Are nontariff measures and tariffs substitutes? Some panel data evidence

Using new estimates of ad valorem equivalent of nontariff measures (NTMs) over time, this paper examines NTMs and tariffs’ relationship for a sample of 70 economies for 4,949 products at the 6‐digit harmonized system level over the period 2003–2015. A panel data methodology models the lagged adjustment of NTMs to tariffs, consistent with a causal relationship. Trade policy substitution is found when the models are estimated in both levels and changes; with this holding for both OECD and non‐OECD countries, but not for the agriculture sector in OECD countries. Overall, there is a fairly complete substitution between policy instruments in absolute terms.     

Impact of nontariff measures on firms in Tunisia

This paper analyzes the effect of nontariff measures (NTMs) on firms in Tunisia. It draws a precise picture of NTMs’ effects on firms’ imports. We use firm‐level data to take into account firm heterogeneity. We explore the impact of NTMs on small vs. medium and large firms. We also consider the differentiated impact of NTMs. Some measures have informational content and help reduce information asymmetries. When the endogeneity issue of NTMs is controlled for, results show an overall positive impact of NTMs on imports. They provide evidence that NTMs are more beneficial to the imports of medium and large firms. Moreover, NTMs with informational content have an import enhancing effect. An extended analysis separating importing and exporting firms from those solely importing suggests that both types of firms benefit from the positive effects of NTMs. This result highlights the need to assist small firms facing NTMs. Furthermore, some NTMs with informational content should be addressed carefully and not considered only as barriers to trade to be eliminated. Instead, harmonization efforts between countries can be a better policy.     

Trade restrictiveness indices in the presence of externalities: An application to non‐tariff measures

We extend the trade restrictiveness index approach to the case of market imperfections and domestic regulations addressing them. We focus on standard‐like non‐tariff measures (NTMs) affecting cost of production and potentially enhancing demand by reducing negative externalities. We apply the framework to the database of Kee et al. ( 2009 ) and derive ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) for technical measures. About 39% of the product lines affected by NTMs exhibit negative AVEs, indicating a net trade‐facilitating effect of these measures. Accounting for these effects significantly reduces previous measures of countries’ trade policy restrictiveness obtained while constraining these NTMs to be trade‐reducing.     

Commercial Policy and Foreign Ownership

Foreign multinationals often not only export but also control local firms through FDI. This paper examines the various effects of trade and industrial policies when exports and FDI coexist. We focus on the case in which a foreign firm has full control of a local firm through partial ownership. Cross‐border ownership on the basis of both financial interests and corporate control leads to horizontal market linkages through which tariffs and production subsidies may harm locally owned firms but benefit the foreign firm. Foreign ownership regulation benefits locally owned firms. These results could have strong policy implications for developing countries that attract an increasing share of world FDI.     

Should Smaller Countries Be More Protectionist? The Diversification Motive for Tariffs

This paper examines the diversification motive for tariffs under trade‐related uncertainty when there is incomplete international and domestic risk sharing. In the context of a two‐country Ricardian continuum‐of‐sectors model with shocks to foreign technologies or preferences, tariffs allow a country to mitigate external risk by diversifying across sectors. Given sufficiently high risk and risk aversion, the optimality of tariffs depends primarily on a country's ability to diversify, rather than its market power, such that small countries gain most.     

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers

It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening‐up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. Using a simple example, the authors show that, in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers.     

Trade Costs,Resource Reallocation and Productivity in Developing Countries

New trade models with heterogeneous firms suggest that international trade plays an important role in reallocating resources from low to high productivity plants. We use plant‐level data from Chile and measures of trade costs that include tariffs and freight rates to analyze the importance of this trade‐induced market selection process. We find that trade costs affect the reallocation process through the various channels predicted by the theory; however, the effects are approximately half of those reported for the US. We also find that while the tariff rate is responsible for preventing some of the reallocation, transportation costs have the most limiting role in terms of the number of channels affected.     

National Border Effects: Location, Not Nationality, Matters

A recent literature documents the downward impact of national borders on trade. This paper probes the relative importance of two potential sources of border effects: (1) pure locational factors, such as transport costs and tariffs; and (2) an inherent disadvantage for a firm selling in a foreign market. I am able to make this decomposition by using data on the local sales of foreign affiliates of US multinational enterprises, on US bilateral exports, and on domestic sales by host‐country firms. The “border effect” arises almost entirely from locational factors. If a firm establishes and sells from a subsidiary located in the foreign country, its local sales are about on a par with those of domestic firms in that market.     

