治理机制、特殊治理水平与财务报告的稳健性

与以往的研究不同,我们将公司治理因素分成管理者可控的和不可控的两个部分,然后研究管理者可控部分即公司特殊治理水平对财务报告稳健性产生的影响。在整合了各种无条件公司治理机制的基础上,控制了其中管理者不可控的部分后得到了公司特殊治理变量。通过对我国A股上市公司2002—2006年的数据的分组检验和坏消息增量反应系数的显著性检验,发现特殊治理水平越高的公司其财务报告的稳健性水平也越高。     

Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism

Using a sample of over 5,000 debt issues, I test whether firms with more extensive use of covenants in their public debt contracts exhibit timelier recognition of economic losses in accounting earnings. Covenants govern the transfer of decision-making and control rights from shareholders to bondholders when a company approaches financial distress and thereby limit managers' abilities to expropriate bondholder wealth. Covenants are expected to constrain managerial opportunism, however, only if the accounting system recognizes economic losses in earnings in a timely fashion. Thus, the demand for timely loss recognition should increase with a contract's reliance on covenants. Consistent with this conjecture, I find evidence that reliance on covenants in public debt contracts is positively associated with the degree of timely loss recognition. I also find evidence that the presence of prior private debt mitigates this relationship.     

公司治理与会计稳健性——基于上市公司的实证研究

会计稳健性是财务报告的一个重要特征和惯例，已成为会计盈余的重要质量特征之一。本文运用basu（1997）模型，将会计稳健性定义为会计报告对坏消息的确认比好消息更及时，探讨了有关公司治理的几个重要因素对会计稳健性的影响。研究发现：在影响会计稳健性的治理因素中，银行借款比例与会计稳健性正相关，国家股比例与会计稳健性负相关，在国家股比例低的分组，会计稳健性较高。发行有B股的企业，会计稳健性与只有A股的企业没有显著差异。研究表明，会计稳健性作为会计报告质量的一种量度，随着会计制度和准则的国际接轨与完善，证券市场监管的加强，取得了一定成效，但是会计准则和会计制度不能保证会计报告的质量，尚需改革国内相关的制度背景，如公司治理、法律实施环境等。     

Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism

In this paper we examine the effect of managerial ownership on financial reporting conservatism. Separation of ownership and control gives rise to agency problems between managers and shareholders. Financial reporting conservatism is one potential mechanism to address these agency problems. We hypothesize that, as managerial ownership declines, the severity of agency problem increases, increasing the demand for conservatism. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that conservatism as measured by the asymmetric timeliness of earnings declines with managerial ownership. The negative association between managerial ownership and asymmetric timeliness of earnings is robust to various controls, in particular, for the investment opportunity set. We thus provide evidence of a demand for conservatism from the firm's shareholders.     

Managerial Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism

Overconfident managers overestimate future returns from their firms’ investments. Thus, we predict that overconfident managers will tend to delay loss recognition and generally use less conservative accounting. Furthermore, we test whether external monitoring helps to mitigate this effect. Using measures of both conditional and unconditional conservatism respectively, we find robust evidence of a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism. We further find that external monitoring does not appear to mitigate this effect. Our findings add to the growing literature on overconfidence and complement the findings by Schrand and Zechman [2011] that overconfidence affects financial reporting behavior.     

Accounting Conservatism and the Relation Between Returns and Accounting Data

This study adds change in cash investments and change in lagged operating assets to the regression of returns on earnings levels and earnings changes examined in Easton and Harris (1991). We argue that a positive coefficient on change in cash investments captures conservatism associated with investments in positive net present value projects the effects of which will not flow into the accounting statements until the expected future benefits are realized. A positive coefficient on change in lagged operating assets implies accounting conservatism associated with the application of accounting rules to operating assets in place. Our empirical results are, in general, consistent with these arguments. We examine differences in conservatism across samples with different market to book ratios, we compare firms with non-negative returns with firms with negative returns, we compare firms reporting losses with firms reporting profits, and we examine firms in different industries, firms with different levels of research and development expenditure, different amounts of depreciation, different amounts of advertising expense, and firms that adopt LIFO inventory valuation compared with those that adopt an alternative to LIFO.JEL Classification: M41     

