On Optimal Commodity Taxes When Consumption Is Time Consuming

This paper studies the problem of optimal taxation of commodities when consumption is a time‐consuming activity. This is done under two distinct preference separability assumptions: between goods and labor supply, and between goods and leisure. It argues that with the labor separability, the traditional uniform taxation results of optimal tax theory continue to hold. With leisure separability, on the other hand, consumption time is a major ingredient of optimal tax rates. However, the relationship between consumption time and optimal tax rates depends crucially on the representation of the economy. In representative consumer economies, time differences determine the pattern of optimal tax rates so that goods whose consumption take more time are subjected to higher tax rates. When individuals have different earning abilities, redistributive, incentive, and efficiency considerations also come into play resulting in a complex relationship. The paper derives formulas for optimal commodity taxes in this case on the basis of three different tax structures: linear commodity taxes in combination with linear and nonlinear income taxes, and nonlinear commodity taxes in combination with nonlinear income taxes.     

Optimal climate and fiscal policy in an OLG economy

This paper develops a climate–economy model to study the joint design of optimal climate and fiscal policies in economies with overlapping generations (OLGs). I demonstrate how capital taxation, if optimal, drives a wedge between the market costs of carbon (the net present value of marginal damages using the market interest rate) and the Pigouvian tax (the net present value of marginal damages using the consumption discount rate of successive OLGs). In contrast to deterministic infinitely lived representative agent models, at the optimum, the capital income tax is positive, the carbon price equals the market costs of carbon but it falls short of the Pigouvian tax when (i) preferences are not separable over consumption and leisure; and (ii) labor income taxes cannot be age-dependent. I also show that restrictions on climate change policy provide a novel rationale for positive capital income taxes.     

Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation When Both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter*

In previous studies on public policy under relative‐consumption concerns, leisure comparisons have been ignored. In this paper, we consider a two‐type optimal non‐linear income tax model, in which people care about both their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component (i.e., a component that is larger for the high‐ability type than for the low‐ability type). Leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public‐good provision.     

Time-consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and a balanced government budget

Abstract .  This paper analyzes optimal, time consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and with a balanced government budget. When tax revenue is used for publicly provided consumption or lump-sum transfers, leisure would be higher than its social optimum. Pareto optimal taxation requires taxing capital income more heavily than labour income and subsidizing investment at the same rate of the tax. Also, it requires either subsidizing labour at the same rate as a consumption tax or subsidizing consumption at the same rate as a labour income tax, and hence it is not a practical guide to policy. Further, a consumption tax, or equivalently a uniform income tax with investment subsidies at the same rate, can be improved on by taxing capital income more heavily than labour income.     

Voting over selfishly optimal tax schedules: Can Pigouvian tax redistribute income?

This paper studies pairwise majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who differ in privately observable skills and make consumption comparisons, which creates a negative positional externality. It shows that the tax schedule preferred by the median skill type will win the voting contest. Given a reference consumption defined as the average consumption in the population, all skills face the same Pigouvian tax rate in the utilitarian optimum, whereas in selfish optima high skills face a Pigouvian tax rate larger than that facing low skills, generating a novel income redistributive effect. Under a constant elasticity of labor supply, two more results are obtained. First, for Pareto, Champernowne, Weibull, and lognormal skill distributions, the selfishly optimal tax schedule facing high (low) skills tends to be more progressive when the bottom‐skill's (top‐skill's) status concern intensifies. Second, it identifies the conditions under which, in the voting equilibrium, high skills face higher marginal tax rates while low skills face lower ones than what they face in the utilitarian optimum.     

Shocks and the unavoidable road to higher taxes and higher unemployment

This paper considers a matching model in which multiple steady-state unemployment rates exist if government expenditures and unemployment benefits are high enough. The focus on the extensive margin and a possible transition to a steady state with higher unemployment rates imply that the effect of tax rates can be high even when the elasticity between consumption and leisure is low. The matching friction limits transitions between steady states due to self-fulfilling expectations. After a sufficiently large increase in the unemployment rate and after a large enough increase in the tax burden caused by an exogenous increase in government spending, however, transition towards the high-unemployment steady state is unavoidable in an economy with generous unemployment benefits.     

