How Much Is Too Much: Are Merger Premiums Too High?

Is it too much to pay target firm shareholders a 50% premium on top of market price? Or is it too much to pay a 100% premium when pursuing mergers and acquisitions? How much is too much? In this paper, we examine how the extent of merger premiums paid impacts both the long‐run and announcement period stock returns of acquiring firms. We find no evidence that acquirers paying high premiums underperform those paying relatively low premiums in three years following mergers, and the result is robust after controlling for a variety of firm and deal characteristics. Short term cumulative abnormal returns are moreover positively correlated to the level of the premium paid by acquirers. Our evidence therefore suggests that high merger premiums paid are unlikely to be responsible for acquirers' long‐run post merger underperformance.     

Long‐term Performance of Greek IPOs

We analyse the long‐run performance of 254 Greek IPOs that were listed during the period 1994–2002, computing buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over 36 months of secondary market performance. The empirical results differ from international evidence and reveal long‐term overperformance that continues for a substantial interval after listing. Measuring these returns in calendar time, we find statistical significance with several of the benchmarks employed. We also find that long‐term overperformance is a feature of the mass of IPOs conducted during a pronounced IPO wave. Cross‐sectional regressions of long‐run performance disclose several significant factors. The study demonstrates that although Greek IPOs overperform the market for a longer period, underperformance eventually emerges, in line with much international evidence. Our interpretation is that the persistence of overperformance over a significant interval is due to excessive supply of issues during the ‘hot IPO period’. Results associated with pricing during the ‘hot IPO period’ indicate positive short‐ (1‐year), medium‐ (2‐year) and negative long‐term (3‐year) performance.     

Valuation Effects of Short Sale Constraints: the Case of Corporate Takeovers

We examine the relation between the degree of short sale constraints for acquiring firms' equity and post takeover stock performance. We find that negative long‐run abnormal returns appear to decline (in economic and statistical terms) as the extent and persistence of institutional block‐holder ownership increase, after accounting for the size, book‐to‐market and method of payment effects. In the spirit of Miller (1977) , such evidence implies that the degree of short sale constraints serves as an important determinant of acquiring firms' short‐run overpricing. It appears that the presence of concentrated institutional presence mitigates and in most cases eliminates, through effective arbitrage, any short‐run overpricing that may be responsible for the long‐run underperformance of acquirers, preserving in this way efficiency in the takeover markets.     

Underwriter Quality and Long‐Run IPO Performance

We analyze the relationship between the quality of underwriters and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in light of underwriter marketing, certification and screening, and information production. We find that higher underwriter quality (measured by the number of managing underwriters, underwriter reputation, and absolute price adjustment) predicts better long‐run performance, even when returns are value weighted. We compare underwriter quality measures and find that the effects of the number of managing underwriters and underwriter reputation are mutually complementary and are especially strong among IPOs with high uncertainty, while absolute price adjustment, which is more likely to be associated with information production than marketing or certification/screening, loses significance. Our findings are consistent with the marketing and certification and screening roles of investment banks but lend little support for the information production role of underwriters.     

Catastrophic Losses and Insurer Profitability: Evidence From 9/11

We examine the effects of 9/11 on the insurance industry, hypothesizing a short‐run claim effect, resulting from insufficient premium ex ante for catastrophic losses, and a long‐run growth effect, resulting from ex post insurance supply reductions and risk updating. Following Yoon and Starks (1995) we use short‐ and long‐run abnormal forecast revisions to measure both effects, analyzing them as a function of firm‐specific characteristics. We find that firm type, loss estimates, reinsurance use, and tax position are important determinants of the short‐run position. Firm type, loss estimates, financial strength, underwriting risk, and reinsurance are key determinants of the firm's long‐run position.     

Long‐Run Stockholder Consumption Risk and Asset Returns

We provide new evidence on the success of long‐run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders. Exploiting microlevel household consumption data, we show that long‐run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross‐sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or nonstockholder consumption risk, and implies more plausible risk aversion estimates. We find that risk aversion around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross‐section of stocks.     

