The incidence of taxes: A dynamic macroeconomic analysis

This paper analyzes the incidence of various tax changes using the intertemporal optimizing framework developed by Brock and Turnovsky. The model contains a reasonably complete specification of the corporate sector, in which firms have the choice of financial structure. It also allows for a range of government financial policies, although only one is considered in detail. Both the short-run and the long-run effects of changes in the personal income, capital gains, and corporate profit tax rates are analyzed. It is shown that the effects of tax changes (a) vary between the short and long run; (b) the effects of tax changes depend critically upon the financial structure adopted by forms; and (c) may also depend upon government financial policy.     

Reexamination of Economic Growth, Tax Policy, and Distributive Politics

The paper examines the relationship between economic growth, tax policy, and distribution of capital and labor ownership in a one‐sector political‐economy model of endogenous growth with productive government spending financed by a proportional tax on capital income. The analysis shows that inequality in wealth and income can be positively or negatively related to the optimal tax rate. In either environment, higher inequality leads to a lower after‐tax return to capital, thereby reducing the economy's growth rate.     

Pure rent taxation and allocation of capital in a two-sector open economy: A long-run analysis

In this paper, the long-run incidence of a tax on pure rent is analyzed in an OLG two-sector small open economy, in which one sector produces a capital good and one sector a consumer good. Contrary to what is obtained in a one-sector closed economy, a land rent tax does not necessarily foster nonhumam wealth accumulation and capital formation. The accommodating scheme for the government budget plays a crucial role for the effects of pure rent taxation. A rent tax stimulates nonhuman wealth if distortionary taxes on wealth or on income from nonland inputs are alleviated. The mechanism spurring capital formation is brought into action, instead, only when the rent tax is matched by a fall in capital taxation or, if the capital sector is capital intensive, by an increase in government spending on the capital good.     

财政政策、货币政策与国外经济援助

本文通过把国外经济援助分成直接对私人的经济援助和直接对政府的经济援助来讨论这两类经济援助对政府财政政策和货币政策的影响。我们发现对私人的经济援助的增加可以使得私人消费水平和政府公共消费水平增加 ,但是它也导致政府收入税税率和通货膨胀率的提高 ;另一方面 ,对政府的经济援助增加可以使得均衡时的私人资本存量、私人消费水平和政府公共消费水平增加 ,同时可以使得均衡时的收入税税率和通货膨胀率下降。     

The Credit Channel of Capital Tax Policy

A neoclassical growth model is augmented by a corporate sector, financial intermediation, and a set of tax rates. In this setting, capital structure is determined by the interplay between a tax advantage of debt finance and costly state verification entailed by asymmetric information. Effects of capital tax reforms are investigated with a special focus on this micro‐founded credit channel of tax policy. The theoretical part of the paper establishes a new, institution‐based view on the motivation of debt finance in general equilibrium and derives financial and real effects of private and corporate income tax policies. Using a calibration with U.S. data, the applied part demonstrates that tax cuts cause significant adjustments of capital structure. Nevertheless, it turns out that the credit channel generates relatively small effects of tax reforms on consumption, investment, and growth.     

The impact of the 2008 German corporate tax reform: A dynamic CGE analysis

In this paper we develop the dynamic CGE model, ifoMod, which is designed to analyse the impact of fundamental tax reforms and in particular capital income tax reforms for Germany. The model is in line with neoclassical growth theory and features all important behavioural interactions between the four major building blocks of an economy including the firm and household sector, the government and the rest of the world. We consider firms of different legal forms which all face an intertemporal investment problem, a financing problem w.r.t. the optimal choice of debt and equity financing as well as a factor input problem when deciding on the optimal amount of different skill types of labour employed. We show the impact of different types of taxes on the behavioural margins of firms and households. The conducted simulation shows the impact of the latest German corporate tax reform of 2008 on the German macroeconomic variables such as investments, GDP, consumption and household's welfare.     

Laffer strikes again: Dynamic scoring of capital taxes

We set up a neoclassical growth model extended by a corporate sector, an investment and finance decision of firms, and a set of taxes on capital income. We provide analytical dynamic scoring of taxes on corporate income, dividends, capital gains, other private capital income, and depreciation allowances and identify the intricate ways through which capital taxation affects tax revenue in general equilibrium. We then calibrate the model for the US and explore quantitatively the revenue effects from capital taxation. We take adjustment dynamics after a tax change explicitly into account and compare with steady-state effects. We find, among other results, a self-financing degree of corporate tax cuts of about 70–90% and a very flat Laffer curve for all capital taxes as well as for tax depreciation allowances. Results are strongest for the tax on capital gains. The model predicts for the US that total tax revenue increases by about 0.3–1.2% after abolishment of the tax.     

