Assessing the Performance of Business Unit Managers

Using a sample of 140 managers, we investigate the use of various performance metrics in determining the periodic assessment, bonus decisions, and career paths of business unit managers. We show that the weight on accounting return measures is associated with the authority of these managers, and we document that both disaggregated measures (expenses and revenues), and nonfinancial measures play a greater role as interdependencies between business units increase. The results suggest separate and distinct roles for different types of performance measures. Accounting return measures are used to create the proper incentives for managers with greater authority, while disaggregated and nonfinancial measures are employed in response to interdependencies.     

Nonfinancial Performance Measures and Promotion-Based Incentives

In this paper, I examine the sensitivity of promotion and demotion decisions for lower‐level managers to financial and nonfinancial measures of their performance and investigate the extent to which the behavior of lower‐level managers reflects promotion‐based incentives. Additionally, I test for learning versus effort‐allocation effects of promotion‐based incentives. I find that promotion and demotion decisions for store managers of a major U.S.‐based fast‐food retailer (QSR) are sensitive to nonfinancial performance measures of service quality and employee retention after controlling for financial performance. The likelihood of demotion in this organization is also sensitive to nonfinancial performance on the dimension of service quality, while the probability of exit is primarily sensitive to financial performance measures rather than nonfinancial performance measures. I also find evidence that the behavior of lower‐level managers is consistent with the incentives created by the weighting of nonfinancial performance measures in promotion decisions. Managers in locations where there is a higher ex ante probability of promotion and a higher potential reward upon promotion demonstrate significantly higher levels and rates of performance improvement in service quality. Finally, consistent with promotion‐based incentives inducing both effort‐allocation and learning effects, I find that performance‐improvement rates for service quality: (1) are higher in prepromotion periods in markets where promotions occur, (2) decrease immediately after the occurrence of a promotion in the same market area, and (3) remain higher than in markets where promotions do not occur. These findings provide some of the first empirical evidence on an alternative to the explicit weighting of nonfinancial metrics in compensation contracts as a mechanism for generating improvements in nonfinancial dimensions of performance.     

The Role of Visual Attention in the Managerial Judgment of Balanced‐Scorecard Performance Evaluation: Insights from Using an Eye‐Tracking Device

This paper investigates the role of visual attention in managerial judgments during balanced‐scorecard performance evaluations. Using the Locarna eye tracker to establish the amount of time managers spent focused on visual cues, we found that managers who look more at strategically linked performance measures are more likely to make decisions consistent with the achievement of their subordinates’ strategic objectives. When aware of strategy, managers focused more on strategically linked performance measures than on nonlinked measures. The presentation format of the strategy information did not significantly affect this focus. Our findings indicate that awareness of strategically linked performance measures, but not their presentation, appears to be important in helping managers to make better decisions. This study contributes to the management accounting literature by generating useful insights into the impact of visual attention on judgments and decision‐making processes.     

Promote Internally or Hire Externally? The Role of Gift Exchange and Performance Measurement Precision

Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an interactive experiment, we examine the drivers of managers’ promote/hire decisions and internal employees’ behavior before and after those decisions. Consistent with gift exchange theory, we find that employees exert costly effort to increase the chance of being promoted, and they raise their effort level as the promote/hire decision becomes imminent. Managers respond by promoting those who exert high effort, despite employees’ inferior ability compared to external candidates. Results suggest that managers view employees’ past effort as both a gift to reciprocate and a signal of their future effort. Moreover, we find that managers are more likely to promote internally rather than hire externally under a less precise performance measurement system, and this result is driven by managers who observe low employee output. Finally, we find that total effort is significantly higher when managers promote internally versus hire externally.     

The effect of non-financial performance measures,organisational politics and political skill on job performance: Evidence from China

We investigate the role of organisational politics (i.e., general political behaviour, going along to get ahead and pay and promotion policies) and political skill on the relationship between non-financial performance measures and job performance, relying on a sample of manufacturing firms in China. Results suggest that non-financial performance measures positively affect managers' job performance, and non-financial performance measures reduce general political behaviour and pay and promotion policies. Results further suggest that managers' political skill positively affects job performance, and political skill also moderates the relationships between (1) general political behaviour and (2) pay and promotion policies, and job performance.     

