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1.
In 2013, the Chinese government implemented Rule No. 18, which suspended the directorships of incumbent government officials and precluded those who retired within the past three years from serving as independent directors for listed firms. The surprise implementation of Rule No. 18 triggered a wave of resignations among official independent directors (OIDs). The event provided a unique opportunity to examine the impacts of the political connections of board members on firm performance. We applied a difference-in-difference technique to empirically investigate the effect of OID resignations on firm performance from the perspectives of resource dependence theory and social capital theory. The results indicate that the resignation of OIDs had a significantly negative effect on firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q and firm leverage. This also confirmed the importance of independent directors’ political connection on firm performance, as discovered in prior research. However, this influence varied across OIDs’ heterogeneity, external environment and firm ownership. The results indicate that political connections may not be necessary channels for firms to achieve success.  相似文献   

2.
This study examines the mediating effect of institutional capital on the relationship between corporate political activities (CPA) and firm competencies. By adopting an institutional perspective, we identify the influence of a firm’s relational CPA and participation CPA, and its two types of institutional capitals, formal institutional capital (FIC) and informal institutional capital (IIC), on the firm’s competencies. Based on survey data from multi-informants in 303 Chinese firms, our results suggest that firms’ institutional capital (IIC/FIC) partially/fully mediates the relationship between CPA and firm competencies. The findings provide the evidence that how nonmarket strategy, such as corporate political activities, affects a firm’s institutional capital and then its competencies.  相似文献   

3.
This study examines the role of CEO social capital, defined as external directorship ties held by the CEO, in determining family vs. nonfamily CEOs' compensation in a network-based business society and governance system. Using a sample of pooled data of family firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2000 to 2002, the empirical results show that CEO social capital is an important determinant in setting nonfamily CEOs' pay level, consistent with the expectation of the contractual governance model. By contrast, as expected by relational governance model, family CEOs' social capital is not incentive-relevant. This study extends the literature on CEO compensation by documenting that in a market where guanxi and connections are considered valuable business tools, corporations will be willing to compensate professional CEOs for the social capital that they bring to the firm.  相似文献   

4.
Is the relationship between environmental munificence, dynamism, and corporate social responsibility contingent on board monitoring power? This is the research question examined in this study of an international sample of 956 listed firms from 2006 to 2014. After applying several regression models for panel data based on Tobit and generalized method of moments' (GMM) estimation, this paper supports the assertion that in munificent and dynamic environments, managers show a lower commitment to social and environmental issues. Proactive promotion of social and environmental concerns only occurs in firms with efficient internal corporate governance mechanisms, resulting in a moderating effect of board monitoring power—board independence and non‐duality of CEO—on the association between environmental conditions and corporate social responsibility. Theoretically, this moderating effect triggers managers to increase their socially responsible performance in munificent and dynamic environments because: (a) these boards reinforce the orientation of a firm towards the meeting of stakeholders' expectations; and (b) managers aim to protect themselves from the greater supervision and control exerted by the board in order to maintain their decision‐making freedom in environments of superior growth, resources, market uncertainty, and instability.  相似文献   

5.
We study the relationship between female representation on boards and firm value and profitability in Turkey from 2011 to 2018, relying on hand-collected data covering the vast majority of listed firms. We build several proxies of female representation on boards and find no evidence that female directors predict firm value and profitability using broad measures that are typically required or mandated by regulators. However, we find that female directors predict higher firm value when they have a more active role in board governance through board committee memberships and when they are represented in these committees in relatively large numbers. The presence of female directors, who are members of controlling families is associated with higher firm value. The presence of female independent directors is associated with higher profitability. We also study three potential channels through which female directors might influence firm outcomes and find that the presence of female directors on boards and board committees (i) facilitates the production of financial statements of higher quality; (ii) may lead to lesser incidence of violations of capital market laws and regulations, and (iii) reduces the hoarding of negative news and the related stock price crash risk. We also compare female directors to their male counterparts and find limited evidence for systematic differences.  相似文献   

