments are usually conveyed via respective governing boards of directors. Therefore, there is much need for understanding SWF governance. Using data for 49 large SWFs globally, we document significant and economically important evidence of the impact of national culture on SWF governance. Even when controlling for the quality of respective national governance, we find that poorer SWF governance is associated with the cultural dimensions of power distance, individualism, and most likely masculinity; while better SWF governance is associated with long-term orientation, indulgence and uncertainty avoidance. These results are consistent with what others have noted: good governance means different institutional dynamics in different countries (cultures). We also find that SWF governance is negatively associated with greater investment in foreign assets. Policy makers, capital-market participants, and managers will be interested in these results, as SWFs have become large and important global investors.     

The future of swiss asset management: A look in the crystal ball

Until recently, Switzerland had an unmatched reputation for the quality of its banking services. Based on a secular tradition of security and a strict banking secrecy enforced by law, Swiss banks have established themselves as leaders in discretionary asset management. Recent studies estimate that about 35 percent of the private off-shore wealth is managed in Switzerland. At the end of 1996, asset management in Switzerland represented about 2.5 trillion Swiss francs (about $2 trillion), provided 3.5 percent of the total added value in the country, and contributed 4.44 billion Swiss francs in taxes, making it one of Switzerland's major sector of activity. But the traditional paradigm on which asset management is based in Switzerland–confidentiality, conservatism, and safety–is undergoing rapid change. Have the profound changes which transformed the banking industry and its production structures over the past several years ended? This is the subject of a large study we carried out with the Institute of Banking and Financial Management at HEC-University of Lausanne. This survey provides an unbiased global reference and a neutral benchmark describing the current state of the Swiss asset management industry. It should help the assessment of specific strategies before considering implementations issues. This interview article contains part of the survey results and identifies a few factors that could prolong the industrial revolution underway. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

美国对外贸易的理念和货物贸易的基本格局

自由贸易是美国对外贸易的基本理念。贸易自由化是战后美国对外贸易政策的基本特征,原因在于贸易自由化每年给美国带来1万亿美元左右的收益。对美国货物贸易的基本格局可以从五个方面认识:美国是世界上进出口规模最大的国家;美国进口规模比出口规模对世界经济的影响更大;美国是世界上最大的贸易逆差国,享受了世界最多的物质财富;美国贸易条件的变动表明对外贸易格局有利于美国;美国进口规模扩大与产业结构升级的结合演变为美国结构性增长优势。     

The Potential for a Sovereign Wealth Fund to Acquire and Exert Influence Over the Eurozone

Intereconomics - The financial clout of the world’s sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) is massive, and many of these are controlled by authoritarian regimes. It cannot be ruled out that these...     

The Payoff to America from Globalisation

This article summarizes the economic payoff to the United States from its postwar trade opening and estimates the potential future gains from more opening going forward. To quantify these gains, we survey different methodologies and estimates. We find that trade opening since World War II has added between $800 billion to $1.4 trillion to the US economy, or about $7,000 to $13,000 per household. More speculative estimates of the potential additional gains from removing the rest of US trade barriers range from $400 billion to $1.3 trillion, or about $4,000 to $12,000 per household. Since trade opening permanently raises national income, these gains are enjoyed annually. Trade opening inevitably entails adjustment costs. We estimate that the lifetime cost of all worker dislocations that have been triggered by expanded trade in the United States could be as high as $54 billion, although probably less. The permanent gains from past and potential liberalization easily swamp the modest sums necessary to alleviate the temporary pains of adjustment. In the future as in the past, free trade can significantly raise income – and quality of life – in America.     

An Overview of the U.S. Regulated Fund Industry

The largest segment of the asset management business in the United States is registered investment companies (regulated funds). This article focuses on U.S. regulated investment companies—mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, closed-end funds, and unit investment trusts. These funds manage more than $17 trillion of assets, largely on behalf of U.S. investors. The industry has experienced strong growth over the past quarter century from asset appreciation and strong demand from households due to rising household wealth, the aging of the U.S. population, and the evolution of employer-based retirement systems. Price competition and supply-side product innovations and efficiencies have reduced the average price that investors pay for fund services.     

