The Bioeconomics of Marine Reserves: A Selected Review with Policy Implications

The paper ‘bridges the divide’ between the biological and economic literature on marine reserves. It provides a selected review of the traditional use of reserves, the early reserve literature, the potential benefits of reserves, spillovers from reserves to harvested areas and bioeconomic models of marine reserves. The bioeconomics literature is examined from the perspectives of deterministic models, spatial economic models and models that include uncertainty and stochasticity. Insights from the review are used to provide management implications in terms of reserve design, stakeholder cooperation and process, reserve-fishery transfers, traditional management controls, and ecosystem approaches to managing fisheries.     

A modified yardstick competition mechanism

This paper expands Shleifer’s (Rand J Econ 16:319–327, 1985) theory of yardstick competition and develops a modified yardstick competition mechanism (MYC), where the yardstick employed consists of a tariff basket and total costs. This mechanism has a significant information advantage: the regulator “only” needs to observe total costs, prices and output of all firms. The MYC mechanism can ensure a socially optimal outcome when allowing for spatial and second degree price discrimination. We also introduce regulatory lags to the model. In addition, we compare the two approaches for the case of unobserved firm heterogeneity, and provide numerical estimations of the effects. The MYC mechanism fares better in the case of unobserved heterogeneity, and may thus be a useful extension of Shleifer’s yardstick mechanism.      

Optimum reserve size,fishing induced change in carrying capacity,and phenotypic diversity

Fish stocks around the world are heavily overexploited in spite of fishing policies in several parts of the world designed to limit overfishing. Recent studies have found that the complexity of ecological systems and the diversity of species, as well as negative impact of fishing activities on environmental carrying capacity of fish stocks—all contribute to the problem. A number of biologists, managers, and practitioners strongly support the use of marine reserves as a management strategy for marine conservation. This paper contributes to this line of research by seeking an optimum reserve size and fishing effort for situations where species diversity decrease at fishing grounds and fishing activities impact carrying capacity. We found that a reserve size which maximizes economic rents could ruin a fish stock if fishing impacts are not accounted for. On the other hand, the reserve serves as a bifurcation term which could improve the resilience of a marine ecosystem.     

Individual Rationality and the “Zonal Attachment” Principle: Three Stock Migration Models

Shared fish stocks migrate across borders between different countries’ exclusive economic zones. This paper discusses the individual rationality of fish-sharing agreements based on the zonal attachment of such stocks. Three types of migrations are considered: (i) a common stock that grows and reproduces and is then distributed in given proportions between two countries’ zones at the beginning of each fishing season; (ii) sub-stocks that breed and grow independently in their separate zones but spill over between zones according to relative abundance; (iii) a stock that grows and breeds in one country’s zone but migrates into the zone of another if it exceeds a certain size. It is shown that in all these cases the minor partner in a fish-sharing agreement may not have an incentive to cooperate unless he gets a larger share of the cooperative profits than that corresponds to his share of the stock. This is particularly likely to happen when the unit cost of fish does not depend on the stock. An exception could occur if stock migration depends on the stock level; the major partner could then keep the entire stock by fishing it down to a critical level.     

Reconsidering social capital: a latent class approach

Social capital has proven to be a useful concept, but has not been well-measured in the economics literature. We motivate and demonstrate the application of latent class models to measure social capital, based on the idea that social capital is an unobservable multidimensional construct. We explain and show the construction of latent classes that measure an individual’s social capital using data from the General Social Survey. Our method generates meaningfully different conclusions about the accumulation of social capital than those obtained by previous research. We present evidence that higher income influences social capital accumulation because of a higher opportunity cost of time. We also find evidence of complementarities in social capital accumulation within an individual’s peer group. Finally, we show that community heterogeneity influences the likelihood that individuals adhere to certain social norms independent of their propensity to participate in voluntary organizations.     

