宏观调控中的财政货币政策搭配

财政政策与货币政策无论是在微观经济领域还是在宏观经济领域都相互影响、相互制约。作为现代宏观经济管理中的核心政策,实现两者的最佳配置并使其具有科学性、系统性和针对性,对于实现我国经济目标和促进经济的健康发展具有重要意义。     

Generalized Stability of Monetary Unions Under Regime Switching in Monetary and Fiscal Policies

Earlier studies on the stability of monetary unions show that an inflation‐targeting central bank imposes strict budgetary requirements on fiscal policy to obtain a unique stable equilibrium. Failure of only one fiscal authority to meet these requirements already results in nonexistence of equilibrium. Nevertheless, it might prove useful to temporarily depart from such requirements in order to absorb country‐specific shocks. We show that such departures are feasible if fiscal authorities commit to switch to more sustainable fiscal regimes in the future. Debt devaluation and fiscal bailouts may also broaden the range of policy stances under which monetary unions are stable.     

Optimal Structure of Fiscal and Monetary Authorities

Why are monetary authorities not elected like fiscal authorities are? Advanced economies pair an elected fiscal authority with an independent monetary authority. Replicating the advanced economies' structure with authorities microfounded by a political economy model shows that this structure is the solution to a constrained mechanism design problem that overcomes time inconsistency and results in the highest possible welfare. Goal and instrument independence, singly and in combination, are insufficient to minimize time inconsistency, though their combination is necessary.     

Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates

I characterize optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a stochastic New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates may occasionally hit the zero lower bound. The benevolent policymaker controls the short‐term nominal interest rate and the level of government spending. Under discretionary policy, accounting for fiscal stabilization policy eliminates to a large extent the welfare losses associated with the presence of the zero bound. Under commitment, the gains associated with the use of the fiscal policy tool remain modest, even though fiscal stabilization policy is part of the optimal policy mix.     

Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Customer Markets

We present a model in which some goods trade in “customer markets” and advertising facilitates long‐lived relationships. We estimate the model on U.S. data and find a large congestion externality in the pricing of customer market goods. This motivates the analysis of optimal policy. Under a complete set of taxes, fiscal policy eliminates the externalities with large adjustments in tax rates on customer markets goods, while labor tax volatility remains low. Constraining the instruments to the interest rate and labor tax, the optimal labor tax displays large and procyclical fluctuations, but monetary policy is little changed compared to a model with no customer markets.     

Fiscal Activism and the Zero Nominal Interest Rate Bound

In an economy where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is an occasionally binding constraint and the government lacks a commitment technology, it may be desirable for society to appoint a policymaker who cares less about government spending stabilization relative to inflation and output gap stabilization than the private sector does. A policymaker of this type uses government spending more elastically to stabilize the economy. At the zero lower bound, the anticipation of aggressive fiscal expansions in future liquidity trap situations increases inflation expectations and lowers real interest rates, thereby mitigating the decline in output and inflation.     

我国财政政策和货币政策相互作用的实证研究——基于政策在价格决定中的作用

本文选取1980～2009年度数据为样本,利用MS-VAR模型检验我国财政政策和货币政策在价格决定中的作用区制。实证结果表明,在1980～1997年间,价格为货币政策主导区制;之后为财政政策主导区制。为检验该结果的稳健性,本文分别对李嘉图等式和财富效应进行分样本区间的实证分析。最后,本文选取1996～2010年的月度数据,利用MS-OLS模型检验财政政策和货币政策与价格的关系,发现我国互补的宏观经济政策在稳定物价上是有效的。     

Identifying the Stance of Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Markov‐Switching Estimation Exploiting Monetary‐Fiscal Policy Interdependence

In this paper, I propose an econometric technique to estimate a Markov‐switching Taylor rule subject to the zero lower bound of interest rates. I show that linking the switching of the Taylor rule coefficients to the switching of the coefficients of an auxiliary uncensored Markov‐switching regression improves the identification of an otherwise unidentifiable prevalent monetary regime because of the presence of the zero lower bound. Using a Markov‐switching fiscal policy rule as the auxiliary regression, I apply the estimation technique to U.S. data. Results show evidence of monetary and fiscal policy comovements, with monetary policy reacting weakly to inflation when fiscal policy is focused on real activity as opposed to debt stabilization, and vice versa.     

