Allocating Shareholder Capital to Pension Plans

This article discusses the corporate challenge of providing retirement income to employees while limiting the costs and risks of pension plans to the companies themselves by addressing five main questions:

• ? What are the major issues and challenges surrounding pensions? Although the pension shortfalls have been the focus of attention, the author argues that the more serious concern is the risk stemming from the mismatch between pension assets and pension liabilities— that is, the funding of debt‐like liabilities with equity‐heavy asset portfolios.
• ? To what extent do the equity market and equity prices reflect the shortfall in value and the mismatch in risk? While the author describes some evidence of the market's ability to capture pension risk, analysts' P/E multiples and management's assessments of cost of capital may still be distorted by failure to take full account of the risks associated with pension assets.
• ? How should management analyze and formulate strategic solutions? Without offering specific solutions, the author presents a framework for analyzing the problem from a strategic perspective that can be used in formulating a company's pension policy. In particular, the article recommends that companies take an integrated perspective that views pension assets and liabilities as parts of the corporate balance sheet, and the pension asset allocation decision as a critical aspect of a corporate‐wide enterprise risk management program.
• ? If a company chooses to make a major change in its pension policy, such as a partial or complete immunization accomplished by substituting bonds for stocks, how would you communicate the new policy to the rating agencies and investors?
• ? What are the major issues to be thinking about when contemplating a change from a DB plan to a defined contribution, or DC, plan? The author argues that DC plans without some corporate oversight or responsibility for results are not a long‐term solution.

     

Pension ratios as “correlates” of municipal pension underfunding

Unlike the corporate sector, detailed estimates of unfunded pension liabilities for most local governments are not available. Thus, prior research on the association between unfunded pension liabilities and municipal creditor decisions (Copeland and Ingram 1983; Marks and Raman 1985) has implicitly assumed that certain pension ratios are good surrogates for municipal pension underfunding. In this paper, we rely on a theoretical model by Ehrenberg (1980) to test empirically the appropriateness of pension ratios as “correlates” of municipal pension underfunding. These ratios were found to be correlated with pension underfunding, although they accounted for only about 30 percent of the variance in the underfunding variable.     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

Valuation of Contingent Pension Liabilities and Guarantees Under Sponsor Default Risk

This article analyzes the relationship between a pension fund with contingently indexed defined benefit liabilities and its sponsor, using contingent claims analysis. As pension funds generally choose to run a mismatch risk, future surpluses and deficits will occur. Surpluses are divided between beneficiaries and sponsor through contingent indexation of the benefits and refunding. Covering a deficit at the pension fund level is a function of the sponsor's financial ability to do so. This article suggests that this system creates an asymmetric allocation of the residual risk between sponsor and beneficiaries. The optimal investment policy for the pension fund in this context can be found by reverse engineering option valuation formulas. The main conclusion is that sponsor default risk negatively impacts the optimum risk profile and thereby the market value of contingent pension liabilities.     

Pension Funding,Share Prices,and National Savings

This paper examines empirically the effect of unfunded pension obligations on corporate share prices and discusses the implications of these estimates for national saving, the decline of the stock market in recent years, and the rationality of corporate financial behavior. The analysis uses the information on inflation-adjusted income and assets which large firms were required to provide for 1976 and subsequent years. The evidence for a sample of nearly 200 manufacturing firms is consistent with the conclusion that share prices fully reflect the value of unfunded pension obligations. Since the conventional accounting measure of the unfunded pension liability has a number of problems (which we examine in the paper), it would be more accurate to say that the data are consistent with the conclusion that shareholders accept the conventional measure as the best available information and reduce share prices by a corresponding amount. The most important implication of the share price response is that the existence of unfunded private pension liabilities does not necessarily entail a reduction in total private saving. Because the pension liability reduces the equity value of the firm, shareholders are given notice of its existence and an incentive to save more themselves. For this reason, unfunded private pensions differ fundamentally from the unfunded Social Security pension and the other unfunded federal government civilian and military pensions.     