Cross-border tax effects on affiliate investment—Evidence from European multinationals

Recent studies suggest that multinational firm activities at home and abroad are positively correlated which may be due to the use of common inputs (like marketing, patents, etc.). Then, a cost shock at one location may lead to reduced activity in all other locations within the firm. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically analyze national corporate tax policy in such a setting. Our main hypothesis is that corporate taxation at the parent location not only reduces the parent's capital stock but also lowers capital stocks at affiliates abroad. Using micro data on European multinational firms, we confirm the hypothesis showing that a 10 percentage point increase in corporate tax rates is associated with a 5.6% decrease in the affiliate's capital stock. From a welfare point of view, this cross-border tax effect on the capital stock gives rise to a negative fiscal externality of corporate taxation which is empirically shown to compensate a substantial fraction of the well-known positive externality due to profit shifting.     

A general equilibrium model of the incidence of corporation income tax under uncertainty

In this paper we investigate the incidence of the corporation income tax in terms of a two-sector, general equilibrium model, where production decisions are made under uncertainty. The conventional result, derived originally by Harberger (1962), is that if the corporate sector is the capital-intensive sector, then capital must bear a greater burden of the tax, in proportion to its initial share in national income, than labor. This result continues to hold unambiguously under uncertainty only if the relative and the absolute risk aversion of the corporations are non- increasing in profits. Otherwise, the Harberger result may not hold.     

Capital Mobility, Agglomeration and Corporate Tax Rates: Is the Race to the Bottom for Real?

Based on a data set for 19 OECD countries for the period 1981–2001,we estimate the impact of FDI on corporate tax rates, wherechanges in FDI are a measure for changes in capital mobility.So far the literature has been concerned with the related butrather different question as to the sensitivity of FDI to taxrates. Our article takes an opposite perspective and asks whatthe impact of capital mobility is on corporate tax rates. Indoing so, we explicitly take the role of agglomeration intoaccount. In theory, core countries can afford a higher tax ratecompared to peripheral countries. In our estimation strategy,we instrument capital mobility to deal with reverse causality.The main conclusion is that increased international capitalmobility, measured by FDI flows, implies a lower corporate taxrate. But we also find that agglomeration matters: core countrieshave a higher corporate tax rate than peripheral countries.If there is a race to the bottom, it seems that it is more realfor some countries than others. (JEL code: H25)     

The role of infrastructure investment and factor productivity in international tax competition

In this paper we use data from 30 developed economies from 1999 to 2014 to analyse the importance of infrastructure investments and factor productivity for explaining international capital tax competition. Our results indicate the existence of intensive tax competition in effective average corporate taxation during this period. It is also suggested that non-tax variables of third countries affect a country's corporate tax policy. Countries whose direct competitors have better infrastructures or are more productive compensate with lower capital taxation. In this way, their infrastructure investment and productivity-enhancing policies are used as strategic substitutes for capital taxation. With regard to the characteristics of closest competitors, we find that corporate tax competition is fiercer among countries that are characterized by similar infrastructure investments and geographical proximity.     

Debt financing of public investment: On a popular misinterpretation of “the golden rule of public sector borrowing”

In this paper I challenge the proposition that the golden rule of public sector borrowing is consistent with the principle of intertemporal allocative efficiency, in the sense that growth-enhancing public investment justifies a structural public deficit. I demonstrate that in the long run the social opportunity cost of debt-financed public investment exceeds the social opportunity cost of tax financed public investments. This result holds if the social rate of time preference is lower than the interest rate on government borrowing. Thus a benevolent government would use taxes to finance public investment. In the short run, debt financing is justified if public investment has a considerable growth effect on private consumption. This requires a corresponding initial undersupply of public capital.     

Taxation,corporate financial policy,and the cost of capital: A comment

Theoretical models of the incidence of the corporate profits tax differ as to whether the tax distorts the allocation of resources, or is a lump-sum tax on the owners of capital. These differences derive from the assumptions made about the special provisions of the tax system with regard to the deduction of interest payments and investment expenditure. Two non-distortionary systems are identified which are shown to be equivalent to a capital levy when the tax is introduced and a zero tax on profits. Under the present UK system, however, a higher rate of corporation tax stimulates investment.     

