共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
We consider an environment where the sale can take place so early that both the seller and potential buyers have the same
uncertainty about the quality of the good. We present a simple model that allows the seller to offer the good for sale before
or after this uncertainty is resolved, namely via forward auction or spot auction, respectively. We solve for the equilibrium
of these two auctions and then compare the resulting expected revenues. We also consider the revenue implications of insurance
in forward auctions. 相似文献
2.
《The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance》1999,39(1):113-128
Using data from dairy cattle auctions plus independent appraisals of the cattle sold, this paper is able to verify the existence of the “declining price anomaly”: prices decline over the course of the auction, with the main decline occurring towards the end of the day. We show that the data are consistent with a simple model of sequential auctions of goods with independent values, and examine distributions which replicate the important features of the data. The crucial feature driving the price declines in the model is a limited capacity for purchases by the participants in the auction, which in turn decreases competition for the final units in the auction. 相似文献
3.
在介绍在线逆向拍卖的基本流程之后,分析了成功进行在线逆向拍卖的前提条件,分批正是其中非常重要的一项准备工作。然后,从聚类分析的思想出发,为满足采购方在分批中的不同原则,对聚类分析的样本距离公式进行了适当修改,得到了可以增加拍卖包吸引力,尽可能节约采购成本的一个分批方法。 相似文献
4.
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature 总被引:46,自引:0,他引:46
Paul Klemperer 《Journal of economic surveys》1999,13(3):227-286
This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions , Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.); We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and a bibliography for each section. 相似文献
5.
Pai Xu 《Journal of Applied Econometrics》2013,28(6):1046-1065
In this paper, I investigate Samuelson's low‐price auction model with entry costs. The model's equilibrium implies that the distribution of bids is truncated at the threshold for participation. I use the model to estimate the cost of participation in Michigan highway procurement auctions. The null hypothesis of zero entry costs is rejected. Using my empirical results, I then construct an estimate of the optimal auction, which employs regular policy tools such as entry fees. Finally, I demonstrate the savings that the Michigan government could have made on payments if optimal auctions had been employed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
6.
Frank H. Page Jr. 《Journal of Mathematical Economics》1998,29(4):389-418
We provide a unified approach to the problem of existence of optimal auctions for a wide variety of auction environments. We accomplish this by first establishing a general existence result for a particular Stackelberg revelation game. By systematically specializing our revelation game to cover various types of auctions, we are able to deduce the existence of optimal Bayesian auction mechanisms for single and multiple unit auctions, as well as for contract auctions with moral hazard and adverse selection. In all cases, we allow for risk aversion and multidimensional, stochastically dependent types. 相似文献
7.
We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stochastic competition setting. We determine the existence of equilibrium bidding strategies and discuss the potential shape of these strategies. Results for the war of attrition contrast with the characterization of the bidding equilibrium strategies in the first-price all-pay auction as well as the winner-pay auctions. Furthermore we investigate the expected revenue comparisons among the war of attrition, the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auctions and discuss the linkage principle as well. Our findings are applicable to future works on contests and charity auctions. 相似文献
8.
Ricardo Gonçalves Miguel A. Fonseca 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2016,25(4):1040-1059
This paper contributes to the emerging empirical literature on penny auctions, a particular type of all‐pay auctions. We focus on the potential learning effects that bidders may experience over time but also (and particularly) across auctions as a result of their auction participation. Using detailed bid‐level information, we find that, similarly to earlier literature, bidders suffer from a sunk cost fallacy, whereby their probability of dropping out of an auction is decreasing in the number of bids they have already placed in that auction. Although we do find that learning through repeated participation alleviates the sunk cost fallacy, participation in simultaneous penny auctions emerges as a much more effective learning mechanism, ultimately contributing toward bidders earning higher individual surpluses. 相似文献
9.
The design of online markets has become a major issue due to the capability of operators to implement almost any set of market rules overnight. With this study we contribute to the literature of auction market design by presenting a theoretical and experimental analysis of sudden termination auctions. Our main focus is on the candle auction that has a positive termination probability at any time in the course of the auction. Candle auctions prove to be a much faster, but equally efficient alternative to standard hard close auctions. 相似文献
10.
Auctions with endogenous participation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their
values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction
since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first-
and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium
where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions
generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature,
the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that
it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions
with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse.
Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct
revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal
to the participation cost.
Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999 相似文献
11.
在线拍卖站点的不断增加给在线竞买人提出了具大的挑战,竞买人需要从大量的拍卖站点中选择一个恰当的拍卖站点,以保证在满足他们偏好的前提下得到他们希望的物品。不同的拍卖站点采用的拍卖方式和竞价策略是不同的,因此,不同的拍卖站点其竞价代理的设计策略也不同。本文主要对目前在线拍卖代理研究进行综述。 相似文献
12.
We study the performance of the first-price format in auctions with asymmetric common-values. We show that, contrary to the result for second-price auctions, a small advantage for one player translates only to small changes in bidders’ strategies, and the equilibrium remains close to the first-price equilibrium of the original game. We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies and their behavior as the degree of asymmetry increases. Finally, we compare the revenues at the optimal auction, the first-price auction and the second-price auction. 相似文献
13.
