Corruption in bank lending to firms: Cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing

Building on the important study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine [2006. Bank supervision and corruption in lending. Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2131-2163], we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus/registries on corruption in bank lending. Using the unique World Bank data set (WBES) covering more than 4,000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus/registries, assembled by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [2007. Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 299–329], and bank regulation data collected by Barth, Caprio, and Levine [2006. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern. Cambridge University Press, New York] to measure bank competition and information sharing, we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption, and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption. We also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks, legal environment, and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption.     

Corruption culture and accounting quality

This paper examines the impact of corruption culture on accounting quality (AQ) of listed firms at the municipal level in China. We consider municipalities with (without) corrupt top government officials as having high (low) corruption culture. To isolate the effect of corruption culture, we use the arrest of corrupt officials (the events) to capture the change in local corruption culture, and apply the difference-in-difference method to compare AQ of firms operating in the jurisdictions of corrupt officials pre and post the events, compared to control firms. We find that AQ of firms affiliated with corrupt officials is higher after the events, which is robust to the placebo test, time-trend analysis, and various robustness tests. We complement the literature by showing that the increase in AQ is greater for firms associated with more powerful officials and having stronger connections with corrupt officials. Moreover, the positive effect on accounting quality is stronger in the post-2012 period. Further, we document that firms improving AQ after the events issue more SEOs and have lower cost of capital. Finally, analyses on channels firms used to improve AQ show that firms switch to higher quality auditors, have better internal control, and issue more management forecasts. This study has implications for policymakers in countries that suffer from corruption.     

给腐败排个座次

有关单位进行的一项调查显示,建设工程,公检法,医疗,教育和组织人事,是群众心目中不正之风和腐败问题比较严重的五大领域。 中央纪委研究室不久前委托地方纪委和有关统计部门,在北京、黑龙江、河北、江苏、江西、湖北、广西、广东等10个省、区、市开展党风廉政问卷调查,共发放问卷1.2万份,有效回收率99.85％。廉政建设和反腐败仍然是群众关注的热点问题。 ——据新华社     

Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?

This paper examines the effect of fiscal decentralization in a country on the level of corruption. Using a tax competition framework with rent-seeking behavior, it is shown theoretically that fiscal decentralization, modeled as an increase in the number of competing jurisdictions, leads to a lower level of corruption. This result is then tested using a small, cross-country data set. The empirical results are not very strong, but they suggest that the hypothesized relationship between decentralization and corruption may indeed exist.     

Corruption Distance and Foreign Direct Investment

We study the effects of “corruption distance,” defined as the difference in corruption levels between country pairs on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a “gravity” model and the Heckman (1979) two-stage framework on a data set of forty-five countries from 1997 to 2007, we find that corruption distance adversely influences both the likelihood of FDI and the volume of FDI. A novel finding in this study is that we identify the asymmetric effect of corruption distance and find that the positive corruption distance, defined as the corruption distance from a high corruption source to a low corruption host country, is the prominent one that affects the behavior of bilateral FDI.     

Corruption and valuation of multinational corporations

This paper examines the relationship between U.S. MNCs' valuation and corruption in countries where the MNCs' foreign subsidiaries are located. We uncover that country-level corruption has a multi-dimensional impact on MNCs' valuation. We find that the impact of intangibles is less pronounced for MNCs operating primarily in corrupt countries, consistent with the view that the lack of property rights protection and information asymmetry problems are more prevalent in corrupt environments. We also find that the expansion of a MNC network dominated by corrupt countries negatively affects MNCs' valuation, suggesting that investors may recognize it as an additional risk. However, more importantly, we find that geographic diversification in corrupt countries significantly increases firm value if the MNC has high levels of intangibles such as technological know-how and marketing expertise. Assuming that transactions costs in corrupt countries are higher, our findings are consistent with the notion that the advantages from internalizing the cross-border transfer of intangibles are greater in the presence of corruption. Our findings remain unchanged when we account for endogeneity at the country-and firm-level, when we use alternative corruption measures, and when we re-estimate models by omitting MNCs with operations in locations with big “negative” shocks during the sample period. Moreover, we show that firms with expertise in dealing with corruption enjoy greater benefits from internalization.     

Corruption, inequality, and fairness

Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases.     

Hedging and competition

We consider firms that, all else equal, wish to minimize variability in their internal capital (due to convex costs of raising external funds). The firms can hedge the cash flow risk of the project, but not that of winning or losing the auction. We characterize optimal hedging and bidding strategies in this competition framework. We show that access to financial markets makes firms bid more aggressively, possibly even above their valuation for the project. In addition, hedging increases the variance of bids and makes firm values more dispersed. Further, with hedging, the covariance of internal capital changes with the risk factor is negative, and is more negative, the higher the correlation of the hedging instrument with the risk factor.