An evolutionary edge of knowing less (or: On the ‘curse’ of global information)

Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his two adjacent neighbors. The trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma ‘rule of engagement.’ A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the two prisoner’s dilemma games played with his two neighbors. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous members of the group comprising his own father and a set of his father’s neighbors. The size of this set, which can vary, is termed the ‘span of information.’ It is shown that a larger span of information can be detrimental to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection, and that in well-defined circumstances, a large span of information leads to an end of cooperation, whereas a small span does not. Conditions are outlined under which, when individuals’ optimization is based on the assessment of less information, the social outcome is better than when optimization is based on an assessment of, and a corresponding response to, more information.     

Microeconomic analysis on the growth of trade volume in China: 1978–2007

The gravity equation is usually employed by researchers in the field of international trade to explain the growth of a country’s imports and exports volume, especially the manufactured goods. But in China, variables in the model, such as exchange rate, tariff, transportation cost, and spatial distance etc., are not sufficient to explain the riddle of China’s growth in trade volume. In fact, this growth in China’s trade volume is owing to the disintegration of production in the process of economic globalization, to the multinational corporations’ (MNC) vertical outsourcing of their manufacturing processes and procedures, and to the timely readjustment of Chinese enterprises on their strategies of participating in the international intra-product specialization. In this paper we establish an equilibrium model of intra-product specialization dominated by MNCs, and do some empirical tests on the growth in trade volume in China by using the variables including technological conditions of trade, similarity of economies, policy conditions of trade, disintegration of production and level of per capita capital equipment. The empirical results support our basic judgments.     

LEARNING-BY-DOING AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN A MODEL OF MONOPOLY REGULATION*

This paper combines learning-by-doing and asymmetric information in a model of monopoly regulation with and without foreign competition. The principal source of the information asymmetry is unobservable firm effort in the learning process, although unobservable costs are also considered. The major result is that a post-learning all-or-nothing output-contingent lump-sum subsidy can achieve the regulator's complete information welfare maximum. With foreign competition this model can best be thought of as one involving infant industry regulation.     

Competition policy: ten lessons learnt from the financial crisis

The financial crisis brought great challenges also for competition policy. The aim of this paper is to summarize the most important insights for competition policy that could be derived from the turbulent period 2008–2010. The financial crisis is seen as project that demanded sound management from competition policy and enforcement. The insights will be presented in the instructive form of ‘lessons learnt’ which represents a common approved project management technique. We come to the result that the financial crisis is not the result of ‘too much competition’, but of regulatory failure and that the main answers to the financial crisis have to come from ‘smart regulation’. The relaxation of competition policy would be the wrong policy response in troubled times since competition policy can play an important role in bringing the crisis economy back on track. In contrast to banking we see no economic rationale for rescue packages for other economic sectors by referring to systemic risk. The renaissance of industrial policy is viewed with great skepticism since empirical evidence shows that the effort of picking ‘winners’ all too often results in saving ‘losers’.     

Dissertation abstract: The experimental analysis of the political economics of fisheries governance

This dissertation focuses on the political economy of fisheries governance. The study develops a formal model of fisheries governance by combining the features of the common pool fishery and the political institution of lobbying; designs a laboratory fishery governance institution and conducts economic experiments to test the hypotheses derived from the formal model. Specifically, the study analyzes how fishing firms invest in efforts to influence fishery regulation and management through voluntary contribution lobbying. The study also analyses and compares contribution and effort behavior in the lobbying and the CPR using data from economic experiments. The results indicate that lobbying to change suboptimal fishery regulations was significantly below the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction and contributions to raise the cap were significantly different than contributions to lower the cap toward the social optimum. Study results show that subjects successfully lobbied to raise inefficiently low fishing quotas, but were unable to lobby to reduce inefficiently high fishing quotas. Detailed analysis of subjects’ contribution and effort behavior suggest that despite the interesting benefit-cost duality between pure public goods and CPRs, the pattern of cooperative behavior in these two social dilemma situations was different and the level of cooperation in the voluntary contribution lobbying experiment was lower than those reported in other public goods experiments. To provide external validity to these experimental findings, the study further analyzes and compares lobbying expenditures in the fishery sector with those in other natural resource industries using field data from the United States. A comparison of actual lobbying expenditures as percentage of valued added shows that lobbying effort in the U.S fishery sector is not significantly different than those in other natural resource industries such as mining and electric utility industries, but the pattern of lobbying is different. Whereas fishing firms lobby through associations or pressure groups, firms in other natural resource industries lobby unilaterally. This observation suggests that differences in industrial structure and incentives influence the pattern of lobbying and the lobbying behavior of firms across industries. The theoretical predictions derived from the formal model of fisheries governance are consistent with our experimental findings and with the field data on lobbying in the US fisheries sector. These findings suggest that heterogeneity drives rent-seeking activities in the US fisheries sector and that fishing firms attempt to circumvent political collective action problems by forming and lobbying through associations of stakeholders with relatively homogenous policy preferences. JEL Classification D22, D72, D78, H41 Advisor: Prof. Jon G. Sutinen     