Risk Allocation in Retirement Plans: A Better Solution

The corporate world is reconsidering the cost‐effectiveness of defined benefit pension plans while contemplating a change to defined contribution plans. This article begins by examining the three primary risks faced by sponsors of most DB pension plans—investment risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk—and shows how shifting these risks to employees through a DC plan would affect both the corporation and the individual. Although DC plans clearly help companies manage risks, they provide at best an incomplete solution for individual participants. This article describes an innovation in pension design—the Retirement Shares Plan (RSP)—that combines many of the best features of DB and DC plans. An RSP provides:

• ? predictable and stable cost to the plan sponsor, with little chance of unfunded liabilities;
• ? lifetime income, guaranteeing that retirees will never outlive their benefits;
• ? a benefit accrual pattern comparable to that of traditional pension plans that preserves value for older, long‐service employees; and
• ? potential inflation protection for retirees.

The RSP accomplishes this by allocating risk to sponsors and individuals differently than either a traditional DB plan or a DC plan. Unlike most DB plans, the RSP shifts investment and interest rate risks from plan sponsors to participants. Unlike DC plans, the RSP keeps longevity risk with the sponsor.     

A simple continuous measure of credit risk

This paper introduces a simple parameterization for the risk-neutral default probability distributions for risky firms that are easily computed from quoted bond prices. The corresponding expected times to default have a particularly simple form and are proposed as a measure for credit risk. Being continuous in nature, times to default provide a much finer measure of risk than those provided by ratings agencies. Comparison with the ratings provided by Moody's and the distance to default measures calculated using the Merton [Merton, R. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates. Journal of Finance, 2(2), 449-470] model shows that the highest rank correlation is found between the proposed time to default measure and Moody's ratings.     

The Influence of Elections on the Accounting Choices of Governmental Entities

This paper investigates whether gubernatorial elections affect state governments’ accounting choices. We identify two accounts, the compensated absence liability account and the unfunded pension liability account, which provide incumbent gubernatorial candidates with flexibility for manipulation. We find that, in an election year, the liability associated with compensated absences and unfunded pension liabilities are both systematically lower. We also find that the variation in these employment‐related liabilities is correlated with proxies for the incumbent's incentives and ability to manipulate their accounting reports. Jointly, these results suggest that state governments manipulate accounting numbers to present a healthier financial picture in an election year.     

Measuring Credit Risk of Individual Corporate Bonds in US Energy Sector

In this paper, using the measures of the credit risk price spread (CRiPS) and the standardized credit risk price spread (S-CRiPS) proposed in Kariya’s (A CB (corporate bond) pricing model for deriving default probabilities and recovery rates. Eaton, IMS Collection Series: Festschrift for Professor Morris L., 2013) corporate bond model, we make a comprehensive empirical credit risk analysis on individual corporate bonds (CBs) in the US energy sector, where cross-sectional CB and government bond price data is used with bond attributes. Applying the principal component analysis method to the S-CRiPSs, we also categorize individual CBs into three different groups and study on their characteristics of S-CRiPS fluctuations of each group in association with bond attributes. Secondly, using the market credit rating scheme proposed by Kariya et al. (2014), we make credit-homogeneous groups of CBs and show that our rating scheme is empirically very timely and useful. Thirdly, we derive term structures of default probabilities for each homogeneous group, which reflect the investors’ views and perspectives on the future default probabilities or likelihoods implicitly implied by the CB prices for each credit-homogeneous group. Throughout this paper it is observed that our credit risk models and the associated measures for individual CBs work effectively and can timely provide the market credit information evaluated by investors.     

