Child allowances,educational subsidies and occupational choice

This paper examines the effects on occupational choice and capital accumulation attributable to government policies of child allowances and educational subsidies. We show that multiple steady states may arise under these two policies, with club convergence occurring, and the initial condition being of relevance, if the tax rate of labor income for skilled labor is fairly high. Under a policy of child allowances, an increase in the tax rate is found to raise the quantity of children, but lower the quality of adults; however, under a policy of educational subsidies, with an increase in the tax rate, corresponding increases are found in both the quantity of children and the quality of adults. For developed countries, introducing child allowances may improve or hurt the welfare while introducing educational subsidies is welfare improving.     

An experimental study on individual choice, social welfare, and social preferences

We experimentally study subjects’ compliance with dominance relationships of income distributions in a ranking task. The experiment consisted of four different treatments: Lottery, individual choice, social preferences, and social planner. Our results suggest that people's risk attitudes do not adequately reflect their inequality attitudes. Uninvolved social planners exhibit randomization preferences, while self-interested social planners are generally more inequality averse and try to avoid extreme outcomes.     

State dependence,individual heterogeneity,and the choice of employment status: evidence from Korea

Focusing on the individual heterogeneity, this article examines the causes of an individual’s employment status choice and the extent of state dependence in the Korean labour market. We estimate a dynamic multinomial logit model using the panel data drawn from the first to fifteenth wave of the Korean Labour and Income Panel Study. The results suggest the presence of state dependence. Individual characteristics and growth background have a significant effect on the choice of employment status. Gender is still an important employment factor; males are more likely to be employed and this gender effect is highest for regular employment (RE). One’s educational attainment and age operate in opposite directions. That is, educational attainment (age) has a positive (negative) impact on the choice of a regular job and a negative (positive) impact on the choice of a non-regular job. Contrary to our expectations, a wealthy family background reduces the probability of individuals being wage workers, and raises the probability of them being unemployed. The barriers to RE are greater than for non-regular employment. These findings are of great importance for designing policies to effectively address unemployment and labour informality problems in Korea.     

How do additional alternatives affect individual choice under uncertainty?

Abstract .  We show, in an artefactual field economics decision-making experiment, that the addition of an alternative to a choice set can affect the measurement of farmers' risk preferences in rural Peru. We found that an alternative that would normally be considered irrelevant was chosen in Peru, and that it affected choice between other alternatives. In Montreal, the irrelevant alternative was not chosen, but also affected choices between other alternatives. Comparing choices made in Peru with those made in Montreal, we identify beliefs and cultural characteristics that are likely to lead to these results.     

Optimal human capital policies under the endogenous choice of educational types

This study examines optimal human capital policies under nonlinear labor and capital income taxes in the presence of consumption value of education in a two‐period setting. We show that when individuals can choose educational types differing by the relative importance of consumption value and production value, education subsidies for low‐type individuals should not equal an efficient level that offsets distortions induced by nonlinear taxes on labor and capital income. Our findings imply that education policy does not restore efficiency, or the Diamond–Mirrlees production efficiency theorem fails. Moreover, capital income taxation is optimal, which means that the Atkinson–Stiglitz theorem breaks down.     

Collective choice and individual action: Education policy and social mobility in England

It is recognised that expressive preferences may play a major role in determining voting decisions because the low probability of being decisive in elections undermines standard instrumental reasoning. Expressive and instrumental preferences may deviate and in electoral settings it is more important to make policies expressively appealing. But policies are even more attractive if they can be made both expressively and instrumentally appealing. This paper studies education policy in England and proposes that the argument for increased state spending in school education is expressively appealing as it appears equitable, but the allocation of students to schools by catchment area is also instrumentally appealing to middle-class families. Allocation to schools by lottery may be expressively but not instrumentally appealing. Cutting education spending and dividing the proceeds between a tax cut to the affluent and a cash transfer to the poor may be instrumentally but not expressively appealing. The effort to provide instrumentally appealing policies with sufficient ethical content to satisfy expressive preferences may lead to inefficiency and distract attention from more serious ethical problems related to the policies.     

Consequences, opportunities, and generalized consequentialism and non-consequentialism

In a recent paper published in Journal of Economic Theory (101 (2001) 423-436), by Suzumura and Xu, an analytical framework was developed, which allowed us to characterize the concept of consequentialism and non-consequentialism. To simplify matters, however, the treatment in that paper was confined only to the cases where no trade-off exists between consequential considerations, which reflect the individual's preferences over alternatives, and non-consequential considerations, which reflect the individual's concern over richness of opportunities from which alternatives are chosen. The present paper represents a generalization of our previous framework, which can now accommodate the situations where consequential considerations and non-consequential considerations actively interact. The analysis covers both the cases of finite and infinite number of alternatives.     

Taxes,institutions and foreign diversification opportunities

Investors can access foreign diversification opportunities through either foreign portfolio investment (FPI) or foreign direct investment (FDI). The worldwide tax regime employed by the US potentially distorts this choice by penalizing FDI, relative to FPI, in low-tax countries. On the other hand, weak investor protections in foreign countries may increase the value of control, creating an incentive to use FDI rather than FPI. By combining data on US outbound FPI and FDI, this paper analyzes whether the composition of US outbound capital flows reflects these incentives to bypass home and host country institutional regimes. The results suggest that the residual tax on US multinational firms' foreign earnings skews the composition of outbound capital flows — a 10% decrease in a foreign country's corporate tax rate increases US investors' equity FPI holdings by approximately 10%, controlling for effects on FDI. Investor protections also seem to shape portfolio choices, though these results are not robust when only within-country variation is employed.     

