GAINS FROM TRADE

In a social choice context, we ask whether there exists a rule in which nobody loses under trade liberalization. We consider a resource allocation problem in which the traded commodities vary. We propose an axiom stating that enlarging the set of tradable commodities hurts nobody. We show that if a rule satisfies this axiom, together with an allocative efficiency axiom and an institutional constraint axiom stating that only preferences over tradable commodities matter, gains from trade can be given to only one individual in the first step of liberalization.     

DISTRIBUTING THE GAINS FROM TRADE WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION*

We argue that the incomplete information which the government has about domestic agents means that tariffs become an optimal instrument to protect them from import competition. Using a model where agents have private information about their endowments, we solve for the optimal government policy subject to the political constraint of ensuring Pareto gains from trade, the incentive compatibility constraint, and the government's budget constraint. We find that the optimal policy takes the form of nonlinear tariffs. These tariffs are never complete, in the sense of bringing prices back to their initial level, but always allow some individuals to be strictly better off than at the initial prices.     

SUPER-SPECIALIZATION AND THE GAINS FROM TRADE

An important facet of "globalization" is the spread of cross-border production, which is variously known as intro product specialization, super-specialization, or production fragmentation. This advanced stage in the international division of labor works particularly well between high-wage developed and low-wage emerging economies. But it is precisely this context in which the practice has been criticized for destroying jobs and undermining wages.
This paper examines the welfare implications of this type of specialization on the part of labor-intensive, import-competing industries in advanced countries. The results will surprise the skeptics, for when import-competing industries abandon production of labor-intensive components, wages rise and industry employment and output expand. National welfare increases. For a large country, the terms of trade improve, raising national welfare still further.     

INCREASING COSTS IN PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION AND GAINS FROM TRADE*

The purpose of this paper is to extend a monopolistically competitive trade model with symmetric costs to one with asymmetric costs in product diversification. Both the trade pattern and the effects of the opening of trade on welfare are examined. It is shown that: (1)the larger country will be a net importer of differentiated products, which contradicts the result of Krugman (1980); (2)the greater the size of the country, the smaller is the share of the intra-industry trade, and (3)the larger the trading partner of a country, the larger are the gains from trade of the country. Some of these results duplicate those from recent studies. However, our results are based on asymmetric costs. In particular, (3) suggests that the presence of increasing-returns-to-scale technology does not always imply that the large country gains from its large market.     

AN ANALYSIS OF TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION AND THE GAINS FROM TRADE: RECONSIDERATION

Abstract.  This paper investigates the effects of transboundary pollution on trade and welfare in a two-country, two-good, one-factor model in which pollution is treated as a negative cross-industry externality. It is shown that trade may improve countries' natural environment and consequently raises the countries' welfare if a comparative advantage in a pollution-producing good is held by a country that greatly surpasses the other in pollution abatement technology. This result has not been obtained from existing models of this type.     

WELFARE GAINS FROM FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION*

Financial liberalization has been a controversial issue, as empirical evidence for growth enhancing effects is mixed. Here, we find sizable welfare gains from liberalization (cost to repression), although the gain in economic growth is ambiguous. We take the view that financial liberalization is a government policy that alters the path of financial deepening, whereas financial deepening is endogenously chosen by agents given a policy and occurs in transition toward a distant steady state. This history‐dependent view necessitates the use of simulation analysis based on a growth model. Our application is a specific episode: Thailand from 1976 to 1996.     

HISTORY‐DEPENDENT PATHS AND TRADE GAINS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY WITH A PUBLIC INTERMEDIATE GOOD*

This study reexamines McMillan's (International Economic Review 19 (1978), 665–78) analysis of a dynamic small open economy with a public intermediate good. Concerning the trade patterns of the open economy, we find results that were overlooked in McMillan's analysis. Among others, if labor endowment is of intermediate size, there are two saddle‐point steady states, and the initial stock of the public good determines the long‐run trade pattern. We also add a gains‐from‐trade analysis to McMillan's model and demonstrate that if the economy has a comparative advantage in a good with productivity less sensitive to the public intermediate good, the economy may lose from trade at the steady state.     

SPECIAL INTERESTS AND THE GAINS FROM POLITICAL INTEGRATION

This paper presents a formal study of economic influence by special-interest groups under political integration and separation. We first show that countries where more groups are organized to lobby gain from political integration on economic grounds. The reason is that a more organized country, under a political union, can affect policies in the other country to its advantage, something that a less organized country can do to a lesser extent. We then study the interaction of political integration and endogenous lobbying structure. We show that political integration affects the formation of interest groups. Moreover, if a country is more organized before political integration, this will continue to be the case afterward.     