Labor Selection,Turnover Costs,and Optimal Monetary Policy

We study optimal monetary policy and welfare properties of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a labor selection process, labor turnover costs, and Nash bargained wages. We show that our model implies inefficiencies that cannot be offset in a standard wage bargaining regime. We also show that the inefficiencies rise with the magnitude of firing costs. As a result, in the optimal Ramsey plan, the optimal inflation volatility deviates from zero and is an increasing function of firing costs.     

Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady‐state debt to follow a random walk. In this paper we consider the nature of the time inconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policymaking. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady‐state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government's objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi‐commitment policy, which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises.     

Systemic and Idiosyncratic Risk in EU-15 Sovereign Yield Spreads after Seven Years of Monetary Union

The market capitalisation of international bond markets is much larger than that of international equity markets. However, compared to the large body of literature on international equity market linkages, there are far fewer empirical studies of bond systemic risk or international bond market co-movements. The extent of international bond market linkages merits investigation, as it may have important implications for the cost of financing fiscal deficit, monetary policymaking independence, modelling and forecasting long-term interest rates, and bond portfolio diversification. In this paper, we investigate the relative influence of systemic and idiosyncratic risk factors on yield spreads over 10-year German government securities during the seven years after the beginning of Monetary Integration. We estimate both panel regressions for the two groups of EU-15 countries (EMU and non-EMU) and specific-country regressions for the nine countries in the EMU group and the three countries in the non-EMU group. All estimations include both domestic (differences in market liquidity and credit risk) and international risk factors. The results present clear evidence that it was mostly idiosyncratic rather than systemic risk factors that drove the evolution of 10-year yield spread differentials over Germany in all EMU countries during the seven years after the beginning of Monetary Integration. Conversely, in the case of non-EMU countries, adjusted yield spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange factor) are influenced more by systemic risk factors. The fact that these countries do not share a common Monetary Policy might explain these results, which may show that government bonds from EMU countries have a better safe-haven status that those of non-EMU countries.     

Asymmetric Preferences and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policy Rules

This paper evaluates the stability properties of optimal monetary policy rules when professionals under adaptive learning have asymmetric preferences. The asymmetric preferences require volatility estimates in real time. An expectations‐based rule can stabilize the economy, while a fundamentals‐based rule leads to instability.     

Inflation Targeting,Fiscal Policy,and the Exchange Rate Regime

Until recently, Turkey’s economy was characterized by high inflation, undisciplined public finance management, and a fragile banking system and experienced multiple economic crises. After the economy was hit by another crisis in 2001, the central bank became independent, adopted inflation targeting as the monetary policy framework, and implemented reforms to adopt a more stringent fiscal policy. Inflation rates decreased to single-digit levels within 3 years after the independence of the central bank. This article analyzes the end of the high inflation period in the context of monetary and fiscal policy interactions within a Markov-Switching Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model in which monetary and fiscal policies are allowed to switch between different regimes.     

Heterogeneous Expectations,Optimal Monetary Policy,and the Merit of Policy Inertia

The design and analysis of optimal monetary policy is usually guided by the paradigm of homogeneous rational expectations. Instead, we examine the dynamic consequences of design and implementation strategies, when the actual economy features expectational heterogeneity. Agents have either rational or adaptive expectations. Consequently, the central bank's ability to achieve price stability under heterogeneous expectations depends on its objective and implementation strategy. An expectations‐based reaction function, which appropriately conditions on private sector expectations, performs exceptionally well. However, once the objective introduces policy inertia, popular strategies have similar determinacy properties, but they are less operational. This finding calls for new implementation strategies under interest rate stabilization.     