Reversal and momentum patterns in weekly stock returns: European evidence

We analyze short‐term reversal and medium‐term momentum patterns in weekly stock returns in Europe. Focusing on raw and stock‐specific returns, our empirical results show for both return specifications (a) a negative relation between weekly past returns and future returns in the short run and (b) a positive relation in the medium run. However, returns from reversal and momentum strategies based on stock‐specific returns are less volatile. In further analyses, we find short‐term reversal and medium‐term momentum patterns to be connected to stock characteristics. Looking at the potential causes of these effects, our results do not support the idea that short‐term reversal in weekly stock returns is due to an over‐ or underreaction to firm‐specific news nor that it is mainly driven by illiquidity. Medium‐term momentum in weekly stock returns, on the other hand, can be connected to behavioral biases. Our concluding tests confirm that our findings are robust among industries, in subperiods, for the January effect and in varying market states. Finally, while medium‐term momentum strategies remain profitable after accounting for transaction costs, short‐term reversal strategies can be mainly explained by transaction costs due to their high turnover.     

The time‐varying performance of UK analyst recommendation revisions: Do market conditions matter?

This study examines the time‐varying performance of investment strategies following analyst recommendation revisions in the UK stock market, with specific emphasis on the impact of changing market conditions. We find a negative relationship between the recommendation performance and market conditions as measured in terms of past market return and market volatility. In particular, the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio generates significantly positive (negative) net abnormal returns in bad market conditions (e.g., the dot‐com bubble burst in 2000 and the credit crisis in 2007), but not in other periods of time. Moreover, our non‐temporal threshold regression analysis shows that the reported negative relationship disappears when market conditions become better, i.e., when the past market return (market volatility) is higher (lower) than a certain level, indicating the importance of taking non‐linearity into account in the long sample period as examined in this study. Our time‐series bootstrap simulations further confirm that the superior recommendation performance in bad market conditions is not due to random chance; analysts have certain skills in making valuable up/downward revisions in bad markets.     

STOCK PRICES AND INFLATION

Numerous empirical studies establish that inflation has a negative short‐run effect on stock returns but few studies report a positive, long‐run Fisher effect for stock returns. Using stock price and goods price data from six industrial countries, we show that long‐run Fisher elasticities of stock prices with respect to goods prices exceed unity and range from 1.04 to 1.65, which tends to support the Fisher effect. We also find that the time path of the response of stock prices to a shock in goods prices exhibits an initial negative response, which turns positive over longer horizons. These results help reconcile previous short‐run and long‐run empirical evidence on stock returns and inflation. Also, they reveal that stock prices have a long memory with respect to inflation shocks, such that investors should expect stocks to be a good inflation hedge over a long holding period. JEL Classification: G12     

Evidence on the Trade-Off between Risk and Return for IPO and SEO Firms

Do the low long‐run average returns of equity issuers reflect underperformance due to mispricing or the risk characteristics of the issuing firms? We shed new light on this question by examining how institutional lenders price loans of equity issuing firms. Accounting for standard risk factors, we find that equity issuing firms' expected debt return is equivalent to the expected debt return of nonissuing firms, implying that institutional lenders perceive equity issuers to be as risky as similar nonissuing firms. In general, institutional lenders perceive small and high book‐to‐market borrowers as systematically riskier than larger borrowers with low book‐to‐market ratios, consistent with the asset pricing approach in Fama and French (1993) . Finally, we find that firms' expected debt returns decline after equity offerings, consistent with recent theoretical arguments suggesting that firm risk should decline following an equity offering. Overall, our analysis provides novel evidence consistent with risk‐based explanations for the observed equity returns following IPOs and SEOs.     

Corporate Sell‐offs in the UK: Use of Proceeds,Financial Distress and Long‐run Impact on Shareholder Wealth

This study examines the long‐run return performance following UK corporate sell‐off announcements. We observe significant negative abnormal returns up to five years subsequent to sell‐off announcements. Our finding is robust to various specifications, irrespective of the intended use of proceeds. We also find a significantly positive association between long‐run abnormal returns and the magnitude of cash proceeds for sellers reducing corporate debt as well as for sellers with deeper financial distress or higher growth prospects. Overall, we find that UK corporate sell‐offs are associated with declines in subsequent shareholder wealth.     

CEO Overconfidence and Long‐Term Performance Following R&D Increases

We examine the relation between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) overconfidence and significant increases in research and development (R&D) expenditures. Although prior studies reveal a significantly positive market reaction to increases in R&D expenditures in both the long and short run, we find that long‐run stock performance is positive only for firms whose CEOs are not overconfident. Our findings, which may be attributable to overinvestment and the overestimation of future cash flows, imply that R&D resulting from overconfident behavior does not provide any value to firms.     