Relative Consumption Concerns and the Optimal Tax Mix

This paper studies the optimal tax mix (taxes on income and commodities) under asymmetric information in a two‐type model, when individuals make relative consumption comparisons. The model includes both positional and nonpositional goods, taking into account the fact that relative concerns matter for some but not for all commodities. We find that in general the whole tax system is affected by the externalities caused by the consumption of positional goods, notably also the taxes on income and on a nonpositional good. The tax rates on positional goods are higher than in the absence of status effects, reflecting their Pigouvian role. The sign of the Pigouvian part in the income tax schedule is ambiguous and depends crucially on whether status goods are complements or substitutes to leisure.     

Fiscal policies,frictional labor market,and endogenous growth

This paper considers the spillover effects from public spending, and studies optimal fiscal policies in frictional labor markets. We obtain that the optimal shares of government spending in production and consumption are the same as those in a frictionless labor market under the Hosios condition. However, as higher capital accumulation increases the cost of job creation and maintenance, the optimal tax rate of capital income is positive. In addition, when the labor market is frictional, the marginal benefit of labor is larger than the marginal utility of leisure. Thus, consumption and labor should not be taxed uniformly any more. Our calibration suggests that all of the three tax rates should be positive. Moreover, in the situation in which the Hosios condition does not hold, the shares of public productive spending and public consumption both increase when the worker’s bargaining power is greater than the elasticity of search in the matching function.     

The choice of excise taxes when savings and labour decisions are distorted

The framework is a simple two period life-cycle model with identical individuals who work in period 1 and are retired in period 2. Initially there are optimally chosen uniform income and commodity tax rates, which lead to distortions in both the labour/leisure choice and the consumption/savings choice. The purpose is to demonstrate in an intuitively comprehensible way how differentiating commodity taxation by slightly increasing the tax on one consumption good can mitigate existing distortions. The sufficient conditions for a welfare improvement are similar to that of Corlett and Hague plus some conditions on average and marginal consumption propensities.     

Optimal taxation with consumption time as a leisure or labor substitute

This paper studies the optimal commodity taxation problem when time taken in consumption is a perfect substitute for either labor or leisure. It shows that while labor substitutability affects the optimal tax structure, leisure substitutability leaves the classical optimal tax results intact. In the Ramsey tax framework with linear income taxes, whether the consumers have the same or different earning abilities, labor substitutes tend to be taxed at a higher rate than leisure substitutes with the tax differential being increasing in consumption time. This is not necessarily the case when one allows for nonlinear income taxation.     

Optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic extensive model: The case for negative participation tax on young people

We consider optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic model where the labor‐leisure choice is the extensive margin, each household faces idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity and a pecuniary cost to work, and there is no insurance market against the shocks. We show that the well‐known property of the optimal participation tax rate in the static model continues to hold in our dynamic economy, that is, the participation tax rates for some income groups with low consumption are likely negative. In dynamic models, the optimal participation tax rate depends on age and on labor income. Our numerical simulations suggest that a negative participation tax should be restricted to young households.     

The political economy of public debt

Public debt (as opposed to current taxation) alters the inter-temporal pattern of tax rates??it reduces current rates and increases future rates. Accordingly, whether the share of the cost of a given public expenditure is reduced or increased by debt for a given individual depends on the time profile of that individual??s income (tax base) vis-à-vis others?? incomes. Therefore, given the age-profile of income in virtually all Western countries, individuals will tend to be better off under current taxes the younger they are. If (as most standard models of political economy assume) individuals vote according to their economic interests, and if they are tolerably well-informed, then the pattern of support for public debt will track age. And increases in the median age of the population will lead to larger public debt. In other words, public debt policy collapses to a kind of demographic politics. This explanation may, however, be sensitive to assumptions about motives for bequest. Specifically, if bequestors seek to leave positive bequests and are motivated exclusively by the lifetime consumption of their heirs (as well as themselves) then the aged may, under plausible assumptions about the age of their heirs, prefer current taxes over debt.     

Optimal time-consistent fiscal policy under endogenous growth with elastic labor supply

We explore the implications of incorporating an elastic labor supply in an endogenous growth economy when characterizing the time-consistent Markov policy. We consider two policy instruments: an income tax rate and the split of government spending between consumption and production services. The Markov-perfect policy implies a higher income tax rate and a larger proportion of government spending allocated to consumption than those chosen under a commitment constraint on the part of the government. As a consequence, economic growth is slightly lower under the Markov-perfect policy than under the Ramsey policy. Under the Markov and Ramsey optimal policies, a higher weight of leisure in households' preferences leads to a lower optimal income tax rate and a lower proportion of public resources devoted to consumption. We also show that the policy bias that would arise when imposing a Markov policy designed ignoring the presence of leisure in the utility function would lead to a significant welfare loss.     