Mapping the trading behavior of the middle class in emerging markets: Evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange

Predicted to grow above 4.9 billion by 2030, with an overall spending capacity of $56 trillion, the rise of the middle class in emerging markets has attracted global practitioner and academic attention. How this new wealth will be invested is a central question; yet our understanding still remains fragmented. Drawing on the literatures of international business, behavioral economics and finance and using high-frequency stock market data, we examine and map the trading behavior of the middle class in Turkey, one of the fastest rising economic powers of the East. We find that middle class traders exhibit discernible differences to professionals, with respect to risk attitudes and stock preferences (e.g. prefer lower-risk, smaller-size and ‘value’ stocks). In addition, while they typically hold small portfolios and tend to realize lower gains than professionals, their role has become considerably influential to the direction of the entire market.     

Connecting U.S. Health Expenditures with the Health Sector Workforce

The National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA) produced by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services report that U.S. health care spending was $2.6 trillion in 2010. More recent estimates from Altarum Institute confirm that the health sector represents 17.9 percent of our national output. The data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that the health sector continued to create jobs throughout the recession and recovery and now accounts for nearly one in nine jobs. For the first time, we link the workforce by occupation to national spending on health care services by aligning data sets from the BLS and Bureau of Economic Analysis with the NHEA. We find $1 trillion, or 57 percent of the $1.78 trillion spent on personal health care services, went to health sector labor. Characterizing the health sector workforce and its contribution to health expenditures informs the potential for spending reductions and the implications of such reductions on employment.     

As the dollar sinks,will the yuan float?

Many scholars believe with the United States' increasing debt, the global position of the dollar is weakening. As the dollar declines, China, now the largest holder of U.S. dollars in the world, is understandably concerned. China's controversial peg to the U.S. dollar, combined with its $2.4 trillion in foreign reserves and trade imbalances, is debated daily by politicians and economists. This article presents arguments for and against the current China monetary policy in economic and political contexts. Statements from China's leaders, other global leaders, and economists are reviewed. Economic and political obstacles and incentives in the context of their influence on the China government are considered. Finally, milestones for business leaders to look for are suggested to help determine China's possible path to a fully convertible yuan. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

A new look at faith-based marketing: The global halal market

Faith-based marketing, or addressing consumers’ religious sensibilities with faith-friendly offerings, represents a new wave of growth for companies. While kosher goods and Christian movies are well-known examples of this trend, companies continue to overlook opportunities for growing faith-based segments. Representing the fastest-growing faith-based consumer group in the world, Muslims, in particular, are a largely untapped segment. Forward-looking companies such as Nestlé, Walmart, and McDonald's consider this segment as the next ‘one-billion’ market, after China and India, and are developing strategies to appeal to the Muslim consumer. We focus on the key to tapping into the sizable Muslim spending power: halal marketing. Contrary to common belief, halal marketing is not confined to dietary goods. Rather, it pertains to a diverse range of offerings from cosmetics to tourism that represents a global market worth $2.1 trillion annually. Modern interpretations of halal echo the claims of organic and fair-trade industries, broadening the appeal of halal to mainstream consumers. Despite the vast opportunities in halal marketing, winning the pocketbooks of Muslim consumers involves cultural, operational, and geopolitical challenges. We provide an overview of this emerging market and offer five lessons for successful halal marketing.     