6.
作为企业治理的重要问题之一,代理成本诱发超额在职消费引起各界广泛关注。文章以2007—2019年A股上市公司为初始样本,考察我国各省(自治区、直辖市)社会资本水平差异对超额在职消费的影响。研究表明,社会资本显著提高了超额在职消费,起到推波助澜的负面效用;进一步研究表明,公司治理水平维度上通过提高机构投资持股比例、短期债务融资比例及扩大独立董事比例和监事会规模均能抑制社会资本加剧超额在职消费的负面效用,公司治理环境维度上通过强化企业内部治理环境、加快市场化进程亦能削弱社会资本对超额在职消费的"推波助澜"。以上结论为社会资本利弊之争提供有益补充,亦凸显非正式制度与正式制度的治理替代效应,同时为企业完善内部治理水平及政府优化制度环境与规则治理以抑制社会资本负面效用提供一定借鉴。  相似文献   

7.
An element in the never-ending debate about the process of funding highpotential businesses is the extent to which venture capitalists add value besides money to their portfolio companies. At one end of the spectrum, venture capitalists incubate start-ups and nurture hatchlings, while at the other extreme, so-called “vulture” capitalists feed on fledgling companies. A very important way in which venture capitalists add value other than money to their portfolio companies is by serving on boards of directors. Hence, by studying the role of outside directors, especially those representing venture capital firms, we were able to shed light on the issue of value-added.In the first phase of the research, we studied 162 venture-capital-backed high-tech firms located in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the second phase (with data from 98 of the 162 firms), the lead venture capitalists on the boards were classified according to whether or not they were a “top-20” firm.Board Size The average board size was 5.6 members, which was somewhat less than half the size of the board of a typical large company. Board size increased from 3 to 4.8 members with the first investment of venture capital.Board Composition and Control The typical board comprised 1.7 inside members, 2.3 venture capital principals, .3 venture capital staff, and 1.3 other outsiders. Insiders constituted 40% or less of the members of 82% of the boards, while venture capitalists made up over 40% of members of 55% of the boards. When a top-20 venture capital firm was the lead investor, then 55% of the board members were venture capitalists; in contrast, when the lead was not a top-20 firm, only 23% of board were venture capitalists.Value-Added Overall, our sample of CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with a top20 venture capital firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly higher—but not outstandingly higher—than the advice from other outside board members. On the other hand, CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists and other outside board members. Hence, in our sample, we could not say that there was a noticeable difference in the value of valueadded by top-20 boards and non-top-20 boards.The areas where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than later-stage companies.Our findings have the following implications for venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and researchers.Venture Capitalist The main product of a venture capital firm is money, which is a commodity. It's impossible to differentiate a commodity in a martetplace where the customers have perfect information. As venture capitalists learned since the mid-1980s, their customers (entrepreneurs) now have an abundance of information that, while it may not be perfect, is certainly good enough to make a well-informed decision when selecting a venture capital firm. Hence, value-added may be the most important distinctive competence with which a venture capital firm—especially one specializing in early-stage investments—can differentiate itself from its competitors. If that is the case, then venture capital firms need to pay more attention to their value-added, because CEOs, overall, do not perceive that it has a great deal of value to their companies. The top-20 appear to be doing a somewhat better job in that area than other venture capital firms.Entrepreneurs If an entrepreneur wants outside board members who bring valueadded other than money, it appears that they can do as well with non-venture capitalists as with venture capitalists. The entrepreneurs we talked to in our survey gave the impression that board members with significant operating experience are more valued than “pure” financial types with no operating experience. If venture capital is an entrepreneur's only source offunding, then the entrepreneur should seek out firms that put venture capitalists with operating experience on boards. It also appears that an entrepreneur, will, on average, get more value-added when the lead investor is a top-20 firm, but there is a drawback: when a top-20 is the lead investor, it is more likely that venture capitalists will control the board. No entrepreneur should seek venture capital solely to get value-added from a venture capitalist on the board, because outside board members who are not venture capitalists give advice that is every bit as good as that given by venture capitalists.Researchers Value-added is a fruitful avenue of research. From a practical perspective, if valueadded exists it should be measurable. So far the jury has not decided that issue. Some finance studies of the performance of venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) claim to have found valueadded, some claim to have found none, and at least one study claims to have found negative value- added. From a theoretical perspective, value-added is relevant to agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the capital asset pricing model. It also is relevant to strategic analysis from the viewpoint of distinctive competencies.  相似文献   