Utility and production externalities, equilibrium efficiency and leisure specification

This paper analyzes the implications that the specification of the leisure activity has on the equilibrium efficiency in a two-sector endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation. We consider external effects of consumption and leisure in utility, and sector-specific externalities associated to physical and human capital in production. The optimal tax policy to correct for the distortions caused by the externalities is characterized under all the typical leisure specifications considered in the literature: home production, quality time and raw time. We show that the optimal policy depends markedly on the leisure specification.     

Optimal taxation in the Uzawa–Lucas model with externality in human capital

In this paper we study the optimal policy in the Uzawa–Lucas model with externality in human capital when agents value both consumption and leisure. We find that the government pursuing the first best can achieve its goal by a subsidy which depends on foregone earnings while studying and which is financed through a lump sum tax. Anyway, the optimal policy, that should be designed to provide incentives for agents to devote more time to schooling and cut both on leisure and working, is not unique. There exists an infinite number of combinations of consumption, capital income, labor income and lump sum taxes that can decentralize the first best.     

Don't shoot yourself in the foot! A (real-effort task) experiment on income redistribution and voting

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the Meltzer–Richard model of equilibrium tax rates in which individuals are either low or high skilled workers and face a real-effort task that includes leisure at the work place. We find that a large proportion of low-skilled workers vote for the lowest tax rate (the one that gives them the lowest payoff), especially when the alternative tax rate is very high. However, this proportion is significantly reduced in treatments in which the subjects are given extra information about how the tax operates in redistributing income. This result suggests that the lack of information about the role of taxes in income redistribution may be an important factor in explaining the counter-intuitive voting behavior of low-income voters over income redistribution. We also find some support that the prospect of upward mobility and the belief in the negative effect of taxes on productivity make low-income voters support low tax rates, especially when the alternative tax rate is very high.     

When is a tax neutral?

A proportional income tax is said to be neutral if variations in the tax rate do not affect the optimal composition of the consumption commodities of a utility maximizing consumer. It is shown that neutrality obtains if and only if the indirect utility function of the consumer is groupwise homothetic. If the income tax rates on labor and property incomes are allowed to differ, then neutrality obtains if and only if the indirect utility function of the consumer is homothetically separable. If, in addition, it is required that the proportional income tax be neutral with respect to not only consumption commodities but also to leisure, then 'the indirect utility function must have the form: $\text{V = V(f(w)+H}{}^1\text{(p))}$, where w and p are the normalized prices of leisure and consumption respectively, and H¹(p) is homogeneous of degree one in p.     

Optimal Income Taxation With Quasi-Linear Preferences Revisited

Properties of the optimal income tax for quasi-linear in leisure preferences are studied. With utilitarian or maxi-min objectives, closed-form solutions are obtained. Bunching occurs over intervals where the second-order incentive condition is binding. Whether this occurs depends solely on the skill distribution. The patterns of consumption and tax rates in the nonbunched range are independent of whether the second-order incentive constraints are binding. Bunching at the bottom can also occur if a non-negative constraint on incomes is binding for some households. The pattern of marginal tax rates depends on the skill distribution and whether it is truncated.     

Which commodity taxes should supplement the income tax?

The analysis takes as its point of departure a continuum of consumers economy in which an optimum income tax exists and is the only tax instrument in operation. The welfare effects of introducing small excise taxes to supplement the income tax are then explored. Essential in this context are changes in the tax distortions of work incentives. It is shown that a commodity should be taxed or subsidized depending on whether it is positively or negatively related to leisure in a sense which is precisely defined. The results are related to earlier contributions to the literature on direct versus indirect taxation.     

Revenue‐enhancing Trade Liberalization in a Differentiated Duopoly

Existing studies suggest that in developing countries, tax reforms that increase consumption taxes can compensate for shortfalls in revenue from a tariff reduction. However, these revenue‐enhancing tariff–tax reforms have a critical shortcoming—they generally reduce welfare under imperfect competition. This paper shows that tax reforms such as consumption tax reforms do not necessarily have to be implemented to make up for revenue shortfalls from tariff reductions under imperfect competition, because trade liberalization through tariff cuts leads to an increase in government revenue when domestic and imported goods have a high substitutability. This revenue‐enhancing effect of a tariff reduction occurs for a wider degree of product substitutability when initial tariff and consumption tax rates are high. More importantly, we show that even if initial tariff and consumption tax rates are sufficiently low, a tariff reduction still increases government revenue for a low degree of product differentiation under Bertrand competition.