An Analysis of SBA Loan Defaults by Maturity Structure

The financial intermediation literature on small business lending focuses on the determinants and costs to credit access. There is, however, little research examining the repayment behavior of small firms that actually receive loans. In this paper, we address this shortcoming in the literature by examining the default behavior of a sample of Small Business Administration 7(a) guaranteed loans with three distinct maturity structures. We employ a discrete-time hazard approach and show that SBA defaults are time-dependent and that the factors impacting default behavior, as well as its timing, are maturity specific. Specifically, we show the importance of loan maturity, seasoning, economic conditions, and other firm-specific factors in predicting the likelihood of SBA loan defaults. JEL classification: G21     

Strategic loan defaults and coordination: An experimental analysis

This paper experimentally studies the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when the bank’s expected strength is low, although loan repayment is a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Borrowers are also less likely to repay when other borrowers’ expected repayment capacity is low, regardless of banks’ fundamentals. We show that changes in expectations about bank and borrower fundamentals change the risk dominance properties of the borrowers’ coordination problem, and that these changes subsequently explain strategic defaults. For the individual borrower, loss aversion and negative past experiences reduce repayment, suggesting that bank failure can be contagious in times of distress.     

Religiosity,borrower gender and loan losses in microfinance institutions: a global evidence

We examine the impact of religious beliefs on loan repayments in 770 microfinance institutions (MFIs) across 65 countries over the period 2006–2018. We find robust evidence of a negative relationship between religiosity and loan losses in MFIs. We also find that the relationship between religiosity and loan losses is stronger for MFIs in Protestant-dominated countries than in Catholic-dominated countries. Moreover, religiosity improves the operational self-sufficiency of MFIs through a reduction in loan losses. We find that religiosity does not improve the loan repayment behaviour of women borrowers, but it reduces the loan size per borrower. Overall, our evidence suggests that although religiosity reduces loan losses through religiosity-induced lender-risk aversion, it does not improve the loan repayment behaviour of borrowers. We also use several approaches to evaluate our results to the effects of endogeneity.

     

Two Extensive Margins of Credit and Loan‐to‐Value Policies

We analyze a model of mortgage markets, housing tenure choice, heterogeneous agents, and default with closed form solutions. We uncover new insights which may inspire empirical work, and we ground already established insights in a series of tractable expressions. Then we study optimal loan‐to‐value (LTV) regulation and show that the choice of an LTV cap should balance the opposing forces of access to homeownership and the negative externalities associated with default. Homeownership affordability concerns induce procyclical elements into optimal regulation which attenuate the countercyclical regulation justified by the negative default externalities.     

Predicting Prepayment and Default Risks of Unsecured Consumer Loans in Online Lending

Online lending provides a means of fast financing for borrowers based on their creditworthiness. However, borrowers may undermine this agreement due to early repayment or default, which are two major concerns for the platform and lenders, since both affect the profitability of a loan. While default risk is frequently focused on credit scoring literature, prepayment has received much less attention, despite a higher prepayment rate being observed in online lending when compared with default. This article uses multivariate logistic regression to predict the probability of both the underlying prepayment and default risks. Real consumer lending data of 140,605 unsecured loans provides evidence that these two events have their own distinct patterns. We consider systemic risk by incorporating macroeconomic factors in modeling and address the influence of economic conditions, which are lessons learnt from the last financial crisis. The out-of-sample validation has shown that both prepayment and default can be accurately predicted. This article highlights the necessity of regulations on prepayment given the fast growing online lending market.     

P2P借款人的定价偏差与被动违约风险——基于“人人贷”数据的分析

本文主要通过行为资产定价理论和"人人贷"2014-2018年的数据,研究网络借贷(P2P)借款人定价偏差的影响因素及其与被动违约风险之间的关系。定价偏差是将P2P借贷利率分解为效率部分和无效率部分,并通过成本随机前沿模型得到。结果表明:借款人定价存在显著偏差且在不同群体间有所差异;借款人的粉饰行为未能起到减小定价偏差的作用,甚至会起到反效果;当借款人的声誉成本高于还款成本时,此时的违约主要表现为被动违约;即使借款人主观还款意愿强烈,但定价偏差越大,借款人剩余收入就越吃紧,还款过程中逾期次数和欠债比例增加的可能性就越大,进而引发被动违约风险。     

Adaptive credit granting policies

We analyze here the optimal interest rate determination of a bank that learns about the repayment behavior of its customers from their past behavior. Optimal dynamic methods are first suggested for determining the interest rate for a bank that learns about the probability of default of its borrowers. It is shown that such a bank determines lower than or equal interest rates than a bank that does not adapt its probability of default according to its past experience. Similar results also obtain when the bank learns about the probabilities that its borrowers belong to each of K (K larger than 2) quality groups.     

Beyond the Transaction: Banks and Mortgage Default of Low‐Income Homebuyers

We evaluate the effects of the lending institution and soft information on mortgage loan performance for low‐income homebuyers. We find that even after controlling for the propensity of a borrower to get a loan from a local bank based on observable characteristics, those who receive a loan from a local bank branch are significantly less likely to become delinquent or default than other bank or nonbank borrowers, consistent with an unobserved information effect. These effects are most pronounced for loans originated to borrowers with marginal credit, where soft information may have a stronger effect. These findings support previous research on information‐driven lending, and provide additional explanation for observed differences in mortgage loan performance between bank and nonbank lenders.     