Makoto Shimoji 《Review of Economic Design》2017,21(4):231-252
We employ weak dominance to analyze both first-price and second-price auctions under the discrete private-value setting. We provide a condition under which the expected revenue from second-price auction is higher than that of first-price auction. We also provide implications for large auctions, including the “virtual” revenue equivalence. 相似文献
14.
Indranil Chakraborty Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2001,10(2):265-276
Different pricing rules in multiunit auctions provide different incentives for a bidder to corner the auction and thus require different levels of effort from the seller to deter cornering. We consider three different types of auctions: the pay-your-bid or "discriminatory" auction commonly used by the US Treasury, the lowest-winning-bid uniform-price auction used in the current Treasury experiment, and the highest-losing-bid uniform-price auction considered by Vickrey almost four decades ago. We show that the pay-your-bid auction provides the greatest incentive to corner the market, that the experimental Treasury auction provides less incentive, and that the highest-losing-bid uniform-price auction provides the least. Arguably, the less the incentive to corner the market, the easier it will be for sellers to deter cornering, and the greater their expected revenue (net of the cost to deter cornering) will be in otherwise expected-revenue-equivalent auctions. 相似文献
15.
Fernando Branco 《Review of Economic Design》1996,2(1):283-309
In this paper I consider a common value model, with independent types, where the ex-post value of the good is influenced by
the bidders' information at the auction stage. The seller cannot fully extract the surplus. In a symmetric model the optimal
mechanism can be implemented through first price, second price, or English auctions; but not through a Dutch auction.
Other properties of the optimal auctions are that the seller's reservation price is endogenous, and that in sealed bid auctions
the price may exceed the value of the object (winner's curse). 相似文献
16.
This paper compares the first-price auction and the second-price auction with several asymmetric bidders who are either weak or strong. The ranking of these auctions in terms of profit may flip as the exogenous reserve price or the number of weak or strong bidders change. Similarly, with endogenous reserve prices the ranking may depend on the seller’s own-use valuation. In other words, the ranking may be fragile to changes along these dimensions. Existing models rule out such ranking reversals by imposing substantial structure on type distributions. The current paper relies on simple mechanism design arguments that require less structure. 相似文献
17.
《Journal of Operations Management》2007,25(5):1035-1054
Buying organizations are increasingly using electronic reverse auctions (eRAs) to source from suppliers. However, recent quasi-experimental and field research has suggested that the use of this sourcing technique can create perceptions of opportunism among participating suppliers. Yet from the buyer's perspective, online reverse auctions can yield lower purchase prices. Given the many ways in which to configure on-line auctions, we extend existing research by using a laboratory experiment to investigate how different reverse auction configurations jointly influence bid price and suppliers’ perceptions of buyer opportunism.Our findings suggest that supplier bid prices decrease over time as they participate in more eRAs, regardless of the configuration of auction parameters. However, the combination of rank (versus price) visibility, high (versus low) supplier need to win a contract, and six (versus three) competitors was significantly more effective than other combinations of variables in immediately reducing bid prices. The data also indicated that when suppliers’ bids dropped substantially across auctions, their perceptions of opportunism increased. Notably, auction parameter combinations such as price visibility, three competitors, and low need for the contract yielded comparably low bids by the third auction, without any increases in perceived buyer opportunism. 相似文献
18.
Landsberger et al. have studied a sealed bid first price auction with two players in which the ranking of the valuations is known. They argue that such a situation can arise in a sequential auction where only the name of the winner is revealed. In this paper we consider sequential auctions where two identical goods are sold sequentially to N players who are interested in both objects. In sealed bid auctions, no information is a priori revealed by the mechanism, but the seller can in principle reveal whatever he wants. We restrict our attention to the case where only the name of the winner is revealed to be in the context of Landsberger et al. for the second auction. The aim of the paper is to compare such a sequential auction with a simultaneous auction where both goods are sold as a bundle or equivalently with a sequential auction where no information is revealed. We first show that there exists an equilibrium of the sequential game in pure and monotone strategies. Then, the comparison of the seller's expected revenue in the two cases allows us to conclude that contrary to Landsberger et al.'s predictions, the seller can not use the information to increase his revenue. This result is obtained using simulations for a large class of distribution functions. The seller must not reveal the name of the winner between the two auctions and instead sell both goods using a simultaneous auction.Received: 31 July 2001, Accepted: 5 February 2003, JEL Classification:
B44I wish to thank Laurent Linnemer, Thomas Ricke, Michael Visser and Shmuel Zamir for helpful comments and suggestions. I am very grateful to the referees and the associated editors in charge of my paper. 相似文献
19.
Indranil Chakraborty 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2002,11(4):663-684
The paper studies the effects of bundling on the bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions when the bidders have common values for the objects. Bundling of objects before the auction reduces the problem of the winner's curse, and the bidders bid more aggressively. This does not mean that a bundled auction is always better for the seller's revenue. Indeed, there is another effect that makes the bundled auction preferable (from the seller's standpoint) if and only if the number of bidders is small. While this is the only effect present in an independent-private-values model, it does not vanish when bidders have pure common values for the objects. The paper concludes that a bundled auction is unambiguously better for the seller than separate auctions when the number of bidders is small. 相似文献
20.
Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price. 相似文献