Do Joint Audits Improve or Impair Audit Quality?

Conventional wisdom holds that joint audits would improve audit quality by enhancing audit evidence precision because “Two heads are better than one.” Our paper challenges this wisdom. We show that joint audits by one big firm and one small firm may impair audit quality, because, in that situation, joint audits induce a free‐riding problem between audit firms and reduce audit evidence precision. We further derive a set of empirically testable predictions comparing audit evidence precision and audit fees under joint and single audits. This paper, the first theoretical study of joint audits, contributes to a better understanding of the economic consequences of joint audits on audit quality.     

How Do Various Forms of Auditor Rotation Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from China

The Enron/Arthur Andersen scandal has raised concerns internationally about auditor independence, audit quality, and the need for regulatory action such as mandatory auditor rotation. China's unique institutional features provide a setting in which we can compare comprehensively the various forms of auditor rotation at different levels (partner vs. firm) and in different settings (voluntary vs. mandatory). In addition, institutional conditions vary dramatically across China, which provides us with an opportunity to test whether the development of market and legal institutions affects the impact of rotation on audit quality. We expect that auditors are less (more) constrained by market forces and less (more) self-disciplined to maintain audit quality in regions with less (more) developed market and legal institutions. Therefore, mandatory rotation may play a more (less) important role in less (more) developed regions. Using auditors' propensity to issue a modified audit opinion (MAO) as a proxy for audit quality, we find that firms with mandatory audit partner rotations are associated with a significantly higher likelihood of an MAO than are no-rotation firms. However, this effect is restricted to firms located in less developed regions. We find similar evidence for voluntary audit firm rotation although the significance level is much weaker than for mandatory partner rotation. Other forms of auditor rotations (i.e., mandatory audit firm rotation and voluntary audit partner rotation), have no effect on MAOs.     

Joint Audits: Does the Allocation of Audit Work Affect Audit Quality and Audit Fees?

Audit quality and cost consequences of joint audits have been continually discussed, especially since the publication of the European Commission’s Green Paper in 2010. We provide new empirical evidence for the French audit market. We show that a more balanced audit work allocation between the engaged audit firms reduces the audit quality and enhances the audit fees as compared to an unbalanced work allocation. We measure the quality effects following the concept of abnormal accruals and the concept of cosmetic earnings management. As unbalanced joint audits have parallels to single audits, our results have interest to those debating the benefits and costs of joint audits as compared to single audits.     

Does Economic Analysis Improve the Quality of Foreign Assistance?

The World Bank undertakes an annual expenditure of around $60million on country-specific economic analysis and advice forits member developing countries. What is the impact of thiseconomic and sector work on the quality of World Bank lending?It would be useful to know whether past analytical work hasgenerated measurable economic benefits that would justify itscontinued provision in an environment of increasingly scarceresources. This article sets out an idealized model of decisionmaking inwhich a country manager makes a broad allocation of resourcesbetween lending services and economic and sector work. Giventhat decision, the task manager for each project makes project-specificdecisions with respect to the allocation of resources betweenpreparation and supervision. The analysis indicates that economicand sector work has a significant positive impact on the qualityof World Bank loans. The results provide clear evidence of underinvestmentin economic and sector work. And the analysis shows that resourcescould be switched from preparation and supervision to economicand sector work to the benefit of both the quality of programsand level of disbursements.     

Does International Accounting Network Membership Affect Audit Fees and Audit Quality? Evidence From China

Regulators suggest that small audit firms join international accounting networks to reduce their resource constraints in serving large clients and providing high-quality service. Bills, Cunningham, and Myers (2016) investigate the issue in the United States and find that both audit fees and quality are higher for members of international accounting networks (i.e., member audit firms). We investigate the effects of network membership on audit fees and quality in China, a relatively weaker institutional environment than the United States. Using data of Chinese listed companies audited by non-Big N audit firms from 2001 to 2010, we find that member audit firms charge 3.9% higher fees than nonmember audit firms, much lower than the 30% fee premiums charged by U.S. member audit firms. We do not find consistent evidence that audit quality is higher for member audit firms. Overall, our results demonstrate that China's weak institutional environment may overwhelm the quality control brought by international accounting networks and that it may weaken or even offset the benefits of audit firms' participation in these networks, resulting in smaller or even no effects of membership on audit fees and quality.     

Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?

Algorithmic trading (AT) has increased sharply over the past decade. Does it improve market quality, and should it be encouraged? We provide the first analysis of this question. The New York Stock Exchange automated quote dissemination in 2003, and we use this change in market structure that increases AT as an exogenous instrument to measure the causal effect of AT on liquidity. For large stocks in particular, AT narrows spreads, reduces adverse selection, and reduces trade‐related price discovery. The findings indicate that AT improves liquidity and enhances the informativeness of quotes.     

Does Volatility Improve UK Earnings Forecasts?

Abstract:  We investigate the relation between UK accounting earnings volatility and the level of future earnings using a unique sample comprising some 10,480 firm-year observations for 1,481 non-financial firms over the 1985–2003 period. The findings confirm the in-sample result of an inverse volatility-earnings relation only for the 1998–2003 sub-period and for the most profitable firms. The out-of-sample forecast accuracy for the top earnings quintile improves when volatility is added as a regressor to a model including only lagged earnings. The findings are consistent with the over-investment hypothesis and the view that the earnings of the most volatile firms tend to mean revert more rapidly.     

How Does Information Quality Affect Stock Returns?

Using a simple dynamic asset pricing model, this paper investigates the relationship between the precision of public information about economic growth and stock market returns. After fully characterizing expected returns and conditional volatility, I show that (i) higher precision of signals tends to increase the risk premium, (ii) when signals are imprecise the equity premium is bounded above independently of investors' risk aversion, (iii) return volatility is U-shaped with respect to investors' risk aversion, and (iv) the relationship between conditional expected returns and conditional variance is ambiguous.     

Do PCAOB Inspections Improve the Quality of Internal Control Audits?

We investigate whether Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections affect the quality of internal control audits. Our research design improves on prior studies by exploiting both cross‐sectional and time‐series variation in the content of PCAOB inspection reports, while also controlling for audit firm and year fixed effects, effectively achieving a difference‐in‐differences research design. We find that when PCAOB inspectors report higher rates of deficiencies in internal control audits, auditors respond by increasing the issuance of adverse internal control opinions. We also find that auditors issue more adverse internal control opinions to clients with concurrent misstatements, who thus genuinely warrant adverse opinions. We further find that higher inspection deficiency rates lead to higher audit fees, consistent with PCAOB inspections prompting auditors to undertake costly remediation efforts. Taken together, our results are consistent with the PCAOB inspections improving the quality of internal control audits by prompting auditors to remediate deficiencies in their audits of internal controls.     

Does Auditor Reputation Matter? The Case of KPMG Germany and ComROAD AG

We study the stock and audit market effects associated with a widely publicized accounting scandal involving a public company (ComROAD AG) and a large, reputable audit firm (KPMG) in a country (Germany) that has long provided auditors with substantial protection from shareholder legal liability. We use this event to study whether an auditor's reputation helps to ensure audit quality, a rationale for which recent literature and events provide scant support. Given the absence of a strong insurance rationale for audit quality, Germany permits a relatively clean test of whether auditor reputation matters. We find that KPMG's clients sustain negative abnormal returns of 3% at events pertaining to ComROAD, and that these returns are more negative for companies that are likely to have higher demands for audit quality. We also find an increase in the number of clients that drop KPMG in the year of the ComROAD scandal (mostly smaller, recently public companies that are similar to ComROAD). Overall, our results provide support for the reputation rationale for audit quality.     

Does Participation Improve Performance? Establishing Causality with Subjective Data

Data from 121 diverse rural water projects provide strong statisticalfindings that increasing beneficiary participation directlycauses better project outcomes. Three possible econometric objectionsto these findings are addressed and answered. The subjectivenature of the data does not preclude valid, cardinal measuresof participation appropriate for statistical analysis. "Haloeffects"—changes in the measurement of one variable becauseof the observed state of another variable—do not seemto induce a strong upward bias in the measurement of participationor project performance. Reverse causation is unlikely: estimationusing instrumental variables, data on project timing, and documentationof case studies support the cause-effect relation between participationand better project performance.     

