Tariffs in a Ricardian Model with a Monopolistically Competitive Sector: the Role of Nontradables

It is shown that for a small open economy the welfare effects of a tariff on the import of the brands of a differentiated good depends crucially on the pattern of trade. The literature has shown that welfare rises when the domestic brands are nontraded. But when the domestic brands are traded, the imposition of a tariff lowers welfare by shifting demand towards the nontraded homogeneous good which causes exit from the differentiated goods industry.     

Discount Chains and Brand Policy

Retail chains are observed in many industries. The question addressed here is whether retail chains can exploit buyer power by excluding some brands. In a theoretical model with two differentiated producers and a single retailer, we show that a retailer will require exclusivity (exclude a brand) if the brands are sufficiently symmetric in demand potential. Exclusivity will increase welfare if the excluded brand is a close substitute for the brand carried by the retailer. Our theoretical results are also set in relation to some findings from the Norwegian grocery industry.
JEL Classification : L 12; L 42     

Privatization in a Small Open Economy with Imperfect Competition

We look at privatization in a general equilibrium model of a small, tariff‐distorted, open economy. There is a differentiated good produced by both private and public sector enterprises. A reduction in government production in order to cut losses from such production raises the returns to capital and increases the tariff revenue, which are welfare‐improving. However, privatization also leads to lower wages and possibly fewer private brands. This lowers workers’ welfare, which may make privatization politically infeasible. Privatization can improve workers’ welfare with complementary reforms, e.g., attracting foreign investment or trade liberalization.     

Trade Policy and Access to Retail Distribution

The paper develops a model in which foreign and domestic manufacturers producing differentiated goods sell through spatially differentiated retailers. There is free entry into retailing but access to the retail distribution network (by manufacturers) may be controlled. The author considers a domestic vertical control mechanism in which domestic retailers carry only domestic brands (termed “domestic dealing”) and compares the use of tariffs on imports and the enforcement of domestic dealing restrictions as means of increasing domestic welfare. It is shown that domestic dealing will always be prohibited when tariffs can be used. When trade policy is not available, however, domestic dealing may be desirable.     

Tariffs and Welfare in an Imperfectly Competitive Overlapping-Generations Model

The effect of a tariff is analyzed in a two-sector model in an uncertain-lifetimes framework. One of the sectors is monopolistically competitive. It is shown that while a tariff leads to a consumption boom and possibly a current-account surplus, its welfare effects depend on whether the homogeneous good or the differentiated good is exported by the small open economy. Welfare improves if the differentiated good is nontraded but deteriorates if the homogeneous good is nontraded.     

International Transmission of Government Spending,Monopolistic Competition and North-South Trade

This paper utilises a North–South general equilibrium model where South exports an intermediate good to North in exchange for differentiated goods. The model is used to examine international transmission of government spending and its welfare implications. It is shown that an increase in government spending in North (South) can increase (decrease) the number of differentiated goods produced, thereby decreasing (increasing) the degree of monopoly power in North. Furthermore an increase in government spending in South can decrease the welfare North, but the impact of an increase in government spending in North the welfare of South cannot be unambiguously determined. [F11, H41]     

Private labels, price rivalry, and public policy

The article examines (i) why low-quality private labels are introduced in some product categories and not in others, (ii) how the existence of a low-quality private label affects the pricing of a competing national brand, and (iii) how consumers’ surplus and welfare are affected by private labels. We find that the potential for private label introduction may—in return for national brand exclusivity in that particular retail store (exclusive dealing)—lead to price concessions from the producer of the national brand. If the national brand producer decides not to offer an exclusivity contract, a private label is introduced. In this case, private label introduction may lead to higher retail prices on national brands, which can be detrimental to consumer welfare as well as total welfare. We argue that our results have important implications for the interpretation of empirical results and the public policy towards national brands     