The role of venture capital in financing small business

Venture capital is a primary and unique source of funding for small firms because these firms (with sales and/or assets under $5 million) have very limited access to traditional capital markets. Venture capital is a substitute, but not a perfect substitute, for trade credit, bank credit, and other forms of financing for small firms. Small businesses are not likely to be successful in attracting venture capital unless the firms have the potential to provide extraordinary returns to the venture capitalist.This study provides an analysis of a survey of venture capital firms that participate in small business financing. The survey participants are venture capital firms that were 1986 members of the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), the largest venture capital association in the United States.The average size of the venture capital firms responding to the survey is $92 million dollars in assets, with a range from $600 thousand to $500 million. Twenty-three percent of the respondents have total assets below $20 million, and 27% have assets above $100 million.The venture capitalists' investment (assets held) in small firms delineate the supply of venture capital to small firms. Sixty-three of the 92 venture capitalists' have more than 70% of their assets invested in small firms.The venture capitalists were asked how their investment plans might change with changes in the tax law that were projected in the spring of 1986. Fifty-four percent expected to increase their investments in small firms, and 38% did not expect to change these activities.Venture capitalists are very selective in allocating their resources. The average number of annual requests that a venture capitalist receives is 652, and the median number is 500: only 11.5 of the respondents receive more than 1,000 proposals per year.     

Sovereign wealth funds: National security risks in a global free trade environment

The proliferation of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) has resulted in an unstable political, legal, and regulatory environment for this form of foreign direct investment (FDI). This article explains SWF growth over the last half‐century; discusses issues surrounding SWF “transparency” and host‐country national security risk; reviews the legal and regulatory structures governing FDI in major national economies; examines proposed regulatory approaches to structure the FDI environment; and concludes with a discussion of SWF regulatory policy recommendations addressing corporate governance principles, national security restrictions on equity investment, and investment reciprocity, and suggests recommendations for executives considering engaging an SWF investment partner. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Summer Davos,Bridge Between Dalian and the World ——Interview of NPC Deputy,Xia Deren

During the interview, NPC Deputy and Mayor of Dalian City, Xia Deren said that the World Economic Forum （WEF） is one of the most influential non-gov-ernmental organizations in the world. With the top 1000 enterprises as its members, these transnational enterprises control over 85 percent of global wealth and have an aggregate annual revenue exceeding US$4.5 trillion. Every year,     

Does money matter?: Wealth attainment as the motive for initiating growth-oriented technology ventures