Non-tariff measures: What's tariffs got to do with it?

After successive rounds of tariff reductions by GATT/WTO members, non-tariff measures (NTMs) have increasingly become the focal point of multilateral trade negotiations. It remains an open question whether the liberalization in tariff rates has subsequently been weakened or even erased by increases in NTMs. Using a product-level global panel of WTO members over the period 1996–2019, this paper systematically examines the empirical link between various tariff measures and the imposition of NTMs. I find that bound or applied tariff reductions do not correlate much on their own with NTM incidence. The relevant trade policy margin for detecting a tariff–NTM nexus is instead tariff overhangs, the difference between WTO members' bound and applied tariff rates. Countries impose more NTMs when their sectoral applied tariffs are close to their respective bound rates, indicating that small tariff overhangs signal limited legal trade policy flexibility.     

Import Penetration and Domestic Process Innovation

This paper develops a model of R&D competition between domestic and foreign firms that explicitly incorporates the effect of the market structure. We focus on how differences in costs modify the effects of increases in the number of foreign firms on R&D investments of domestic firms. We show that an increase in the number of foreign firms may have a positive effect on a domestic firm's R&D investment and also show that two trade policies, tariffs or quotas, could have different effects on R&D investments of domestic firms. A welfare analysis shows that greater cost advantages increase social welfare.     

Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms

The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariffs in the presence of multinationals finds a knife-edge result where, in equilibrium, all foreign firms are either multinationals or exporters. Utilizing a model of heterogeneous firms, we find equilibria in which both pure exporters and multinationals coexist. We utilize this model to study the case of endogenously chosen tariffs. As is standard, Nash equilibrium tariffs are higher than the socially optimal tariffs. Unlike existing models with homogeneous firms, we find that non-cooperative tariffs promote the existence of low-productivity firms relative to the socially optimal tariffs. This highlights a new source of inefficiency from tariff competition not found in models of homogeneous firms. In addition, we find that in many cases the Nash equilibrium tariff when FDI is a potential firm structure is lower than when it is not. As a result, FDI improves welfare by mitigating tariff competition.     

Import sensitive products and perverse tariff‐rate quota liberalization

Abstract This paper shows that a Tariff‐Rate‐Quota's (TRQ) minimum access expansion can perversely trigger domestic price increases. Often, TRQs have prohibitive over‐quota tariffs to mimic import quotas in providing minimum market access. In the WTO's Doha Round, it is likely that countries using TRQs will avoid aggressive tariff reductions if they increase the quota portion of TRQs. We show that when the import price lies between the unit cost of production and the price received by domestic upstream firms, an increase in import quota as a share of domestic production may cause an increase in the domestic retail price.     

Why does China protect its labour‐intensive industries more?*

China's tariff structure favours labour‐intensive sectors, and this is at odds with traditional theory of comparative advantage. The paper argues that tariffs in China are a mechanism for protecting technology‐backward domestic – especially state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from competition technology‐advanced foreign enterprises producing in China. With relatively integrated labour markets and cross‐firm technology differences, SOEs’ subsistence is supported by subsidized credit and limited access of foreign firms’ local production to tariff‐protected domestic markets. Labour market integration and capital subsidies increase the relative cost of labour in SOEs compared to their foreign competitors, hurting more domestic firms in industries that use labour more intensively. Restrictions to FIEs’ (foreign‐invested enterprises) access to tariff‐protected product markets, which protect more labour‐intensive industries, compensate for the greater cost disadvantage of SOEs in labour‐intensive sectors.     

Domestic political competition and pro‐cyclical import protection

Governments, especially in developing countries, routinely practice binding overhang (i.e. setting applied tariffs below binding WTO commitments) and frequently move applied tariffs for given products up and down over the business cycle. Moreover, applied tariffs are pro‐cyclical in developing countries. We explain this phenomenon using a dynamic theory of lobbying between domestic interest groups. Applied tariffs are pro‐cyclical when high‐tariff interests (e.g. import‐competing industries) capture the government: these groups concede lower tariffs to low‐tariff interest groups (e.g. exporting firms or firms using imported intermediate inputs) during recessions because recessions lower the opportunity cost of lobbying and thereby generate a stronger lobbying threat.     

