Regional Inequality and Internal Conflict

This paper studies the influence of regional inequality within countries on internal conflicts. Regional inequalities are measured by the population‐weighted coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita. As the main innovation, I use a panel dataset of country‐level regional inequalities, which covers 56 countries (835 subnational regions) between 1980 and 2009. I also consider a broader cross section dataset for the year 2005, which covers 110 countries (1569 subnational regions). Conflict is measured by the incidence of civil war (UCDP/PRIO data) and a risk measure of internal conflict (war, terrorism and riots) provided by the PRS Group's International Country Risk Guide. Logit estimations are employed as well as OLS fixed effects panel regressions. I find that regional inequalities increase the risk of internal conflict.     

War, peace, and the size of countries

This paper studies the relationship between international conflict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargaining and nonpeaceful confrontations are possible. We show how the size distribution of countries depends on the likelihood, benefits, and costs of conflict and war. We also study the role of international law and show how better defined international ‘property rights’ may lead to country breakup and more numerous local conflicts.     

Quota Wars In Conjectural Variations*

This paper uses a two-country, two-good, conjectural-variations model of trade to show that a quota war will not end in autarky as Rodriguez (1974) and Tower (1975) concluded. Since both countries expect retaliatory responses to reductions in their quotas, both countries are willing to stop the trade war before autarky is reached. the possible equilibria are free trade, two equilibria in which one country has its optimal quota while the other country chooses free trade, and an interior solution. It is possible that some, all, or none of these equilibria will exist.     

Make Trade Not War?

This paper analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship between military conflicts and trade. We show that the conventional wisdom that trade promotes peace is only partially true even in a model where trade is economically beneficial, military conflicts reduce trade, and leaders are rational. When war can occur because of the presence of asymmetric information, the probability of escalation is lower for countries that trade more bilaterally because of the opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains. However, countries more open to global trade have a higher probability of war because multilateral trade openness decreases bilateral dependence to any given country and the cost of a bilateral conflict. We test our predictions on a large data set of military conflicts on the 1950–2000 period. Using different strategies to solve the endogeneity issues, including instrumental variables, we find robust evidence for the contrasting effects of bilateral and multilateral trade openness. For proximate countries, we find that trade has had a surprisingly large effect on their probability of military conflict.     

Social memory,evidence, and conflict

This paper examines an equilibrium model of social memory — a society's vicarious beliefs about its past. We show that incorrect social memory is a key ingredient in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts.We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries face off each period in a game of conflict characterized by the possibility of mutually destructive “all out war” that yields catastrophic consequences for both sides. Each country is inhabited by a dynastic sequence of individuals. Each individual cares about future individuals in the same country, and can communicate with the next generation of their countrymen using private messages. Social memory is based on these messages, and on physical evidence — a sequence of imperfectly informative public signals of past behavior. We find that if the future is sufficiently important for all individuals, then regardless of the precision of physical evidence from the past there is an equilibrium in which the two countries engage in all out war with arbitrarily high frequency, an outcome that cannot arise in the standard repeated game. In our construction, each new generation “repeats the mistakes” of its predecessors, leading to an endless cycle of destructive behavior.Surprisingly, we find that degrading the quality of information that individuals have about current decisions may “improve” social memory. This in turn ensures that arbitrarily frequent all out wars cannot occur.     

National Sentiment and Consumer Choice: The Iraq War and Sales of US Products in Arab Countries

Did the rise in anti‐American sentiment caused by the Iraq war affect sales of US goods abroad? We address this question using data on soft drinks and fabric detergents sales in nine Arab countries. We find a statistically significant negative impact of the war on sales of US soft drinks in seven countries. The impact dissipates after a few months in two countries but persists in the other five. In the case of detergents, we only find a significant negative impact in one country. We conclude that international politics can sometimes affect consumer behavior and market outcomes.     