Characteristics of Mortgage Terminations: an Analysis of a Loan-Level Dataset

Understanding mortgage termination behavior is crucial for valuating mortgage-backed securities. Analyzing a unique loan-level dataset, this study examines the characteristics of mortgage prepayment and default behaviors in the Korean housing and housing finance markets. We also analyze mortgage termination behaviors across regions, loan purposes, and periods. The results suggest that the prepayment rate of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and the ratio of adjustable-rate mortgages to FRMs can provide meaningful signals for the Korean household economy. Although the macro-prudential policies pertaining to the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt-to-income ratio (DTI) are very effective, their effects can vary depending on the region or loan purpose. Furthermore, the DTI and credit score cannot always identify the default risks of mortgages not intended for housing purchases even though such mortgages are more vulnerable to macroeconomic changes. The observed changes in default behavior indicate that the government’s policies to promote fixed-rate loans have achieved a certain degree of success.     

修正的房价收入比:衡量我国城市房价泡沫水平的更优指标

改革开放以来,我国城镇居民可支配收入连续多年高速增长,本文通过构建一个包含收入增长的模型,估算城镇居民可承受的按揭还款房价收入比极值。在此基础上,考虑到实际购房分为首付和按揭还款两部分,提出了修正的房价收入比这一新指标,用于衡量首付部分或按揭还款部分是否存在泡沫。通过实证检验,发现我国房地产市场的泡沫主要集中在首付部分,且当首付比例超过20%以后,所考察的13个重点城市的房价都存在严重的泡沫。     

企业风险异质性、贷款利率与信贷违约风险——基于银行信贷微观数据

通过某股份制商业银行2010-2015年贷款数据,讨论不同风险贷款企业、贷款利率与信贷违约之间的关系.结果表明:贷款利率与贷款违约之间呈现U型关系;高风险等级企业与贷款违约之间正相关且显著;无论是高风险等级企业还是低风险等级企业与银行贷款利率之间均呈现负相关且显著,说明贷款利率的抑制现象依然存在.从参数估计值来看,低风险等级企业贷款利率要低于高风险等级企业;高风险企业与贷款利率交叉项与违约之间呈现负相关且显著,说明高风险企业通过贷款利率渠道确实可以降低信贷违约概率.     

Loan Portfolio Swaps and Optimal Lending

Theories on loan portfolio swap hedging are based on a portfolio-choice approach. This paper presents an alternative: a firm-theoretic model for bank behavior with loan portfolio swaps. Our paper derives the optimal loan rate and rate-taking loan amount of the banks portfolio, and relates them to the market loan rate, counterparty loan rate, swap default risk, capital-to-deposits ratio, and deposit insurance. We find that in the bilateral default risk approach, the comparative static results are generated by four factors: the banks risk magnitude about the equity market value, loan composition in the swap contract, the substitution effect in the loan portfolio, and the income effect from the swap transaction. The results imply that changes in the payoff asymmetry in the event of swap default and the banks regulatory parameters have a direct effect on the banks loan portfolio for lending and swap transactions.We would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and advice.     

STUDENT LOANS: AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR COST RECOVERY IN HIGHER EDUCATION?

Governments and universities have trouble reconciling the goalof keeping higher education widely accessible with the needto retrieve some of its costs from students. Student loans offera plausible solution to the problem. But loan programs turnout in practice to have been a disappointing instrument of costrecovery: analysis of twenty-three programs found that studentsrepay only a small portion of the value of the original loan.Subsidies, high default rates, and high administrative costshave eroded the value of repayments. Sometimes loan programshave proved as expensive as outright grants. This article argues that most loan programs could be reformedto improve financial effectiveness—through targeting,charging positive real interest rates, designing repayment plansto take account of the likely pattern of graduate earnings,and ensuring that the oversight institutions can and will collect.Or governments could explore alternative devices for cost recovery,such as a graduate tax. This approach levies a higher incometax rate on beneficiaries of government-subsidized higher educationand thus preserves the idea, implicit in loan programs, of payingfor education with future earnings. As part of an effectivetax system, a graduate tax could bring in significantly morerevenue than traditional loan programs.      

