The impact of tax reforms on unemployment in a SMOPEC

This paper analyzes revenue-neutral tax reforms for a small open economy which is constrained to a balanced current account and whose producers have market power on the world market. We consider origin-based and destination-based commodity taxes as well as taxes on income, the payroll, and on an imported factor of production. Our main findings are the following. First, the strength, and for some parameter constellations, even the sign of the employment effect of tax reforms varies with the degree of openness of the economy. Second, the indeterminacy of the sign of the employment effect crucially hinges on the presence of an internationally mobile factor. The central mechanism underlying our results are adjustments of the real exchange rate which have repercussions on wage and price setting and therefore on employment.     

Is it Harmful to Allow Partial Cooperation?

In economics, politics and society, examples abound in economics, politics and society where agents can enter partial cooperation schemes, i.e., they can collude with a subset of agents. Several contributions devoted to specific settings have claimed that such partial cooperation actually worsens welfare compared to the no-cooperation situation. Our paper assesses this view by highlighting the forces that lead to such results. We find that the nature of strategic spillovers is central to determining whether partial cooperation is bad. Our propositions are then applied to various examples as industry wage bargaining or local public goods.
JEL classification: C 72; E 62; J 5     

Lower Tax Progression, Longer Hours and Higher Wages

The impact of tax reforms that decrease income tax progression is analysed in an equilibrium search model with wage bargaining and endogenous individual working hours. Working hours are either bargained together with the hourly wage (case 1) or determined solely by workers after bargaining over the wage (case 2). In both cases reducing tax progression increases working hours of employed and, more interestingly, unambiguously increases wages and unemployment. Wages and unemployment rise more and working hours and production less in case 1 compared to case 2, probably making case 2 countries best suited for such tax reforms.
JEL Classification : H 24; J 22; J 41     

Stakeholders’ relationships and product market competition

In this article, we study the relationships between main stakeholders (shareholders, consumers and employees) when firms are consumer oriented (CO) in the sense of caring about consumers’ interests in the objective function. We let these firms first bargain with labour union over their employees’ wages and then compete either in the quantity space (Cournot competition) or in the price space (Bertrand competition). Our model shows that taking care of the consumers’ interests when determining product market strategies may reverse the traditional ranking between Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. This implies that if shareholders in a CO firm can choose either a quantity or a price strategy, they will surprisingly choose the latter. Moreover, we show that the conflicting interests between main stakeholders are attenuated under Bertrand competition compared to Cournot competition.     

The Interaction of Wage Bargaining Institutions and an Independent Central Bank – A Methodological Reflection on Current Theories

The paper analyses the increasingly popular literature on strategic interactions from a methodological viewpoint. These political economy approaches focusing on interactions between wage bargaining institutions and an independent central bank do not follow unified methodological rules and so cannot be categorised under a single particular paradigm. Moreover, the literature remains in a way circumscribed by the limits of our logical capacities and of mathematical tractability and therefore relates to the 'real world' of wage bargaining and economic policy institutions in a very limited way only. A consideration of the vast complexity of institutional conditions that impact economic performance in EMU reminds and cautions one that actual economic policy research is able to cover only very few of the numerous conditions responsible for the overall outcome.     

Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing with Wage Bargaining: Implications for Equilibrium Unemployment

We analyze the relationship between profit sharing, employee effort, wage formation and unemployment under different relative timings of the wage and profit sharing decisions. The optimal profit share under commitment exceeds that under flexibility, because through a profit share commitment the firm can induce wage moderation. The negotiated profit sharing depends positively on the bargaining power of trade union and it has both effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects. Higher profit sharing is shown to reduce equilibrium unemployment under ``sufficiently rigid' labor market institutions, but it can harm employment when labor market ``rigidities' are ``small enough'.     

Central Wage Setting under Multiple Technological Equilibria: A Mechanism for Equilibrium Elimination

Instituting an initial round of centralized wage setting before an ultimate round of decentralized wage bargaining may actually raise employment. A general multi–equilibrium model is set up with strategic complementarities in the implementation of a new technology through aggregate demand spillovers. In this model, centralized wage setting to establish an outside option wage, which is selectively binding on lo–tech firms, may achieve the "big push" to a hi–tech general equilibrium with higher employment, output, wages and profits.     