McClelland's trichotomy of needs theory and the job satisfaction and work performance of CPA firm professionals

This paper examines the ability of McClelland's trichotomy of needs theory (need for affiliation, need for power, need for achievement) to provide a conceptual explanation of the job satisfaction and work performance of CPA firm professionals. Seventy-seven of the 89 professionals at an office of a large international CPA firm participated in the study. For partners and managers, need for affiliation correlated negatively with job satisfaction. For partners and managers, junior-level audit/tax specialists and junior-level management consultants, need for power correlated positively with job satisfaction. Job satisfaction correlated positively with the intent to remain with their current firm for all three categories. Need for achievement correlated positively with hours devoted to work for junior-level audit/tax specialists, and with the firm's work performance ratings for partners and managers and junior-level audit/tax specialists. The results suggest that McClelland's theory, which has not been previously applied to examine job satisfaction, might provide a conceptual explanation of why some individuals experience relatively high job satisfaction in an environment where their contemporaries experience relatively low job satisfaction.     

Judging Fund Managers by the Company They Keep

We develop a performance evaluation approach in which a fund manager's skill is judged by the extent to which the manager's investment decisions resemble the decisions of managers with distinguished performance records. The proposed performance measures use historical returns and holdings of many funds to evaluate the performance of a single fund. Simulations demonstrate that our measures are particularly useful in ranking managers. In an application that relies on such ranking, our measures reveal strong predictability in the returns of U.S. equity funds. Our measures provide information about future fund returns that is not contained in the standard measures.     

Managerial ability and debt maturity

We examine whether and how managerial ability affects corporate debt maturity decisions. The demand for shorter maturity debt is expected to be higher in firms operated by high-ability managers, who possess the superior skills needed to anticipate firms’ economic prospects and communicate their private information, thereby alleviating information asymmetry and bolstering their reputation. We document that firms with high ability managers are associated with more short-term debt financing. The effect becomes stronger for firms facing severe information asymmetry problems, unconstrained firms or high quality firms. Supportive evidence is found from the analysis of short- and long-term debt issuance activity. Our findings remain robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and debt maturity choice, and are not driven by omitted variable bias, endogeneity concerns or industry group. Overall, we provide robust evidence that supports the signalling theory for debt maturity structure and contributes to the literatures on managerial ability.     

Self‐Serving Attribution Bias,Overconfidence, and the Issuance of Management Forecasts

Prior studies document that managers consider a variety of costs and benefits when deciding whether to issue earnings forecasts. Using an abstract experiment and a survey of experienced financial managers, we provide evidence that managerial overconfidence may also contribute to this decision. Our experiment shows that participants engage in self‐serving attribution, giving greater weight to internal than external factors as explanations for good performance. This increases confidence in improved future performance, which increases their willingness to issue forecasts. Two facets of the stable individual trait overconfidence, dispositional optimism and miscalibration, also contribute to confidence in improved future performance and willingness to issue forecasts. Consistent with these results, experienced financial manager survey participants believe other managers are likely to overestimate the extent to which they contribute to positive firm performance, and both overoptimism about firm performance and overconfidence in their ability to predict future firm performance contribute to issuance of earnings forecasts.     

Managerial ability and firm risk-taking behavior

In this study, we show that managerial heterogeneity plays an important role in firm decisions. Our view is that in addition to the effects of previously examined determinants, firm decisions are affected not just by the managers’ explicit mandate to maximize firm value, but also by the ability of the manager in managing the firm. We find that high-ability managers and low-ability managers have opposite effects on firm behavior and firm value. High-ability managers are receptive to risk-taking whereas low-ability managers refrain from risk-taking. High-ability managers cut capital expenditures but spend significantly more on research and development projects; low-ability managers reduce both capital expenditures and research and development expenses significantly. High-ability managers are associated with higher levels of firm focus than low-ability managers. Managerial ability is negatively associated with firm leverage. In addition, our results show that high-ability managers are associated with increases in firm value whereas low-ability managers are associated with decreases in firm value.     

Financial and nonfinancial performance measures: How do they affect job satisfaction?

