Executive risk-taking and the agency cost of debt

Firms compensate managers to maximize shareholder value, yet these same incentives affect bondholder risk. We investigate the relation between executive equity pay and the cost of debt. Our findings indicate a “u-shaped” relation between bond yields and equity pay. These results are consistent with the notion that bondholders prefer a moderate amount of executive equity pay and above or below that level, bondholders increase yields to protect their interests. These findings suggest that moderate levels of equity pay mitigate the agency costs between firm shareholders and bondholders.     

De-branching,too-much-branching,and cost of debt of SMEs in Slovakia

We investigate nonlinear effects of bank branch saturation on SMEs' cost of debt at regional level in Slovakia over the period 2013–2019. We adopt the two-step approach by first constructing model of bank branch localization, and then analyzing effects of positive and negative deviations from the equilibrium level. We observe negative effect of debranching, but report no effect of positive increase in deviations from equilibrium level on SMEs' cost of debt. The most affected firms are middle-sized, domestically owned, operating in low-tech industries, and with better creditworthiness. Bank market characteristics also tend to matter for pricing of firm's debt.     

Mandatory IFRS adoption and the cost of debt in Italy and UK

This paper analyses the effect of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) within the EU on the cost of corporate debt. In order to avoid the imprecision involved in a large-scale cross-country study, we examine the impact of IFRS in two very clearly different institutional settings, the UK and Italy. The UK is a common-law country characterised by strong enforcement and national generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) which are equivalent to IFRS. Italy is a typical European code-law country, characterised by a weak outside investor protection system, and national GAAP significantly different from the IFRS model. No IFRS effect is observed in the UK, consistent with it having standards which are close to IFRS. During the post-IFRS period, in Italy more weight is placed on the accounting numbers to assess the cost of debt. We also find that accruals quality improves in Italy, thus suggesting that public financial reporting data are enhanced relative to privately held information about borrowers' credit ratings.     

The investment decision with technological and market uncertainties

This paper examines how technological uncertainty affects current investment; specifically, what is the impact on a firm’s investment in an existing technology when an improved technology might arrive in the future. The firm can invest in the current technology and upgrade to the new technology after its arrival (sequential investing), or it can bypass the current technology and invest directly in the new technology (leapfrogging). The main result is that, in the presence of market risk, future technological uncertainty has a non-monotonic effect on investment, with the investment trigger being a U-shaped function of the expected speed of arrival of the new technology. In this U-shaped relationship, the investment trigger starts rising later if the new technology is more attractive and also when volatility and interest rate are high and growth rate low; thus, technological uncertainty is more likely to have a positive effect on investment under these conditions. Finally, we apply the model to the sequential versus leapfrog investment decision, and find that leapfrogging becomes more attractive relative to sequential investment when interest rate and new technology earnings enhancement are higher, and when market volatility, growth rate and new technology investment cost are lower.     

社会责任投资基金的实施契约与代理成本的关系研究

通过对社会责任投资基金契约条款适应社会责任目标而进行的规范和调整进行评估,并采用异质性随机前沿分析和LSDV法阐释基于契约的社会责任约束程度与基金代理成本之间的关系,研究发现,非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金的契约对社会责任主题的约束程度普遍高于市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金,这种差异主要体现在投资目标和投资范围的契约条款设计方面。社会责任投资基金的契约得分与基金的代理成本呈正相关关系,尤其是非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金表现得更加明显。因此,“规则前置”的契约条款对社会责任主题的限制和约束增加了代理成本,契约作为一种硬约束手段在解决委托代理问题上作用有限。     

Compliance with pension‐related mandatory disclosures and debt financing

Using hand‐collected data on the level of pension‐related mandatory disclosures required by International Accounting Standard 19 Employee Benefits, we test whether compliance levels with these disclosures convey information that affects firms’ access to the public instead of the private debt market, as well as the cost of their new debt issues. We document a higher tendency to access the public debt market for firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure. Furthermore, we find that firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure enjoy a lower cost in terms of issuance of public debt, but not a lower cost for private debt issues. Thus, the benefits of disclosure in reducing information risk are only realisable when creditors rely heavily on financial statements in their decision making, due to the limited access to private information. Additional tests reveal that high compliance levels effectively mitigate the negative effect of pension deficits on the cost of public debt. These findings provide novel evidence in the extant literature on the role of mandatory (and, in particular, pension‐related) disclosures on firms’ debt financing. They also have important policy implications.     

A stochastic differential game for optimal investment of an insurer with regime switching

We introduce a model to discuss an optimal investment problem of an insurance company using a game theoretic approach. The model is general enough to include economic risk, financial risk, insurance risk, and model risk. The insurance company invests its surplus in a bond and a stock index. The interest rate of the bond is stochastic and depends on the state of an economy described by a continuous-time, finite-state, Markov chain. The stock index dynamics are governed by a Markov, regime-switching, geometric Brownian motion modulated by the chain. The company receives premiums and pays aggregate claims. Here the aggregate insurance claims process is modeled by either a Markov, regime-switching, random measure or a Markov, regime-switching, diffusion process modulated by the chain. We adopt a robust approach to model risk, or uncertainty, and generate a family of probability measures using a general approach for a measure change to incorporate model risk. In particular, we adopt a Girsanov transform for the regime-switching Markov chain to incorporate model risk in modeling economic risk by the Markov chain. The goal of the insurance company is to select an optimal investment strategy so as to maximize either the expected exponential utility of terminal wealth or the survival probability of the company in the ‘worst-case’ scenario. We formulate the optimal investment problems as two-player, zero-sum, stochastic differential games between the insurance company and the market. Verification theorems for the HJB solutions to the optimal investment problems are provided and explicit solutions for optimal strategies are obtained in some particular cases.     

Robust optimal excess-of-loss reinsurance and investment strategy for an insurer in a model with jumps

This paper considers a robust optimal excess-of-loss reinsurance-investment problem in a model with jumps for an ambiguity-averse insurer (AAI), who worries about ambiguity and aims to develop a robust optimal reinsurance-investment strategy. The AAI’s surplus process is assumed to follow a diffusion model, which is an approximation of the classical risk model. The AAI is allowed to purchase excess-of-loss reinsurance and invest her surplus in a risk-free asset and a risky asset whose price is described by a jump-diffusion model. Under the criterion for maximizing the expected exponential utility of terminal wealth, optimal strategy and optimal value function are derived by applying the stochastic dynamic programming approach. Our model and results extend some of the existing results in the literature, and the economic implications of our findings are illustrated. Numerical examples show that considering ambiguity and reinsurance brings utility enhancements.     

Optimal investment of an insurer with regime-switching and risk constraint

We investigate an optimal investment problem of an insurance company in the presence of risk constraint and regime-switching using a game theoretic approach. A dynamic risk constraint is considered where we constrain the uncertainty aversion to the ‘true’ model for financial risk at a given level. We describe the surplus of an insurance company using a general jump process, namely, a Markov-modulated random measure. The insurance company invests the surplus in a risky financial asset whose dynamics are modeled by a regime-switching geometric Brownian motion. To incorporate model uncertainty, we consider a robust approach, where a family of probability measures is cosidered and the insurance company maximizes the expected utility of terminal wealth in the ‘worst-case’ probability scenario. The optimal investment problem is then formulated as a constrained two-player, zero-sum, stochastic differential game between the insurance company and the market. Different from the other works in the literature, our technique is to transform the problem into a deterministic differential game first, in order to obtain the optimal strategy of the game problem explicitly.