城乡税制统一:基于公共财政的分析视角

城乡分割的二元税制加重了农民负担,降低了我国农产品的国际竞争力,也有悖于市场经济的公平原则;在农村公共产品供给上,政府存在着职能缺位,这些都不利于建立城乡统一的公共财政。当前统一城乡税制面临着财政资金压力、税收征管能力、二元经济结构等方面因素的限制。统一城乡税制需要逐步完善城乡税收体系、加大政府对农村公共品投入以及深化基层人事制度改革和促进农业产业化等方面的配套改革。     

Trade tariff,wage gap and public spending

This paper studies the interplay between wage gap and government spending in a small open economy facing a shock in trade policy. We consider a specific factor model with an export sector, which uses skilled labour, and an import-competing sector, which uses unskilled labour. We find the conditions under which there exists an inverse (direct) relation between trade liberalization (protection), which increases (decreases) the skilled-unskilled wage gap, and the level of government expenditure. We also show how either an unbalanced distribution of political bargaining power, or tariff revenue co-financing public spending may break this inverse relation. Moreover, the direct relation between tariff protection and public goods provision can be strenghtened by progressive taxation and weakened by regressive taxation.     

Investment scaling up and the role of government

This article studies the fiscal and welfare implications of a scaling up of public investment when the government is subject to inefficiencies on the spending and on the tax collection side. In our simulations, the scaling up of public investments results in higher long-run output and consumption levels but requires a fiscal stabilization package in order to preserve fiscal sustainability. The effects on consumers’ welfare after the fiscal adjustment are nontrivial. Our welfare analysis shows that consumers’ welfare is increased when the government smooths the fiscal adjustment via higher borrowing and not through an increase in taxation. Moreover, the comparison between several stabilization packages via tax adjustment shows that higher welfare is achieved when the government relies mostly on taxation of capital as this allows higher levels of consumption. Lower fiscal costs that do not undermine fiscal sustainability can however be achieved if the government manages to reduce inefficiency in tax collection. Finally, we consider a change in the trade regime that causes a decline in revenues. We find that the higher fiscal burden required to preserve fiscal sustainability would completely wipe out the welfare gain of higher public investments.     

Who is afraid of capital mobility? on taxation of labor income and the level of public services in an open economy

This paper deals with the effects of international capital mobility on the taxation of labor income and on the size of the public sector. It employs a model of the labor market where national trade unions set the wage level in their country and national governments set the tax rate of a proportional labor-income tax. The tax revenues are used to finance a public good and unemployment benefits. In this model, competition between the national trade unions caused by international capital mobility leads to full employment, and the governments supply the public good on the first best level. As no unemployment benefits have to be financed, the tax on labor income may decline with the introduction of capital mobility. These tax cuts may even overcompensate the unions for the wage decline.     

Environmental Policies, Comparative Advantage and the Gains/Losses from International Trade

A multihousehold economy with multilateral nondepletable externalities, environmental (output) taxation and governmental production of pure, nonexclusive and nonrivalrous public goods is assumed. Modelling many different households the "almost perfect" isomorphism between the normative analysis of public goods and environmental policies is highlighted. Globally valid necessary and sufficient conditions for gains from international trade are derived and interpreted. A simple yet general environmental policy rule ensuring trade gains is put forward. The law of comparative advantage is generalized to economies with multilateral nondepletable externalities and over or underproduced pure public goods.     

A natural experiment for identifying the impact of ‘natural’ trade barriers on exports

The paper investigates the relative importance of trade policy and ‘natural’ sources of export taxation in Malawi, a landlocked African economy. These sources of export taxation are in turn used to explore how export supply would respond to trade liberalisation as opposed to measures which lower other international trade costs. The findings indicate that trade policy barriers are now only a limited source of ‘true’ export taxation and that trade policy reform needs to be complemented with reforms to reduce international trade, including transport, costs.     

A Factor Endowment Theory of Endogenous Growth and International Trade

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of multi‐country, two‐good and two‐factor, in which both long‐run growth and international trade patterns are examined. In each country, government expenditure on a public intermediate good plays a crucial role in the realization of persistent growth. It is shown that the long‐run pattern of international trade is determined in a Heckscher‐Ohlin manner.     

