Stock and Compensation*

Compensation planning within firms creates important corporate financial problems. Theoretical models and empirical tests of hypotheses in this area should play a much larger role than currently in the modern theory of corporate finance. Employees fund a large proportion of their firm's activities through deferred compensation arrangements tied to the performance of their company. These arrangements are generally put in place for incentive reasons, to align the interests of employees more closely with those of shareholders. Moreover, tax rules encourage or discourage these arrangements at various times. Currently, both tax rules and incentive considerations encourage stock buyback programs to fund deferred compensation arrangements. Prior to the 1980s, however, tax rules favored funding in other than company stock, implying that employees likely held company stock for incentive and not for tax reasons during this time period.     

What Public Companies Can Learn from Private Equity Pay Plans

Studies of private equity pay, including one by current SEC commissioner Robert Jackson, have pointed to restrictions on equity sales as a key difference between private equity and public company pay. In this article, the author argues that there is another very important difference: equity compensation in PE pay plans is typically front loaded, with top executives of portfolio companies often required to buy shares, and receiving upfront option grants on three times the number of shares they purchase. Such front‐loaded equity compensation allows PE pay plans to avoid the unintended effects of the “competitive pay policy” that have been embraced by public companies for the past 50 years. Competitive pay—targeted, for example, to provide 50th percentile total compensation regardless of past performance—has the effect of creating a systematic “performance penalty,” rewarding poor performance with more shares and penalizing superior performance with fewer shares. The author's research shows that, for public companies during the past decade or so, the number of shares granted has fallen by 7% for each 10% increase in share prices—and that, primarily for this reason, the front loaded option grants used by PE firms have provided five times more incentive (“pay leverage”) than the average public company's annual series of equity grants. What's more, to the extent that PE pay has been guided by partnership and fixed‐sharing concepts rather than competitive pay, it is the spiritual heir to the value‐sharing concepts that guided public company pay in the first half of the 20th century. For 60 years, General Motors used value sharing in “economic profit”—10% of GM's profit above a 7% return on capital was the formula for the bonus pool for many years—as the basis for all incentive compensation. The author uses the GM history to highlight four ways to improve public company incentives and corporate governance.     

Independent directors and the propensity to pay dividends

Using data from 944 public companies in 2006, I examine how a firm's propensity to pay dividends is related to (i) board independence and (ii) independent directors' tenure, number of board seats (busy) and equity incentive compensation. After controlling for the effects of traditional economic, CEO entrenchment and ownership determinants of the propensity to pay dividends, I find evidence of a positive association between the propensity to pay and (i) board independence and (ii) director tenure, and a negative association between the propensity to pay and (i) busy directors and (ii) greater equity incentive compensation in the director pay structure. I find consistent results when the decision is to pay cash dividends or repurchase shares. In further tests, I find that equity incentive compensation in the independent director pay structure is the most pervasive determinant across other dividend measures such as dividend payout, total payout and repurchases. Overall, the findings suggest that the characteristics of independent directors are important determinants of the payout policy. The results also suggest that future corporate governance research could benefit from incorporating characteristics of independent directors rather than limiting governance measures to board independence especially when recent empirical evidence (Linck et al., 2008, 2009) shows convergence, and therefore, narrowing variation in the proportion of outsiders and insiders on a board.     

CEO inside debt and investment‐cash flow sensitivity

This paper provides a new explanation for investment‐cash flow sensitivity from the perspective of CEO inside debt holdings. We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on investment‐cash flow sensitivity for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 2006 to 2012. We find that the firms with higher relative CEO leverage ratios (CEO's debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm's debt/equity ratio) generate higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the relative CEO leverage ratio enlarges investment‐cash flow sensitivity by 50 per cent. This positive relationship still holds even after we take account of endogeneity and financial constraints.     

Strategic alliances,equity stakes,and entry deterrence

I study how strategic alliances and their impact on future competitive incentives can motivate interfirm equity sales. In the model, an alliance between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm improves efficiency for both. However, the requisite knowledge transfer heightens the established firm's incentive to enter one of its partner's markets. I show that equity can eliminate the entry incentive, but accommodation is sometimes chosen to encourage entrepreneurial effort on future growth options. I analyze stake sizes, block pricing, and welfare effects. The results have implications for equity alliances, corporate venture capital, and the organization of research activities.     

Sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures in all-equity firms

We investigate the relation between chief executive officer compensation and accounting performance measures as a function of the firm's capital structure. We specifically analyse pay–performance relationships for all‐equity firms relative to high‐levered firms. We find a significant positive association between return on equity and the level of compensation for all‐equity firms. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we cannot discern any such relationship for high‐levered firms. Because of agency costs of debt, managerial compensation in high‐levered firms plays the role of a precommitment mechanism in addition to its conventional role of aligning management incentives with shareholder interest.     

