Licensing a technology standard

I examine the optimal licensing strategy of the owner of a proprietary technology standard in a monopolistically competitive industry. The standard owner can be either an outsider inventor or a joint venture of downstream firms. I find that (1) a simple revenue royalty replicates the integrated monopoly outcome; (2) a patent pool cannot do better than adopting a non-discriminatory licensing policy that offers higher royalty rates to pool members than to nonmembers; (3) if the standard owner also sells a complementary good, then it may choose a decentralized marketplace as a commitment not to maximize licensing revenue. Implications to the use of RAND pricing in standard settings are discussed.     

Licensing Essential Patents: The Non‐Discriminatory Commitment and Hold‐Up

Licensors of patents essential to a standard are often required to license on reasonable and non‐discriminatory (RAND) terms. Using a model with owners of essential patents and licensees who invest into standard‐conforming technologies, this paper demonstrates that the non‐discriminatory commitment alleviates the hold‐up problem. Moreover, it improves consumer and social welfare, and promotes upstream innovation as licensing revenue is increased. In an extended model with each licensor independently choosing whether to make the commitment, all licensors voluntarily commit in the unique equilibrium.     

Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information*

Standards may create market power for the holders of standard essential patents (SEPs). To address these concerns, the literature advocates price commitments, whereby SEP holders commit to the maximum royalty they would charge were their technology included in the standard. We consider a setting in which a technology implementer holds private information about profitability. In this setting, price commitments increase efficiency not only by curbing SEP holders' market power, but also by alleviating distortions in the design of the royalty scheme. We derive conditions under which price commitments can be implemented using a simple royalty cap as used in practice.     

PATENT LENGTH AND THE TIMING OF INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY

The standard result in patent policy, as demonstrated by Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), is that infinitely lived but very narrow patents are optimal as deadweight losses are minimised and spread through time but inventors can still recover their R&D expenditures. By extending their innovative environment to include timing as an important choice, we demonstrate that a finitely lived, but broader, patent can be socially desirable. This is because a patent breadth is a better instrument than length to encourage socially optimal timing. Thus, patents need not be infinitely long in order to encourage a greater number of inventions     

Does Competition Lead to Agglomeration or Dispersion in EMR Vendor Decisions?

We examine hospital Electronic Medical Record (EMR) vendor adoption patterns and how they relate to hospital market structure. As in many network technology adoption decisions, hospitals face countervailing incentives to coordinate or differentiate in their choice of vendors. We find evidence of substantial agglomeration on EMR vendors, which increases as hospital markets become more competitive. These findings suggest that incentives to coordinate dominate incentives to differentiate overall, and the relative balance grows stronger in favor of coordination as markets become more competitive. Our findings also have important implications regarding antitrust policy. A potential downside of hospital consolidation—increased obstacles in information sharing due to vendor differentiation—should be taken into account in evaluation of hospital mergers.     

Per unit vs. ad valorem royalties under asymmetric information

We study an inside patent holder's optimal licensing policy when it has imperfect information about the value of the patent to its rival. The patent holder can choose any two-part licensing fee with either per unit or ad valorem royalties. We demonstrate that the equilibrium will be either a fully separating contract with different per unit royalty rates, or a contract with a single ad valorem royalty that excludes a high cost rival. Fixed fees will not be used. The presence of asymmetric information uniquely drives the per unit royalties that otherwise would not be adopted. Per unit royalties always generate higher social welfare than ad valorem royalties.     

Patent office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect

The number of patent applications and “bad” patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years. Based on this trend, we study the overload problem within the Patent Office and its consequences on the firms' R&D incentives. We assume that the examination process of patent applications is imperfect, and that its quality is poorer under congestion. Depending on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non-obviousness requirement, the system may result in a high-R&D equilibrium, in which firms self-select in their patent applications, or in an equilibrium with low R&D, opportunistic patent applications and the issuance of bad patents. Multiple equilibria often co-exist, which deeply undermines the effectiveness of policy instruments. We investigate the robustness of our conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized, taking into consideration the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications, as well as the role of commitment to a given patent protection policy.     

How to analyze technology lifecycle from the perspective of patent characteristics? the cases of DVDs and hard drives

This study aims to analyze the technology lifecycle from the perspective of the dynamics of patent characteristics; the dynamics of patent characteristics are proposed as an approach for characterizing technology lifecycle in this study. DVD and hard drive technologies, which have already experienced their complete technology lifecycles, were selected for analyzing their patent characteristics as a function of the different stages of their technology lifecycles to thus obtain the objective of this research. The results obtained in this study provide a channel to assess the nature of firms’ innovation strategies along technology lifecycles. It can be observed that (1) patents attempt to cite more prior patent or non-patent references at the latter stages to find more technological or scientific sources that can contribute to technological innovation, (2) most litigated patents are granted in the Growth stage, so it is expected that patents in the Growth stage should be more important and, thus, more relevant to dominant design than the patents granted in other stages.     

