财务困境中CEO权力、高管层薪酬差距与公司业绩

以2005—2009年深沪两市上市公司为样本,设定财务困境公司与财务健康公司两个对比组,分析CEO权力对高管层薪酬差距的影响,以及薪酬差距、CEO权力和两者的交互效应对公司业绩的影响。研究发现:CEO强权在财务困境公司中不会导致高管层薪酬差距显著扩大,而在财务健康公司则会;财务困境公司中较大的高管层薪酬差距和CEO强权均能促进公司业绩的提升,且比财务健康公司更显著;CEO权力与薪酬差距对公司业绩的影响在财务困境公司中呈互补关系,而在财务健康公司中呈替代关系。     

Underpaid and Corrupt Executives in China’s State Sector

This study examines the role of executive compensation in public governance. We collect data on corruption cases that involve top-level executives in Chinese listed state-controlled firms. We find a significant positive relationship between underpayment of executives and the likelihood of an investigation into corrupt behavior. We also show that corruption is positively associated with firm performance and that the relationship between underpayment of executives and corruption is influenced by firm performance, suggesting that top managers are more likely to engage in illicit behavior if they are compensated poorly while the firms under their control perform well. Finally, we find that pay-performance sensitivity decreases when top executives are involved in corruption investigations, indicating a lack of pecuniary incentives. Our empirical findings point toward an important relationship between executive compensation and corrupt behavior, thus providing valuable input to the understanding of executive pay and its effects in China’s state sector.     

CEO tenure and ownership mode choice of Chinese firms: The moderating roles of managerial discretion

Based on upper echelon theory, this study has explored how CEO tenure affects ownership mode choice of Chinese firms investing abroad, and how some organizational factors, such as firm size, firm age and CEO duality, moderate this relationship. Using secondary data, this study finds CEO tenure has a positive relationship with the choice of full control mode, CEO duality can reinforce this relationship, but firm size and firm age have no significant moderating effect.     

Whom to dismiss? CEO celebrity and management dismissal

Based on the power dynamics in strategic leadership ranks, this study examines whether chief executive officer (CEO) celebrity serves as a source of CEO power and empirically investigates its role in management dismissal. In the spirit of scapegoating theory, this study proposes that CEO celebrity weakens the likelihood of CEO dismissal but strengthens the likelihood of executive dismissal in the face of poor firm performance. This study goes further to explore the previously unexamined question of “whom to dismiss” and argues that less powerful non-board executives as opposed to board executives are more likely to be handy scapegoats of power dynamics. The data from Korean public firms in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis largely support such a scapegoating hypothesis.     

CEO personality and language use in CSR reporting

We explore the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) personality traits and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting. Upper echelons theory indicates that the values, experiences, and personalities of top organizational managers influence their organization's strategic decisions and effectiveness. We utilize IBM Watson Personality Insights software to infer CEOs’ personality traits based on their responses to questions raised by analysts during year-end conference calls; we obtain CEOs’ Big Five personality traits—openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism—from which we compute a measure of their risk tolerance. Using a longitudinal dataset of Standard and Poor's 500 firms for 2008–2015, we document that high CEO risk tolerance is related to lower CSR report readability and smaller CSR disclosure volume. This finding indicates that executives who are comfortable with greater risk are more willing to supply stakeholders with reports that are shorter and require greater effort to understand. Exploration of the association between CEO Big Five personality traits and CSR report readability and disclosure volume allows key stakeholders to better comprehend CSR disclosures and connotations thereof. Overall, our results contribute to the debate on how CEO personality traits affect organizations’ CSR disclosure reporting strategies, and support upper echelons theory in the CSR setting.     

