Price Stability in Economies with Habit Persistence

This paper shows that the divine‐coincidence does not hold in a sticky price model with external habit if a time‐varying tax rate on labor income is not implemented to fully eliminate the time‐varying distortions associated with external habit and monopoly power in goods market. The required labor income tax rate is inversely related to the risk‐free real interest rate and the markup in the goods market, but it is proportional to the degree of external habit. Under this circumstance, the optimal monetary policy commands a countercyclical interest rate, having a perfect negative correlation with tax rate in the sticky price model with external habit. If a time‐invariant tax is the only fiscal instrument, then the degree of external habit entails a gap between the private marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor and the social marginal rate of substitution, generating an endogenous trade‐off between the stabilization of welfare‐relevant output gap and inflation. Under this circumstance, price stability is not the optimal policy. The monetary policy authority should optimally try to undo the time‐varying distortions associated with external habit and monopoly power in goods market by deviating from price stability.     

Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model

Most central banks perceive a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade‐off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare‐relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of nontrivial real imperfections. We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare‐relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation–unemployment relation found in the data.     

The Central Banker as a Risk Manager: Estimating the Federal Reserve's Preferences under Greenspan

We derive a natural generalization of the Taylor rule that links changes in the interest rate to the balance of the risks implied by the dual objective of sustainable economic growth and price stability. This monetary policy rule reconciles economic models of expected utility maximization with the risk management approach to central banking. Within this framework, we formally test and reject the standard assumption of quadratic and symmetric preferences in inflation and output that underlies the derivation of the Taylor rule. Our results suggest that Fed policy decisions under Greenspan were better described in terms of the Fed weighing upside and downside risks to their objectives rather than simply responding to the conditional mean of inflation and of the output gap.     

Price‐Level Targeting and Stabilization Policy

We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study optimal monetary stabilization policy. Prices are fully flexible and money is essential for trade. Our main result is that if the central bank pursues a price‐level target, it can control inflation expectations and improve welfare by stabilizing short‐run shocks to the economy. The optimal policy involves smoothing nominal interest rates that effectively smooths consumption across states.     

Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to target?

In an economy with nominal rigidities in both an intermediate good sector and a finished good sector, and thus with a natural distinction between CPI and PPI inflation rates, a benevolent central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing the two measures of inflation, a final output gap and, unique to our model, a real marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector, so that optimal monetary policy is second-best. We discuss how to implement the optimal policy with minimal information requirement and evaluate the robustness of these simple rules when the central bank may not know the exact sources of shocks or nominal rigidities. A main finding is that a simple hybrid rule under which the short-term interest rate responds to CPI inflation and PPI inflation results in a welfare level close to the optimum, whereas policy rules that ignore PPI inflation or PPI sector shocks can result in significant welfare losses.     

On Targeting Frameworks And Optimal Monetary Policy

We show that speed limit policy, a monetary policy strategy that focuses on stabilizing inflation and the change in the output gap, consistently outperforms flexible inflation targeting and flexible price level targeting in empirical medium‐scale DSGE models under discretionary policymaking. In contrast to small‐scale New Keynesian models, this welfare ranking of the targeting frameworks is not overturned when inflation dynamics are mostly backward‐looking. Importantly, the performance of the speed limit policy shows less sensitivity to its parameterization than other frameworks that target the inflation rate or the price level.     

Flexible inflation targeting and financial stability: Is it enough to stabilize inflation and output?

We investigate empirically whether a central bank can promote financial stability by stabilizing inflation and output, and whether additional stabilization of asset prices and credit growth would enhance financial stability in particular. We employ an econometric model of the Norwegian economy to investigate the performance of simple interest rate rules that allow a response to asset prices and credit growth, in addition to inflation and output. We find that output stabilization tends to improve financial stability. Additional stabilization of house prices, equity prices and/or credit growth enhances stability in both inflation and output, but has mixed effects on financial stability. In general, financial stability as measured by e.g., asset price volatility improves, while financial stability measured by indicators that depend directly on interest rates deteriorates, mainly because of higher interest rate volatility owing to a more active monetary policy.     