Why exporting countries agree to voluntary export restraints: the oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier

This paper studies the impact of VER on an exporting country. It shows that a VER at the free‐trade level favours the concentration of industry, allows firms with an export licence to expand, causes the contraction of the size of the firms producing for the domestic market only, and raises the price mark‐up in the domestic market. The impact on welfare is indeterminate depending upon the effect on global efficiency. If a VER is binding, also the price mark‐up in the foreign market rises and this effect on terms of trade, ceteris paribus, is welfare improving. An applied general equilibrium model for Turkey supports the conjecture that with a VER the increased oligopolistic power of incumbent firms with an export licence, the higher price mark‐up in the domestic market and a possible social welfare gain, are the key elements in understanding the rationale behind VERs. However, if authorities induce firms to engage in unproductive profit‐seeking activities, rent dissipation occurs and the impact on social welfare becomes negative.     

Trade Marks and Performance in Services and Manufacturing Firms: Evidence of Schumpeterian Competition through Innovation

We develop Lancaster's model of consumer behaviour under product differentiation to analyse Schumpeterian creative destruction. Launching new products with novel characteristics enables firms to temporarily steal market share from rivals. Product launch is monitored by using trade marks, patents and research and development. The dataset covers a large sample of UK service and manufacturing firms. We find that stock market value is positively associated with own trade mark activity and trade mark‐active firms achieve significantly higher value‐added. Greater trade mark activity by competitors reduces net output of firms, but raises their stock market value. This is consistent with the Schumpeterian process of competition through innovation.     

NON‐UNIFORM STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND AGGREGATE PROFIT CREATION EFFECT

This paper illustrates a new theoretical case for a strategic R&D policy in a two‐country third‐market international oligopoly model. Asymmetric treatment of domestic firms through a non‐uniform R&D policy can create aggregate profits without a foreign retaliation concern and further improve national welfare in addition to what a uniform policy accomplishes. This effect occurs when the conventional Brander–Spencer incentive is entirely absent as well as when the uniformly optimal R&D policy initially prevailed. The superiority of non‐uniform policy to uniform‐policy is not guaranteed, however, when the number of firms becomes endogenous.     

Regional Blocs and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper examines the impact of the emergence of regional blocs on the patterns of interbloc and intrabloc trade when firms have the option to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). For exogenously given external tariffs, when firms have the option to engage in FDI, all interbloc trade may cease—complete trade diversion that is replaced by interbloc FDI investment creation. In such an event the volume of world trade declines but this is more than offset by the increase in world output due to direct investment. The paper also investigates the optimal tariff that a trading bloc levies on imports from nonmember countries. The tariffs are restricted by the option to engage in two‐way direct investment; hence, the regional blocs are hampered from mutually harming one another through an escalation in the tariff war. Finally, the formation of two regional blocs enhances the welfare of all countries.     

Productivity Performance of Export Market Entry and Exit: Evidence from Indian Firms

This paper contributes to the literature on exporting and firm productivity, focusing on export entry (efficiency), learning (post‐entry growth) and exit (inefficiency) by Indian firms. Drawing on 7000 firms during 1989–2009, our main objective is to examine the effect of exporting on firm productivity, correcting for selection bias using propensity‐score matching, which allows a “like‐for‐like” comparison between new exporters and nonexporters. Robust to different matching estimators, we find evidence of learning‐by‐exporting that new exporters acquire rapid productivity growth after entry, relative to nonexporters. We also find that (1) exporters are more productive than nonexporters; (2) productive firms tend to self‐select in entering the exporting market, and (3) least productive exporters are found to exit the export market as they experience adverse productivity effect prior to the year of exit. Our robust result on learning‐by‐exporting suggests that entering export market does appear to be a channel explaining the Indian recent growth miracle.     

Technological Upgrading under Tariffs and Equivalent Quotas*

This paper compares the effect of tariffs and that of equivalent quotas on the domestic firm’s production technology choice when it competes with a foreign firm in the domestic market. It is shown that under Bertrand price competition, the ranking of technology under tariff protection and quota protection is ambiguous, as it depends on the relative strength of the strategic vs output effects. The equivalent quota regime can generate a higher‐technology (implying a lower production cost) choice than the tariff regime if the strategic effect dominates the output effect. In contrast, the technology level is necessarily higher under the tariff regime than under the equivalent quota regime when the firms engage in Cournot quantity competition.