Mobile voice diffusion and service competition: A system dynamic analysis of regulatory policy

Dynamic behavior in mobile telecommunications markets is often the result of interactions between market actors. As the structure and dynamic complexity of such interactions tend to be difficult to identify, it is challenging for regulators to anticipate the effects of their policy decisions. This article uses system dynamics to evaluate the effect of technology harmonization and mobile number portability policies on mobile voice diffusion and service competition. This is realized by first modeling the endogenous feedback structure resulting in dynamic behavior in the mobile telecommunications market and then by configuring the model for retrospective simulations of the Finnish market. Based on the retrospective simulations, the effect of technology harmonization and mobile number portability policy decisions is analyzed and the usefulness of system dynamics is demonstrated.     

Beachfront commons

Technology competition between wireless communication technologies can lead to new, more or less disruptive services. A potentially disruptive technology would be to have unlicensed transmission in the lower UHF bands at power levels up to, e.g. 2 W EIRP. This would give citizens a share of the best spectrum for free use. Tools against congestion could be based on mandatory stochastic channel back-off or, if multiple users are present, on adaptive power and bandwidth control. Compared to the FCC TV white space regulation, no back link would be needed as the spectrum would be used exclusively by wireless devices. In an environment of shrinking interest in terrestrial TV broadcasting, such a regulation is expected to create a new market for high-range consumer devices, competing with licensed communication, while also being suitable for offloading traffic from licensed operations. Furthermore, the approach will allow for efficient digitization of equipment for Programme Making and Special Events (PMSE), but could also be made compatible with novel disaster relief services. To enable accurate interference prediction, it is proposed that, instead of only providing transmitter regulation, receivers should also be regulated, such as be required to adhere to a certain minimum selectivity. The proposal should be taken up in the WRC process.     

Competitive behavior in the European mobile telecommunications industry: Pioneers vs. followers

This paper studies the relationship between competitive strategy and improvement in the competitive position of pioneers and followers in the mobile telecommunications industry. The analysis uses a panel of data comprising all the actions of European firms operating in the digital mobile telecommunications industry with GSM 900 and/or DCS 1800 networks. The results show that competitors gain market share when they follow competitive strategies that are different from those of other firms. The paper also finds that price reduction actions represent the best approach for followers, while differentiation actions are the most effective strategy for pioneers.     

Surplus extraction by network providers: Implications for net neutrality and innovation

This paper looks at surplus extraction by network providers who control the medium of information transfer between application developers and consumers, and addresses the following questions: is net neutrality beneficial to society? and does providing network providers flexibility in pricing stunt innovation in the long run? To answer the first question, it looks at a market consisting of a monopoly network provider and two application providers with non-substitutable products, using a simple single period model. It shows that net neutrality is necessary to ensure maximal benefit to the society. To answer the second question, the paper shows that a monopoly network provider, if allowed complete flexibility in pricing, does not necessarily stunt innovation. Looking at a market that consists of one network provider and one application provider, and using a simple multi-period model, it shows that given maximum flexibility the network provider not only encourages innovation when the potential benefits are sufficiently high but also maximizes surplus. This paper takes the view that the topic of net neutrality is not only controversial but also complicated, and suggests that policy makers use a balanced approach based on sound analysis.     

Network neutrality and difference in efficiency among Internet application service providers: A meta-frontier analysis

As Internet applications evolve and require wider and more stable bandwidth, Internet service providers (ISPs) try to maximize their profit by controlling application service providers (ASPs); this has caused a network neutrality debate. This article categorizes ASPs into four groups by bandwidth-usage attributes and latency sensitivity. By estimating the efficiency of these groups, their efficiency differences are estimated, indicating evidence of discrimination of ISPs when network neutrality is not maintained. Meta-frontier analysis is used to compare efficiencies across companies using different production function technologies. Finally, a Tobit regression model is used to determine which variables explain the difference of efficiencies. The estimation result indicates that the discrimination of ISPs against ASPs is not significant enough to decrease the efficiency of any application group.     

Current and future European regulation of electronic communications: A critical assessment

The current European regulation for electronic communications has been applicable since 2003 and is currently under a review that should lead to new rules applicable by 2010. This paper aims to assess the implementation of the current regulation and the proposals for reform tabled by the European Commission. It is argued that those proposals go in the right direction but should go further. First, the regulatory framework should clearly state that the objectives of regulators are to maximise the long-term welfare of European citizens. Secondly, the main body of economic regulation—the so-called Significant Market Power regime—should be based on a strong test aiming to identify structural market problems that cannot be efficiently dealt with by competition law. Thirdly, possible remedies applicable by the regulators should include structural and technological components, provided that a strict cost benefit analysis is undertaken. Fourthly, the institutional design should be improved by better aligning the incentives of the National Regulatory Authorities with the dynamic nature of the markets, by improving the checks and balances (in particular those provided by national courts and European Commission), and by improving coordination amongst the institutions (the national regulators and the national Courts).     

Competition between exchanges: A research agenda

This paper describes open research questions related to the competition and market structure of financial exchanges and argues that only a combination of industrial organization and finance can satisfactorily attack these questions. Two examples are discussed to illustrate how the combination of these two approaches can significantly enrich the analysis: the “network externality puzzle”, which refers to the question of why trading for the same security is often split across trading venues, and the impact of the multi-sided character of financial exchanges on pricing and profitability.