Is firm-sponsored training a palliative? A common agency approach

We analyse the issue of firm-sponsored training under product market imperfections. In this setting, qualification becomes a public good for firms when their profits are increasing in the stock of skilled workers but remains a private good to students/workers. Students have to pay a tuition fee but at the same time firms sponsor education: universities sell training to both. We prove that the proportion of skilled workers is larger in more competitive economies/industries while the share of firms in the financing of training is a monotonically decreasing function of the degree of competition. An increase of the latter indeed increases the equilibrium skilled wage while reducing its sensitivity to an increase of the supply of skilled workers. The firms’ aggregate expenditures on training per worker are nevertheless a nonmonotonic function of the competitiveness of the economy.     

Knightian uncertainty and poverty trap in a model of economic growth

This paper explores how Knightian uncertainty affects dynamic properties in an economic growth model. The decision-making theory employed in the analysis is the theory of expected utility under a non-additive probability measure, i.e., the Choquet expected utility model of preference. We apply this decision-making theory to an overlapping generations model where producers face “uncertainty” in their technologies. When the producer is averse to uncertainty, the firm's profit function may not be differentiable. Therefore, the firm's decision to invest and hire labor becomes rigid for a certain measurable range of real interest rates. In dynamic equilibrium, the existence of firm-level rigidity causes discontinuity in the wage function; this makes multiple equilibria the more likely outcomes under the log utility and Cobb–Douglas production functions. In this paper, we show that even if aversion to uncertainty is small, the “poverty trap” can arise for a wide range of parameter values.     

中小企业信贷市场的监控研究——基于信息和产品差异化模型

中小企业信用缺损成为中小企业陷入融资困境并制约其发展的重要原因,但中小企业信贷市场风险高,对中小企业信贷市场的监控便成为研究的重要课题.银行监控中小企业信贷市场的有效途径之一是对借主的事前监控.构建监控模型和产品差异化模型在于银行利用资源在发放贷款之前监测企业,通过银行获取信息或者在市场力(产品差异化)投资模型的分析表明两种选择产生不同的预测,即银行加大分支机构和人力资本的投入,有利于提高信息获取的范围以及信息获取的准确性,但对市场力增长不显著;银行对借主资金交易的管理有利于提高借贷风险控制能力.     

贫困陷阱的微观机制与实证研究述评

近年来,一批发展经济学家在吸收早期贫困陷阱理论合理内核的基础上,借助现代经济学新的理论与方法,将贫困陷阱问题的研究从宏观层面推进到微观层次、从抽象的理论阐释推进到精细的实证分析,并在此过程中拓展了贫困陷阱问题的研究范围。本文以述论结合的方式梳理这一研究领域的新进展,并在发展经济学学科发展史的视野中审视贫困陷阱理论、展望进一步的研究方向。     

Families and firms: Agency costs and labor market imperfections in Sialkot's surgical industry

The family firm is generally viewed as an organizational solution to agency costs in the labor market for managers and institutional underdevelopment. Consistent with this view, this paper links the preponderance of family firms in the surgical instrument industry of Sialkot to the prevailing agency and institutional problems. However, strong dependence on family management coupled with restrictions on family size constrains the firms from optimally choosing management size. The resulting labor market distortion is manifested by a significant positive correlation between the founder's family size and the firm size such that the founders who have more brothers (a larger pool of potential managers) end up with bigger firms.     

Endogenous capital market imperfections, human capital, and intergenerational mobility

In this paper, capital market imperfections are endogenized considering an adverse selection problem between banks and borrowers. We develop a growth model with linear OLG wealth dynamics, where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and ability, which is private information. We show that banks react to this informational asymmetry by granting higher loans to talented borrowers. This, in turn, helps poor and talented agents to become educated and catch up with the rich agents. Furthermore, the credit market friction leads to greater human capital accumulation.     

信贷偏好与中国低消费、高投资的经济增长结构——基于中美两国数据的比较分析

本文建立了一个将个人工作期分为两期的增长模型,该模型表明,消费信贷市场完美程度将对经济增长结构产生显著影响。利用中美两国数据进行的实证检验结果表明:消费信贷对经济增长结构影响显著,消费信贷比率提高将使消费占GDP比率上升;收入差距并不是导致中国消费占GDP比率下降的原因。为提高消费占GDP比率,我们应完善社会信用体系,降低信用贷款的交易成本,放宽金融业的准入限制,促进竞争,增加消费信贷供给,放松居民预算约束;同时增加政府的社会福利支出,为居民消费提供稳定预期,降低预防性储蓄动机,扩大内需。     

环境资源视角下西藏农牧民反贫困研究

贫困是伴随着人类发展而产生的一种社会经济现象,普遍发生在世界上所有的国家地区或民族中.西藏是中国西部自然条件恶劣、人类生存难度大、少数民族人口比重最高、贫困现象最严重的地区之一.切实改善西藏生态环境,解决农牧民的贫困问题,不仅是经济社会问题,更是重大的政治问题.如若不能很好解决,会严重影响西藏人与自然、经济社会与生态环境的可持续发展.本文通过对西藏环境资源与农牧民贫困关系的研究,认为恶劣的环境条件是导致西藏农牧民贫困的重要原因,对如何在保护生态环境基础上将西藏丰富的资源优势转化为现实的经济优势,实现农牧民的脱贫致富提出对策和建议.     