中国的金融发展、所有制结构调整与经济增长

本文利用中国分省面板数据证明:银行虽然将大部分资金贷给了国有企业,但是通过所有制结构调整,主要包括合法的国有企业改制,和不合法的国有资产流失等形式的资金漏损,使得银行信贷资产从国有企业手中转移到民营企业手中,提高了信贷资金的使用效率和资本边际生产率,促进了经济增长."拨改贷"使得银行贷款成为国有企业的主要外部资金来源,银行贷款的偿还压力推动了国有企业的改制,而政府出于保护银行信贷资产安全的需要也会催促国有企业加快改制.本文的结论为财政、外汇资金补充银行资本金和国有银行体制改革提供了理论和经验支持,为转轨国家的经济改革次序提供了启示.     

How do market reforms affect China's responsiveness to environmental policy?

A large percentage of total investment in China is allocated by the central government at below-market interest rates in pursuit of non-economic objectives. This has resulted in low rates of return and a high number of non-performing loans, threatening the future health of the Chinese economy. As a result, reform of capital markets is a high priority of the Chinese government. At the same time, the country is implementing various environmental policies to deal with serious pollution issues. In this paper we ask how reforms of the capital market will affect the functioning of a carbon tax. This allows us to assess how China's willingness to join global efforts to reduce carbon emissions is influenced by China's current efforts to reduce investment subsidies. We compare the costs of a carbon tax in a reformed economy with the costs of a carbon tax in the current subsidized economy. We find that in the subsidized economy the tax-interaction effect dampens the effect of a carbon tax resulting in smaller reductions in emissions than what would result in a reformed economy. Importantly, we also find that the effect on economic welfare from a carbon tax is lower in the subsidized economy; in fact, for lower levels of reductions, the carbon tax is actually welfare improving. These results have important implications for an economy undergoing economic transition. The carbon tax rate required to achieve a certain level of emission reductions will be higher in an economy with capital subsidies. However, the welfare implications of the tax indicate that the current system with capital subsidies is highly distorting implying that there is a high efficiency cost for the non-economic objectives the government is pursuing by maintaining this system of subsidies.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Tax policy,capital use,and investment incentives

In this paper, we investigate the effect of a corporate income tax on the utilization and maintenance of capital and on the demand for capital stock and services. We find that a tax that allows interest deductions is distortionary unless allowable depreciation depends on the firm's utilization and maintenance decisions. Also, we show that the usual demand equation for capital stock is misspecified if capital utilization is not a technological constant.     

State investment tax incentives: A zero-sum game?

Over the past four decades, state investment tax incentives have proliferated. This emergence of state investment tax credits (ITC) and other investment tax incentives raises two important questions: 1) Are these tax incentives effective in achieving their stated objective, to increase investment within the state?; 2) To the extent these incentives raise investment within the state, how much of this increase is due to investment drawn away from other states?To begin to answer these questions, we construct a detailed panel dataset for 48 states for 20+ years. The dataset contains series on output and capital, their relative prices, and establishment counts. The effects of tax variables on capital formation and establishments are measured by the Jorgensonian user cost of capital that depends in a nonlinear manner on federal and state tax variables. Cross-jurisdictional differences in state investment tax credits and state corporate tax rates entering the user cost, combined with a panel that is long in the time dimension, are key to identifying the effectiveness of state investment incentives.Two models are estimated. The Capital Demand Model is motivated by the first-order condition for a profit-maximizing firm and relates at the state level the capital/output ratio to the relative user cost of capital. The Twin-Counties Model exploits both the spatial breaks (“discontinuities”) in tax policy at state borders and our panel dataset to relate at the county level the relative user cost to the location of manufacturing establishments. Using the Capital Demand Model, we find that own-state capital formation is substantially increased by tax-induced reductions in the own-state price of capital and, more interestingly, substantially decreased by tax-induced reductions in the price of capital in competitive-states. Similarly, using our Twin-Counties Model, we find that county manufacturing establishment counts around state borders are higher on the side of the border with the lower price of capital, but the difference is economically small, suggesting that establishments are much less mobile than overall capital. Extensions of the Capital Demand Model also reveal that state capital tax policy appears to be a zero-sum game among the states in that an equiproportionate increase in own-state and competitive-states user costs tends to have no effect on own-state capital formation.     

Corporate social responsibility,stock prices,and tax policy

We model a market in which some investors get utility from owning shares of firms that engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). In equilibrium, investors' CSR considerations influence portfolio choices, stock prices, and CSR spending. We study tax policy designed to maximize total giving (individual and corporate) net of government tax breaks and find that its effectiveness is non‐monotonic in the proportion of altruistic investors: with few or many altruistic investors, it has little impact on giving, but, at intermediate levels, effective tax policy intuitively relates the corporate tax rebate rate on giving and the cap on allowable tax savings.