Do Auditors Applaud Corporate Environmental Performance? Evidence from China

This paper examines the relationship between turnover among chief executive officers (CEOs) and corporate sustainability performance (CSP) by identifying the influence of two major types of succession to the top job (internal or external promotion) and the reasons for change. Our model also integrates the firm’s past prioritization of CSP and the impact of a company’s participation in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Upper echelons theory and agency theory frameworks are adopted to understand CSP. Using an analysis of panel data for 88 public companies across 13 years in France, we find that a change of chief executive has a positive and significant effect on CSP 5 years after the change. This positive effect is stronger when the new CEO is recruited from outside the firm. The impact on CSP is invariably positive and significant, except for voluntary departures. The arrival of a new CEO affects CSP less when the firm has already achieved a high standard of CSP and participates in the GRI. These results are obtained after controlling CSP determinants already validated in the literature (financial performance, size, profitability, etc.). The findings show that expectations of CEOs are not solely economic and financial but also concern CSP. In terms of governance, they should prompt shareholders looking to strengthen CSP to choose new CEOs from outside the firm and to encourage the firm to participate in the GRI.     

CEO任期、董事会治理与绩效强制变更敏感性

本文以2010-2014年我国沪深A股主板上市公司以及在此期间的1341例CEO变更事件为初始研究样本,采用Logit模型和OLS模型研究CEO任期对公司绩效与CEO强制变更敏感性的影响,并从董事会治理视角,进一步说明敏感性发生变化的原因。研究发现,任期是识别CEO能力的重要标识,随着CEO任期逐渐延长,绩效与CEO强制变更的敏感性、以及董事会的监督力度均显著降低,董事会治理机制能够反映股东监督CEO并获取相关信息的需求。     

Influence of CEO Demography on Entrepreneurial Orientation: The Moderating Role of Competitive Intensity

Although entrepreneurial orientation has been identified as a key facilitator of a firm’s innovative behaviors, its antecedents, especially the determinant role of the business leader, have yet to be explored. Drawing on strategic leadership theory, which posits the role of CEO in determining a firm’s strategic direction, we examined the influence of CEO demography, specifically age, tenure, and education, on a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation. Based on a sample of 231 Chinese firms, we found firms with a CEO who was younger, higher educated, and with a shorter tenure on the job had a greater extent of entrepreneurial orientation. Moreover, the firm’s competitive environment moderated these relationships.     

Top management teams and corporate success in an emerging industry

This longitudinal study investigates changes in top management teams of a cohort of firms established in an emerging, high growth industry-the minicomputer industry. Given the turbulent conditions that organizations in this industry must contend with, top management teams do not remain stagnant. Most firms in the industry require a new set of executives to bring forth the organizational changes necessary to cope with major shifts in the environment.Little consensus exists in the literature on the impact of new executives on organizational performance. Studies have found that executive succession may be either positively, negatively, or unrelated to subsequent organizational effectiveness. The authors argue that a weakness of the existing research stream is a failure by scholars to adequately consider either the characteristics and skills of newly appointed executives or the patterns of change in management characteristics over time. The authors propose that organizational performance implications of executive succession events can be clarified by examining who the newly recruited executives are.When executive replacements are made, new successors often have characteristics which widely deviate from those of their predecessors. Such deviations in top management characterisics are shown to be pronounced where top management changes are made in response to crisis. In crises, successors are apparently recruited in an attempt to compensate for the shortcomings of their predecessors. However, while both high and low performing organizations make executive replacements as they evolve, the types of top management revisions they make differ. This study provides evidence that the types of senior management team changes made and the characterisics of newly recruited top management are related to organizational performance. High performing firms recruit new top management with new skills that are appropriate to the evolving environment. Lower performing firms somehow replace executives in response to crises, but seem to make the wrong executive recruitment decisions, apparently because the successors in the lower performing organizations do not match the changing competitive conditions in the industry. Low performing firms appear to recruit executives that entirely lack the types of top executive expertise are necessary for new environmental conditions.Although the majority of minicomputer firms required sizable changes in their executive teams over time, a small but significant subgroup of exceptional firms were identified that defy conventional wisdom. These extraordinary organizations were led by visionary CEOs—capable of maintaining management team stability as they successfully repositioned their firms' strategies to cope with continual environmental change. Among the conventional theories that these exceptional managers defy are: 1. Firms in high growth industries can be highly successful even if they retain their CEO/ Founders well beyond the embryonic stage. 2. Firms in high growth industries can retain a significant proportion of management ownership and still grow exponentially without financial crises. 3. Firms in high growth industries can maintain a high level of insider recruitment and still not become inbred.There appear to be two entirely distinct patterns of CEO/executive team success:Pattern 1 involves firms with no CEO change. This visionary CEO tends to be a founder who appears to be able to systematically recruit a limited number of external recruits in the top management team, selecting recruits who fit a changing environment yet also making maximum use of the existing team's longstanding experience and relationships. To maintain the necessary external perspective and avoid an inbred mindset, these firms a) tend not to allow the CEO to also be chairman, b) encourage a modest level of external ownership.Pattern 2 involves firms in which there is extensive turnover in both CEO and senior management teams, once again bringing in the kind of skills needed to match the changing environment. The CEO tends also to be chairman, and the external perspective is provided by having many external recruits plus low level of management ownership.     