Recent interest on the use of nonfinancial measures (e.g. in the Balanced Scorecard) generally assumes that such measures are essential to overcome the inadequacies of financial measures. However, it remains unclear (1) if the behavioural effects of these nonfinancial measures are different from those of financial measures; and (2) whether these effects are influenced by the relative importance of nonfinancial measures vis-à-vis financial measures. This study hypothesises that the use of performance measures for performance evaluation will significantly affect managers' job satisfaction. However, these effects are indirect through the managers' perceptions of the fairness of these measures and the interpersonal trust these measures promote. Based on a sample of 70 managers, these expectations are supported by the results. More importantly, the results also suggest that (1) the process by which nonfinancial measures affect employee job satisfaction is not different from that of financial measures, and (2) the relative importance of nonfinancial measures vis-à-vis financial measures has no significant effect on employee job satisfaction. These results may have important theoretical and practical implications.     

Discretion and bias in performance evaluation: the impact of diversity and subjectivity

This paper examines the impact of performance measure diversity and the use of subjective performance measures on performance evaluation bias. The empirical results indicate that both performance measure diversity and subjectivity are positively related to performance evaluation bias. More specifically, I find that the use of multiple objective performance measures and the use of subjective performance measures are related to more compressed performance ratings and more lenient performance ratings, which could result in problems in personnel decisions and future incentives.     

Effects of budgetary participation conflict on job performance of Mexican and US managers

This study extends the stream of participative budgeting literature by introducing a new variable, Budgetary Participation Conflict (BPC). BPC occurs when the level of budget participation experienced by a manager differs from a desired level. We propose a model where BPC is the independent variable to further evaluate the effect of budget participation on job performance. Using path analysis, we measure the direct effect of BPC on job performance, and the indirect effects between BPC and performance that run through job satisfaction and job tenure in two countries, Mexico and the US.While the results do not indicate that BPC either directly or indirectly affects the performance of US managers, the results indicate that BPC negatively affects the job performance of Mexican managers indirectly through the effects of BPC on job satisfaction and job tenure. The relationship between tenure and performance is much stronger among the Mexican managers than among their US counterparts, which is the largest single difference between the Mexican and US results.     

How do different performance measures affect managerial time orientation? Empirical evidence from sales managers in the oil and gas industry

This study investigates the relative effect of performance measures on managerial time orientation. We collect survey data on the actual time allocation of sales managers for tasks that affect financial performance on the short-, medium-, and long-term horizons. In addition, we obtain survey data on the specific metrics used by an oil and gas firm and classify them into three groups: traditional accounting (gross margin and budgeted costs), nonfinancial (market share and sales volume), and accounting returns (economic value added — EVA). Based on partial least-squares analysis, our results suggest that, in our setting, both nonfinancial and accounting return measures can supplement traditional accounting metrics to mitigate potential short-term orientation by inducing sales managers to consider mainly not only sales tasks but also investing tasks, which will affect the firm results more than a quarter ahead. In addition, our results imply that accounting return metrics are not better than nonfinancial measures in inducing a longer-term orientation in our research setting.     

The effect of target managerial ownership on the choice of acquisition financing and CEO job retention

In this paper we report on our investigation into whether the level of target managerial ownership has an effect on acquisition financing choice and target CEO job retention. We find that cash is more likely used to finance acquisitions when target management ownership levels are high. This result is consistent with a reduced monitoring hypothesis, where bidding firm managers seek to avoid the formation of a large block holder that may become an active monitor. We also find evidence specific only to stock deals that the probability of target CEO job retention increases with the level of target managerial ownership. In these cases, it appears the potential benefits associated with retaining certain target managers outweighs any negative consequence associated with creating a new monitoring block.     