The Cost of Short‐Selling Liquid Securities

Standard models of liquidity argue that the higher price for a liquid security reflects the future benefits that long investors expect to receive. We show that short‐sellers can also pay a net liquidity premium if their cost to borrow the security is higher than the price premium they collect from selling it. We provide a model‐free decomposition of the price premium for liquid securities into the net premiums paid by both long investors and short‐sellers. Empirically, we find that short‐sellers were responsible for a substantial fraction of the liquidity premium for on‐the‐run Treasuries from November 1995 through July 2009.     

R2: Does it Matter for Firm Valuation?

A considerable amount of research has been devoted to why R² differs across firms or markets, but little attention has been paid to the consequences of this difference. We fill this gap by investigating how differing R² affects investors’ assessment of firm value. Using a sample of 90,111 firm‐year observations from 1970 to 2004, we find that higher R² leads to higher firm valuation and that, on average, high‐R² firms experience significant underperformance in the long run. These results suggest that high‐R² firms tend to be overpriced.     

Long‐Run Risk and Its Implications for the Equity Premium Puzzle: New Evidence from a Multivariate Framework

This paper investigates the empirical evidence of long‐run risk and its implications for the equity premium puzzle. We find that the long‐run risk model is generally weakly identified and that standard inferences tend to underestimate the uncertainty of long‐run risk. We extend the LM‐type test of Ma and Nelson (2010) that remains valid under weak identification to the bivariate VARMA‐GARCH model of consumption and dividend growth. The results cast doubt on the validity of long‐run risk as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle. We also evaluate the approach of Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2007a), which extracts long‐run risk by regressing consumption growth and its volatility on predictive variables. The results using the Bonferroni Q‐test of Campbell and Yogo (2006) suggest that consumption and dividend growth are generally unpredictable by the price‐dividend ratio and risk‐free rate. This casts doubt on the validity of the BKY approach.     

Europe's Second Markets for Small Companies

European stock exchanges have repeatedly opened second markets to list small companies. We explain the motivation for the creation of these second markets, and the reasons why many of them have failed. We find that the average long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) on second markets is dramatically worse than for main market IPOs. However, the second markets have provided firms with the opportunity to raise funds at the IPO and in follow‐on offerings. The relative success of London's AIM, which is an exchange‐regulated market with minimal regulations, has led other European stock exchanges to establish similar non‐EU regulated second markets. Most of the IPOs on these exchange‐regulated markets are offered exclusively to institutional investors, and are equivalent to private placements. These IPOs, which frequently raise only a few million euros, rarely develop liquid trading.     

Law,Stock Markets,and Innovation

We study a broad sample of firms across 32 countries and find that strong shareholder protections and better access to stock market financing lead to substantially higher long‐run rates of R&D investment, particularly in small firms, but are unimportant for fixed capital investment. Credit market development has a modest impact on fixed investment but no impact on R&D. These findings connect law and stock markets with innovative activities key to economic growth, and show that legal rules and financial developments affecting the availability of external equity financing are particularly important for risky, intangible investments not easily financed with debt.     

Sales of Secondary Shares in SEOs: A Comparison across Top Managers,Other Insiders,and Outsiders

This paper investigates the information content of registered insider sales in the Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) process from 1997 to 2009. We find that initial market reactions and long‐run post‐issue stock performance are negatively related to C‐level executive insider sales, but unrelated to participation by nonexecutive insiders. We also find significantly lower post‐issue abnormal earnings surprises for SEOs with C‐level executive sales. Overall, the findings are consistent with the predictions of asymmetric information and agency theories.     

Fundamental Investors Reduce the Distraction on Management from Random Market “Noise”: Evidence from France

The authors find that financial markets have real effects on corporate decisions but that, unfortunately, some temporary market enthusiasm, unrelated to firm intrinsic value, may cause management to make value‐destroying decisions as the result of random and uninformed stock market volatility. In particular, they are prone to making bad decisions after stock market overreactions to “surprise” earnings announcements. This study shows a positive effect of greater long‐term ownership on French listed firms. Fundamental investor ownership reduces the degree of market mispricing which serves long‐run shareholder value maximization. A fundamental investor is one that, on average, hold his shares for at least two years, is in the top quartile of a firm ownership, and has an active allocation strategy. They are about 8% of all investors. Compared to non‐fundamental investors, fundamental investors hold their positions on average three times longer and have positions 1.5 times larger. Fundamental investors are more present in firms which have more liquid stocks, which pay dividends, and which are relatively poorer performers and have relatively lower market‐to‐book than their industry peers.