Development of 5G – Identifying organizations active in publishing,patenting, and standardization

Publications, patents, standard-essential patents (SEPs), and standard contributions are important indicators for the drivers in the technology development of 5G. However, current 5G technology reports predominately draw on patent data to identify technology developing organizations, ignoring the importance of publications and standard contributions. Therefore, we identify 5G technology developing organizations in publishing, patenting, and standardization and compile a unique dataset to identify leading organizations per category and to identify possible correlations and interdependencies. We find that for companies offering fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing conditions related to standard-essential patents, their publication, patent, and standard contribution counts highly correlate. Our findings suggest that 5G technology developing companies holding a high number of patents declared to 5G manage the three contributing factors of publishing, patenting, and standardization to optimize their impact on 5G technology development. Furthermore, we show that patenting and standardization are dominated by a few large companies from the United States, China, Korea, Japan, Finland, and Sweden, while publishing is much more globally distributed and not as concentrated. Our research suggests that scientific findings can be more easily published via scientific journals and that barriers might hinder filing patents and participating in standardization committees focusing on 5G, which only large companies overcome.     

Licensing information goods

A significant amount of research on patent licensing and the diffusion of knowledge is organized around static frameworks of analysis. Patent holders, however, may face a dynamic problem, namely the intertemporal consistency problem of the durable-goods monopolist that is induced by durability on the demand side. Licensing practices such as exclusive licensing contracts and most favored customer clauses allow patentees to solve or mitigate this dynamic consistency problem. There are situations, however, where these practices are not possible either due to the nature of the patent (the case of information goods) or due to compulsory patenting laws. We study the effects of the intertemporal consistency problem on patent licensing in these situations. Relative to the existing literature, we obtain the following main results: (i) all of the firms that remain in the industry will be using the innovation; (ii) royalty licensing may be superior to fixed-fee or auction licensing from the licensor's point of view; (iii) social welfare and consumer surplus may be lower than when the patent holder can commit not to make additional sales; (iv) even for non-drastic innovations, the price of the good that is produced may be lower than the competitive price corresponding to the initial situation (before the innovation was discovered).     

Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation

This paper presents a model of sequential innovation in which industry structure is endogenous and a standard of patentability determines the proportion of all inventions that qualify for protection (in U.S. patent law, this standard is called nonobviousness ; in Europe, it is called the inventive step ). The rate of innovation initially rises as this standard is raised from very low levels, but eventually falls as the standard is raised to very high levels. Hence, there is a unique patentability standard that maximizes the rate of innovation. Surprisingly, this critical standard is more stringent for industries disposed to innovate rapidly. The model suggests a number of important implications for patent policy.     

中小型制造企业创新特征分析:基于德阳企业调查数据

本文利用2009年四川德阳地区地震灾后中小型企业调查数据,从产业、所有制及企业规模等角度系统地考察了当地中小型企业的创新特征,并分析了其中存在的主要问题。我们发现,企业的平均专利数量及专利结构具有明显的产业异质性,在考虑专利申请的集中度后,产业的专利密度与研发密度呈现负相关性;各种不同所有制企业在创新动力、创新类型与创新的信息来源方面存在显著差异;发明专利密度与企业规模呈倒U形关系,而实用新型及外观设计专利密度随企业规模的增大而减小;政府研发资助存在选择效应,规模较大的企业更有可能获得政府的创新扶持。本文突破既有研究的数据限制,为我国中小型企业在创新模式转变中的差异性提供了证据,并为政府相应的创新扶持政策提供了借鉴。     

专利执行保险、技术创新与企业绩效

作为知识产权保护重要制度之一,专利执行保险通过降低技术溢出损失和外部融资约束提升企业技术创新,进而对企业绩效产生深远影响。本文基于沪深A股2012~2019年上市公司微观数据,实证研究专利执行保险实施背景下专利保护对企业技术创新和财务绩效的影响。研究发现:专利执行保险对企业技术创新存在显著的“创新激励”效应,特别是对创新投入和创新产出的提升作用明显,在考虑控制内生性问题后,上述结论仍成立;技术溢出损失效应和外部融资约束是影响专利执行保险创新激励效应的重要机制和渠道;专利执行保险和企业技术创新对企业财务绩效影响显著,其中对滞后5期内的企业财务绩效提升最为明显。研究为完善知识产权保护对创新激励作用探讨,加快专利执行保险试点推广以及如何激发企业创新提供理论价值和政策启示。     

NETWORK SECURITY: VULNERABILITIES AND DISCLOSURE POLICY*

Software security is a major concern for vendors, consumers and regulators. When vulnerabilities are discovered after the software has been sold to consumers, the firms face a dilemma. A policy of disclosing vulnerabilities and issuing updates protects only consumers who install updates, while the disclosure itself facilitates reverse engineering of the vulnerability by hackers. The paper considers a firm that sells software which is subject to potential security breaches and derives the conditions under which a firm would disclose vulnerabilities. It examines the effect of a regulatory policy that requires mandatory disclosure of vulnerabilities and a ‘bug bounty’ program.     