Unexpected Accruals and Conditional Accounting Conservatism

Abstract:  This paper examines the impact of management discretion over accruals on conditional accounting conservatism, defined as the tendency of accountants to recognize bad news on a timelier basis than good news. Prior research suggests that conditional accounting conservatism reflected in earnings is mainly due to the accrual component of earnings, not the cash flow component of earnings. After decomposing total accruals into expected and unexpected accruals, I find that (1) conditional accounting conservatism reflected in accruals is mainly due to unexpected accruals; (2) the negative association between unconditional and conditional accounting conservatism is mainly attributable to unexpected accruals; and (3) firms with higher leverage exhibit conditionally more conservative accounting primarily through unexpected accruals. These results are robust to accrual models that take into account the systematic association between accruals and cash flows and their non-linearity and to the asymmetric persistence of earnings changes specification of conditional accounting conservatism. Taken together, these results suggest that managers exercise their discretion over accruals to expedite the recognition of bad news rather than good news.     

多个“大债权人”与会计稳健性

本文考查了企业拥有多个大债权人对其会计稳健性的影响.研究发现,多个大债权人的共同监督显著提高了企业的会计稳健性水平.进一步研究发现:当企业复杂度较高或信息环境较差时,多个大债权人对会计稳健性的提升作用更加明显;但是当金融控股银行在债权人中占比较高时,该提升作用显著弱化.作用机制检验表明,多个大债权人的共同监督促使企业计提更多的资产减值损失和预计负债,进而提高了会计稳健性水平.最后,经济后果检验发现多个大债权人促使会计稳健性提高以后,企业的贷款融资规模显著增大,但融资成本未发生变化.本文提供了非辛迪加贷款模式下“债权人共同监督效果”的本土化证据,研究结论对企业和政策制定者具有重要的参考价值.     

会计稳健性研究述评

越来越多的研究表明,会计稳健性是财务报告最重要的特征。本文系统地评论了会计稳健性研究的最新内容。第一方面为会计稳健性的不同计量方法及各种计量方法之间存在的关系,第二方面为稳健性起因的最新研究,尤其是契约对企业会计稳健性的影响,第三方面为会计稳健性的经济后果,包括会计稳健性对资本成本的影响以及对企业真实经济活动的影响。文章最后指出了会计稳健性未来研究的方向。     

会计稳健性与会计信息的信贷决策有用性

采用基于账面市价比的固定效应模型度量公司的会计政策稳健性程度;采用盈利能力指标和偿债能力指标与事后的违约概率之间的相关性度量会计信息的信贷决策有用性,实证研究结果是会计稳健性强化了信贷决策失误与会计信息(盈利能力指标和偿债能力指标)之间的负相关关系.这表明,会计稳健性提高了会计信息的信贷决策有用性.     

Corporate Governance and Accounting Conservatism in China

A principal-agent relationship exists among creditors, shareholders and management, and information asymmetry among them leads to asymmetric loss functions, which induces conservative accounting. This paper investigates the determinants of accounting conservatism using accrual-based measures and data from 2001 to 2006 in China. We find that a higher degree of leverage, lower level of control of ultimate shareholders and lower level of management ownership lead to more conservative financial reporting. We also find that political concerns and pressures among state-owned enterprises are greater than those among non-state owned enterprises, which leads to more conservative financial reporting among the former. However, a decrease in such concerns leads to a decrease in accounting conservatism. Overall, we find that among the determinants of conservatism in China, debt is the most important, followed by ownership, and that board has little influence.     

论公允价值与会计稳健性的兼顾

2006年财政部颁布了新的会计准则,最大的特点就是全面引入了公允价值计量属性。公允价值计量的引入,有利于提高会计信息的决策有用性和价值相关性。但是由于公允价值固有的不确定性及确认传统会计中不予确认的未实现的收益等,会对会计信息的稳健性产生影响。因此,深入系统探讨公允价值会计信息的稳健性问题,有着重要的理论意义和现实意义。本文从相关理论及研究文献的回顾出发,通过分析公允价值的不确定性及风险性,认为公允价值会计信息在稳健性方面存在一定的缺陷,提出通过合理确定两者使用顺序和充分披露等方法,确保公允价值信息在提高信息决策的相关性方面又能兼顾稳健性。     

