Age-specific dynamic labor demand and human capital investment

To study the optimal age-specific labor demand and human capital investment at the firm level we extend the standard dynamic labor demand model by introducing ‘age’ as a second dynamic variable and distinguish between two types of workers: ‘low skilled’ and ‘high skilled’. Applying an age-structured optimal control model we derive qualitative features of the optimal age-specific hiring and training effort. For the case of a linear revenue and production function we prove that firms do not anticipate changes in adjustment costs in their optimal decisions. This result no longer holds if a nonlinear revenue or production function is considered.     

The spatial structure of production with a leontief technology – II: Substitute techniques

The structure of the optimal spatial pattern of production is studied when there are dependencies among production units which can be described by a Leontief technology with substitute techniques, and when there is a single marketplace of final demand, the CBD. Transportation cost is proportional to distance. The various goods are produced in rings. There are a finite number of patterns in which these rings are arranged, and they can be obtained by a finite algorithm. The particular pattern depends on the final demand. Hence there is no ‘non- substitution’ theorem. ‘Reswitching’ of techniques can occur, that is, in an optimal pattern a technique may be operated at large and small distances from the CBD, but not at intermediate distances; this contradicts prevailing beliefs about optimal capital/land profiles.     

Two planar facility location problems with high-speed corridors and continuous demand

The planar minisam (‘median’) and minimax (‘center’) facility location problems are examined under the assumptions that: demand is continuously and uniformly distributed: the L₁ (right-angle) metric is in use; and the planar region is traversed by a high-speed corridor (highway) running parallel to one of the directions of travel. For the minisum problem in a rectangular region, it is shown that, for any combination of problem parameters, there are only two candidate points in the region for the optimum location of the facility. This is also shown to be true for any convex and symmetric planar region. For the minimax problem in a rectangular region, there are only three candidate points for the optimal location. Some extensions and conjectures for the minisum problem involving more than one highway are also discussed.     

Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling

Hurwicz (1979) and Otani and Sicilian (1982, 1990) characterized the Nash equilibrium allocations of the Walrasian demand manipulation game in successively more general exchange environments. In this paper, I extend the analysis to production economies with short-selling. First, I generalize Hurwicz’s and Otani and Sicilian’s theorem that any allocation at which each agent’s consumption bundle lies above her true offer curve can be supported in Nash equilibrium. I then show that for finite economies of any size the set of such allocations is often topologically large.Received: 17 January 2003, Accepted: 4 April 2005, JEL Classification: D51, D82For comments on this and earlier versions of the paper, I wish to thank Rick Bond, Bhaskar Chakravorti, Tom Gresik, Costas Syropoulos and William Thomson. I would especially like to thank Mike Jerison for helping to overcome a difficulty with a previous version. Also, the comments of the anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.     

A Hotelling model with a ceiling on the stock of pollution

Environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol aim to stabilize the amount of carbon in the atmosphere, which is mainly caused by the burning of nonrenewable resources such as coal. We characterize the solution to the textbook Hotelling model when there is a ceiling on the stock of emissions. We consider both increasing and decreasing demand for energy. We show that when the ceiling is binding, both the low-cost nonrenewable resource and the high-cost renewable resource may be used jointly. A key implication is that if energy demand were to decline in the long run, we may supplement energy supply through ‘clean’ renewables to meet the environmental standard, but then revert back to using only ‘dirty’ fossil fuels in the future when the ceiling has become non-binding. That is, the much heralded societal ‘transition’ to clean energy resources may be short-lived.     

The Delphi technique as a forecasting tool: issues and analysis

This paper systematically reviews empirical studies looking at the effectiveness of the Delphi technique, and provides a critique of this research. Findings suggest that Delphi groups outperform statistical groups (by 12 studies to two with two ‘ties’) and standard interacting groups (by five studies to one with two ‘ties’), although there is no consistent evidence that the technique outperforms other structured group procedures. However, important differences exist between the typical laboratory version of the technique and the original concept of Delphi, which make generalisations about ‘Delphi’ per se difficult. These differences derive from a lack of control of important group, task, and technique characteristics (such as the relative level of panellist expertise and the nature of feedback used). Indeed, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that a Delphi conducted according to ‘ideal’ specifications might perform better than the standard laboratory interpretations. It is concluded that a different focus of research is required to answer questions on Delphi effectiveness, focusing on an analysis of the process of judgment change within nominal groups.     