Patent Hold‐Up and Antitrust: How A Well‐Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation

Licensing technology essential to a standard can present a hold‐up problem. After designing new products incorporating a standard, a manufacturer could be confronted by an innovator asserting patent rights to essential technology. This hold‐up problem can be solved with a damages remedy provided by antitrust or some other body of law, but a damages remedy can reduce the innovator's licensing revenue and thereby retard innovation. The availability of an ex post damages remedy also alters the licensing terms in ex ante bargaining with the result that fewer socially beneficial R&D projects are undertaken.     

The limits to IPR standardization policies as evidenced by strategic patenting in UMTS

The impact of patents and patent royalties are a major concern of standards setting organizations. This study examines the patents filed in the standardization of UMTS, the third-generation mobile phone technology developed under sponsorship of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and others, using a patent policy developed in response to issues faced in the earlier GSM (née Group Special Mobile) standardization. After contrasting firm strategies and policy effectiveness between the GSM and UMTS efforts, the paper reviews the potential impact of potential changes to the ETSI IPR (intellectual property rights) policy.     

Patent Races with Secrecy

Firms do not always patent their innovations. Instead, they often rely on secrecy to appropriate the returns of innovations. This paper endogenizes firms’ patent propensity, and shows that when the equilibrium patent propensity is small, strengthening patent protection can decrease firms’ incentive to innovate. Paradoxically, this result holds precisely when a stronger patent policy induces more patent applications. Also, these results can arise even in the simplest patent race model with independent innovations as well as with complementary innovations.     

Free‐riding in multi‐party alliances: The role of perceived alliance effectiveness and peers' collaboration in a research consortium

Research summary : Multi‐party alliances rely on partners' willingness to commit and pool their efforts in joint endeavors. However, partners face the dilemma of how much to commit to the alliance. We shed light on this issue by analyzing the relationship between partners' free‐riding—defined as their effort‐withholding—and their perceptions of alliance effectiveness and peers' collaboration. Specifically, we posit a U‐shaped relationship between partners' subjective evaluations of alliance effectiveness and their free‐riding. We also hypothesize a negative relation between partners' perceptions of the collaboration of peer organizations and their free‐riding. Results from a mixed‐method study—combining regression analysis of primary data on a major inter‐organizational research consortium and evidence from two experimental designs—support our hypotheses, bearing implications for the multi‐party alliances literature. Managerial summary : Free‐riding is a major concern in multi‐party alliances such as large research consortia, since the performance of these governance forms hinges on the joint contribution of multiple partners that often operate according to different logics (e.g., universities, firms, and government agencies). We show that, in such alliances, partners' perceptions have relevant implications for their willingness to contribute to the consortium's shared goals. Specifically, we find that partners free‐ride more—that is, contribute less—when they perceive the effectiveness of the overall alliance to be either very low or very high. Partners also gauge their commitment to the alliance on the perception of the effort of their peers—that is, other organizations similar to them. These findings provide managers of multi‐party alliances with additional levers to motivate partners to contribute fairly to such joint endeavor. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Traditional food traders in developing countries and competition from supermarkets: Evidence from Indonesia

Indonesia’s urban centers recently underwent an explosion of supermarkets. With cheaper, higher quality commodities and better services, supermarkets have the potential to drive traders in traditional markets out of business. In this paper, we evaluate whether this is indeed the case. We find that traditional traders experienced declines in their business. However, both qualitative and quantitative findings indicate that the main cause of decline is not supermarkets. Instead, traditional markets are plagued with internal problems and face increasingly bitter competition from street vendors. Therefore, the policy recommendations include strengthening traditional traders and seriously tackling the problem of street vendors.     

Identifying technology trends for R&D planning using TRIZ and text mining

The current pace of technological development has forced many companies to invest significant capital and resources in research and development (R&D) activities. A systematic and efficient method of identifying technology trends and their evolutionary potentials can help companies guide their R&D planning and wisely allocate their R&D resources. This study proposes a framework combining the evolutionary trends developed by the Theory of Inventive Problem Solving, or Teoriya Reshniya Izobretatelskikh Zadatch (TRIZ) in Russian, with the visualization technique of text mining to systematically identify technology trends from patent documents. As technological information in patent documents is stored almost entirely in text format, the text mining method allows R&D personnel to efficiently identify technology trends and effectively conduct R&D planning. Utilizing text mining method on patents of magnetic random access memory (MRAM) systems and the underlying principles of TRIZ evolutionary trends, this study shows that MRAM includes 10 important technology trends. These trends have almost reached the evolutionary limit phase defined by TRIZ, which means that MRAM is fast becoming a mature technology. Therefore, for businesses that intend to acquire MRAM technology they do not possess, a wise R&D plan may be licensing the technology, buying the technology from others, or participating in a joint venture rather than using in‐house R&D.