The delivery option in credit default swaps

Under standard assumptions the reduced-form credit risk model is not capable of accurately pricing the two fundamental credit risk instruments – bonds and credit default swaps (CDS) – simultaneously. Using a data set of euro-denominated corporate bonds and CDS our paper quantifies this mispricing by calibrating such a model to bond data, and subsequently using it to price CDS, resulting in model CDS spreads up to 50% lower on average than observed in the market. An extended model is presented which includes the delivery option implicit in CDS contracts emerging since a basket of bonds is deliverable in default. By using a constant recovery rate standard models assume equal recoveries for all bonds and hence zero value for the delivery option. Contradicting this common assumption, case studies of Chapter 11 filings presented in the paper show that corporate bonds do not necessarily trade at equal levels following default. Our extension models the implied expected recovery rate of the cheapest-to-deliver bond and, applied to data, largely eliminates the mispricing. Calibrated recovery values lie between 8% and 47% for different obligors, exhibiting strong variation among rating classes and industries. A cross-sectional analysis reveals that the implied recovery parameter depends on proxies for the delivery option, primarily the number of available bonds and bond pricing errors. No evidence is found for a direct influence of the bid-ask spread, notional amount, coupon, or rating used as proxies for bond market liquidity.     

Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies

CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm. Because these characteristics of inside debt expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, theory predicts that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns, R&D expenditures, and financial leverage, and a positive association between CEO inside debt holdings and the extent of diversification and asset liquidity. Collectively, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that CEOs with large inside debt holdings prefer investment and financial policies that are less risky.     

PREDICTING INDUSTRIAL BOND RATINGS WITH A PROBIT MODEL AND FUNDS FLOW COMPONENTS

Since 1978, there has been a significant change in new bond offerings with a substantive increase in the number of nonconvertible high risk bonds. This study uses an n-chotomous multivariate probit model with cash-based funds flow components and financial ratios to predict industrial bond ratings. The n-chotomous probit model provides superior information for evaluating the bond classification process. The model determines the probabilities of a bond being rated in one of three risk classes. The distribution of the probabilities for each predicted bond rating provides a wealth of new information for evaluating the accuracy of the actual rating. New and reclassified bond ratings by Moody's in 1983 provide the information base for the model that is used to predict 1984 ratings. Initially the classification and predictive results were slightly lower than previous studies. A careful analysis of the probability distributions showed that results were close to being correct in over 90 percent of the cases. The analysis found five cash flow components to be significant in predicting the bond ratings of reclassified issues. The significant components were inventories, other current liabilities, dividends, long-term financing, and fixed coverage charges. The likelihood tests indicated that both ratios and funds flow components contributed information that significantly improved the ability of the n-chotomous multivariate probit model to classify new and revised bond ratings. The study provides valuable insight and nuances concerning the bond-rating process.     

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk‐appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash‐out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt‐like compensation for corporate tax policies.     

The effects of default and call risk on bond duration

This paper examines the effects of default risk, call risk, and their interactions on bond duration. We find that call risk decreases durations of default-free bonds, while default risk alone generally decreases durations for risky bonds with only a few exceptions. The joint effect of default and call risk always results in shorter durations for corporate bonds. Controlling for the effect of default risk, call risk has a negative effect on duration, which diminishes as bond ratings decline. Finally, the effect of call risk on duration depends on bond characteristics. Empirical evidence shows that the effect of call risk is smaller for discount bonds and for deep-discount fallen angels.     

Measuring Longevity Risk: An Application to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Pension Plan

An employer that sets up a defined benefit pension plan promises to periodically pay a certain sum to each participant starting at some future date and continuing until death. Although both the future beneficiary and the employer can be asked to finance the plan throughout the beneficiary's career, any shortcoming of funds in the future is often the employer's responsibility. It is therefore essential for the employer to be able to predict with a high degree of confidence the total amount that will be required to cover its future pension obligations. Applying mortality forecasting models to the case of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police pension plan, we illustrate the importance of mortality forecasting to value a pension fund's actuarial liabilities. As future survival rates are uncertain, pensioners may live longer than expected. We find that such longevity risk represents approximately 2.8 percent of the total liability ascribable to retired pensioners (as measured by the relative value at risk at the 95th percentile) and 2.5 percent of the total liabilities ascribable to current regular contributors. Longevity risk compounds the model risk associated with not knowing what is the true mortality model, and we estimate that model risk represents approximately 3.2 percent of total liabilities. The compounded longevity risk therefore represents almost 6 percent of the pension plan's total liabilities.     