外商直接投资、知识产权保护与发展中国家的社会福利--兼论发展中国家的引资战略

本文在一个由发达国家企业和发展中国家企业所构成的寡头垄断的产量竞争模型中 ,考察了在发达国家企业所进行的产品创新型R&D投资具有溢出效应的情况下 ,发达国家企业对发展中国家的外商直接投资 (FDI)所产生的福利效果。本文发现 ,即使发展中国家拥有生产成本相对低廉的优势 ,发达国家企业对发展中国家的FDI也只有在溢出效应较小时才可能发生。但这种情况下的FDI也可能损害发展中国家的同类竞争企业 ,甚至损害发展中国家的社会福利。当然 ,以上结论并不意味着引进外资必然损害发展中国家的利益 ,外资引进对发展中国家所产生的福利效果 ,在很大程度上取决于FDI的性质 (产品市场的所在国 )、发展中国家成本优势的大小以及它对知识产权的保护力度等因素。     

Indian export incentives

This paper analyses Indian export incentives within the framework of piecemeal ‘second-best’ welfare economics, taking the extant import control system as a binding constraint. It provides a condensed account of recent Indian export incentives together with some quantitative estimates (based on firm level data for some engineering good exporters) of their likely effects on feasible second-best welfare levels.     

域名保护的法律与经济分析

本文从法律和经济学两种视角对域名产权的初始分配进行了分析。文章阐述了有关域名纠纷的产生及司法实践中对其处理的不足。从财产法、知识产权制度、民事行为分析、竞争法等法律角度对域名纠纷解决的缺憾进行了回顾;然后从经济学的产权理论入手,对域名的分配做了效率分析,最终得出了合适的产权分配方案。     

Economic Integration and Public Provision of Education

This paper develops a model of fiscal competition in public provision of a private good: education. In this framework, the welfare enhancing effects of public education provision are shown to be reduced by increased student mobility when, like in the EU, countries are unable to set differentiated fees to foreign students. Indeed, the threat of attraction of foreigners who free-ride on the national education system may induce suboptimal levels of public education provision when (price) discrimination is forbidden. Alternatively, countries may try to escape regulation and avoid equal treatment of foreign students. The paper provides some empirical evidence of the existence of a fiscal externality in education at the EU level.     

Maximum-revenue tariffs versus free trade

Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products; and under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade. Under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, assuming linear demands and constant marginal costs, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is always higher than free-trade welfare. Under perfect competition, assuming linear demand and supply, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than free-trade welfare if the country has sufficient market power.     

Price Discrimination in Public Healthcare

Could a public healthcare system use price discrimination—paying medical service providers different fees, depending on the service provider's quality—lead to improvements in social welfare? We show that differentiating medical fees by quality increases social welfare relative to uniform pricing (i.e. quality‐invariant fee schedules) whenever hospitals and doctors have private information about their own ability. We also show that by moving from uniform to differentiated medical fees, the public healthcare system can effectively incentivise good doctors and hospitals (i.e. low‐cost‐types) to provide even higher levels of quality than they would under complete information. In the socially optimal quality‐differentiated medical fee system, low‐cost‐type medical‐service providers enjoy a rent due to their informational advantage. Informational rent is socially beneficial because it gives service providers a strong incentive to invest in the extra training required to deliver high‐quality services at low cost, providing yet another efficiency gain from quality‐differentiated medical fees.     

High-quality bias in vertically differentiated oligopolies—a note on skills, trade, and welfare

In a vertically differentiated Cournot oligopoly where the high-quality variant of the good requires the use of high-quality labor, firms may either all supply the same quality or differentiate their product. In differentiated configurations the number of firms choosing to supply the high-quality variant is generally above the optimum. The opening of trade between symmetric countries entails a pro-competitive effect that raises welfare through a reduction in average quality. This result contrasts with previous findings concerning the opening of trade in vertically differentiated oligopolistic industries (Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton, and Thisse,International Economic Review 22 [1981]; Shaked and Sutton, in Kierzkowski, ed.,Monopolistic Competition and International Trade, Oxford 1984).     

Product availabilty as a strategic variable: The implications of regulating retailer stockouts

We study product availability as a strategic variable in a sequential game between consumers and a monopolist. We use a perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept to solve the game under different regulatory regimes. We show that under certain assumptions about the regulatory environment, a two-price equilibrium in which the quantity of the lower-priced good is limited may exist even when a single retailer sells two brands that are perfect substitutes. The FTC Guides Against Bait Advertising are shown to be potentially welfare enhancing as they facilitate commitment on the part of a monopolist credibly to plan for stockouts. Paradoxically, our analysis suggests that the more stringent FTC regulation prohibiting stockouts by retail food stores from 1971 to 1988 was Pareto worsening, as it removed the monopolist's commitment mechanism.     