Aiding violence or peace? The impact of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

This paper considers the impact of foreign aid flows on the risk of civil conflict. We improve on earlier studies on this topic by addressing the problem of the endogenous aid allocation using GDP levels of donor countries as instruments. A more structural addition to the literature is that we efficiently control for unobserved country specific effects in typical conflict onset and conflict continuation models by first differencing. The literature often overlooks the dynamic nature of these types of models, thereby forcing unlikely i.i.d. structures on the error terms implicitly.¹ As a consequence, malfunctioning institutions, deep-rooted political grievances, or any other obvious, yet unobserved and time persistent determinants of war are simply assumed away. We find a statistically significant and economically important negative effect of foreign aid flows on the probability of ongoing civil conflicts to continue (the continuation probability), such that increasing aid flows tends to decrease civil conflict duration. We do not find a significant relationship between aid flows and the probability of civil conflicts to start (the onset probability).     

A Theory of Voluntary Unrequited International Transfers

This paper proposes a theory of voluntary unrequited international transfers which explicitly allows for an international externality such that the well being of each country is influenced by the well being of other countries. Formulating a simple two–country and two–commodity model, this paper shows that (a) either neither country extends aid to the other, or one country extends aid and both countries benefit from the aid; and (b) there exist acceptable (Arrow–Debreu) economies such that neither country extends aid to the other, and there exist acceptable economies such that one country extends aid to the other.
JEL Classification Numbers: F11, F35.     

War and peace: Third-party intervention in conflict

This paper develops a simple sequential-move game to characterize the endogeneity of third-party intervention in conflict. We show how a third party's “intervention technology” interacts with the canonical “conflict technologies” of two rival parties in affecting the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. From the perspective of deterrence strategy, we find that it is more costly for a third party to support an ally to deter a challenger from attacking (i.e., to maintain peace or acquiescence), as compared to the alternative case when the third party supports the ally to gain a disputed territory by attacking (i.e., to create war), ceteris paribus. However, an optimally intervening third party can be either “peace-making”, “peace-breaking”, or neither depending on the characteristics of the conflict and the stakes the third party holds with each of the rival parties.     

A dynamic theory of war and peace

In every period, an aggressive country seeks concessions from a non-aggressive country with private information about their cost. The aggressive country can force concessions via war, and both countries suffer from limited commitment. We characterize the efficient sequential equilibria. We show that war is necessary to sustain peace and that temporary wars can emerge because of the coarseness of public information. In the long run, temporary wars can be sustained only if countries are patient, if the cost of war is large, and if the cost of concessions is low.     

Trade diversion effects of the US–China trade war on Vietnam

This paper empirically examines the US–China trade war that began in mid-2018, focusing on the impact on a third country, Vietnam. Using regression analysis, we found that while the trade war had a negative impact on US imports from China for all targeted products, there was a partial offset from increased imports from other countries. Notably, US imports from Vietnam experienced a sharp increase, particularly after the third round of US import tariffs on Chinese goods. Additionally, our research reveals that the four rounds of tariff escalation affected US imports from China differently depending on their end-use and technology intensity.     

An analysis of the MFN clause under asymmetries of cost and market structure

Abstract.  We conduct a welfare comparison of MFN and tariff discrimination in an oligopoly model of trade between two exporting countries and one importing country. While MFN dominates tariff discrimination from a world welfare perspective when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to either cost or market structure, such need not be the case when both types of asymmetries co‐exist. In particular, when high‐cost exporters are merged and the cost disadvantage of the merged unit relative to competing firms is of intermediate magnitude, tariff discrimination can be welfare preferred to MFN (even when the average tariff is actually lower under MFN). JEL classification: F13, F12     

Understanding Resilience in Climate Change and Conflict Affected Regions of Nepal

In the face of global climate change, strengthening community resilience becomes increasingly important, especially in conflict affected countries with fragile governance. Nepal is such a country, recovering from a decade of civil war while facing several climate and environmental risks, including floods, droughts and landslides. We aim to contribute to the understanding of resilience building by drawing on case studies from Banke, Dang and Rolpa districts in Nepal. To compare the resilience of the districts we conduct field research. None of the analysed approaches to strengthen the resilience are without unintended consequences. The provision of rice in Rolpa increases food security but also creates local preferences for rice that cannot be met sustainably. In Dang and Banke aid resources themselves have become a source of conflict. We conclude that a more holistic understanding of local realities is needed to minimise unintended effects and strengthen resilience under challenging governance and (post)conflict conditions.     

Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War

This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem.     

CIVIL WAR EXPOSURE AND VIOLENCE

In recent years scholars have begun to focus on the consequences of individuals' exposure to civil war, including its severe health and psychological consequences. Our innovation is to move beyond the survey methodology that is widespread in this literature to analyze the actual behavior of individuals with varying degrees of exposure to civil war in a common institutional setting. We exploit the presence of thousands of international soccer (football) players with different exposures to civil conflict in the European professional leagues, and find a strong relationship between the extent of civil conflict in a player's home country and his propensity to behave violently on the soccer field, as measured by yellow and red cards. This link is robust to region fixed effects, country characteristics (e.g. rule of law, per capita income), player characteristics (e.g. age, field position, quality), outliers, and team fixed effects. Reinforcing our claim that we isolate the effect of civil war exposure rather than simple rule breaking or something else entirely, there is no meaningful correlation between our measure of exposure to civil war and soccer performance measures not closely related to violent conduct. The result is also robust to controlling for civil wars before a player's birth, suggesting that it is not driven by factors from the distant historical past.     

Peacekeeping: A strategic approach

This paper presents a theoretical model of conflict between two players, with intervention by a peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers are treated as a military contingent, capable of taking sides, acting as a third (independent) side in the war or remaining inactive, depending on circumstances. This departs from previous models, in which peacekeeping was no more than a parameter affecting players' fighting costs. The main result is an optimal deployment strategy by peacekeepers, detailing the nature and level of intervention required under different circumstances; this strategy results in the lowest possible level of warfare between the two antagonists. The credible threat of force (rather than mere intervention) is the strategy's key component.     

A Two‐Country Game of Competition Policies

Recently a number of studies have recognized that trade policy can be substituted for by competition policy. This study demonstrates, however, that there is a fundamental difference in the working of terms‐of‐trade effects between competition policy and tariff policy and that if countries optimally set their respective competition policies, it is unlikely to result in a tariff‐war‐like state in which all countries adopt distortionary policies. Instead, in a Nash equilibrium, one country maintains perfect competition in its domestic service sector while the other country tolerates imperfect competition.     

PROFIT TAX AND FIRM MOBILITY IN A THREE‐COUNTRY MODEL

We construct a three‐country model that incorporates international relocation by imperfectly competitive firms and examine both the effects of each country's profit tax reduction on the consumption and welfare of all countries, and the incentive for the countries to decrease the profit tax. In such a model, both the terms of trade and international relocation of firms offer the key to understanding the impacts of one country's profit tax policy. In particular, we note that the relocation of firms from the other two countries is positively related to the wage incomes of the third country through a shift in labour demand, and the terms‐of‐trade improvement is not only positively related to the wage incomes, but also negatively related to profit incomes through a shift in world consumption demand. We show that (i) in a three‐country world economy, regardless of the reduction's source, the profit tax reduction of each country leads to relocation of firms away from foreign countries toward its own economy and deteriorates the terms of trade of its economy and (ii) this becomes a ‘beggar‐thy‐neighbour’ policy in the sense that it lowers the welfare of the other foreign countries.     

A theory of efficient coexistence

Abstract

Neighbours have to coexist over an infinite horizon. Neither of them can eradicate the other or extricate him or herself from the bondage. Their respective resources regenerate themselves periodically. Hence, the capacities for production and war repeatedly recuperate from exhaustion. This paper uses a simple dynamic model to study the cooperation and conflict between two neighbours. It is shown that the way for one party to enhance its own prosperity without inducing a war with its neighbour is to collaborate on mutually beneficial projects and divide the output according to each side's contribution. Rejecting potential collaboration or dividing the joint output disproportionately risks the eruption of war. If the duration that one side is prepared to fight exceeds that of the other, the one with a shorter duration will concede defeat before the war starts. Nonetheless, when the planned durations of war of both sides are identical, the first-strike advantage induces them to wage war simultaneously.