How Long Do Junk Bonds Spend in Default?

This paper analyzes junk bond defaults during 1980 to 1991 to determine which factors affect the length of time spent in default. Bondholder holdouts are not a significant problem, as firms with proportionately more bonds have shorter default spells. In contrast, bank debt is associated with slower restructurings. Bargaining problems arising from contingent liabilities, lawsuits, and size delay the process, although multiple bond classes do not. Neither information problems nor firm value appear to matter. HLTs do not resolve their defaults at a significantly faster pace. Defaults tend to take less time in the 1990s, despite Drexel's disappearance from the market.     

How does the corporate bond market value capital investments and accruals?

This paper examines whether the mispricing of accruals documented in equity markets extends to bond markets. The paper finds that corporate bonds of firms with high operating accruals underperform corporate bonds of firms with low operating accruals. In the first year after portfolio formation, the underperformance is 115 basis points using an accrual measure that includes capital investments and 93 basis points using an accrual measure that is based only on working capital investments. The Sharpe ratios of the zero-investment bond accrual portfolios are comparable to those of the corresponding zero-investment stock accrual portfolios. The results are also robust to risk adjustments based on both a factor model consisting of the Fama and French (J. Financial Econ 33 (1993) 3) stock and bond market factors and a characteristics model based on bond ratings and duration. Cross-sectional Fama–MacBeth regressions that use individual bond data and control for stock and bond issuances in addition to ratings and duration also confirm the time-series portfolio findings. Overall, our results reveal an accrual anomaly among bonds similar to that observed among stocks.

A new way of looking at the risk in defined benefit pension plans

The portability feature of a defined contribution (DC) pension greatly reduces the risk to the accumulation of pension wealth. Conversely, defined benefit (DB) pensions have a variety of default risks that decrease the expected value of DB pension wealth. This paper examines those risks. Accrual of DB pension wealth is characterized in terms of purchases of risky bonds. Changing jobs triggers default on these bonds. Simulations are presented to show the potential loss in pension wealth from default. In addition, a methodology used to price corporate bonds is applied to generate estimates of the implied risk premiums of DB pension bonds over comparable riskless bonds.     

Pension Funds and the U.K. Economy

Abstract

The paper considers the impact of U.K. defined benefit (DB) pension plan unding and investment on the U.K. economy. It suggests that many conventional theories are based on incomplete or inconsistent economics. In particular, the author suggests that:

? An economy cannot really gain competitive advantage from high returns on the domestic assets in which pension funds invest.

? DB liabilities are essentially similar for most schemes and can be closely matched with bonds.

? Funding pension liabilities has no primary impact on individuals’ consumption and saving or on firms’ capital investment.

? Pension funds are not natural investors in the equity of new ventures.

The conclusion of the paper is that the most significant impact of pension funds on the U.K. economy relates to the costs imposed by extreme mismatching between their financial assets and liabilities. The author argues that such risks can, in essence, “crowd out” entrepreneurial risk. He asserts that the U.K. economy would gain from greater focus on the matching of these assets and liabilities, and that the best way to stimulate enterprise is by eliminating the frictional costs in the economy arising from current practices.     

Implicit government guarantees and credit ratings

Exploiting the first default of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in China, we analyze the role of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings. We consider two causes of implicit government guarantees. First, we suggest a “too big to fail” effect by revealing positive associations between credit ratings and issuer size, number of employees and taxes paid. Second, we propose a “government link” effect by showing positive associations between credit ratings and an issuer's state ownership, indicators for SOEs and central SOEs. Importantly, after the first SOE default, both dimensions of implicit government guarantees are weakened when explaining credit rating variations. Extending to analyses of yield spreads, we find that debt pricing relies more on credit ratings after the default event, consistent with bond investors weighing credit ratings more with weakened beliefs in implicit government guarantees. Collectively, our study proposes two dimensions of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings and shows how the initial SOE default significantly changes the role of such guarantees in credit ratings.