8.
This study investigates the effect of multiple directorships on firm performance, using a database of non‐financial firms listed on the Pakistan stock exchange. Prior literature provides inconsistent evidence on the relationship between multiple directorships and firm performance in an emerging country context, which may be the result of overlooking both the large differences in institutional environments among emerging countries and the dynamic endogenous relationships between board variables and firm performance. We aim to contribute to this academic debate by focusing on directorship appointments to multiple boards in a weak institutional context. Corporate governance practices, such as boards with outside directors exercising their fiduciary duties, are crucial for effective governance in weak institutional environments. However, serving in multiple directorships is expected to compromise the execution of director duties. Using a dynamic system Generalized Method of Moments model, our findings show, indeed, a negative effect of multiple directorships on firm performance in a weak institutional environment. Building on the premise that corporate governance is conditional in nature, we also tested the moderating influence of firm size on this relationship, but we did not find supporting evidence in a dynamic model setting. Our results have important practical implications for policy makers as well as firms.  相似文献   

9.
Recently "born global" firms have received considerable attention in the entrepreneurship and international business literature. Managers leading these new ventures typically face substantial resource constraints when seeking information critical to internationalization. This paper examines how the owner/operators of new ventures in the Turkish clothing export industry utilize their informal and formal social networks to acquire the information they need to export successfully. Field research and a survey of 250 Turkish clothing firm owners was conducted in Istanbul, Turkey to explore this issue. Findings indicate that informal social ties – particularly friends and family connections – are key sources of information for new-venture firm owners in this industry. Two formal organizations provide export information to entrepreneurs in the Turkish clothing industry, but only one was found to be easily accessible to new-venture firm owners: the Istanbul Textile and Clothing Exporters' Union (ITKIB). OLS regression results reveal that new venture firm owners' perceptions of ITKIB's importance can be explained by their perceived importance of various kinds of export-oriented information offered by this organization. In particular, perceived importance of export-law, market-research, and export-process information drive their perceptions of the importance of their ITKIB membership.  相似文献   

10.
Grounded in theories of resource dependence, vicarious and superstitious learning, information processing, and board group literature, this study examines how outside directors’ human and social capital affect the value of corporate foreign direct investments. We employ the event study approach to examine 1210 international investment cases of 836 US firms over a 13-year period. We find significant but distinct non-linear impacts of board members’ human capital (U-shaped effect) and social capital (inverted U-shaped effect). The quality of board capital is also influential, as demonstrated by the effect of directors’ prior foreign investment performance in addition to size and degree of internationalization of interlocked companies. The performance measures of both abnormal announcement returns and operating ROA yield similar results. Our findings highlight the importance of incorporating factors related to board human and social capital for a more comprehensive analysis of the contribution of outside directors to a firm’s international success.  相似文献   

11.
Using data from a single database of Colombian firms, we confirmed an endogenous relationship between specific board characteristics, compliance with corporate governance guidelines, and firm performance. A board comprising experts without conflicts of interest is more likely to control ethical behavior, implement audit committees, review compliance with accepted accounting standards, and approve and control the firm’s strategic planning, all of which will lead to an improvement in firm results, and engagement and retention of higher quality board members. Conclusions have strong implications for public policy and managerial practice.  相似文献   

12.
Drawing on the resource-based view, this study examines how board composition and board tasks affect the relationship between the firm’s global focus and performance in private family firms. Based on a sample of 234 Belgian private family firms, our empirical analyses reveal that nonfamily involvement in the board attenuates the negative relationship between the firm’s global focus and performance. Furthermore, our results show that the global focus-performance link turns positive at higher levels of board networking and advisory tasks, whereas board control task has no significant effect. Ultimately, these findings underscore the board of directors as a key governance contingency, highlighting its important role in overcoming the challenges of global expansion in private family firms.  相似文献   

13.
Despite the importance of internationalization for many firms and the substantial roles of independent directors as monitors and resource providers in corporate strategic orientation, few, if any, studies have investigated how independent directors with human and social capital contribute to firm internationalization. Drawing upon agency and resource dependence theories, this study argues that independent directors with human and social capital provide firms with strategic advice and adequate resources for internationalization, thereby increasing firm willingness to internationalize. Using 173 Taiwanese electronics firms and a weighted linear fixed-effects regression approach, the results indicate that independent directors’ industry-specific experience, international experience and interlocking directorate ties are positively associated with internationalization and that an inverted-U relationship exists between independent directors’ tenure overlap and internationalization. One implication is that international firms may consider appointing independent directors with human and social capital to the board because they will provide firms with resources necessary for successful internationalization.  相似文献   