Does the Quality of Financial Advice Affect Prices?

Using a large data sample of 58,562 new municipal issues covering the period from 1984 to 2002, we examine whether the quality of advice provided by a financial advisor affects new issue interest costs. We find that higher‐quality financial advisors are associated with statistically significant decreases in new issue yields. The effect of advisor quality on yields is more pronounced for revenue, negotiated, and opaque bond issues than for general obligation and competitively sold issues. However, issuers of revenue or negotiated bonds are more likely to choose a low‐quality advisor.     

Does ESG Certification Improve Price Efficiency in the Chinese Stock Market?

Asia-Pacific Financial Markets - This paper investigates the impact of ESG certification on the pricing efficiency in Chinese listed firms and examines the internal mechanism of this impact....     

Is an Auditor's Propensity to Issue Going Concern Opinions a Valid Measure of Audit Quality?

A number of previous studies use auditor propensity to issue a going concern opinion (GCO) as a proxy of audit quality when examining a sample of financially distressed firms. This study examines whether audit quality (measured by discretionary accruals) influences the probability of financially distressed firms receiving GCOs using a non‐specific sample of 2937 firm‐year observations from Australia over the period 2011–2015. The study first investigates the association between financially distressed firms and the issuance of GCOs. This association is then re‐tested after separating the total sample into low and high audit quality subsamples. The results indicate that financially distressed firms are more likely to receive GCOs, confirming the application of ASA 570 Going Concern. However, financially distressed firms that receive GCOs from their auditors are limited to firms that have higher‐quality audits.     

Before an Analyst Becomes an Analyst: Does Industry Experience Matter?

Using hand‐collected biographical information on financial analysts from 1983 to 2011, we find that analysts making forecasts on firms in industries related to their preanalyst experience have better forecast accuracy, evoke stronger market reactions to earning revisions, and are more likely to be named Institutional Investor all‐stars. Plausibly exogenous losses of analysts with related industry experience have real financial market implications—changes in firms’ information asymmetry and price reactions are significantly larger than those of other analysts. Overall, industry expertise acquired from preanalyst work experience is valuable to analysts, consistent with the emphasis placed on their industry knowledge by institutional investors.     

Does Corporate Lending by Banks and Finance Companies Differ? Evidence on Specialization in Private Debt Contracting

This paper establishes empirically the existence of specialization in private-market corporate lending, adding a new dimension to the public versus private debt distinctions now common in the literature. Comparing corporate loans made by banks and by finance companies, we find that the two types of intermediaries are equally likely to finance information-problematic firms. However, finance companies tend to serve observably riskier borrowers, particularly more leveraged borrowers. Evidence supports both regulatory and reputation-based explanations for this specialization. In passing, we shed light on various theories of debt contracting and intermediation and present facts about finance companies.     

Does Regulation Fair Disclosure Reduce the Information Quality of Managerial Guidance?

We examine an effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) on voluntary public managerial guidance information quality. Results suggest that the information quality of public guidance has not deteriorated after Reg FD. We also examine separately the effect of Reg FD on information efficiency before earnings releases for firms that provide public managerial guidance and those that do not. We find that when we control for the impact of Reg FD on firm characteristics, information efficiency deteriorates for firms that do not provide public guidance and for new guiders, while it does not change for firms that continue issuing public guidance after Reg FD.     

Political Uncertainty and Bank Loan Contracts: Does Government Quality Matter?

Journal of Financial Services Research - We investigate the relation between political uncertainty and bank loan spreads using a sample of loan contracts for the G20 firms during the period from...     

Can Information Transparency Improve Earnings Quality Attributes? Evidence from an Enhanced Disclosure Regime in Taiwan

Investors demand timely and accurate corporate disclosures in order to comprehend the governance and performance of a firm; they also rely on quality earnings information to assess the intrinsic value of a company. This study links the two using a Taiwan sample because the government of Taiwan has just performed a market-wide corporate-transparency rating. We find significant improvement on four accounting-based earnings-quality attributes, including accrual quality, earnings persistence, predictability, and smoothness. Further, there is a statistically reliable association between the level of information transparency and each of these earnings attributes, implying that a disclosure mechanism design can enhance management accountability in financial reporting.