Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission, 2012–2013

Pointing to the role of economic analysis, this article reviews major Federal Communications Commission actions and initiatives that are related to universal service support in high-cost areas that are served by price-cap incumbent local exchange carriers, special access policy, secondary market spectrum transactions, spectrum reassignments, and rules that govern interoperability among certain licensees in the 700 MHz band and spectrum ownership. Also discussed are activities of the recently created Technology Transitions Policy Task Force and challenges to communications policy that are posed by the transition to voice over internet protocol interconnection.     

Do Court Decisions Drive the Federal Trade Commission’s Enforcement Policy on Merger Settlements?

Mergers are generally conglomerate in nature with only minor (if any) horizontal overlaps. Under U.S. law, an enforcement agency may challenge any anticompetitive aspect of the merger and the consequent delay associated with litigation would impose costs on the firm. These costs may give the enforcement agency “leverage” to extract a settlement even when the firm would prevail in court. This paper explores whether the FTC’s decisions to challenge transactions approximate the case law. We find that the representative enforcement regimes of the FTC and the courts are remarkably similar, although the FTC credits efficiencies, while courts consider buyer sophistication as a mitigating factor.     

Economic Analysis at the European Commission 2012–2013

In 2012–2013 the European Commission has had particularly prominent merger cases, with two prohibitions of transactions and several clearances with far-reaching remedies. In these cases economic analysis has been tightly integrated into the general argument of the Commission and became central to the outcome of the cases. Based on economic theory and supporting data, the Commission has pursued novel economic theories of harm and challenged some economically dubious “common wisdom” in merger assessment. The second area in which economic analysis has had a major impact is in state aid modernization. The new regional aid guidelines of 2013 have moved the rules much closer to economic thinking about effective regional aid and introduced requirements for economic ex-post analysis. Finally, the decisions on the e-books case reflect close cross-Atlantic cooperation with respect to the economic analysis and the design of appropriate remedies. This article reports on a number of examples for the most important cases.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division 2013–2014

During 2013–2014, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice brought a wide range of matters to successful conclusions. The three matters that are discussed below demonstrate the diverse set of issues that the division examines every year.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division 2012–2013

During 2012–2013, the Antitrust Division brought a wide range of litigated matters to successful conclusions. Litigation puts the economic analysis of an antitrust investigation to the ultimate test, and the Division continues to rely on its first-rate economic staff to help explain a wide range of matters to the courts. The four cases discussed below demonstrate the diverse set of issues the Division examines every year.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division 2003–2004

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG), during 2003–2004. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, litigations, and administrative and appellate matters.The authors are, respectively, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, and Economics Director of Enforcement, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. The views contained herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2004–2005

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG), during 2004–2005. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, appellate matters, and other activities as an advocate for competition.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2007–2008

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2007–2008. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, and in other activities as an advocate for competition. The views in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Antitrust Division.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2008–2009

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2008–2009. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, and in other activities as an advocate for competition.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2009–2010

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2009–2010. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations and other activities as an advocate for competition.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2018–2019

Review of Industrial Organization - This article highlights the economic analysis that underlay certain enforcement efforts of the Antitrust Division over the past year. The Division’s...     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2020–2021

Challenging anticompetitive acquisitions of nascent competitors is a top priority of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. It is especially important that competition agencies remain vigilant of such acquisitions in platform markets, where indirect network effects and other market forces tend to preserve the status quo at the expense of smaller, more innovative rivals and potentially final consumers. This article discusses two such attempted acquisitions: (1) Visa’s acquisition of technology firm Plaid that threatened to disrupt Visa’s monopoly power in online debit; and (2) Sabre’s acquisition of Farelogix, which is a firm that allows airlines to connect directly to travel agencies and thereby disintermediates Sabre and other global distribution systems.

     

European Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions

This paper provides a survey of  European antitrust law enforcement since its foundation in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 up to and including 2004. We present a complete overview and statistical analysis of all 538 formal Commission decisions under Articles 81, 82, and 86 of the European Community Treaty. We report a range of summary statistics concerning report route, investigation duration, length of the decision, decision type, imposed fines, number of parties, sector classification, nationality, and Commissioner and Director General responsible. The statistics are linked to changes in legislation and administrative implementation, thereby providing an historical overview that summarizes the Commission’s work in the area of antitrust. One or more appeals were filed with respect to 161 of the 538 decisions. We estimate the determinants of the size of the imposed fine and probability of appeal when an infringement has been found.     

Universal service in China and India: Legitimating the state?

This paper examines the contrast between China's and India's universal service policies as manifestations of the two states' differing self-conceptualizations and legitimation strategies. We examine the timeline of universal service policies in the two countries, differentiating between the territorial, demographic and layered dimensions of universal service. The analysis reveals many similarities between the two countries, as well as some differences primarily related to the mode of funding universal service programs and the lead China has taken in deploying informatization services. We identify some of the proximate causes that resulted in these policy decisions. But in addition, we also examine how universal service policies are related to contrasting models of state legitimation.     

Economics at the FCC, 2016–2017: Auction Designs for Spectrum Repurposing and Universal Service Subsidies

The Federal Communications Commission is responsible for federal regulation in the telecommunications and electronic media sectors, and for management of the nation’s non-federal radio frequency spectrum. During the past year, Commission economists contributed to the agency’s ongoing efforts to use market-based mechanisms—such as auctions—to allocate spectrum and distribute universal service subsidies efficiently. This includes repurposing broadcast television spectrum for more efficient use by wireless service providers through the recently concluded Broadcast Incentive Auction and structuring auction mechanisms to promote efficient allocation of universal service subsidies for the increased build-out of mobile wireless and fixed broadband service in unserved and underserved areas.     

Economics at the FCC 2018–2019: Competition,Broadband Deployment,and Transaction Review

Review of Industrial Organization - The U.S. Federal Communications Commission is responsible for regulation in the communications marketplace and for management of the nation’s non-federal...     

Breaking institutionalized corruption: Is the experience of the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption generalizable?

The literature on corruption has seldom analyzed how institutional changes and the management of anti-corruption agencies could affect the success in transforming a relatively corrupted society into a cleaner one. Using the institutional changes of Hong Kong after the establishment of its anti-corruption agency in 1974, we identify the key changes in its institutional environment and the management of the agency that led to its success. We discuss the possibility that this experience can be generablizable to other societies such as the China Mainland.