Unemployment insurance and labor supply and demand: A time series analysis for the United States

A disequilibrium model of the U.S. labor market in which the unemployment insurance system plays a key role is estimated. An increase in the level of real unemployment benefits markedly lowers employment and raises real wages.     

Unemployment insurance and union bargaining — an insider-outsider approach

A trade union is required to tax its own members to fund unemployment benefit paid to its unemployed members in an insider-outsider model of union bargaining over wages and employment. An increase in unemployment benefit imposed by the government increases employment overall but not necessarily the employment of insiders if the tax rate is exogenously fixed by the government.This paper has benefited from comments of Mick Common, Dipak Ghosh, Bob Hart, and Robin Ruffell. The comments of two anonymous referees and the advice of the Editor have greatly improved the presentation of the paper. Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.     

Unemployment insurance and redistributive taxation

This paper studies the simultaneous determination of the socially optimal levels of unemployment insurance, income taxation and experience rating. It argues that there is a normative justification for state unemployment insurance. When the government wishes to use redistributive taxes, but cannot enforce lump-sum transfers, it is not socially optimal for there to be full experience rating of unemployment insurance schemes: one distortion should be used to off-set another. The state must then intervene in the provision of insurance for those without jobs.     

Unemployment,insurance and smoking

Using recent state-level data from the United States, this article examines new influences on cigarette demand. In particular, we uniquely focus on the effects of unemployment and health insurance coverage on smoking. Results show that higher cigarette prices, a lack of health insurance and restrictions on smoking at home, all lead to reduced smoking. On the other hand, literacy, income, unemployment, workplace smoking restrictions, smokeless tobacco taxes and tobacco-producing states do not seem to have an appreciable impact. The magnitude of the price elasticity of demand is greater than that found in the pre-MSA era. Policy implications are discussed.     

Unemployment insurance and the business cycle*

An equilibrium model is developed to study the interaction of the business cycle, unemployment insurance (UI), and the labor market for young men in Canada. The model combines optimal job offer, layoff, and recall decisions within a numerically solved and restricted Bayesian–Nash equilibrium. We consider the long‐run implications of changes made to unemployment insurance in Canada during the 1990s. The changes lead to equilibrium increases in average rates of unemployment, layoffs, and recalls. Eliminating UI lowers the equilibrium unemployment rate and average observed earnings. UI policy affects the timing of cycles of endogenous outcomes relative to the productivity cycle.     

Effects of future pension benefits on pre-retirement labor supply: Evidence from Chile

In this paper, I estimate the effect of future pension benefits on pre-retirement labor supply for a representative sample of Chilean workers. Using nonlinear patterns in pension benefit formulas and a reform that permanently changed non-contributory pensions, I estimate the effect of pension accrual and expected pension wealth on labor force and contributory-sector participation, labor earnings, and hours worked. I find that the effect is concentrated on the impact of pension accrual on the probability to contribute to the pension system. The effect is heterogeneous and is concentrated among middle-aged workers, low-skilled workers, and workers with higher financial literacy.     

Unemployment dispersion and the allocative efficiency of the labor market

An idea that seems to gain recurrent popularity in the economics profession is that, because of technological change, changes in consumer demand, skill mismatches, and the like, the unemployed tend to become concentrated or trapped in particular geographic areas and that for these reasons unemployment rates have grown more disparate over time. This paper examines the theoretical conditions necessary for the above argument to hold and shows that such conditions are not consistent with the notion of a competitive labor market. The paper then examines various measures of unemployment-rate dispersion in order to determine whether or not unemployment rates have indeed drifted further apart over time. The empirical evidence presented indicates unequivocally that geographic unemployment rates are neither more nor less dispersed now than they were twenty years ago. The results, therefore, suggest that the competitive view of the labor market is appropriate and that the hypothesis that unemployment rates have become more dispersed over time because of structural imperfections in the labor market should be rejected.     

Unemployment and labor force participation in the United States

This paper uses historical data from the United States to investigate the relationship between unemployment and labor force participation. Cointegration analysis supports a long-run relationship between these two variables, which leads us to question the empirical relevance of the unemployment invariance hypothesis for the United States.     

工资、附加福利和工人流动

引言本文研究企业如何把工资和附加福利作为工具来使用以获得他们需要的劳动力供给。我们的分析也提供了在享乐工资体系下存在摩擦的证据。据我们所知,我们的研究是首次使用雇主-雇员联接数据来检验工人流动如何对一般的附加福利范围(包括了若干种的附加福     

Unemployment insurance design: Inducing moving and retraining

Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can affect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain. Realistically, such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the identity of those may be unobservable ex ante. The problem of characterizing constrained optimal unemployment insurance in this case has been neglected in previous literature. We construct a model of optimal unemployment insurance where multiple incentive constraints are easily handled. The model is used to analyze the case when an incentive constraint involving moving costs must be respected in addition to the standard constraint involving costly unobservable job-search. Absent wealth effects on behavior, we derive closed-form solutions showing that when the moving/retraining incentive constraint binds, unemployment benefits should increase over the unemployment spell, with an initial period with low benefits and an increase after this period has expired.     

Unemployment insurance,recalls, and experience rating

In the United States, almost half of the workers who separated from their jobs ended their unemployment spell by returning to work for their last employer. In this study, we explore the impact of the experience rating (ER) system on recalls. In states using reserve ratio ER, and for a firm that is not at the minimum or the maximum tax rate, each layoff of a worker receiving unemployment benefits increases the future tax rate while each recall reduces it. This provides a natural incentive for firms to recall former workers receiving unemployment benefits. We use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators dataset, which provides information on recalls at the county level, and exploit the differences in tax schedule across states to estimate the impact of ER on recalls. We show that the recall share from hires increases with the degree of ER. We then develop a search and matching model with different unemployment insurance (UI) status, endogenous UI take-up, endogenous separations, recalls, and new hires. We illustrate that this model reproduces the effects of ER on recalls admirably. We show that an increase in the intensity of ER translates into a higher recall share at the steady state, especially for unemployed workers collecting unemployment benefits. We then use this model to analyze the labor market dynamics under alternative financing schemes. We show that ER has stabilization virtues—the higher the degree of ER, the less volatile the unemployment rate.     