A UNIFIED ANALYSIS OF TRADE GAINS IN THE PRESENCE OF PUBLIC GOODS*

It has long been known that free trade is potentially (after lumpsum compensatory transfers) beneficial for each trading country if the autarkic and post‐compensation free‐trade equilibria are perfectly competitive, with market distortions limited to non‐negative taxes on imports and exports. However these conditions are merely sufficient. It can now be shown that, under alternative sufficient conditions, free trade is potentially beneficial to each trading country even in the context of public goods.     

MANAGED TRADE WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION*

This article illustrates the importance of imperfect information in self‐enforcing trade agreements. It shows that expected welfare is higher with current period uncertainty, and a high level of uncertainty may even undermine the need for a safeguard clause. These results were derived by extending the seminal paper by Bagwell and Staiger (The American Economic Review 80 (1990), 779–95) to account for current period uncertainty.     

FREE TRADE NETWORKS WITH TRANSFERS*

We investigate the network of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a network formation game with transfers. In a previous paper we showed that without international transfers countries with different industrialization levels cannot sign an FTA, so that the global free trade network, in which every pair of countries signs an FTA, is not in general pairwise‐stable. In this paper we show that, even if the world consists of fairly asymmetric countries, the global free trade network is pairwise‐stable when transfers between FTA signatories are allowed. Moreover, it is a unique pairwise‐stable network unless industrial commodities are highly substitutable.     

ON THE ESTIMATION OF GROWTH AND INEQUALITY ELASTICITIES OF POVERTY WITH GROUPED DATA

After decades of intensive research dedicated to efficient and flexible parametric statistical distributions, the lognormal distribution still enjoys, despite its empirical weaknesses, widespread popularity in the applied literature related to poverty and inequality analysis. In the present study, we emphasize the drawbacks of this choice for the calculation of the elasticities of poverty. For this purpose, we estimate the growth and inequality elasticities of poverty using 1,132 income distributions, and 15 rival assumptions on the shape of the income distributions. Our results confirm that the lognormal distribution is not appropriate in most cases for the analysis of poverty: the magnitude of the elasticities is generally overestimated and the estimation of the relative impact of growth and redistribution on poverty alleviation is biased in favor of the growth objective.     

GRADUAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION WITH SLUGGISH CAPITAL MOVEMENT

Abstract.  This paper analyses how domestic sluggish capital movement can affect multilateral trade negotiations between countries. In multilateral trade talks, including the current Doha Round of trade talks organized by the World Trade Organization, countries take steps to liberalize even though they seem to be moving towards the ultimate free trade equilibrium. This paper argues that when capital moves sluggishly between sectors in an economy, there are cases in which countries do not want to move to the ultimate free trade equilibrium immediately. Instead, they find it more beneficial if they simultaneously move gradually, with their tariffs lowered step by step.     

时变弹性生产函数与全要素生产率

由于缺乏资本价格等国民核算资料,收入份额法在我国的使用受到一定限制。传统Cobb-Douglas生产函数估计的资本和劳动力产出弹性,反映的只是整个研究时期的一个平均水平,适用于估计整个研究时期的平均贡献率,但用于估计逐期贡献率很可能是有偏的甚至是有误的。本文给出了一个改进生产率增长测算的新思路,系统地提出利用非参数模型、变系数模型、可变参数模型和面板数据模型替代收入份额法,估计不同时期资本和劳动力的时变产出弹性。实证结果表明时变弹性生产函数具有更好的统计性质。     

A NEW THEORY OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY AND EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE FROM DOMESTIC TRADE

Abstract. In the paper a fixed learning cost is introduced into a framework with consumer-producers and transaction costs. The fixed learning cost yields a rate of return on the investment in individual specific learning and training which is increasing in its rate of utilization. Division of labor can avoid duplicated learning costs and generate economies of specialized learning. The tradeoff between economies of specialization and transaction costs can be used to explain concurrent increases in the extent of the market, aggregate demand, productivity, trade dependence, the degree of market integration, the degree of production concentration, diversity of economic structure, variety of different professions, each person's level of specialization, and the extent of endogenous comparative advantage and the emergence of international trade from domestic trade. This model explains demand and supply as two sides of the level of division of labor which is determined by a transaction cost coefficient. Hence, the demand law may not hold even for normal goods owing to complicated interdependencies between the level of specialization and demand and between the level of specialization and prices of traded goods. The extended version of this model with the CES function is used to endogenize variety of consumption in addition to the endogenization of individuals'level of specialization.     

ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH TRADE IN FACTORS OF PRODUCTION

We study the world trading equilibrium in a Ricardian model, where factors of production are produced and traded. Even in the absence of technology transfer, international investment, research and development, and aggregate scale effects, trade affects economic growth through comparative advantage. Trade may raise the growth rate or leave it unchanged, depending on the patterns of comparative and absolute advantage. Trade in factors of production can effectively equalize technology even when technology transfer does not occur. Factor price equalization may hold, but the Stolper–Samuelson and Rybczynski theorems do not. The transition dynamics can be monotonic or oscillatory.