14.
This paper provides empirical evidence on the effect of woman directors on performance of family firms in the context of an emerging economy. Using data from India covering periods prior to and post institution of gender quotas, we find evidence that the presence of woman directors on board leads to higher firm performance. However, this positive effect is driven by independent woman directors. Further this effect gets attenuated when family members occupy key management positions in the firm. We conclude that governance structures of firms in emerging economies matter for the impact of woman directors on firm performance.  相似文献   

15.
Our objective is to disentangle which family business characteristics enable family ownership to be an effective corporate governance mechanism. To this aim, we investigate whether the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value is moderated by the type of family influence. This study shows that family control positively affects performance, primarily when family members serve on the board and when the founder is still influential. Our findings hold when we control for the general blockholder effect and they are robust to a battery of tests. We conclude that the impact of ownership concentration on firm value differs across family firms.  相似文献   

16.
Vertical relationships with the government, particular relational capital and organizational social network capital, constitute corporate social capital (CSC). Using the empirical data of 97 listed companies in China, this paper examines the impact of CSC on corporate performance, finds that CSC has a positive impact on sales revenue but an insignificant impact on the improvement of ROA. More specifically, when a firm enlarges its sales revenue, the function of organizational network capital is stronger than that of a particular relational capital and that of governmental connections. The paper also finds that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have more advantages in using governmental connections, therefore leading to better social status than non-SOEs do, who have fewer advantages in using any particular relational capital. The article suggests that managers should appraise carefully the effectiveness of CSC, and combine it with other resources; firms should distinguish the structure of the impact of CSC on performance improvement in a dynamic way. With respect to the implication of this paper, it could help in analyzing firm behaviors in the transitional China. Translated from paper in International Symposium on Entrepreneur Research and Education, 2006, April (in Chinese)  相似文献   

17.
Boards of directors are key governance mechanisms in organizations and fulfill two main tasks: monitoring managers and firm performance, and providing advice and access to resources. In spite of a wealth of research much remains unknown about how boards attend to the two tasks. This study investigates whether organizational (firm profitability) and environmental factors (industry regulation) affect board task performance. The data combine CEOs' responses to a questionnaire, and archival data from a sample of large Italian firms. Findings show that past firm performance is negatively associated with board monitoring and advice tasks; greater industry regulation enhances perceived board task performance; board monitoring and advice tasks tend to reinforce each other, despite their theoretical and practical distinction.  相似文献   

18.
This paper analyses the effect of family ownership on performance in an emerging economy. Two dimensions represent family ownership: ownership concentration and characteristics of family control (i.e. family involvement in the board of directors). The study also includes the effect of firm institutional relatedness on performance, meaning the degree of informal embeddedness or interconnectedness with dominant institutions. The empirical analysis uses a data set of publicly traded Chilean firms from 2000 and 2003. The evidence indicates that performance depends on ownership concentration and that family control and institutional relatedness also have a significant effect.  相似文献   

19.
This study investigates the effects of internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms on the choice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement and the value of firms engaging in CSR activities. The study finds the CSR choice is positively associated with the internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms, including board leadership, board independence, institutional ownership, analyst following, and anti- takeover provisions, after controlling for various firm characteristics. After correcting for endogeneity and simultaneity issues, the results show that CSR engagement positively influences firm value measured by industry-adjusted Tobin’s q. We find that the impact of analyst following for firms that engage in CSR on firm value is strongly positive, while the board leadership, board independence, blockholders’ ownership, and institutional ownership play a relatively weaker role in enhancing firm value. Furthermore, we find that CSR activities that address internal social enhancement within the firm, such as employees diversity, firm relationship with its employees, and product quality, enhance the value of firm more than other CSR subcategories for broader external social enhancement such as community relation and environmental concerns.  相似文献   

20.
We contribute to institutional and social capital theory by developing a theoretical framework that suggests that informal and formal institutions are important in mitigating moral hazard in reward-based crowdfunding. We analyze a large sample of Kickstarter campaigns to test these predictions. We find a strong positive relationship between entrepreneurs' home-county social capital and their crowdfunding performance. A rule change that strengthens entrepreneurs' obligation to provide backers with the promised rewards is associated with a reduction in the effect of social capital, suggesting that formal institutions can substitute for informal ones and provides causal evidence of the effect of social capital.  相似文献   

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