Interest rate smoothing and financial stability

Central banks smooth fluctuations in interest rates based on a belief that this policy promotes financial stability. This belief is based on a presumption that the direct effect of less interest rate volatility on a bank's likelihood of insolvency is the predominant effect of this policy. The main point of this paper is that these policies also give rise to indirect effects that lower financial stability. These indirect effects occur because the policy itself alters bank behavior. In effect, if the central bank provides (liquidity) insurance (at zero premia), it may introduce a classic moral hazard problem that encourages risk taking by banks. As a result, to maintain a given degree of financial stability, a bank regulator may, in fact, need to impose a higher prudential capital requirement when an interest rate smoothing policy is in place. The paper concludes that the link between interest rate smoothing policy and financial stability may be more complicated than is generally recognized.     

The conditioning role of performance on the bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy: Evidence from a multiple-tool regime

The study investigates how monetary policy affects bank risk-taking under a multiple-tool regime of Vietnam during 2007–2018. Particularly, we also consider the conditioning role of bank performance, broken down by bank profitability and cost efficiency, in this nexus. Using both dynamic and static panel models, we show that the liquidity injection initiated by the central bank’s asset purchases induces banks to take more risks, captured by the traditional Z-score and two alternative measures of credit risk. However, monetary policy easing through decreased interest rates is beneficial to the credit portfolio and financial stability of banks, which therefore challenges the functioning of the bank risk-taking channel. This startling result is robust across three different interest rate measures, including lending rates, refinance rates and rediscount rates. Further analysis reveals that our observed effects are alleviated for banks with higher performance — i.e., more profitable and efficient banks. This in-depth finding offers more insights into the “search for yield” incentive, based on the theory of information asymmetry and the two competing hypotheses of “bad management” and “cost skimping”.     

Monetary Policy,Bank Lending,and the Risk‐Pricing Channel

This paper identifies a monetary policy channel through the risk pricing of bank debt in the market for jumbo certificates of deposit (jumbo CDs). Adverse policy shocks increase debt holder perceptions of bank default, increasing the risk premia for some banks, thereby decreasing their external funding of loans. The results show that contractionary policy increases the sensitivity of jumbo‐CD spreads to leverage and asset risk for small banks, and to leverage for large banks. The results also show a distributional and aggregate effect on banking system jumbo CDs and total loans, producing a risk‐pricing (or market discipline) channel. This channel has implications for monetary and regulatory policies, and financial stability.     

EFFECT OF FED POLICY ACTIONS ON THE DEFAULT LIKELIHOOD OF COMMERCIAL BANKS

Using a measure of default likelihood based on an option pricing method, we provide evidence that Fed policy actions affect the financial distress of commercial banks. When the Fed increases (decreases) interest rates, the measure of default likelihood increases (decreases). We show that when the Fed uses a tight money policy, the increase in default likelihood is more pronounced for banks that have less capital, have greater financial leverage, are smaller, have fewer growth opportunities, and have lower asset quality. Additionally, the effects on bank default likelihood are more pronounced when the Fed's policy signals less concern about economic growth, as indicated by its bias toward further tightening, and when there is a market expectation of higher short‐term market rates in the future.     

Banks and markets in a monetary economy

Modern financial sectors consist of banks, asset markets and a central bank. This paper builds a model where these institutions provide different financial services, and their interaction supports efficient allocations. When one institution is missing equilibria are, by construction, inefficient. The paper analyzes how interest rates and asset prices depend on the structure of the financial sector and characterizes the central bank policy that supports efficient allocations. The analysis relies on the difference between liquidity and real shocks, and relates the notion of liquidity used in this paper to the one adopted in other studies.     

Banks’ Financial Reporting and Financial System Stability

The use of accounting measures and disclosures in banks’ contracts and regulation suggests that the quality of banks’ financial reporting is central to the efficacy of market discipline and nonmarket mechanisms in limiting banks’ development of debt and risk overhangs in economic good times and in mitigating the adverse consequences of those overhangs for the stability of the financial system in downturns. This essay examines how research on banks’ financial reporting, informed by the financial economics literature on banking, can generate insights about how to enhance the stability of the financial system. We begin with a foundational discussion of how aspects of banks’ accounting and disclosures may affect stability. We then evaluate representative papers in the empirical literature on banks’ financial reporting and stability, pointing out the research design issues that empirical accounting researchers need to confront to develop well‐specified tests able to generate reliably interpretable findings. To this end, we provide examples of settings amenable to addressing these issues. We conclude with considerations for accounting standard setters and financial system policy makers.     

Variations in Market Liquidity and the Intraday Interest Rate

Most central banks offer banks participating in large‐value real‐time gross settlement (RTGS) systems a free intraday overdraft facility to discourage banks from actively managing their daylight liquidity. In this paper, we ask whether this facility has kept the intraday interest rate at zero. Using a unique transaction‐level data set on collateralized interbank loans for 2006–12, we find that during periods of financial distress, rates for morning transactions are higher than those in the afternoon. Moreover, this intraday rate correlates with market liquidity, suggesting that rates contain a liquidity premium. This intraday pattern is reduced, but not eliminated by the Eurosystem's accommodative liquidity provision.     