A NOTE ON PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN A LINEAR CITY AND WAGE BARGAINING

Economides (Economics Letters, 1986, 21, pp. 67–71) has shown that within a linear city an equilibrium exists in a two‐stage location–price game when the curvature of the transportation cost function is sufficiently high. One important point is that not all of these equilibria are at maximal differentiation. In this paper, we include an additional stage with decentralized wage bargaining. This intensifies price competition resulting in locations that are nearer to the extremes of the city. The magnitude of this effect depends on the bargaining power of the unions. Contrary to the model with exogenously given costs, if unions are sufficient strong all price equilibria in pure strategies are at maximal differentiation. With a low parameter for the curvature of the transportation cost function unions can improve the location decision from a social viewpoint.     

The effects of structural change and economic liberalisation on gender wage differentials in South Korea and Taiwan

This paper investigates the sources of divergent trends in genderwage differentials in two important newly industrialised economies(NIEs), South Korean and Taiwan. As these economies have enteredthe 'post-industrial' phase of development, gender wage differentialsin Taiwan's manufacturing sector have widened, while in Koreathey have narrowed. Decomposition analysis is used to broadlyidentify sources of change in gender wage differentials. Multivariateregression analysis is relied on to differentiate the impacton the gender wage gap of (1) macro-levels policies, (2) institutionalfactors, and (3) shifts in labour demand and supply. In additionto the predictable effects of several standard supply-side variables,in Taiwan physical capital mobility is found to have contributedto a wider gender earnings gap. Women's greater concentrationin industries where capital is mobile may explain this result.The effects of capital mobility in Korea appears to differ,which may be due to the dissimilar characters of outward FDIfrom that country.     

Investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model

We analyze the interactions between investment and local wage bargaining in a putty-clay model where the investment decision commits the firm to a particular capital intensity. This technological precommitment is used strategically in order to manipulate the bargaining outcome. We show that this strategic behavior induces a nonmonotonic relationship between the capital and labor demands of the firm and most of its environmental parameters (e.g., the bargaining power of the union, its minimum wage requirement, the capital cost). The results we obtain in our putty-clay framework thus contradict several conclusions of the standard literature on wage bargaining and investment.     

Strategic Interactions of Monetary Policymakers and Wage/Price Bargainers: A Review with Implications for the European Common-Currency Area

This paper reviews recent work on macroeconomic management with varying organization of wage/price bargaining and degrees of credible monetary conservatism. The emerging literature synthesizes and extends theory and empirics on central bank independence (CBI) and coordinated wage/price bargaining (CWB), arguing that the degrees of CBI and CWB interact with each other and with other political-economic conditions (sectoral composition, international exposure, etc.) to structure the incentives facing actors involved in monetary policy and wage/price bargaining. The core implication, theoretically surprising but empirically supported, is that even perfectly credible monetary conservatism has long-run, equilibrium, on-average real effects, even with fully rational expectations, and that these effects depend on the organization of wage/price bargaining. Conversely, wage/price-bargaining structure has real effects that depend on the degree of credible conservatism reflected in monetary-policy rules. Each also has interactive nominal effects though this is less surprising. Some disagreement remains over the precise nature of these interactive effects, but all emerging theory and evidence agree that a common, credibly conservative European monetary policy has nominal and real effects that depend on the Europe-wide institutional-structural organization of wage/price bargaining. Indeed, the one specific piece of theoretical and empirical agreement suggests that, for many member countries, the nominal gains from monetary-policy delegation to a credibly conservative European Central Bank will worsen these bargaining-policy interactions.     

谈判能力与标价策略

厂商能够通过策略性地选择不标价销售,利用其较强的谈判能力获取更多的利益。当厂商谈判能力较弱时,厂商将选择标价以最大化其利润。考虑消费者的谈判成本,厂商选择不标价时,其利润和谈判能力呈倒U型关系。当厂商谈判能力过高时,由于消费者将无利可图而放弃购买,因而厂商将选择标价的策略。在一定条件下,厂商实施策略性不标价不是市场有效的,可以通过强制标价实现市场的有效性。     

The unequal distribution of unequal pay – An empirical analysis of the gender wage gap in Switzerland

In this paper we analyze the distribution of the gender wage gap. Using microdata for Switzerland we estimate conditional wage distribution functions and find that the total wage gap and its discrimination component are not constant over the range of wages. At low wages an overproportional part of the wage gap is due to discrimination. In a further analysis of specific individuals we examine the wage gap at different quantiles and propose a new measure to assess equal earnings opportunities. These additional results reveal that it is primarily low education that causes the large discrimination component at low wages. First version received: April 1999/Final version accepted: July 2000