Sector specific foreign investment,labour inflow,economies of scale and welfare

This paper argues that the impact of foreign investment on welfare depends on the sector that attracts the investment and certain characteristics of the economy. It is shown that, as long as the intermediate good is non-traded, foreign investment in a sector that is subject to economies of scale increases welfare by increasing the size of the intermediate good sector. On the other hand, foreign investment in a sector that is subject to constant returns to scale decreases welfare by decreasing the size of the intermediate good sector. The impact of foreign investment (in either sector) on welfare depends on relative factor intensities when the intermediate good is traded.     

The Aggregation of Climate Change Damages: a Welfare Theoretic Approach

The economic value of environmental goods is commonly determined using the concepts of willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA). However, the WTP/WTA observed in different countries (or between individuals) will differ according to socio-economic characteristics, in particular income. This notion of differentiated values for otherwise identical goods (say, a given reduction in mortality risk) has been criticized as unethical, most recently in the context of the 'social cost' chapter of the IPCC Second Assessment Report. These critics argue that, being a function of income, WTP/WTA estimates reflect the unfairness in the current income distribution, and for equity reasons uniform per-unit values should therefore be applied across individuals and countries. This paper analyses the role of equity in the aggregation of climate change damage estimates, using basic tools of welfare economics. It shows one way of how WTP/WTA estimates can be corrected in aggregation if the underlying income distribution is considered unfair. It proposes that in the aggregation process individual estimates be weighted with an equity factor derived from the social welfare and utility functions. Equity weighting can significantly increase aggregate (global) damage figures, although some specifications of weighting functions also imply reduced estimates. The paper also shows that while the postulate of uniform per-unit values is compatible with a wide range of 'reasonable' utility and welfare specifications, there are also cases where the common-value notion is not compatible with defensible welfare concepts.     

North–South Trade, Income Distribution, and Welfare Effects of R&D Policy

The paper considers an extension of the Flam and Helpman model of North–South trade in which the government of South organizes and pays for R&D activity to reduce the production cost of quality-differentiated products. The main conclusions are the following: South has a welfare incentive to initiate R&D activity under some conditions on effectiveness of R&D in improving the technology. By doing so, South can increase the production of higher-quality differentiated products. North suffers a welfare loss from this R&D except in the case where the effectiveness of South's R&D activity is unusually high.     

来源国形象、消费者偏见与中国品牌跨国营销——中国电子产品在美国的品牌来源国效应检验

来源国效应对一国产品的海外销售产生着重要影响。本文以在美国销售的中国H公司运动手表作为被试商品,在606份有效样本基础上,通过多元线性回归验证了中国品牌电子产品在美国的来源国效应。通过与其他七个国家进行对比,本文发现,虽然中国在美国消费者心目中的产品国家形象较为正面,但相对中国经济地位和产品质量而言,美国消费者对中国电子产品和中国品牌的“来源国偏见”普遍存在,“Made in China”目前仍是中国品牌在美国营销的不利因素。在以往研究的基础上,本文将来源国效应中的产品国家形象划分为整体绩效形象、整体制度形象和产品类属形象,在此基础上检验了多个消费者因素对来源国效应的调节作用,首次检验了消费者网购依赖度对消费者购买倾向的影响,并且发现消费者产品知识负向调节来源国效应,这一结论可以导出明确的管理启示。本文结论进一步深化了来源国效应相关研究,弥补了发展中国家逆向拓展发达国家市场时来源国效应研究的不足。     

Product differentiation and the gains from trade under Bertrand duopoly

Abstract.  In the literature on the welfare effects of free trade under imperfect competition, one important case seems to have been overlooked, and that is the Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products. Although many authors have analysed the welfare effects of free trade under Cournot duopoly and demonstrated the possibility of losses from trade, there has been no thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand duopoly. In this article we present a thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products, and it is shown that there are always gains from trade. JEL Classification: F12