Regulation of a Spatial Externality: Refuges versus Tax for Managing Pest Resistance

We examine regulations for managing pest resistance to pesticide varieties in a temporally and spatially explicit framework. We compare the performance of the EPA’s mandatory refuges and a tax (or subsidy) on the pesticide variety under several biological assumptions on pest mobility and the heterogeneity of farmers’ pest vulnerability. We find that only the tax (or subsidy) restores efficiency if pest mobility is perfect within the area. If pest mobility is imperfect and when farmers face identical pest vulnerability, only the refuge might restore efficiency. With simulations we illustrate that complex outcomes may arise for intermediate levels of pest mobility and farmers’ heterogeneity. Our results shed light on the choice of regulatory instruments for common-pool resource regulations where spatial localization matters.     

The employment contract when the firm can utilize a free resource

The output of a free resource, like Open Source programming or basic research, may influence the firm’s revenue by reducing costs or through market interaction. Under moral hazard, if the principal determines how much to utilize the free resource, he will utilize it more, profits are higher and the agent’s effort is lower than when the agent makes the decision. Contrary to the standard result, the incentive coefficient is increasing in the variance of the free resource’s output. Utilization of the free resource and the agent’s effort are always substitutes.     

Individual autonomy in evolutionary game theory: defending Sugden against Ross’s accusation of eliminativism

In this paper, I provide a defence of Robert Sugden’s contribution to evolutionary game theory against Donald Ross’s accusation of eliminating the individual’s autonomy by denying the explanatory role of rationality, utility maximization and rational beliefs. In this regard, I claim that Sugden’s methodological remarks on evolutionary game theory do not imply a characterization of real agents as automata. On the methodological level, Sugden claims that it is not correct to conceive the empirical phenomenon of social evolution in terms of normative concepts, whose empirical status is not obvious. However, Sugden proposes a theory that explains the agent’s behaviour in terms of inductive reasoning, adaptive beliefs, salience and pattern recognition. The latter are psychological features that describe the way agents manage to self-determine their own actions. From these clarifications, I draw the conclusion that Ross’s critique misunderstands Sugden’s contribution both on the methodological and empirical level.     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

Parental education and wages: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the relationship between parents’ education and children’s wage using two nationally representative data sets in China. Controlling for other things, both father’s and mother’s education are positively correlated with children’s wage. Nevertheless, returns to father’s education are lower in more market-oriented segments of the economy, including coastal regions, the non-state sector, and the later period of the reform era (post-1992), while the opposite is true for mother’s education. We argue that this new empirical evidence is consistent with the story that father’s education mainly indicates family connections useful for locating a better-paying first job, while mother’s education primarily captures unmeasured ability.     