Narcissus Enters the Courtroom: CEO Narcissism and Fraud

This study explores the aspects of the relationship between possible indicators of CEO narcissism and fraud. Highly narcissistic CEOs undertake challenging or bold actions to obtain frequent praise and admiration. The pursuit of narcissistic supply may result in a stronger likelihood of a CEO to undertake bold actions with potential detrimental consequences for the organization. The sample consists of all S&P 500 CEOs from 1992 till 2008 with more than 3 years of tenure. The measurement of CEO narcissism is based on 15 objective indicators and fits the main conceptualization of narcissism. This data collection provides a score for all S&P 500 CEOs according to their narcissistic tendencies. The Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases on the SEC’s website are the indicators of managerial fraud. The findings confirm the expected influence of plausible proxies for CEO narcissism on fraud by showing a positive relationship. This confirms the psychologic perspective of CEO narcissism as a potential cause of fraud.     

Top management teams and corporate political activity: Do top management teams have influence on corporate political activity?

This study explores how senior executives affect firms' propensity to engage in political activity. I propose that firms' participation in the political process depends on their senior executives' involvement in political activity. I examine this framework using data on the campaign contributions of 151 U.S. manufacturing firms during the years 1999-2002. The results suggest that senior executives' involvement in a particular political activity affects their firms' commitment to that political activity, contingent on CEO tenure and top management team heterogeneity.     

Executive migration and international mergers and acquisitions

This study applies the microfoundations approach to examine the impact of migrating executives on firms’ selection of host country in their international acquisition decisions. Viewing executive migration as a conduit for inter-organizational learning, this study offers the first empirical findings that a migrating executive’s inter-organizational learning associated with two specific types of international acquisition experience, i.e., general and country-specific, accumulated at a prior affiliated firm positively impacts host country selection in the executive’s current affiliated firm’s acquisition decisions. The findings further suggest that the migrating executive’s prior country-specific international acquisition experience has a greater influence compared with the migrating executive’s prior general international acquisition experience. Last, the findings show that industry similarity between a migrating executive’s prior and current affiliated firms enhances the effect of the migrating executive’s specific host country acquisition experience. In sum, this study contributes by introducing migrating executives as a new learning conduit in international acquisitions.     

The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive Turnover and Compensation

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards.     

Determinants of chief executive officer compensation following major acquisitions

This study sought to determine whether major increases in firm size, achieved through acquisitions, result in greater chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, given manager versus owner control. A second issue addressed is whether the type of firm—single industry or multiple industry—plays a role in the linkage between acquisition activity and additional compensation. Other variables included in the analysis were CEO tenure and profitability. Annual observations from 1979 through 1986 of 50 firms that had engaged in acquisition activity form the basis of the study. Findings reveal that acquisitions, after allowing 1 year for the full impact of the merger to be felt, led to significant increases in CEO compensation for both owner- and manager-controlled firms. Also, it was found that manager-controlled firms gave their CEOs further rewards for additional years on the job, regardless of performance, while owner-controlled firms were found to reward more on the basis of performance.     

Does CEO transformational leadership influence top executive normative commitment?

Grounded in social exchange theory logic, this study proposes that CEO transformational leadership causes high normative commitment among top executives but this relationship is nonlinear. Specifically, top executives in Turkey express less normative commitment when their CEOs exhibits moderate levels of transformational leadership than low or high levels of transformational leadership. Additionally, CEO transformational leadership exhibits a similar nonlinear relationship to affective commitment which fully mediated the J-shaped relationship between CEO transformational leadership and normative commitment. The findings highlight the need to consider the nonlinear effects of leadership types as well as implications for further exploration of antecedents of normative commitment.     