会计稳健性与上市公司投资行为——基于资产减值角度的实证分析

本文从资产减值角度考察会计稳健性对公司投资行为的影响。稳健性要求公司推迟确认不完全确定的收入,但是尽快确认可能发生的损失。在本文中,我们发现,由于及时确认损失有助于促使公司及早停止低效率的投资,因此资产减值准备计提会对公司的过度投资产生制约作用。由于及时确认损失也会促使厌恶风险的经理人放弃对风险较大但却可能盈利的项目进行投资,因此资产减值准备计提也会导致公司投资不足。我们的研究为公司过度投资问题的解决提供了一个新视角,同时也说明会计稳健性具有一定的两面性,该原则的运用应当权衡其利弊。     

The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings

Abstract:   Is earnings management affecting (driving) the measures of earnings conservatism? Ball et al. (2000) point out that the asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news in earnings (faster recognition of bad news: earnings conservatism) is more pronounced in common‐law than in code‐law based accounting regimes. However, comparative studies on earnings conservatism in Europe have failed to identify significant differences between common‐law and code‐law based countries. We argue that in code‐law based countries managers have incentives to reduce earnings consistently. This enhances the association between earnings and returns in bad news periods. We find that after controlling for discretionary accruals, the differential earnings response to bad news in Germany and France decreases significantly.     

会计稳健性研究的理论回顾与展望——基于契约观和信息观的视角

会计稳健性持续而普遍存在的经验证据激发了大量正式的理论研究。通过系统梳理,这些文献主要包括两个方面:一是从契约观的角度解释会计稳健性存在的经济需求,二是从信息观的角度预测会计稳健性对权益估价以及资本市场定价效率的潜在影响。本文进一步对会计稳健性理论研究的未来方向做出展望。     

产权性质差异、管理层过度自信与会计稳健性

本文从行为金融角度,利用沪深两市A股上市公司2008-2012年的经验数据,实证检验了管理层过度自信对会计稳健性的影响,以及不同产权性质下二者影响程度的差异。研究结果表明,管理层的过度自信心理会显著降低公司的会计稳健性水平。进一步区分产权性质,国有上市公司由于存在所有者缺位和债务软约束,管理层过度自信对会计稳健性的影响较民营上市公司更强。文章的结论为完善上市公司管理层权力约束和监督机制提供了一定借鉴意义。     

职工薪酬与会计稳健性——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

企业职工对未来可持续的高工资和管理层对未来低劳动力成本的不同期望,可能导致两者对会计稳健性需求的差异。本文以Khan et al.(2009)的C Score为会计稳健性的计量方式,分析了职工薪酬、工资刚性与会计稳健性的关系。结果显示:较高的职工薪酬与较强的会计稳健性相联系;工资的向下刚性特征与较强的会计稳健性相联系;作为工会规模代理变量的职工人数也与会计稳健性显著正相关。此外2008年实行《新劳动合同法》之后,企业的会计稳健性有了显著提高,这也可能侧面体现了职工与会计稳健性的关系。本文的研究意义在于联结了传统的职工薪酬研究和会计稳健性研究,对Watts(2003)提出的与会计稳健性相关的契约集合进行了扩展,显示了职工薪酬契约对会计稳健性的影响。     

会计稳健性、融资约束与投资效率

会计稳健性是一项备受争议的会计信息质量要求,考虑到我国企业普遍受融资约束影响的背景,本文以2007-2015年A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了会计稳健性、融资约束及投资效率之间的关系。研究发现:(1)会计稳健性对投资过度和投资不足均具有抑制作用,融资约束会抑制投资过度而加剧投资不足;(2)融资约束加强了会计稳健性对投资过度的抑制作用,二者在一定程度上存在协同效应;(3)融资约束加强了会计稳健性对投资不足的抑制作用,会计稳健性表现出治理效应。本文揭示了会计稳健性与融资约束的交互作用对投资效率的影响机制,从而提供了改善投资效率的有效途径,证明了会计稳健性存在的必要性,有利于为企业的决策提供理论指引。