影子银行体系对房地产价格的作用机理探究

通过信用创造增强效应、风险承担意愿增强效应和资产替代增强效应,影子银行体系较传统银行信贷对房地产价格变动具有特殊的作用机理,文章以此为理论基点和研究出发点,采用影子银行规模、传统银行信贷规模、影子银行贷款利率、房地产价格等指标,选用我国2010-2014年的月度数据,运用VAR模型、 Granger因果检验、脉冲响应函数和方差分解分析,实证检验我国影子银行体系与房地产价格之间的短期互动关系和长期动态均衡关系,得出相比银行而言影子银行体系对房地产价格波动的影响强度更高,且影响方向相反的结论,同时基于此结论对政府决策部门提出相应的调控建议。     

Accumulation and distribution of human capital: the interaction between individual and aggregate variables

The paper analyses the joint evolution of accumulation and distribution of human capital in an OLG framework. Dynamics arises from the interplay between human capital distribution and individual variables—inherited human capital and inborn ability. Such interaction drives individual investment in human capital and accumulation in the economy. According to initial distribution the model provides different dynamical behaviours linking growth and inequality; in general economies with a more equal initial distribution grow faster but other cases are possible. Moreover, since the model provides an endogenous threshold for investing in human capital, the distribution is characterised by multi-modality.     

Structure,Clearinghouses and Symmetry

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure     

On the growth and welfare effects of monopolistic distortions

The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition is that there is a tradeoff between static welfare and long-term growth. This paper reconsiders this basic proposition in an expanding variety endogenous growth model with competitive markets for “old” innovative products and for a traditional good. We shed light on some implications of monopolistic distortions which tend to be ignored by standard models. First, no growth may be better than some growth, since modest positive growth potentially requires sizeable static welfare losses. Second, the economy may converge to a steady state with zero growth, even though a locally saddle-point stable steady state with positive growth exists if the initial share of “cheap” competitive markets is sufficiently high, as this implies a relatively low demand for “expensive” innovative goods. Third, such a “no-growth trap” may happen in a world economy made up of several countries engaged in free trade with each other. The policy implications are that growth-enhancing policies may be misguided and that quick deregulation as well as quick trade liberalization can lead to stagnation in the long term.      

Non-convex aggregate technology and optimal economic growth

This paper examines a model of optimal growth where the aggregation of two separate well behaved and concave production technologies exhibits a basic non-convexity. First, we consider the case of strictly concave utility function: when the discount rate is either low enough or high enough, there will be one steady state toward which the convergence of the optimal path is monotone and asymptotic. When the discount rate is in some intermediate range, we will find sufficient conditions for having either one equilibrium or multiple equilibria steady state. Depending to whether the initial capital per capita is located with respect to a critical value, we show that the optimal paths monotonically converge to one single appropriate equilibrium steady state. Second, we consider the case of linear utility and provide sufficient conditions to have either unique or two steady states when the discount rate is in some intermediate range. In this range, we give conditions under which the above critical value might not exist, and the economy attains one steady state in finite time, then stays at the other steady state afterward. P. Michel passed away when this research was completed. This paper is dedicated to his memory as a friend and colleague. N. M. Hung and C. Le Van thank the referee for vey helpful remarks and criticisms. They are grateful to Takashi Kamihigashi for very fruitful discussions. They also thank J.-F. Leclerc for editing the final version of this paper.     

An Experimental Education Market with Positive Externalities

A graphical approach shows that in order for the tax revenue to increase, following a reduction in the marginal rate, the increase of aggregate supply must be greater the lower the price level elasticity of aggregate demand.     

中国的政府公共支出与减贫政策

在中国 ,尽管农村经济增长和贫困减少取得了长足进展 ,但很少有研究对农村经济的动力源进行分析 ,而把公共投资作为农村发展和消除贫困的直接动力源的研究尤其缺乏。本文旨在弥补以前研究的空白 ,并指出各类公共投资对农村经济增长、贫困减少和地区不均等的边际效应在各地区和各时期差别很大。根据实证结果和对历史上公共支出方式的分析可知 ,农村公共支出再分配可以带来很大的潜在收益。     

On the efficiency of fair trade

The first part of this paper reviews five major theoretical approaches that describe the fundamental causes of poverty, with particular attention to what these theories imply about government policy towards markets and the need for immediate poverty alleviation. Different causal theories have very different policy implications; it is difficult to recommend specific anti-poverty policies with making assumptions about the nature of economic markets and of individual behavior. The paper ends with comments about how to make these choices, arguing that the greater moral onus one associates with poverty, the more willing one should be to adopt less efficient strategies that do more to raise incomes among the poor. The interconnections between markets and social and political systems—which often disadvantage poor populations—suggests that some market regulations and targeted programs may be necessary to reduce poverty, especially if these can be implemented with minimal corruption and monitored for effectiveness.     

The environmental Kuznets curve in a world of irreversibility

This paper develops an overlapping generations model where consumption is the source of polluting emissions. Pollution stock accumulates with emissions but is partially assimilated by nature at each period. The assimilation capacity of nature is limited and vanishes beyond a critical level of pollution. We first show that multiple equilibria exist. More importantly, some exhibit irreversible pollution levels although an abatement activity is operative. Thus, the simple engagement of maintenance does not necessarily suffice to protect an economy against convergence toward a steady state having the properties of an ecological and economic poverty trap. In contrast with earlier related studies, the emergence of the environmental Kuznets curve is no longer the rule. Instead, we detect a sort of degenerated environmental Kuznets curve that corresponds to the equilibrium trajectory leading to the irreversible solution. I would like to thank Alain Venditti, Mabel Tidball, Alain Jean-Marie and Thierry Bréchet for their helpfull comments and suggestions. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee whose comments have greatly improved the paper.