Benchmark priors for Bayesian model averaging

In contrast to a posterior analysis given a particular sampling model, posterior model probabilities in the context of model uncertainty are typically rather sensitive to the specification of the prior. In particular, ‘diffuse’ priors on model-specific parameters can lead to quite unexpected consequences. Here we focus on the practically relevant situation where we need to entertain a (large) number of sampling models and we have (or wish to use) little or no subjective prior information. We aim at providing an ‘automatic’ or ‘benchmark’ prior structure that can be used in such cases. We focus on the normal linear regression model with uncertainty in the choice of regressors. We propose a partly non-informative prior structure related to a natural conjugate g-prior specification, where the amount of subjective information requested from the user is limited to the choice of a single scalar hyperparameter g_0j. The consequences of different choices for g_0j are examined. We investigate theoretical properties, such as consistency of the implied Bayesian procedure. Links with classical information criteria are provided. More importantly, we examine the finite sample implications of several choices of g_0j in a simulation study. The use of the MC³ algorithm of Madigan and York (Int. Stat. Rev. 63 (1995) 215), combined with efficient coding in Fortran, makes it feasible to conduct large simulations. In addition to posterior criteria, we shall also compare the predictive performance of different priors. A classic example concerning the economics of crime will also be provided and contrasted with results in the literature. The main findings of the paper will lead us to propose a ‘benchmark’ prior specification in a linear regression context with model uncertainty.     

Identification and estimation of polynomial errors-in-variables models

Methods of estimation of regression coefficients are proposed when the regression function includes a polynomial in a ‘true’ regressor which is measured with error. Two sources of additional information concerning the unobservable regressor are considered: either an additional indicator of the regressor (itself measured with error) or instrumental variables which characterize the systematic variation in the true regressor. In both cases, estimators are constructed by relating moments involving the unobserved variables to moments of observables; these relations lead to recursion formulae for computation of the regression coefficients and nuisance parameters (e.g., moments of the measurement error). Consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimated coefficients is demonstrated, and consistent estimators of the asymptotic covariant matrices are provided.     

Market power of large cities and policy differences in metropolitan areas

When a single city, the ‘central city’, has a large share of the metropolis population, it will influence housing prices in other, smaller cities, the ‘suburbs’. This market power leads to differences in government policy and property values between the central city and suburbs even when residents and amenities in the two regions are identical. When the central city's government is controlled by property-owning residents, its property tax rate exceeds the rate in the suburbs. The central city will also have lower property values than suburbs.     

Intertemporal price–quality discrimination and the Coase conjecture

We examine time-consistent intertemporal price–quality discrimination by a durable goods monopolist, when there are a continuum of buyer demand-intensities with respect to product quality, and it is profitable for the monopolist to trade with the marginal buyer-type (i.e., the “gap” case). We show that along every subgame perfect equilibrium path, with probability 1, prices and qualities decline over time, and the market is completely and monotonically depleted according to buyer-type in a finite number of offers. But, unlike the fixed quality literature, the monopolist may randomize over price–quality offers along the equilibrium path. We also show that the Coase conjecture continues to be valid here, but in a form that is significantly different from the usual formulation. In the limit, as the time between offers evaporates, the monopolist makes a continuum of offers and perfectly screens the market. However, he effectively cannot price-discriminate, because the equilibrium profits converge to the complete “pooling” profits that would be made if the entire market had the marginal buyer-type’s valuation.     

When does coordination pay?

In a continuous-time model of two symmetric open economies, with a floating exchange rate, we find that the pay-off to macroeconomic policy coordination depends systematically on how heterogeneous is their inflation experience. While monetary policy coordination improves welfare in handling a common rate of underlying inflation, it exacerbates the ‘time consistency’ problem arising when there are differences (as is illustrated diagrammatically). Since the principle of ‘certainty equivalence’ applies to time-consistent policy in linear quadratic models, we are also able to give a stochastic interpretation of the deterministic results.     

Stability and efficiency from a Neo-Keynesian viewpoint

This paper raises once more the Keynesian challenge of the classical doctrine that an unguided market economy has a natural tendency towards optimal employment of resources. By means of a simple macromodel, we show that if quantity expectations are incorporated into the Walrasian model, then it is no longer generally true that the ‘invisible hand’ leads the economy to Walrasian equilibrium. Instead, it may lead the economy to a kind of Keynesian equilibrium in which the firms' sales expectations constitute a binding constraint on production. Moreover, while Pareto optimum is unstable and hence unattainable in our model, a ‘second-best’ optimum among stable equilibria exists and requires a public sector. Accordingly, a trade-off between efficiency and other policy aims occurs only at tax rates above the positive tax rate in optimum     

Can indeterminacy resolve the cross-country correlation puzzle?