货币供应量、利率与银行系统性金融风险——基于CoVaR方法的实证研究

在常态化疫情防控的背景下,商业银行系统性金融风险有上升迹象,这对央行实施货币政策工具和力度的把握提出了更高要求。本文利用条件在险值模型检验了我国货币供应量、利率与银行系统性金融风险的关系。研究结果表明,货币供应量和利率与银行系统性风险之间的关系不是线性的,而是U型的,即存在最优的货币供应量和利率能够使商业银行的系统性金融风险最低。当货币供应量和利率小于这个最优组合时,增加货币供应量和提高利率能够有效降低商业银行的系统性金融风险;而当货币供应量和利率大于这个最优组合时,增加货币供应量和提高利率反而会增加银行系统性金融风险,进而降低商业银行的金融稳定性。     

Time-varying monetary-policy rules and financial stress: Does financial instability matter for monetary policy?

We examine whether and how selected central banks responded to episodes of financial stress over the last three decades. We employ a recently developed monetary-policy rule estimation methodology which allows for time-varying response coefficients and corrects for endogeneity. This flexible framework applied to the USA, the UK, Australia, Canada, and Sweden, together with a new financial stress dataset developed by the International Monetary Fund, not only allows testing of whether central banks responded to financial stress, but also detects the periods and types of stress that were the most worrying for monetary authorities and quantifies the intensity of the policy response. Our findings suggest that central banks often change policy rates, mainly decreasing them in the face of high financial stress. However, the size of the policy response varies substantially over time as well as across countries, with the 2008–2009 financial crisis being the period of the most severe and generalized response. With regard to the specific components of financial stress, most central banks seemed to respond to stock-market stress and bank stress, while exchange-rate stress is found to drive the reaction of central banks only in more open economies.     

Examining the Relationships between Capital,Risk and Efficiency in European Banking

This paper analyses the relationship between capital, risk and efficiency for a large sample of European banks between 1992 and 2000. In contrast to the established US evidence we do not find a positive relationship between inefficiency and bank risk‐taking. Inefficient European banks appear to hold more capital and take on less risk. Empirical evidence is found showing the positive relationship between risk on the level of capital (and liquidity), possibly indicating regulators' preference for capital as a mean of restricting risk‐taking activities. We also find evidence that the financial strength of the corporate sector has a positive influence in reducing bank risk‐taking and capital levels. There are no major differences in the relationships between capital, risk and efficiency for commercial and savings banks although there are for co‐operative banks. In the case of co‐operative banks we do find that capital levels are inversely related to risks and we find that inefficient banks hold lower levels of capital. Some of these relationships also vary depending on whether banks are among the most or least efficient operators.     

The information content of Eonia swap rates before and during the financial crisis

Before August 2007, implied forward rates in the overnight interest swap rates closely reflected market expectations about the future path of the Eonia, and therefore, about the future course of the ECB’s monetary policy stance. Nevertheless, this link was weakened considerably during the most acute episode of the financial crisis. Using the expectations hypothesis of the term structure as a benchmark model for the determination of the overnight interest swap rates, we find that after May 2010 the monetary transmission mechanism was partially restored when the ECB implemented various ‘unconventional measures’ in response to the financial crisis. On the contrary, liquidity and credit risks are still present in unsecured deposit markets, distorting the pricing and transmission of the ECB monetary policy stance along the Euribor rates. These results should be of interest for regulators, financial institutions, and researchers in European money markets.     

Implications of bank ownership for the credit channel of monetary policy transmission: Evidence from India

Using bank-level data from India, we examine the impact of ownership on the reaction of banks to monetary policy, and also test whether the reaction of different types of banks to monetary policy changes is different in easy and tight policy regimes. Our results suggest that there are considerable differences in the reactions of different types of banks to monetary policy initiatives of the central bank, and that the bank lending channel of monetary policy is likely to be much more effective in a tight money period than in an easy money period. We also find differences in impact of monetary policy changes on less risky short-term and more risky medium-term lending. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.     

货币政策和银行风险承担：一种非线性关系

宽松的货币政策会通过估值、收入和现金流机制,追逐收益机制以及中央银行沟通和反应机制等渠道增加银行风险承担,通过风险转移机制降低银行风险承担,从而导致货币政策与银行风险承担之间可能存在复杂的非线性关系。本文使用面板阈值模型,基于我国银行业数据研究了货币政策对银行风险承担的影响,发现我国货币政策对银行风险承担的影响存在门限效应,即货币政策对银行风险承担的影响取决于货币政策基准利率偏离泰勒规则利率的程度。当这种偏离小于门限值时,宽松货币政策会增加银行风险承担;当这种偏离大于门限值时,宽松货币政策会降低银行风险承担。本文研究对更好地理解我国货币政策对银行风险承担及金融稳定的影响有一定参考意义。     