基于产学合作的国贸实践教学团队建设研究

优秀的国贸实践教学团队是培养应用型外贸人才的重要智力保障。而在现有的制度及外贸环境下，外贸企业、高校教师参与产学合作的积极性不够，其原因在于双方的利益诉求得不到满足以及社会责任意识不强。特别是对于中小城市的中小外贸企业而言，参与产学合作的培养成本高，而且毕业生就业流失概率大。本文通过产学合作困境的原因分析，进而从政府、舆论、高校三个层面，针对如何培养一只基于产学合作的国贸实践教学团队提出对策建议。     

The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements

This paper analyzes the links between policies aimed at supplying a global public good and international trade in segmented markets. I find that the credible threat to impose trade sanctions may be capable of sustaining full cooperation in the supply of the public good, provided the sanctions are accompanied by a minimum participation clause which serves to coordinate government behavior. In equilibrium, trade is not restricted. But if the threat to impose sanctions were not allowed by the rules of the game, supply of the public good would be Pareto-inefficient.     

Income Distribution, Taxation, and the Private Provision of Public Goods

This article investigates the role of taxation when public goods are privately provided. Externalities between consumers via the public good are shown to cause kinks in social indifference curves. As a result, a government restricted to income taxation should engineer enough inequality to ensure there are some non-contributors to the public good. Whether commodity taxation changes this conclusion depends on the extent to which consumers "see through" the government budget constraint. If they can, inequality should still be sought. When they cannot, in contrast to the case of an economy with only private goods, commodity taxation can be used in conjunction with income transfers to achieve the first-best.     

International Trade with a Public Intermediate Good and the Gains from Trade*

This paper presents a one‐primary factor, two‐consumer good, and two‐country model of international trade where each country’s government supplies a country‐specific public intermediate good so as to attain efficient production. By introducing the Marshallian adjustment process, it is demonstrated that the country with larger factor endowment exports the good whose productivity is more sensitive to the public intermediate good. Our normative analysis of free trade shows the following results. First, at least one country gains from trade. Secondly, if a country incompletely specializes in the trading equilibrium, the country necessarily loses from trade.     

浅议电子商务的税收征管

数字革命催生下的电子商务是一种不同于任何传统商务活动的新兴的商务交流方式,这种交流方式给税收工作带来了许多新的挑战,建立健全完善的电子商务税务征管制度和对策是应对这些挑战的有力武器,也是社会发展的必然要求.通过对电子商务的概念、特征以及国内外发展状况和电子商务对国际税收和税收征管工作的影响的全面分析,提出四种对策来实现和完善对电子商务的税收征管工作.     

ELIMINATING THE INFLATIONARY FINANCE TRAP IN A POLITICALLY UNSTABLE COUNTRY: DOMESTIC POLITICS VS. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE

This paper presents an intertemporal political economy model of public finance relevant for developing and transition countries where there is inherent political instability. As in Cukierman et al. (1992) , it is shown that political instability causes myopic behaviour by a rational government resulting in high levels of revenue from seigniorage. It is then argued that inflationary finance also increases barter and currency substitution, but if the government tries to suppress them, seigniorage taxation rises even more. Only international financial pressure can help eliminate the inflationary finance trap, but becomes less effective as the instability increases.     

Fiscal strategies,foreign indebtedness,and overlapping generations

Conclusions This paper offers a unifying dynamic system approach to real government debt and real capital formation in a world economy. The sustainability of permanently maintained primary fiscal deficits is investigated in an open economy. In particular if national governments compete in the issuance of debt at an international capital market sustainable debt profiles appear only as a theoretical (i. e., not empirically valid) curiosity. Within the more realistic regime of an undercapitalized world economy a nation can only run a permanently maintained primary surplus. Starting from a PMP surplus the paper also demonstrates the viability of temporary deficits implying an increase in taxation later to stabilize the fiscal debt. By reversing the argument this shows, the right way to reduce government debt in a non-traumatic manner is to run a higher temporary surplus via higher taxation. Using this extrasurplus to buy back fiscal debt the economy may reduce taxation later while enjoying vigorous capital accumulation towards a higher capital-labour ratio. Furthermore, the paper shows that ceteris paribus a relatively high social security load and a relatively high size of a balanced budget causes external indebtedness via consumption oriented current account deficits. It is left for further research to see what happens if government borrows for public investment instead of public consumption.My research was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. While preparing the paper 1 had access to unpublished work by M. Carlberg and T. Ihori. Discussions with M. Carlberg, H. Großmann, J. Michaelis, and H. Schmid are gratefully acknowledged. The diagrams were mastered by C. Schwarz.     

