Trade-off Model of Debt Maturity Structure

In this paper, we suggest the trade-off model to explain the choice of debt maturity. This model is based on balancing between risk and reward of using shorter-term loans. Shorter-term loans have cost advantage over, but incur higher refinancing and interest rate risk than longer-term loans. Using the Compustat data, we show that the principal components of financial attributes are financial flexibility and financial strength. Therefore, only firms with greater financial flexibility and financial strength can use proportionately more short-term loans. We also document that financially strong firms take advantage of lower interest rates of short-term debt. They use proportionately more short-term loans when the term premium is high. The results of our study also provide evidence supporting the agency cost hypothesis, which is strongly supported by current literature.     

Yield spreads,agency costs and the corporate bond call feature

This paper theoretically compares yields and optimal default policies for callable and non-callable corporate debt. It shows that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, it is possible for the yield spread (callable minus non-callable) to be negative. It also identifies the key determinants of the yield spread. Next, it shows that the optimal default trigger for non-callable debt is higher than the trigger for callable debt, resulting in additional default-related costs. Thus, the use of non-callable debt gives rise to an indirect agency cost of early default, which is the difference in total firm value with callable and non-callable debt. This agency cost provides a rationale for the existence of callable debt. By examining the determinants of the magnitude of this agency cost, the conditions that make callable debt more attractive (to the issuing firm) relative to non-callable debt are identified. This allows certain predictions to be made regarding the likelihood of a call feature in a corporate bond. The model's implications are supported by existing empirical studies.     

基于自由现金流代理成本假说的投资行为研究

基于自由现金流代理成本假说，本文利用我国上市公司（A股）制造业1998-2003年数据对上市公司投资行为进行实证研究。研究结果表明，（1）经理持股比例越低，代理问题越严重，投资现金流相关性越高。（2）企业融资约束程度越轻，代理问题越严重，投资现金流相关性越高，经理越容易建造“企业帝国”。具体表现为：国家股比例越高，投资现金流相关性越高；净资产税后利润率越高，投资现金流相关性越高；企业规模越大，投资现金流相关性越高。建立有效的公司治理机制可以解决有关代理问题。     

社会责任投资基金的实施契约与代理成本的关系研究

通过对社会责任投资基金契约条款适应社会责任目标而进行的规范和调整进行评估,并采用异质性随机前沿分析和LSDV法阐释基于契约的社会责任约束程度与基金代理成本之间的关系,研究发现,非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金的契约对社会责任主题的约束程度普遍高于市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金,这种差异主要体现在投资目标和投资范围的契约条款设计方面。社会责任投资基金的契约得分与基金的代理成本呈正相关关系,尤其是非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金表现得更加明显。因此,“规则前置”的契约条款对社会责任主题的限制和约束增加了代理成本,契约作为一种硬约束手段在解决委托代理问题上作用有限。     

Investment Decisions in Anticipation of Recessions and Outperformance of Pre-Acting Firms

We empirically examine whether firms make investment decisions in anticipation of recessions and subsequently perform better. Using a large quarterly dataset of fixed asset investments for U.S. firms during 1984–2012, we show that not all firms efficiently adjust their investment decisions in anticipation of a recession. However, we find that pre-acting firms that properly adjust their investment decisions (i.e., underinvest) before a recession outperform re-acting firms that fail to make proper investment decisions (i.e., overinvest) before a recession in subsequent returns on assets, returns on investments, and market-adjusted return measures.     

Why is Convertible Debt Subordinated? An Investment‐Based Agency Theory

This paper offers an agency‐based explanation for the junior priority status of convertible bonds. Using a simple economic model, I show that when convertible and straight debt have equal priority, shareholders can prefer value‐decreasing projects, which results in wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders; and I prove that this problem is solved when convertible debt is subordinated. Empirical evidence supports the theory. I find that firms with greater potential for investment‐based agency conflicts are more likely to issue subordinated convertible debt, and firms with senior convertible debt are more likely to deviate from the optimal investment policy.     