A Joint Latent-Class Model: Combining Likert-Scale Preference Statements With Choice Data to Harvest Preference Heterogeneity

In addition to choice questions (revealed and stated choices), preference surveys typically include other questions that provide information about preferences. Preference-statement data include questions on the importance of different attributes of a good or the extent of agreement with a particular statement. The intent of this paper is to model and jointly estimate preference heterogeneity using stated-preference choice data and preference-statement data. The starting point for this analysis is the belief that the individual has preferences, and both his/her choices and preference statements are manifestations of those preferences. Our modeling contribution is linking the choice data and preference-statement data in a latent-class framework. Estimation is straightforward using the E-M algorithm, even though our model has hundreds of preference parameters. Our estimates demonstrate that: (1) within a preference class, the importance anglers associate with different Green Bay site characteristics is in accordance with their responses to the preference statements; (2) estimated across-class utility parameters for fishing Green Bay are affected by the preference-statement data; (3) estimated across-class preference-statement response probabilities are affected by the inclusion of the choice data; and (4) both data sets influence the number of classes and the probability of belonging to a class as a function of the individual’s type.     

Food security implications of global marine catch losses due to overfishing

Excess fishing capacity and the growth in global demand for fishery products have made overfishing ubiquitous in the world’s oceans. Here we describe the potential catch losses due to unsustainable fishing in all countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and on the high seas over 1950–2004. To do so, we relied upon catch and price statistics from the Sea Around Us Project as well as an empirical relationship we derived from species stock assessments by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In 2000 alone, estimated global catch losses amounted to 7–36% of the actual tonnage landed that year, resulting in a landed value loss of between 6.4 and 36 billion (in 2004 constant US6.4 and 36 billion (in 2004 constant US). From 1950–2004, 36–53% of commercial species in 55–66% of EEZs may have been overfished. Referring to a species-level database of intrinsic vulnerability (V) based on life-history traits, it appears that susceptible species were depleted quickly and serially, with the average V of potential catch losses declining at a similar rate to that of actual landings. The three continental regions to incur greatest losses by mass were Europe, North America, and Asia—forming a geographic progression in time. But low-income and small island nations, heavily dependent on marine resources for protein, were impacted most profoundly. Our analysis shows that without the inexorable march of overfishing, ~20 million people worldwide could have averted undernourishment in 2000. For the same year, total catch in the waters of low-income food deficit nations might have been up to 17% greater than the tonnage actually landed there. The situation may be worst for Africa, which in our analysis registered losses of about 9–49% of its actual catches by mass in year 2000, thus seriously threatening progress towards the UN Millennium Development Goals.     

A Global Ex-vessel Fish Price Database: Construction and Applications

Synopsis We describe the first effort at creating a global ex-vessel fish price database, which is required for understanding the economic behavior of participants in the world’s fisheries. We demonstrate potential applications of the database by linking it to a spatially defined catch database, which makes it possible to attach landed values to species in both time and space. This is the first database available publicly where interested members of the public, researchers and managers can easily find and access ex-vessel prices of the world’s major commercial fish species. Preliminary results indicate that the average real price of a number of species have declined between 1950 and 2002. The estimated landed value of fish globally, in year 2000 dollars, was about US$24 billion in 1950. It increased steadily to about US$90 billion in the early 1970s, reached a peak of US$100 billion at the end of the 1980s, and declined to about US$80 billion in 2000. The top 15 fishing countries cumulatively account for 79% of total real landed value, with Japan leading, even though the value of its landings has been declining.      

The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis

This paper quantitatively analyzes the stability and breakup of nations. The tradeoff between increasing returns in the provision of public goods and the costs of greater cultural heterogeneity mediates agents’ preferences over different geographical configurations, thus determining the likelihood of secessions and unions. After calibrating the model to Europe, we identify the regions prone to secession and the countries most likely to merge. We then estimate the implied monetary gains from EU membership. As a test of the theory, we show that the model can account for the breakup of Yugoslavia and the dynamics of its disintegration. We find that economic differences between the Yugoslav republics determined the order of disintegration, but cultural differences, though small, were key to the country’s instability. The paper also provides empirical support for the use of genetic distances as a proxy for cultural heterogeneity.