民营企业股权激励计划与研发投入关系分析

以2008~2011年民营上市公司为样本,使用3SLS回归分析以及DID模型,从外部环境以及内部环境两个方面分析了我国民营企业股权激励计划对于企业研发投入的影响。实证研究发现,民营企业实施股权激励能够促进企业的研发投入,而高科技行业的民营企业实施股权激励能够加强这种正向影响;对于股权激励具体方案的分析表明,激励计划的有效期与研发投入有弱相关关系,行权条件当中非财务指标的使用对于企业研发投入有正向影响,但是相对绩效指标的使用则对于研发投入有抑制作用。     

Agency,Firm Growth,and Managerial Turnover

We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when growth opportunities arrive stochastically and pursuing them requires a change in management. A trade‐off arises between the benefit of always having the “right” manager and the cost of incentive provision. The prospect of growth‐induced turnover limits the firm's ability to rely on deferred pay, resulting in more front‐loaded compensation. The optimal contract may insulate managers from the risk of growth‐induced dismissal after periods of good performance. The evidence for the United States broadly supports the model's predictions: Firms with better growth prospects experience higher CEO turnover and use more front‐loaded compensation.     

Earnings Smoothing,Cash Flow Volatility,and CEO Cash Bonus

Prior studies generally relate managers’ decisions to smooth earnings to their desire to maximize their overall compensation and to smooth their consumption. However, earnings smoothing could also be driven by the firm's expected benefits from reporting a smooth earnings stream. Our paper provides empirical support for the latter explanation of earnings smoothing. Specifically, we find that while CEO bonus on average increases with earnings smoothing, the increase is larger when the firm's cash flow volatility is higher. Further, CEO bonus is shielded from the negative effects of lower earnings arising from the need to report a smoother earnings stream.     

The effect of supplier industry competition on pay-for-performance incentive intensity

We examine how supplier industry competition affects CEO incentive intensity in procuring firms. Using Bureau of Economic Analysis data to compute a weighted supplier industry competition measure, we predict and find that higher supplier competition is associated with stronger CEO pay-for-performance incentive intensity. This effect is incremental to that of the firm's own industry competition previously documented and is robust to alternative measures of supplier competition and to exogenous shocks to competition. Importantly, we show that performance risk and product margin act as mediating variables in the relation between supplier competition and CEO incentive intensity providing support for the theory underpinning our finding. We document that CEO compensation contracts are used as a mechanism to exploit the market dynamics of upstream industries to a firm's benefit. Our findings are economically important as suppliers provide, on average, 45 percent of the value delivered by procuring firms to the market (BEA, 2016).     

Efficient management remuneration plan design: A consideration of specific human capital investments

This paper investigates the contractual relationship between the manager and the firm. The results indicate that cross-sectional variation in the components of management remuneration plans can be explained by variations in the specificity of both the manager's human capital investments and the firm's resources. Where the returns on the firm's resources are relatively more dependent upon (specific to) a particular manager, that manager is more likely to be able to negotiate his/her remuneration. The manager is also more likely to be paid on a long run contingent basis and to be offered deferred forfeitable remuneration. The results also indicate that the greater the firm-specificity of a manager's human capital investments the greater the likelihood that the manager is offered termination compensation as part of the remuneration package.     

Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad

Principal-agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm's own performance. Recently, it has been argued that such indexation is not observed in the data because executives can set pay in their own interests; that is, they can enjoy “pay for luck” as well as “pay for performance.” We first show that this argument is incomplete. The positive expected return on stock markets reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk. If executives’ pay is tied to market movements, they can only expect to receive the market-determined return for risk-bearing. This argument, however, assumes that executive pay is tied to bad luck as well as to good luck. If executives can truly influence the setting of their pay, they will seek to have their performance benchmarked only when it is in their interest, namely, when the benchmark has fallen. Using industry benchmarks, we find significantly less pay for luck when luck is down (in which case, pay for luck would reduce compensation) than when it is up. These empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and robustness checks, and they suggest that the average executive loses 25–45% less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck.     

Coaches or Speculators? The Role and Impact of Venture Capital on Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies

In this paper, we utilize a panel dataset that covers 1245 listed companies which accomplished their IPO during 2006 to 2014 in China to investigate the impact of venture capital (VC) firms on executive compensation, equity incentive and pay-performance-sensitivity. We make several key findings: First, we find the presence of VCs can significantly raise the executive compensation. Second, high reputation VCs and private VCs increases the likelihood of granting executive equity incentives, whereas foreign VCs are significantly negatively related with executive equity incentive. Third, the pay-performance sensitivity of government VCs and foreign VCs is significant on stock return (RET) whereas insignificant on accounting performance (ROA). Moreover, the increasing VCs share in portfolio companies enhance the pay performance sensitivity on RET. Our results show that before VCs final exiting their post-IPO portfolio companies in China, VCs’ impact on executive compensation are more consistent with grandstanding theories and intending to provide higher cash compensation to encourage executives to raise the companies’ stock price, which is indicating VCs’ changing role from a coach into a speculator after the portfolio companies’ IPO.     

CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: an Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data

This paper examines the link between CEO pay and performance employing a unique, hand‐collected panel data set of 390 UK non‐financial firms from the FTSE All Share Index for the period 1999–2005. We include both cash (salary and bonus) and equity‐based (stock options and long‐term incentive plans) components of CEO compensation, and CEO wealth based on share holdings, stock option and stock awards holdings in our analysis. In addition, we control for a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables. The empirical results show that in comparison to the previous findings for US CEOs, pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs seems to be lower; pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs is 0.075 (0.095) for cash compensation (total direct compensation), indicating that a ten percentage increase in shareholder return corresponds to an increase of 0.75% (0.95%) in cash (total direct) compensation. We also find that both the median share holdings and stock‐based pay‐performance sensitivity are lower for UK CEOs when we compare our findings with the previous findings for US CEOs. Thus, our results suggest that corporate governance reports in the UK, such as the Greenbury Report (1995) that proposed CEO compensation be more closely linked to performance, have not been totally effective. Our findings also indicate that institutional ownership has a positive and significant influence on CEO pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants. Finally, we find that longer CEO tenure is associated with lower pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants suggesting the entrenchment effect of CEO tenure.     

Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.     

Aligning Incentives at Systemically Important Financial Institutions: A Proposal by the Squam Lake Group

To address the moral hazard problem that can motivate bank executives to take excessive risks and to fail to raise capital when needed, a group of 13 distinguished financial economists recommends that systemically important financial institutions be required to issue contingent convertible debt (CoCos) and to hold back a substantial share—as much as 20%—of the compensation of employees who can have a meaningful impact on the survival of the firm. This holdback should be forfeited if the firm's capital ratio falls below a specified threshold. The deferral period should be long enough—the authors suggest five years—to allow much of the uncertainty about managers' activities to be resolved before the bonds mature. Except for forfeiture, the payoff on the bonds should not depend on the firm's performance, nor should managers be permitted to hedge the risk of forfeiture. The threshold for forfeiture should be crossed well before a firm violates its regulatory capital requirements and well before its contingent convertible securities convert into equity. The Swiss Bank UBS has paid bonuses to its top 6,500 executives that have been structured in exactly this way. Management forfeits its deferred compensation if the bank's regulatory capital ratio falls below 7.5%, and its contingent convertible debt is set up to convert into equity if the bank's capital ratio falls below 5%.     

Capital Structure Swaps and Shareholder Wealth

We show how capital structure swaps can increase the wealth of a firm's long‐term shareholders when a firm's debt or equity is misvalued. We review the conventional rule that a firm should issue equity and use the proceeds to retire outstanding debt (an equity‐for‐debt swap) when equity is overvalued, or repurchase equity with proceeds of new debt (a debt‐for‐equity swap) when equity is undervalued. We also analyse the more complex case where a firm's debt and equity are both undervalued, showing the optimal swap may be to issue undervalued equity, contrary to the conventional rule.     

Earnings Manipulation and the Cost of Capital

The widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short‐term stock price performance. This paper examines the role of earnings management in affecting a firm's cost of capital. Using an agency model with multiple firms whose cash flows are correlated, we demonstrate that the extent of earnings manipulation varies across the business cycle. Depending on a firm's earnings profile, it can have stronger incentives to overstate its performance in good times or in bad times. Because of this dependence on the state of the economy, earnings manipulation can influence a firm's cost of capital despite the forces of diversification.     

Are banks happy when managers go long? The information content of managers’ vested option holdings for loan pricing

While traditional finance theory holds that managers with option-laden incentive contracts may favor equity at the expense of debt, a risk-averse manager may be more likely to retain vested in-the-money options if the manager has private information that the firm's risk-adjusted performance will be better. It follows that vested option holdings should be positively associated with credit quality. In support of this, we find that vested option holdings have a strong negative association with loan pricing, especially for informationally sensitive loans, and also predict higher cash flows and credit ratings, a greater distance to default, and lower equity volatility.     

Comparable firms and the precision of equity valuations

I investigate the relationship between the amount of information provided by a firm's comparables (i.e., firms in the same line of business as the firm being valued) and the precision of the firm's equity valuation. When investors have more information, previous studies argue that investors can make a more precise estimate of a firm's true equity value and this implies a lower (excess) stock return volatility around corporate events such as earnings announcements. I develop a simple model that shows a negative relationship between the amount of information provided by a firm's comparables and the firm's stock return volatility. Using alternative measures of information provided by comparables and different definitions of comparables, I consistently find a negative and significant relationship between these information measures and stock return volatility, ceteris paribus.