Trade,educational costs,and skill acquisition

A model of heterogeneous agents is built to study the effects of trade and educational costs in shaping individual educational outcomes and their aggregate distribution. In a two‐country model, trade has nonmonotonic impacts on individual education choices and causes education and job polarization for both countries. We use this model to evaluate the effects of reductions in educational costs. A reduction in educational cost has no impact on occupational choice in a closed economy. In the open economy, however, it creates an expanded middle class in the home country, whereas the opposite happens in its trading partner.     

Money,transactions and portfolio choice

Real money balances are held separately forconsumptionandportfolioreasons. When real balances are a state variable in the investor 's optimization problem, there is a specific inflation-hedging portfolio. An investor hedges against inflation when the effect of real money holdings on the marginal utility of wealth is negative. We show that a decrease in real balances due to inflation has two opposite effects on the marginal utility of wealth. On the one hand, the decrease in real balances reduces consumption, which in turn raises the marginal utility and decreases the marginal cost of consuming: this explains why an investor would normally hedge inflation. On the other hand, the decrease in real balances tends to increase the marginal cost of consuming. When this second effect dominates, we have the somewhat surprising result that the investor reverse-hedges inflation.     

Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution

We consider a model of occupational choice in large economies where individuals differ in their wealth endowment. Individuals can remain self-employed or engage in productive matches with another individual, i.e., form firms. Matches are subject to a moral hazard problem with limited liability. The division of the gains from such matches is determined by competitive forces. When the incentive problem is asymmetric, matches are typically wealth-heterogeneous, with richer individuals choosing the occupation for which incentives are more important. The utilities attained within a match depend on the wealth distribution and changes in the latter give rise to ‘trickle down’ effects.     

Self-control,revealed preference and consumption choice

We provide a time-consistent model that addresses the preference reversals that motivate the time-inconsistency literature. The model subsumes the behavior generated by the time-inconsistency approach in finite settings but, unlike the time-inconsistent models, allows for self-control. This paper provides a brief summary of theoretical results shown elsewhere [Gul and Pesendorfer, Econometrica 69 (2001) 1403; Econometrica, (2002), in press; Rev. Econ. Stud. (2002), in press] and contrasts the predictions and welfare implications of our model and the time-inconsistent β−δ model.     

Public entrepreneurship,public choice and self-governance

The Review of Austrian Economics - Is there a Classical Liberalism inspired doctrine of public governance, besides the basic pro-market and anti-statist stance? What are the governance operational...     

Portfolio choice, attention allocation, and price comovement

This paper models the attention allocation of portfolio investors. Investors choose the composition of their information subject to an information flow constraint. Given their expected investment strategy in the next period, which is to hold a diversified portfolio, in equilibrium investors choose to observe one linear combination of asset payoffs as a private signal. When investors use this private signal to update information about two assets, changes in one asset affect both asset prices and may lead to asset price comovement. The model also has implications for the transmission of volatility shocks between two assets.     

Water allocation,crop choice,and priority services

We analyze the problem of allocating irrigation water among heterogeneous farmers when water supply is stochastic. If farmers are risk-neutral, a spot market for water is efficient; while the oft-used uniform rationing system is inefficient, both ex ante and ex post. Indeed, we show that it leads farmers to overexpose to risk, thus making shortages more severe and more frequent in case of drought. We propose instead a regulation by priority classes extending Wilson, and we derive an efficiency result. We characterize the set of farmers that would win or lose from such a reform. We also argue that a system of priority classes may be preferred to a spot market system, because scarcity is easier to manage ex ante than ex post, and because this system facilitates the supply of insurance to risk-averse agents.     

Third-degree price discrimination,quality choice,and welfare

Employing an endogenous quality choice model, we reconsider the effect on welfare of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination. We prove that price discrimination always enhances welfare, mainly because the quality improvement owing to price discrimination increases consumer surplus. Moreover, we show that third-degree price discrimination benefits all parties, including consumers in the higher priced market if the preference differences between markets are sufficiently large.     

Election frequency,choice fatigue,and voter turnout

Influential scholars have argued that frequent elections lead to voter fatigue and can therefore be directly responsible for low turnout in countries characterized by frequent contests. However, other theories predict that frequent elections can even increase turnout. The existing empirical evidence is problematic as it simply correlates election frequency with turnout. By contrast, I exploit a natural experiment in the German state of Hesse, where voters from different municipalities faced the same electoral contest but experienced different election frequency, due to the staggered timing of some local elections. I find that when two elections are scheduled within a relatively short period of time, voter turnout at the later election is significantly reduced. This effect is stronger when the election is deemed less important in the eyes of the voters. Election frequency thus might also partly explain the wide turnout gap between first- and second-order elections, as suggested by Lijphart (1997).     

Symbolic values, occupational choice, and economic development

Channeling human resources into occupations with high social productivity has historically been a key to economic prosperity. Occupational choices are not only driven by the material rewards associated with the various occupations, but also driven by the esteem that they confer. We propose a model of endogenous growth in which occupations carry a symbolic value that makes them more or less attractive; the evolution of symbolic values is endogenously determined by purposive transmission of value systems within families. The model sheds light on the interaction between cultural and economic development and identifies circumstances under which value systems matter for long-run growth. It shows the possibility of culturally determined poverty traps and offers a framework for thinking about the transition from traditional to modern values.