Transfer payments from the central government to the local governments and the local governments' efforts on taxation: taking China as an example

The influence of the transfer payments from the central government to the local governments on the local governments' efforts on taxation must be taken into consideration by every country for the design of the transfer payments. Based on the theoretical analysis on the influence of the transfer payments from the central government to the local governments on the local governments'payments, this paper indicates that the local governments'efforts on taxation depends on the demand elasticity of the district for public goods. It increases with the increase of the elasticityλ.Judge the degree of the local government's efforts on taxation by measureλ. After an empirical analysis on the transfer payments from the central government to the local governments from 2000 to 2004, thins paper gets the conclusion that the local governments'efforts on taxation abates with the increase of supporting payments or with the increase of the ratio of transfer payments to local willing public payments. Under specific circumstances, the higher the ratio of transfer payments to the local fiscal expenditure is, the smaller the local governments' efforts on taxation is under the central payments, whereas the higher the local income is, the higher the efforts is under the eentral payments. Based on this. this paper gives the meanmg of its corresponding policies.     

International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition

We analyze non‐cooperative commodity taxation in a two‐country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents accruing to capital owners. With consumption‐based taxation, these fiscal externalities exactly offset each other and the non‐cooperative tax equilibrium is Pareto efficient. With production‐based taxation, however, there are additional externalities on the foreign tax base and the foreign price level that lead non‐cooperative tax rates to exceed their Pareto efficient levels.     

寻求更有效的财政政策——中国宏观经济分析

宏观财政政策是一种公共物品 ,其有效性的标准是 ,在实现政府利益的同时 ,能够增进社会的福利。面临通货紧缩 ,政府将继续实施以财政政策为主导的扩张性宏观政策 ,在财政支出空间有限的情况下 ,就要选择能够作大投资乘数 ,提高市场效率的措施 ;同时要考虑调整税制结构 ,改变对投资征高税的税制 ,逐步变生产型增值税为收入型增值税和消费型增值税 ,并通过把内资企业税负降至外资企业的水平 ,一方面提高企业的利润预期 ,另一方面 ,消除税负不公 ,提高社会经济效率和减少资本外流 ;在运用国债政策时 ,既要重视国债的发行和使用 ,更要重视国债的交易和流通 ,推进我国金融市场的发育和功能的发挥以及促进公用事业的企业化 ,转换资源配置方式 ,从政府配置转向市场配置 ,从集中配置转向分散配置。总之 ,在体制转轨时期 ,推行一种与市场化改革相结合的财政政策 ,把短期的政策操作和长期的制度调整结合起来 ,实现政策和体制联动。     

Tax-mix, public spending composition and growth

This paper characterizes optimal fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model whose policy implications are consistent with the relationship between two stylized facts observed in a majority of OECD economies, namely the growth in the ratios of both government consumption to public investment and of direct to indirect taxation from 1970 to 2004. Assuming a continuation in the upward trend for the public consumption to output ratio consistent with that observed for this variable between 1970 and 2004 for most developed economies, we find that the optimal tax system becomes more intensive in income taxation relative to consumption taxation, and that public disbursements become less intensive in public investment, which is consistent with the co-evolution of these ratios over the last 40 years.     

Openness, Government Size and the Terms of Trade

This paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size of governments, both theoretically and empirically. We argue that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels: (1) a terms-of-trade externality, whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation, and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. We provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms. Our main theoretical prediction is that the relative strength of the two explanations depends on a key parameter, namely, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Moreover, while the first mechanism is inefficient from the standpoint of world welfare, the second, instead, is optimal. In the empirical part of the paper, we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and government size and we explore its determinants. Consistent with the terms-of-trade externality channel, we show that the correlation is contingent on a low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Our findings raise warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments.     

Subsidies versus Public Provision of Private Goods as Instruments for Redistribution

The literatures on differential commodity taxes and on quantity controls to supplement income taxation have developed separately. This paper combines these two strands in the standard framework of optimal non-linear income taxation. We use a model with two types of households where the government has access to both subsidy policy and public provision of a good substitutable for leisure, and ouseholds can supplement the publicity provided good from the market. We present conditions under which policy should involve one or both of these two instruments alongside income taxation. The model is extended to many ability types.