The desire to attain personal wealth has long been regarded as the foremost motive for entrepreneurship. Other goals and values, however, may also contribute to entrepreneurial motivation. Thus, the extent to which money matters relative to other motives is an empirical question. In this study we examine the role of wealth as the motive for the decision to found new ventures. Three focal questions guide our research: 1) does money matter more relative to other decision dimensions in deciding to start a new high-technology venture? 2) does money matter more to entrepreneurs compared to non-entrepreneurs? and 3) does money matter in absolute terms, that is, does a decision model that focuses solely on the motive of wealth attainment parsimoniously predict entrepreneurs' start-up decisions?We conducted in-depth interviews with 51 entrepreneurs and a control group of 28 senior managers who decided not to start ventures (non-entrepreneurs) in the high-technology industry in British Columbia to address our research questions. The motives we examined are wealth attainment and an aggregate of other dimensions identified by entrepreneurs and managers. We considered three components of values: participants' ratings of the importance of various decision dimensions, their rating of the salience of these dimensions, and their satisfaction with prior levels of attainment on those decision dimensions. We assessed beliefs as participants' perceived probability of attaining their desired level of a particular decision dimension in each of three alternatives: the position held at the time the venture decision was made, the venture itself, and the next best career alternative at that time. The data were analyzed to compare entrepreneurs' values and beliefs regarding wealth with an aggregate of other decision dimensions (our relative hypotheses), and with those of non-entrepreneurs (our comparative hypotheses).Our findings do not support the common perception that money is the only, or even the most important, motive for entrepreneurs' decisions to start new ventures. Wealth attainment was significantly less important to entrepreneurs relative to an aggregate of 10 other decision dimensions, and entrepreneurs did not rate wealth as any more important than did non-entrepreneurs. Non-entrepreneurs rated wealth as no more important than other motives. Wealth attainment was also significantly less salient to entrepreneurs' decisions to venture than were other motives. Non-entrepreneurs reported that wealth was significantly more salient to their decision against founding a venture than other dimensions. In fact, non-entrepreneurs rated wealth attainment as significantly more salient to their decision against founding than entrepreneurs rated it for their decision to proceed with starting a high-technology business. A significant number of entrepreneurs started businesses even when they believed that doing so offered them a lower probability of obtaining their most desired level of wealth than did one of their other alternatives.Satisfaction ratings and stated beliefs also dispute classical predictions. Just prior to making the decision to venture, the entrepreneurs in our study were as satisfied with wealth as they were with other decision dimensions. The non-entrepreneurs were actually more satisfied with wealth attainment than with other dimensions. A comparison of the groups revealed no difference in satisfaction with wealth attainment levels. Entrepreneurs did believe that their chances of attaining their desired level of wealth were much greater through founding a new high-technology venture than through their other alternatives. This difference in beliefs, however, was not significantly greater than their optimistic beliefs about chances of attaining desired levels of other dimensions. It was significantly higher compared to the non-entrepreneurs' belief difference measures for wealth. In fact, the entrepreneurs' stated beliefs regarding the chances of attaining their desired levels of all dimensions were higher than those of the non-entrepreneurs, suggesting that entrepreneurs were simply more optimistic at the time of their decision than non-entrepreneurs.Salience findings suggest that these optimistic beliefs about wealth did not motivate the founding decision alone.We can distinguish those people who successfully started ventures by their regard for wealth as a less salient factor, and their beliefs in higher chances of a venture producing monetary and other returns. Other motives, such as innovation, vision, independence, and challenge were more important and much more salient to this sample of entrepreneurs.Our findings have implications for practice, teaching, and research. Venture capitalists who partially base their assessment of entrepreneurs on the extent to which they are motivated to make a great deal of money may benefit from reconsideration of this criterion. We have evidence of one group of high-technology entrepreneurs who achieved success without placing much decision weight on attainment of personal wealth. Nascent entrepreneurs and those who teach entrepreneurship can use this empirical finding to argue two main points: 1) not all entrepreneurs found a business for personal wealth reasons, and 2) one need not be motivated by personal wealth attainment to be a successful entrepreneur. Similarly, theoretical models that assume money is the primary motive for entrepreneurial activity require re-examination. Future research in entrepreneurship should focus less on wealth attainment and more on other motives for the venturing decision. A multiple-attribute decision model may be able to more fully explain venturing decisions.     

Income shares,secular stagnation and the long-run distribution of wealth

Four alarming stylized facts have recently emerged in the United States: (a) a decline in the labor share of income; (b) a decline in labor productivity; (c) an increase in the top 1% wealth share and (d) an increase in the capital-income ratio. In Capital in the XXI Century, Thomas Piketty's argument is that the r > g inequality determines an increase in the capital-income ratio; if the elasticity of substitution in production is above one, the profit share rises. We provide a contrasting explanation that draws from the Post Keynesian approach to differential saving propensities between classes and the Classical-Marxian theory of induced technical change. In a simple model of “capitalists” and “workers,” we show that institutional changes that lower the labor share—declining unionization, increasing monopsony power in the labor market, the global ‘race to the bottom' in unit labor costs or the exhaustion of path-breaking scientific discoveries—can reduce labor productivity growth because of the lessened incentives to innovate to save on labor costs. A falling labor share reduces workers' total savings, and wealth concentrates in the capitalists' hands. A higher profit share and wealth share both put pressure on accumulation: but the long-run growth rate, which is anchored to labor productivity growth, has fallen. To restore balanced growth, the capital-income ratio must rise, independent of the elasticity of substitution. These tendencies are not inevitable: taxation can be used to implement any wealth distribution targeted by policymakers, while worker-crushing institutional arrangements can also in principle be reversed through policy. Neither change appears likely given the current institutional and global policy climate.