Fairness in performance evaluation and its behavioural consequences

A recent paper in Accounting and Business Research by Lau et al. (2008) offers systematic evidence to explain whether managers’ perceptions on fairness of performance evaluation procedures affect attitudes such as job satisfaction; and if it does, the different behavioural processes involved. Our paper re‐examines Lau et al.’s model and hypotheses to assess the external validity of their findings, based on a very different sample of managers. Drawing on recent organisational justice literature, it further develops the model and examines the potential interaction effects of fairness of performance evaluation procedures and other variables on job satisfaction. Finally, it extends the outcome variable to include manager performance. Using survey responses from 165 managers, supported by 24 interviews, drawn from three major organisations in the manufacturing and financial services sectors, we find that Lau et al.’s results on the indirect effects of fairness of performance evaluation procedures on job satisfaction are generalisable to other organisational settings and managerial levels. However, using their model we do not find support for the outcome‐based effects through distributive fairness. Developing a revised model we observe that the effects of distributive fairness on job satisfaction are indirect via organisational commitment. When the model is further developed to incorporate performance as the outcome variable, we observe similar findings.     

Are Auditors Professionally Skeptical? Evidence from Auditors’ Going‐Concern Opinions and Management Earnings Forecasts

We examine whether auditors exercise professional skepticism about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions. Using publicly issued management earnings forecasts as a proxy for earnings forecasts provided by managers to auditors, we find that management earnings forecasts are negatively associated with both auditors’ going‐concern opinions and subsequent bankruptcy. The weight auditors put on management forecasts in the going‐concern decision is not significantly different from the weight implied in the bankruptcy prediction model. Moreover, compared with the bankruptcy model, auditors assign a lower weight to management forecasts they perceive as being less credible, including those (1) issued by managers who issued optimistic forecasts in the previous two years, and (2) predicting high earnings increases or high earnings. Taken together, our evidence is consistent with auditors being professionally skeptical about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions.     

The role of organisational concern for workplace fairness in the choice of a performance measurement system

Prior studies linking performance management systems (PMS) and organisational justice have examined how PMS influence procedural fairness. Our investigation differs from these studies. First, it examines fairness as an antecedent (instead of as a consequence) of the choice of PMS. Second, instead of conceptualising organisational fairness as procedural fairness, it relies on the impression management interpretation of organisational fairness. Hence, the study investigates how the need of senior managers to cultivate an impression of being fair is related to the choice of PMS systems and employee outcomes. Based on a sample of 276 employees, the results indicate that the need of senior management to cultivate an impression of being fair is associated with employee performance. They also indicate that a substantial component of these effects is indirect through the choice of comprehensive performance measures (CPM) and employee job satisfaction. These findings highlight the importance of organisational concern for workplace fairness as an antecedent of choice of CPM. From a theoretical perspective, the adoption of the impression management interpretation of organisational fairness contributes by providing new insights into the relationship between fairness and choice of PMS from a perspective that is different from those used in prior management accounting research.     

An Intertemporal CAPM Approach to Evaluate Mutual Fund Performance

Merton (1973) and Campbell (1993) have demonstrated that if an investor anticipates information shifts, he will adjust his portfolio choice today in an attempt to hedge these shifts. Exploiting these insights, we construct a new performance measure to evaluate fund managers' hedging ability. This new measure is different from two widely adopted performance evaluation measures: securities selectivity and market timing. Moreover, an econometric methodology is developed to simultaneously estimate the magnitudes of these three portfolio performance evaluation measures. The results show that mutual fund managers are on average with positive security selection and negative market timing ability. Furthermore, the mutual funds with investment style classified as Asset Allocation generally have positive hedging timing ability.     

Procedural justice in managerial performance evaluation: Effects of subjectivity,relationship quality,and voice opportunity

This study investigates the effect of subjectivity in performance evaluation on managerial perceptions of procedural justice. Using survey data from a sample of 317 managers, we examine two forms of subjectivity: use and weight of subjective performance measures and ex post flexibility in the weighting of multiple performance measures. We also examine the interaction effects of two contextual factors, superior–manager relationship quality and voice opportunity, on the association between subjectivity and perceived procedural justice. The results suggest that only the superior's use of ex post flexibility in weighting multiple performance measures adversely affects managers' perceptions of procedural justice. Moreover, superior–manager relationship quality reduces the negative effects of ex post flexibility in weighting multiple performance measures on procedural justice, whereas voice opportunity amplifies this negative effect. These findings have practical and theoretical implications, as they shed new light on the trade-off between the informative benefits and perceived unfairness of incorporating subjectivity into performance evaluation.