量化宽松货币政策的理论、实践与影响

全球金融危机已使全球经济陷入衰退,为应对危机各国央行不断降息。随着短期利率接近于零,美、日、英等主要国家的央行转而求助于"量化宽松货币政策",即通过购买长期国债等方式向经济注入巨量的流动性。全球大规模采取量化宽松政策在历史上尚属首次,对世界经济和中国经济都将产生难以估量的影响,对此有必要进行深入的分析。为此,本文在对量化宽松货币政策的理论基础进行分析的基础上,进一步研究了日本量化宽松政策实践的经验与教训及其影响,并提出相应的政策建议。     

Firm balance sheets and monetary policy transmission

The functioning of internal capital markets in financial conglomerates facilitates a novel identification strategy of the balance sheet channel of monetary policy. We look at small subsidiary banks that are affiliated with the same holding company but operate in different geographical areas. These banks face the same marginal cost of funds due to internal capital markets, but face different borrowers as they concentrate their lending with small local businesses. Exploring cross-sectional variation in local economic conditions across these subsidiaries, we investigate whether borrower creditworthiness influences the response of bank lending to monetary policy. Our results are consistent with a demand-driven transmission mechanism that works through firm balance sheets and is independent from the bank lending channel.     

The Risk‐Taking Channel of Monetary Policy: Exploring All Avenues

The literature on the risk‐taking channel of monetary policy grew quickly, leading to scattered evidence. We examine this channel through different angles, exploring detailed information on loan origination and performance. Ex ante riskier borrowers receive more funding at the extensive margin when interest rates are lower. Ex post performance is independent of the level of interest rates at origination. Still, loans granted in periods of very low and stable interest rates show higher default rates once interest rates start to increase. Risk‐taking is stronger among banks with lower capital ratios, suggesting that this channel may be linked to managerial incentives for risk‐shifting.     

Discerning the Impact of Derivatives on Asset Risk: The Case of Canadian Banks

The Canadian banks have shown remarkable resilience to the financial crisis that intensified in the late 2008. The interesting question is whether this stability is due to their prudent lending practices to limit the original risk exposures or due to effective risk management through hedging by using financial derivatives. In this paper, we implement the option‐theoretic model of Merton to calculate the implied asset risk and discern the impact of these derivatives on the aggregate risk for Canadian banks over the period 1997–2008. An algorithm of iterative procedure is developed to impute asset value and risk from bank stock prices. Our estimates show that the risk for Canadian banks is low and even decreasing till the unfolding of the recent crises in 2008. Further analyses reveal that such low risks are not due to reliance on hedging, nor is it related to trading in derivatives, after disentangling the intertwined effects of hedging and trading. These results suggest that involvements in derivatives, in and of themselves, should not be blamed for causing the bank crises; rather, it is conservatism in controlling original risk exposures that remains fundamental for safeguarding a healthy financial system.     

Banking Competition,Collateral Constraints,and Optimal Monetary Policy

We analyze optimal monetary policy in a model with two distinct financial frictions: monopolistically competitive banks that charge endogenous lending spreads, and collateral constraints. We show that welfare maximization is equivalent to stabilization of four goals: inflation, output gap, the “consumption gap” between borrowers and savers, and a “housing gap” that measures the distortion in the distribution of the collateralizable asset between both groups. Collateral constraints create a trade‐off between stabilization goals. Following both productivity and financial shocks, and relative to strict inflation targeting, the optimal policy implies sharper movements in the policy rate, aimed primarily at reducing fluctuations in asset prices and hence in borrowers' net worth. The policy trade‐offs become amplified as banking competition increases, due to the fall in lending spreads and the resulting increase in borrowers' leverage.     

Disclosure Regulation in the Commercial Banking Industry: Lessons from the National Banking Era

I exploit variation in the adoption of disclosure and supervisory regulation across U.S. states to examine their impact on the development and stability of commercial banks. The empirical results suggest that the adoption of state‐level requirements to report financial statements in local newspapers is associated with greater stability and development of commercial banks. I also examine which political constituencies influence the adoption of disclosure and supervisory regulation. I find that powerful landowners and small private banks are associated with late adoption of these regulations. These findings suggest that incumbent groups oppose disclosure rules because the passage of such rules threatens their private interests.     

Credit risk transfer in U.S. commercial banks: What changed during the 2007–2009 crisis?

Following the debate on the role of credit risk transfer (CRT) in exacerbating the 2007–2009 crisis, this paper investigates the usage and effects of loan sales, securitization, and credit derivatives in U.S. commercial banks over the last decade, with special emphasis on the financial crisis. We find that in times of severe funding constraints, the need to raise financial resources becomes the principal incentive behind CRT. We document some beneficial effects of CRT on the economy, since the funds released through CRT are subsequently invested by banks to sustain credit supply, also in recession. However, we report higher overall riskiness in banks that engage intensively in loans sales and securitization, which translates into higher default rates during the crisis. Interestingly, the benefits and drawbacks of CRT are much stronger for loan sales and securitization than for credit derivatives.