Are productivity shocks the only driving force of international business fluctuations? In this paper I argue that another source of uncertainty—changes in market expectations or ‘sunspots’ – is also important. One major shortcoming of existing IRBC models is the ‘cross-country correlation puzzle’: models tend to generate cross-country consumption correlations that are too high and output, investment and employment correlations that are too low when compared to the data. I show that with empirically supported level of increasing returns, an otherwise standard model possesses multiple, indeterminate convergent paths to the steady state, which allow for sunspots to influence the economy. The model displays time series properties that in many ways match the data better than the conventional model. It is especially successful in generating realistic consumption and output correlations.     

Approximation of convex preferences

It is shown geometrically that a monotone concave preference order can be approximated by orders representable by a concave utility function. This is applied to proving that preferences with ‘desirable’ properties (such as inducing smooth excess demand functions, analyticity, strict convexity) are dense.     

The system of towns with spatial public goods

In this paper, we introduce a model of ‘spatial public goods’, whose provision costs depend on the size of the benefit area. It is assumed that there are many developers providing spatial public goods in their towns. Each developer chooses the area size of his/her town and the quality of its spatial public good so as to maximize profit, taking the market price system as given. Each consumer chooses the level of the public good, and hence the town that supplies it, so as to maximize his/her utility. We show that the competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy is efficient.     

Implementing property tax reforms in Bangalore: an actor-network perspective

Many municipal governments in developing countries are experiencing serious difficulties in dealing with the rapid growth of population in cities. Catalysed through processes of globalisation, the growth of cities, especially the so-called ‘mega-cities’, has not been matched by investments in infrastructure like roads and power due to the inability of local government organizations to collect adequate revenues from sources like property tax. Recognizing these difficulties, agencies such as the Asian Development Bank have initiated systems for property tax reforms in a number of Asian cities, including Bangalore. In this paper, we discuss the story of this reform process drawing upon the actor-network perspective on translations. We argue that such a perspective helps to go beyond studying innovation processes through the lens of ‘technology diffusion’, and provides a more interesting and insightful perspective of ‘technology translation’.     

Self-organized criticality in evolutionary systems with local interaction

This paper studies a stylized model of local interaction where agents choose from an ever increasing set of vertically ranked actions, e.g. technologies. The driving forces of the model are infrequent upward shifts (‘updates’), followed by a rapid process of local imitation (‘diffusion’). Our main focus is on the regularities displayed by the long-run distribution of diffusion waves and their implication on the performance of the system. By integrating analytical techniques and numerical simulations, we come to the following two main conclusions. (1) If non-coordination costs are sufficiently high, the system behaves critically, in the sense customarily used in physics. (2) The performance of the system is optimal at the frontier of the critical region. Heuristically, this may be interpreted as an indication that (performance-sensitive) evolutionary forces induce the system to be placed ‘at the edge of order and chaos’.     

Linear-quadratic approximation, external habit and targeting rules

We examine the linear-quadratic approximation of nonlinear dynamic stochastic optimization problems. A discrete-time version of Magill [1977a. A local analysis of N-sector capital accumulation under uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory 15(2), 211–219] is generalized to models with forward-looking variables paying special attention to second-order conditions. This is the ‘large distortions’ case in the literature. We apply the approach to monetary policy in a DSGE model with external habit in consumption. We then develop a condition for ‘target-implementability’, a concept related to ‘targeting rules’. Finally, we extend the approach to a comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria in a two-country model and show that the ‘small distortions’ approximation is inappropriate for this exercise.     

Towards a common understanding of the differences between purchasing, procurement and commissioning in the UK public sector

This paper recognises that commissioning has now become an important term in the lexicon of UK public policy but the term ‘commissioning’ is taking on a different meaning than that traditionally used within the purchasing and supply management community. The frequent inter-changeability of the terms ‘commissioning’, ‘procurement’ and ‘purchasing’ is now causing confusion and means different things to different people. Therefore the academic community needs to help practitioners understand the differences and implications. A document analysis of various UK Central Government departments’ commissioning frameworks was used to establish the key themes and compare commissioning, procurement and purchasing. This paper discusses the similarities and differences, and argues that commissioning is different from procurement, but that commissioning offers major opportunities for Procurement practitioners to make a strategic contribution.     

Theoretical tests of the rational expectations hypothesis in economic dynamical models

This paper examines different theoretical stability tests of infinite-horizon rational expectations equilibria. These ‘tests’ have different status: two of them express that the considered equilibrium is ‘isolated’ [neither (non-sunspot) equilibria (test 1) nor (well-behaved) sunspot equilibria exist in a neighbourhood (test 2)] and two of them are learning criteria [either standard ‘evolutive learning’ (test 3) or game-theoretical ‘eductive’ learning (test 4)]. Surprisingly, these four tests select the same steady state equilibria in the class of one-dimensional one-step-forward looking economic models. The extension of this equivalence theorem to n-dimensional and then more complex systems is discussed.