Implied Volatility in the U.K. Commercial Property Market: Empirical Evidence Based on Transaction Data

The primary aim of this research is to compute implied volatility based on a stochastic contingent claim valuation model proposed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Over the sample period of 1984 to 1997, and with approximately 20,000 commercial property transactions in the United Kingdom, we find that implied volatility of rental returns is in the region of 24.83 percent. Over the same sample period, the historical and conditional standard deviations of the log returns of transaction-based rental series is estimated to be 15.60 percent and 35.64 percent, respectively. The tests of information content of these risk measures show that there is strong orthogonality in the information impounded in implied volatility estimates compared to that contained in historical standard deviations.     

An Empirical Examination of Tax Factors and Mutual Funds' Stock Sales Decisions

We examine whether taxes affect stock sales by mutual funds. For certain funds, the expected amount of a given stock sold in a given quarter is 62% greater when liquidation would trigger a capital loss equal to 1% of the value of the portfolio than when a like-size gain would be triggered, a greater effect than is associated with either contemporaneous excess stock returns of 50% or unexpected EPS equal to 50% of the stock price. For growth funds, responses to tax factors are consistent from year to year, and dispositions vary with the year-to-date realized gain.     

Debt Overhang, Costly Expandability and Reversibility, and Optimal Financial Structure

Abstract:   This article compares the investment and financing decisions of a firm that adopts a 'first‐best' strategy with those of a firm that adopts a 'second‐best' strategy. The former issues bonds upon deciding an initial capacity, while the latter issues bonds, and only then decides an initial capacity. The former is thus able to avoid the agency cost associated with the 'debt overhang' problem. Accordingly, the former will both issue more bonds and install a larger initial capacity than the latter. However, the agency cost of debt, i.e., firm value difference between these two strategies, is modest for plausible parameter values.     

Firm Internationalization and Capital Structure in Developing Countries: The Role of Financial Development

We investigate the relationship between internationalization and the level of debt financing for more than 18,000 firm/year observations from thirty-one developing countries in the period 1991-2006. We argue that this relationship can be affected by both country-level and firm-level factors. The results show that in developing countries with relatively higher financial development, firm internationalization corresponds with a greater level of debt when firms have more growth opportunities (which also indicate a higher level of asymmetric information). This evidence suggests that relatively developed financial markets in developing countries at least partially mitigate the effect of asymmetric information and decrease the agency cost of debt for firms with higher levels of internationalization.     

Additional Evidence on the Association Between Director Stock Ownership and Incentive Compensation

Governance scholars argue that outside directors have little incentive to monitor managers when their equity stake in the firm is not significant. A sample with a substantial level of outside director shareholdings is examined and a negative relationship between incentive compensation and outside director stock ownership is found. While firms pay higher incentive compensation when they have greater investment opportunities, the compensation contains excess pay due to ineffective corporate governance. Overall, the results suggest more effective corporate governance and lower incentive compensation when outside director stock ownership is higher.     

Do Banks Price Litigation Risk in Debt Contracting? Evidence from Class Action Lawsuits

Class action lawsuits can be detrimental to debtholders because they deteriorate defendant firms’ financial position and lower these firms’ value. This study examines whether banks price their borrowers’ litigation risk in debt contracting. We find that banks charge 19% higher interest spreads on loans to lawsuit firms after litigation. In addition, banks monitor lawsuit firms more closely by using tighter non‐price terms. The results are robust after correcting for possible endogeneity issues using the propensity score matching approach. We further find that the effects of lawsuit filing are more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance. Following a lawsuit in the industry, banks also perceive an increased likelihood of litigation for industry peer firms and adjust price and non‐price terms accordingly. Finally, we find that the magnitude of the lawsuit filing effect is greater for firms with lower ex‐ante litigation risk. Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that banks, as informed stakeholders, perceive litigation risk to be detrimental and price this risk in debt contracting.     

Hidden Overhang of Domestic Debt and Its Role in the This-Time-Is-Different Syndrome: An Empirical Contingent Liabilities Model

The recent studies in public finance literature open an exciting research area on hidden overhang of domestic public debt and creative accounting. In this study, I identify hidden public debts in Turkey. I then develop a dynamical model that takes as given the stock of contingent liabilities generated by lending/borrowing relationships among public entities and looks for the debt (in)tolerance of government to liquidate it in finite periods. Last, I introduce a general empirical methodology to analyze the role of overborrowing in the this-time-is-different syndrome and test model outcome against data for hidden debts in Turkey's postliberalization period (1989-2010).