On Monetary Policy and Stock Market Anomalies

This study utilizes a macro‐based VAR framework to investigate whether stock portfolios formed on the basis of their value, size and past performance characteristics are affected in a different manner by unexpected US monetary policy actions during the period 1967–2007. Full sample results show that value, small capitalization and past loser stocks are more exposed to monetary policy shocks compared with growth, big capitalization and past winner stocks. Sub‐sample analysis, motivated by variation in the realized premia and parameter instability, reveals that the impact of monetary policy shocks on these portfolios is significant and pronounced only during the pre‐1983 period.     

U.S. Monetary Policy and International Bond Markets

This paper analyzes how U.S. monetary policy affects the pricing of dollar‐denominated sovereign debt. We document that yields on dollar‐denominated sovereign bonds are highly responsive to U.S. monetary policy surprises—during both the conventional and unconventional policy regimes—and that the passthrough of unconventional policy to foreign bond yields is, on balance, comparable to that of conventional policy. In addition, a conventional U.S. monetary easing (tightening) leads to a significant narrowing (widening) of credit spreads on sovereign bonds issued by countries with a speculative‐grade credit rating but has no effect on the corresponding weighted average of bilateral exchange rates for a basket of currencies from the same set of risky countries; this indicates that an unanticipated tightening of U.S. monetary policy widens credit spreads on risky sovereign debt directly through the financial channel, as opposed to indirectly through the exchange rate channel. During the unconventional policy regime, yields on both investment‐ and speculative‐grade sovereign bonds move one‐to‐one with policy‐induced fluctuations in yields on comparable U.S. Treasuries. We also examine whether the response of sovereign credit spreads to US monetary policy differs between policy easings and tightenings and find no evidence of such asymmetry.     

The Interaction between Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy

The interaction between capital requirements and monetary policy is assessed by means of simple rules in a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector. In “normal” times, when economic dynamics are driven by supply shocks, an active use of capital requirements generates modest benefits in terms of volatility of the target variables compared to the case in which only the central bank carries out stabilization policies. The lack of cooperation between the two policymakers may result in excessive volatility of the monetary policy rate and capital requirements. The benefits of introducing capital requirements become sizeable when financial shocks, which affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics; the availability of capital requirements as a policy tool yields a significant gain in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, regardless of the type of interaction between monetary and capital requirements policies.     

Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion

In models of monetary policy, discretionary policymaking is typically constrained in its ability to manage public beliefs. However, when a policymaker possesses private information, policy actions serve as signals to the public about unobserved economic conditions and belief management becomes an integral part of optimal discretion policies. This article derives the optimal time‐consistent policy for a general linear‐quadratic setting. The optimal policy is illustrated in a simple New Keynesian model, where analytical solutions can be derived as well. In this model, imperfect information about the policymaker's output target leads to lower policy losses.     

Fiscal Multipliers at the Zero Lower Bound: The Role of Policy Inertia

The presence of the lagged shadow policy rate in the interest rate feedback rule reduces the government spending multiplier nontrivially when the policy rate is constrained at the zero lower bound (ZLB). In the economy with policy inertia, increased inflation and output due to higher government spending during a recession speed up the return of the policy rate to the steady state after the recession ends, which in turn damps the expansionary effects of the government spending during the recession via expectations. In our baseline experiment intended to capture the effectiveness of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the output multiplier at the ZLB is 1.9 when the weight on the lagged shadow rate is zero, and 0.5 when the weight is 0.85.     

Cyclical Risk Aversion,Precautionary Saving,and Monetary Policy

This paper analyzes the conduct of monetary policy in an environment in which cyclical swings in risk appetite affect households’ propensity to save. It uses a New Keynesian model featuring external habit formation to show that taking note of precautionary saving motives justifies an accommodative policy bias in the face of persistent, adverse disturbances. Equally, policy should be more restrictive—that is “lean against the wind”—following positive shocks. Under sufficiently persistent habits it is, in fact, optimal to increase interest rates following a rise in productivity.