Agrarian class struggle and state formation in post‐colonial Pakistan, 1959–1974: Contingencies of Mazdoor Kisan Raj

State formation in post‐colonial societies is often explained with reference to the roles of elites. In Pakistan, landed elites continue to dominate the rural political economy through informal and formal institutions, but the history of its largest peasant movement shows how agrarian class struggle can change the institutional forms and functions of power. The Hashtnagar peasant movement achieved lasting de facto land and tenancy reforms in north‐western Pakistan in the 1970s through forcible land occupations that were regularized by state intervention. I argue that although divisions among elites were important, the state intervened in favour of peasants due to the rising organizational power of tenants and landless labourers under the centralized leadership of the radical Mazdoor Kisan Party. Agrarian class struggle weakened the informal power of landed elites and gave rise to institutions of peasant power. However, other fractions of the ruling class sought to undermine their landed opponents while co‐opting the militancy of the peasant movement by strengthening state institutions to intervene in favour of upwardly mobile tenants. The latter were separated from poorer peasants and the landless, thus demobilizing the movement.     

Revolution from below in Panguipulli: Agrarian reform and political conflict under the Popular Unity in Chile

This article examines the political conflict in rural society during the Popular Unity Government (1970–73) by focusing on the mobilization of forestry workers in Panguipulli, a district in southern Chile. Adopting land invasions as their main strategy in the struggle for land and power, Panguipulli workers experienced a radical politicization by aligning themselves with the Peasant Revolutionary Movement, the “peasant front” of the Revolutionary Left Movement. Because of its relation with this emerging “new left,” rural mobilization was a significant expression of the “revolution from below”, which challenged the Popular Unity's “Chilean road to socialism.” Moreover, because rural mobilization also took place in other areas throughout Chile where the Revolutionary Left Movement was influential, it gave rise to a grassroots project for radicalizing the government's agrarian reform. As a result, the rural “revolution from below” strongly influenced the content and trajectory of political conflict under the Popular Unity Government.     

'Changing Before Our Very Eyes': Agrarian Questions and the Politics of Land in Capitalism Today

This paper endorses the criticisms of neo-classical populism and its advocacy of redistributive land reform provided by other contributions to this special issue of the Journal, to which it adds several further points. If GKI propose a version of an agrarian question of 'small' or 'family' farming, and its resolution through a familiar (Chayanovian) path of development, much of the critique rests, in one way or another, on the 'classic' agrarian question in capitalist transition, in effect the agrarian question of capital in which the agrarian question of labour was once subsumed. Here the question is posed whether, in the conditions of contemporary 'globalization' and its tendency to the 'fragmentation' of labour, there might be a new agrarian question of labour, now detached from that of capital, and which generates a new politics of struggles over land (and its distribution). Even to conceive of this question is beyond the analytical and political field of vision of neo-classical populism. Some of the dimensions of an agrarian question of labour are illustrated in a brief consideration of recent, and highly contradictory, events in Zimbabwe: a unique case of comprehensive, regime-sanctioned, confiscatory land redistribution in the world today.     

The hidden edifice of (food) sovereignty: Rights,territory, and the struggle for agrarian reform in Venezuela

This article seeks to make a critical contribution to the “sovereignty problem” in food sovereignty (FS) studies. Contemporary scholarship has largely struggled to answer the question of who or what is sovereign within the realm of FS politics—underpinned by the relocalisation of agrarian production, sustainable nature–society relations, and a radical democratisation of food systems. Although the most recent scholarship has made significant progress on this issue, I offer an alternative historical materialist account of sovereignty understood as the combination of rights and territory. From a critical Marxian perspective, I deconstruct the basis of sovereign power as the intersection between social property rights (exploitation) and territorial governance (political technology) congealed within both capital and the state. This approach thus provides some clarity as to the necessary breaks required to establish an FS regime (self‐directed labour and cooperative territorial governance). The framework is then applied to the case of Bolivarian Venezuela. While witnessing some important achievements, Venezuela's FS experiment has encountered a number of contradictions. As this case study shows, peasant struggles aiming to retake control over production and establish cooperative forms of governance must traverse the entire terrain of the state and thus affect a broader socialisation of society's sociopolitical infrastructures.     

Local economic structure,regional competition and the formation of industrial land price in China: Combining evidence from process tracing with quantitative results

The price of industrial land in China has been found distorted and remarkably low. However, it is overlooked that industrial land price is relatively high in some regions. This local variation cannot be explained by classical theories on land price that focus on local economic level, population density, and location factors. We propose a theoretical framework incorporating local economic structure and governments’ behavior in regional competition, to interpret the formation of industrial land price in China. We first model local firms as foot-tight ones, whose relocation costs are enormous, and outside firms as foot-loose ones, whose relocation costs are negligible. Then we divide local governments as outside-capital-dependent governments (OCDGs) and non-outside-capital-dependent governments (NOCDGs) according to the role of outside capital in local economic structure. In such a setting, OCDGs are supposed to aggressively pursue outside firms and use industrial land as a critical endowment to engage in race-to-bottom competition, making the price extremely low. On the contrary, the optimal strategy for NOCDGs, who lack strong incentives in attracting outside investment, is to stay aside and let potential land users compete to determine the land price, resulting in a higher land price. Evidence from quantitative results and comparative case studies with process tracing based on Suzhou and Wenzhou together prove the validity of this theory. This paper advances the conventional understanding of industrial land price and concludes with implications on industrial land policies and sustainable development.