The Role of CEO’s Personal Incentives in Driving Corporate Social Responsibility

In this study, we explore the role of Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs’) incentives, split between monetary (based on both bonus compensation and changes in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of stocks and options) and non-monetary (career concerns, incoming/departing CEOs, and power and entrenchment), in relation to corporate social responsibility (CSR). We base our analysis on a sample of 597 US firms over the period 2005–2009. We find that both monetary and non-monetary incentives have an effect on CSR decisions. Specifically, monetary incentives designed to align the CEO’s and shareholders’ interests have a negative effect on CSR and non-monetary incentives have a positive effect on CSR. The study has important implications for the design of executive remuneration (compensation) plans, as we show that there are many levers that can affect the CEO’s decisions with regard to CSR. Our evidence also confirms the prominent role of the CEO in relation to CSR decisions, while also recognizing the complexity of factors affecting CSR. Finally, we propose a research design that takes into account endogeneity issues arising when examining compensation variables.     

Corporate Governance Reform and CEO Compensation: Intended and Unintended Consequences

Recent scandals allegedly linked to CEO compensation have brought executive compensation and perquisites to the forefront of debate about constraining executive compensation and reforming the associated corporate governance structure. We briefly describe the structure of executive compensation, and the agency theory framework that has commonly been used to conceptualize executives acting on behalf of shareholders. We detail some criticisms of executive compensation and associated ethical issues, and then discuss what previous research suggests are likely intended and unintended consequences of some widely proposed executive compensation reforms. We explicitly discuss the following recommendations for reform: require greater independence of compensation committees, require executives to hold equity in the corporation, require greater disclosure of executive compensation, increase institutional investor involvement in corporate governance (including executive compensation), and require firms to expense stock options on their income statements. We provide a brief summary discussion of ethical issues related to executive compensation, and describe possible future research.     

Why Do Managers Leave Their Organization? Investigating the Role of Ethical Organizational Culture in Managerial Turnover

This study contributes to the corporate social responsibility, stakeholder theory, and executive succession literature by examining the effect of corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR) on strategic leadership turnover. We theorize that firms’ CSiR increases the likelihood of executive turnover. We also investigate the nature of succession (non-voluntary or voluntary succession) and successor origin (internal candidate or external candidate) following CSiR. We further examine how the CSiR–CEO succession relationship is moderated by firm visibility to stakeholders and industry dynamism. Our results, based on a dataset of 248 U.S. public firms between 2001 and 2008, provide evidence that firms’ CSiR affects what is conventionally seen as primarily a market-driven decision on executive turnover, especially when firms operate in a more dynamic industry. Research contributions and implications are discussed.     

The influence of the CEO’s business education on the performance of hybrid organizations: the case of the global microfinance industry

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are typical examples of hybrid organisations, meaning organisations pursuing both a financial and social logic. This study examines the question of whether financial and social performance improves when an MFI’s chief executive officer (CEO) has a business education. We apply the random effects instrumental variable regression method to examine the influence of the CEO’s business education on the MFI’s financial and social performance. Our panel dataset that includes 353 MFIs from across the globe indicates that ‘only’ 55% of the MFIs have a CEO with a business education. The empirical results indicate that MFIs with CEOs who have a business education perform significantly better, financially and socially, than MFIs managed by CEOs with other types of educational backgrounds. The findings suggest that CEOs with a business education seem better at managing the much-debated tradeoff between providing small loans and producing healthy financial results.     

Exploring the link between internationalization of top management and accounting quality: The CFO’s international experience matters

This study examines whether and how top management internationalization is associated with accounting quality. We combine upper echelons perspectives, agency theory, human capital theory and accounting research, and demonstrate that top management internationalization mitigates the level of managerial discretion in financial reporting. By decomposing the top management team, our analysis reveals that higher levels of accounting quality are associated with the internationalization of the CFO, not the internationalization of the CEO. In particular, we find that CFO’s international education and international work experience are important factors in higher accounting quality.