Monetary Policy Estimation in Real Time: Forward‐Looking Taylor Rules without Forward‐Looking Data

I propose a methodology for estimating forward‐looking Taylor rules in real time when forward‐looking real‐time central bank data are unavailable. The methodology consists of choosing appropriate models to closely replicate U.S. Greenbook forecasts and then applying these models to Canada, Germany, and the U.K. The results show that German and U.S. Taylor rules are characterized by inflation coefficients increasing with the forecast horizon and a positive output gap response. The U.K. and Canada interest rate reaction functions achieve maximum inflation response at middle‐term horizons of about 1/2 years and the output gap coefficient is insignificant.     

股票价格具有货币政策指示器功能吗——来自中国1997～2006年的经验证据

本文运用VAR模型考察了以股票价格为代表的金融资产价格对我国通货膨胀的影响。实证分析表明,我国股票价格的变动对产出缺口存在一定的正向影响,但是这种影响不太稳定,说明我国股票价格通过总需求渠道对未来通货膨胀产生的影响比较微弱。同时,我国股票价格的变动能引起未来CPI和WPI的同向变化,尤其与CPI的关系非常稳定,说明股票价格在一定程度上包含了我国未来通货膨胀的信息。因此,我国股票价格可以作为一个帮助判断未来经济走势和通货膨胀变动趋势的货币政策指示器。     

Monetary Policy and the Asset Risk‐Taking Channel

How important is the risk‐taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem that distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these distortions become more important and excessive risk taking increases, lowering the efficiency of investment. We show theoretically that this novel transmission channel generates a new monetary policy trade‐off between inflation and real interest rate stabilization, whereby the central bank may prefer to tolerate greater inflation volatility in order to lower excessive risk taking.     

Monetary policy when potential output is uncertain: Understanding the growth gamble of the 1990s

The Fed kept interest rates low and essentially unchanged during the late 1990s despite a booming economy and record-low unemployment. These interest rates were accommodative by historical standards. Nonetheless, inflation remained low. How did the Fed succeed in sustaining rapid economic growth without fueling inflation and inflationary expectations? In retrospect, it is evident that the productive capacity of the economy increased. Yet as events unfolded, there was uncertainty about the expansion of the capacity of the economy and therefore about the sustainability of the Fed's policy.This paper provides an explanation for the success of the Fed in accommodating growth with stable inflation in the late 1990s. It shows that if the central bank is committed to reverse policy errors it makes because of unwarranted optimism, inflation can remain in check even if the central bank keeps interest rates low because of this optimism. In particular, a price level target—which is a simple way to model a commitment to offset errors—can serve to anchor inflation even if the public does not share the central bank's optimism about shifts in potential output. The paper shows that price level targeting is superior to inflation targeting in a wide range of situations. The paper also provides econometric evidence that, in contrast to earlier periods, the Fed has recently put substantial weight on the price level in setting interest rates. Moreover, it shows that CPI announcement surprises lead to reversion in the price level. Finally, it provides textual evidence that Alan Greenspan puts relatively more weight on the price level than inflation.     

Monetary Policy Response to Oil Price Shocks

How should monetary authorities react to an oil price shock? This paper shows that in a noncompetitive economy, policies that perfectly stabilize prices entail large welfare costs, hence explaining the reluctance of policymakers to enforce them. The policy trade‐off is nontrivial because oil (energy) is an input to both production and consumption. As welfare‐maximizing policies are hard to implement and communicate, I derive a simple interest rate rule that depends only on observables but mimics the optimal plan in all dimensions. The optimal rule is hard on core inflation but accommodates oil price changes.     

Regulation and the Neo-Wicksellian Approach to Monetary Policy

Laubach and Williams (2003) employ a Kalman filter approach to jointly estimate the neutral real federal funds rate and trend output growth using an IS relationship and an output-gap-based inflation equation. They find a positive link between these two variables, but also much error surrounding neutral real rate estimates. We modify their approach by including variables for regulations on deposit interest rates and on wages and prices. These variables are statistically significant and notably affect estimates of two policy-relevant coefficients: the sensitivity of output to the real interest rate and that of inflation to the output gap.     

