Trading on Private Information: Evidence from Members of Congress

I examine the stock trades of members of Congress and find that over 2004–2010 the buy‐minus‐sell portfolios of powerful Republicans have the highest abnormal returns, exceeding 35% on an annual basis under a one‐week holding period. Among powerful Republicans, the abnormal returns are mostly concentrated in the portfolios of those with less trading experience. I also find that the positive abnormal returns disappear after the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act was passed in 2012. My results imply that the STOCK Act affected politicians' incentives to trade on private information, which they acquired through their power and party membership.     

The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research

This paper discusses the empirical literature on the economic consequences of disclosure and financial reporting regulation, drawing on U.S. and international evidence. Given the policy relevance of research on regulation, we highlight the challenges with (1) quantifying regulatory costs and benefits, (2) measuring disclosure and reporting outcomes, and (3) drawing causal inferences from regulatory studies. Next, we discuss empirical studies that link disclosure and reporting activities to firm‐specific and market‐wide economic outcomes. Understanding these links is important when evaluating regulation. We then synthesize the empirical evidence on the economic effects of disclosure regulation and reporting standards, including the evidence on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. Several important conclusions emerge. We generally lack evidence on market‐wide effects and externalities from regulation, yet such evidence is central to the economic justification of regulation. Moreover, evidence on causal effects of disclosure and reporting regulation is still relatively rare. We also lack evidence on the real effects of such regulation. These limitations provide many research opportunities. We conclude with several specific suggestions for future research.     

Divergence of Cash Flow and Voting Rights,Opacity, and Stock Price Crash Risk: International Evidence

This study investigates whether and how the deviation of cash flow rights (ownership) from voting rights (control), or simply the ownership‐control wedge, influences the likelihood that extreme negative outliers occur in stock return distributions, which we refer to as stock price crash risk. We do so using a comprehensive panel data set of firms with a dual‐class share structure from 20 countries around the world for the period of 1995–2007. We predict and find that opaque firms with a large wedge are more crash prone than opaque firms with a small wedge. In addition, we predict and find that the positive relation between the wedge and crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more effective external monitoring and for firms with greater growth opportunities. The results of this study are broadly consistent with Jin and Myers’s theory that agency costs, combined with opacity, exacerbate stock price crash risk.     

Marketing Closed‐End Fund IPOs: An Analysis of the International Stock Funds

Various studies argue that underwriting fees are excessive and investment bankers prolong the price stabilization period in aftermarket trading of closed‐end fund (CEF) shares. The poor performance of these funds also raises questions about the financial sophistication of initial public offering (IPO) buyers. In this study, we examine these issues for a sample of international stock CEFs. Our findings indicate that underwriting fees are not excessive relative to industrial issues, and we do not find that investment bankers prolong the stabilization period to camouflage the underwriting cost. Our findings are consistent with earlier studies that discounts contribute significantly to the poor performance during the first six months of aftermarket trading.     

The First‐ and Second‐Hand Effect of Analysts' Stock Recommendations: Evidence from the Swiss Stock Market

This paper empirically investigates the impact of both the first release of analysts' stock recommendations to a limited clientele and the subsequent dissemination of the same information in a major newspaper to a broader audience. For a sample of 1460 stock recommendations published in FuW, Switzerland's major financial newspaper, significant positive abnormal returns on the day of the original release of buy recommendations and on the day of publication in FuW are documented. Tests of the price pressure and information hypotheses reveal that analysts' recommendations contain new information, which is quickly incorporated in the stock prices on the first release of this information. In contrast, the statistically significant announcement effects associated with the subsequent publication can be primarily ascribed to price pressure in the underlying securities.