Unemployment insurance, moral hazard, and economic growth

It is important but difficult to distinguish between desirable and undesirable effects of unemployment insurance (UI) that are observationally equivalent when designing optimal UI schemes. For example, a UI-induced rise in the wage rate caused by workers taking more time to match their skills with job vacancies is desirable. However, another view of the same observation is that UI causes permanently higher involuntary unemployment by raising the reservation wage. This paper avoids this problem by regarding the trade-off between the UI replacement rates and unemployment as an intermediate relationship that matters only as far as it impacts economic growth. An empirical analysis of UI replacement rates, unemployment rates, and growth rates using annual panel data finds UI replacement rates are associated with higher unemployment. However, no significant relationship is found between UI-related unemployment and the real growth rate of gross domestic product.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fiftieth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 15–18, 2000, Charleston, South Carolina. Financial support from the Scottish Economic Society and the University of Stirling is gratefully acknowledged. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development generously provided access to their database on benefit entitlements and gross replacement rates. The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for constructive comments.     

Taxes and female labor supply

The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the U.S. income tax structure in a dramatic fashion. In particular, these two reforms reduced the marginal tax rates for married households. In this paper I investigate what part of the rise in labor force participation of married women between 1980 to 1990 (a rise of 13 percentage points) can be accounted by the changes in taxes. I build an heterogeneous agent model populated by married households. Households differ by age and educational attainment levels of their members and decide whether the second earner, the wife, should participate in the labor market. I select parameter values so that the model economy is consistent with the 1980 U.S. economy in terms of income tax structure, wages (skill premium and gender gap), marital sorting (who is married with whom), and female labor force participation. Using counterfactual experiments I find that 20–24 percent of the rise in married female labor force participation is accounted for by the changes in the income tax structure. Changes in wages account for 62–64 percent, and changes in marital sorting account for 14–16 percent of the rise in the participation rate of married women.     

Liquidity constraints and labor supply

In this paper we shed some light on how restrictions in financial markets, the so-called liquidity constraints, might act in affecting labour supply decisions of Italian workers. One way to neutralize the existence of binding liquidity constraints is simply by supplying additional labor, instead of reducing consumption. We estimate whether resorting to additional labor supply as a smoothing consumption device is at work by using the Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW). The longitudinal dimension of the SHIW dataset allows us to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity. We also use an IV strategy to address the endogeneity of our measure for credit constraints in labor supply equations due to time varying factors.Our results show that liquidity constraints increase the intensity in the supply of men׳s labor. Constrained men work, on average, 4 hours more than their unconstrained counterpart. Self-employed workers turn out to be more sensitive to binding liquidity constraints, possibly because they are more flexible in adjusting the intensity of their labor supply.     

Habit persistence and the long-run labor supply

Standard macroeconomic models possess the undesirable feature that people stop working in the long run. Assuming standard parameters, the neoclassical model predicts that 2% of annual productivity growth leads to a 99% decline in the labor supply after 624 years. Yet, this contradicts the fact that labor hours per capita are relatively stable, even over a long period of time. This paper shows how internal and external habit persistence each work to stabilize the long run labor supply, independent of key parameter choices.     

Taxation,insurance, and precautionary labor

We examine optimal taxation and social insurance with adverse selection in competitive insurance markets. In a previous literature, it has been shown that, with perfect insurance markets, social insurance improves welfare since it is able to redistribute without creating distortions. This result has been taken as robust to the introduction of adverse selection as this would only provide additional justifications for social insurance. We show, however, that adverse selection can weaken the case for social insurance compared to a situation with perfect markets. Whenever social insurance mitigates private underinsurance, it also causes welfare-reducing effects by decreasing precautionary labor supply and hence tax revenue. In addition, adverse selection may reduce the redistributive potential of social insurance. We illustrate our general results using different equilibrium concepts for the insurance market. Notably, we derive conditions under which a complete renunciation of social insurance is optimal and the government only relies on income taxation to achieve its redistributive objectives.     

Government policies and graft in an economy with endogenous labor supply

This paper is an extension of Marcouiller and Young's [Am. Econ. Rev. 85 (1995) 630] paper which shows that in a two-good economy with constant labor supply, the government can always increase graft by squeezing the formal sector out of existence. In this paper, we find that if individuals choose the amount of labor they supply, the government can increase graft by eliminating formal production in relatively rare cases.     

Unemployment insurance and involuntary unemployment: The case of adverse selection

This paper studies the private and public provision of unemployment insurance in a model where equilibrium unemployment results from the use of the wage as a worker selection device. It is shown that private provision will not occur, essentially because those workers most desired by a firm place least value on such coverage. Respecting the same informational constraints, public provision necessarily gives rise to some distortions in participation decisions, but nonetheless is welfare improving in the aggregate.     

Intertemporal labor supply and involuntary unemployment

We estimate a model of intertemporal male labor supply behavior which explicitly accounts for the effect of income taxation and the transfer system. Moreover, we model the demand-side driven rationing risk that prevents agents from choosing the optimal labor supply state. Our results show that elasticities derived in an unconstrained pure choice model are significantly higher compared to a model with involuntary unemployment. This holds true for short-run and long-run labor supply elasticities.