地理距离、契约设计与企业内部资本市场借贷风险防控——来自中国企业集团内部借贷交易的证据

地理因素对保持距离型市场交易的影响已被大量文献证实,但系统考察地理因素是否以及如何影响企业内部经济活动的研究仍十分匮乏。基于手工搜集整理的企业集团内部委托贷款这一独特数据,我们实证考察了地理距离对企业集团内部借贷契约设计的影响及相关的风险防控问题。实证结果显示,借贷距离越远,针对借款者的契约设计越严苛,不仅贷款者更可能要求借款者提供抵押担保,而且对资金用途施加限制的概率也大幅增加。进一步研究发现,与地理距离阻碍了信息搜集和监督的经济直觉一致,距离对企业内部借贷契约严苛性的推高作用会因为借贷双方之间的信息摩擦问题差异而改变。而且,基于借贷违约信息的检验结果表明,作为应对信息不对称的机制,动态调整契约严苛性这一精巧契约设计有效降低了企业内部贷款违约风险。本文不仅增进了对地理因素影响企业内部资本配置的认识,而且加深了对企业内部借贷契约设计的理解,从而对如何有效防控企业内部资本市场运作风险具有启示意义。     

Commercial Mortgage Workout Strategy and Conditional Default Probability: Evidence from Special Serviced CMBS Loans

This study recognizes that commercial mortgage default is not a one-step process and examines a previously under explored aspect in the whole default process, that is the stage between the initial delinquency and default. We distinguish the servicers’ behavior from the borrowers’ behavior. A multinomial logit model is applied to analyze the servicers’ choice of workout options and a proportional hazard model is applied to analyze the borrower’s default decision-making process under time-varying conditions. We find that cash flow condition is the most significant factor in the servicers’ decision making process. We also find that borrowers make default decisions based upon both the equity position in the mortgage and the cash flow condition in the space market. Key real estate space market variables, such as market-level vacancy rates, also provide useful information in explaining commercial mortgage defaults. We find that special service seems to be successful in reducing the probability that a troubled loan will default. Finally, sensitivity analysis shows nontrivial economic significance of the impact of explanatory variables, real estate market variables in particular have the most significant impact on the pricing of special-serviced loans.     

基于借款人保护视角的住房按揭贷款业务分析

文章在揭示住房按揭贷款的内涵与本质的基础上,总结出现阶段我国住房按揭贷款业务中借款人面临的主要问题有:开发商虚假承诺为业主办理按揭贷款、商业银行实施强制保险问题、商业贷款与公积金贷款问题、等额本金还款法与等额本息还款法的利息负担等。针对这些问题产生的原因以及影响,文章从保护借款人的角度分别提出相应的对策建议,包括:保费应与贷款余额同步减少,购房者应事前了解商业银行拒贷原因,购房者应结合自身的投资能力选择还款方式,人民银行应进一步明确对提前还贷违约金的规定等。     

The economics of loan commitment contracts: Credit pricing and utilization

Our purpose is to examine the circumstances under which enduring customer relationships (such as revolving credit agreements) will become predominant. We compare loan commitment contracts, under which borrowers may take down funds at fixed marginal mark up, to spot lending, under which funds are priced in consideration of customers' leverage. Under the first arrangement, insurance against default risk is priced as a fixed front-end fee. Under the second arrangement, it is priced under a rising leverage-specific markup schedule. We show that when default risk is independent of take down, the loan commitment contract will always dominate spot loans. When default risk increases with credit use, spot loans may become dominant.     

What do a million observations have to say about loan defaults? Opening the black box of relationships

Using a unique dataset of more than 1 million loans made by 296 German banks, we evaluate the impact of many aspects of customer–bank relationships on loan default rates. Our research suggests a practical solution to reducing loan defaults for new customers: Have the customer open a simple transactions account – savings or checking account. Observe for some time and then decide whether to make a loan. Loans made under this model have lower default, as banks can use historical data about their borrowers to establish a baseline against which new client-related information can be evaluated. Banks assemble this historical information through relationships of different forms. We define relationships in many different ways to capture non-credit relationships, transaction accounts, as well as the depth and intensity of relationships, and find each of these can provide information that helps reduce default – even establishing a simple savings or checking account and observing the activity prior to loan granting can help reduce loan defaults. Our results show that banks with relationship-specific information act differently compared with banks that do not have this information both in screening and subsequent monitoring borrowers which helps reduce loan defaults.     

Enhancing Loan Quality Through Transparency: Evidence from the European Central Bank Loan Level Reporting Initiative

We explore whether transparency in banks’ securitization activities enhances loan quality. We take advantage of a novel disclosure initiative introduced by the European Central Bank, which requires, as of January 2013, banks that use their asset‐backed securities as collateral for repo financing to report securitized loan characteristics and performance in a standardized format. We find that securitized loans originated under the transparency regime are of better quality with a lower default probability, a lower delinquent amount, fewer days in delinquency, and lower losses upon default. Additionally, banks with more intensive loan level information collection and those operating under stronger market discipline experience greater improvement in their loan quality under the new reporting standards. Overall, we demonstrate that greater transparency has real effects by incentivizing banks to improve their credit practices.     

Regional redistribution through SBA guaranteed loan programs

We document and quantify a new implicit transfer mechanism in the SBA 7(a) loan program that redistributes funds between US states. We use SBA 7(a) loan data in conjunction with Dealscan private corporate loan data to show that SBA 7(a) loan interest rates are much less responsive to predicted local loan default risk compared to private corporate loans. This redistributes funds from states with low default risk to states with high default risk. These transfers are positively correlated with the severity of local economic shocks during the Great Recession and the COVID-19 Recession. Therefore, even though it was unintended, the interest rates on SBA 7(a) loans acted as an automatic stabilizer mitigating regional economic shocks.