A quantitative exploration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation

Under a conventional policy rule, a central bank adjusts its policy rate linearly according to the gap between inflation and its target, and the gap between output and its potential. Under “the opportunistic approach to disinflation” a central bank controls inflation aggressively when inflation is far from its target, but concentrates more on output stabilization when inflation is close to its target, allowing supply shocks and unforeseen fluctuations in aggregate demand to move inflation within a certain band. We use stochastic simulations of a small-scale rational expectations model to contrast the behavior of output and inflation under opportunistic and linear rules.     

On the optimal monetary policy response to noisy indicators

We describe a behavior of a central bank when its measures of current inflation and output are subject to measurement errors, in a framework of optimizing models with nominal price stickiness. In our model, a central bank sets the interest rate equal to its current estimate of the so-called Wicksellian natural rate of interest. This is shown to imply that the interest rate responds to the central bank's estimates of both current inflation and output gap, as advocated by Taylor (1993). It is also shown that the noise contained in the indicators justifies a degree of policy cautiousness. A reduced-form representation of optimal policy should exhibit interest-rate smoothing, which is often found in the empirical literature on monetary policy reaction functions.     

Monetary Policy and the Lost Decade: Lessons from Japan

I investigate how monetary policy can avoid a deflationary slump when policy rates are near zero by studying interest rate policy during Japan's “Lost Decade.” Estimation results suggest that the Bank of Japan's interest rate policy fits a conventional reaction function with an inflation target near 1%. The disapointing economic performance thus seems primarily due to adverse economic shocks rather than extraordinary policy errors. Also, counterfactual policy simulations suggest that simply raising the inflation target would not have substantially improved performance. However, price‐level targeting or combining a higher inflation target with an aggressive output response would have achieved superior stabilization results.     

全球化、资产价格变动与中国货币政策反应——基于泰勒规则的扩展研究

在经济全球化、虚拟化的背景下对泰勒规则进行了扩展研究,分析了利率与汇率、利率与资产价格的相关影响机制;并采用静态模型和基于预期的动态模型对名义利率与通货膨胀水平、产出缺口、汇率、股票价格缺口以及房地产价格缺口之间的关系进行了检验。结果显示,考虑预期因素的动态模型能够达到稳定通货膨胀的作用,短期名义利率对于汇率和资产价格起到了符合经济意义的稳定作用。     

Interest‐Rate Pegs in New Keynesian Models

The conventional policy perspective is that lowering the interest rate increases output and inflation in the short run, while maintaining inflation at a higher level requires a higher interest rate in the long run. In contrast, it has been argued that a Neo‐Fisherian policy of setting an interest‐rate peg at a fixed higher level will increase the inflation rate. We show that adaptive learning argues against the Neo‐Fisherian approach. Pegging the interest rate at a higher level will induce instability and most likely lead to falling inflation and output over time. Eventually, this would precipitate a change of policy.     

How Do Nominal and Real Rigidities Interact? A Tale of the Second Best

This paper analyzes the importance of real wage rigidities, in particular through their interaction with price stickiness, in a New Keynesian model. Real wage rigidities result from a combination of staggered wage setting and partial indexation of nonreset wages to past inflation. Blanchard and Galí (2007) show real rigidities to introduce a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and the welfare‐relevant output gap. The present paper complements their findings by showing that the welfare costs of real rigidities can be substantial compared to nominal frictions. In a typical “tale of the second best,” we also show that in the presence of real wage rigidities, higher price stickiness can be welfare enhancing.     

The Advantage of Flexible Targeting Rules

This paper investigates the consequences of debt stabilization for inflation targeting. If the fiscal authority holds constant the real value of debt at maturity under strict inflation targeting, the equilibrium dynamics are indeterminate for a wide range of parameters and steady‐state fiscal stances. “Flexible” targeting rules that include a concern for stabilization of the output gap can restore determinacy of the equilibrium. Flexible inflation targeting appears to be more robust than flexible debt targeting to alternative parameterizations. The fiscal authority can prevent indeterminacy under strict targeting rules by committing to hold constant debt net of interest rate spending.