Strategic management under duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to present a general conjectural variation model to provide an integrative treatment of strategic management under duopoly. It is shown that the nature of the desired distortion of managers' incentives depends critically on the magnitudes of the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs as well as the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives. In particular, it has been demonstrated that when the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives are zero, the owners will motivate their managers to maximize profits and provide no incentives for sales under consistent conjectures. However, the owners make their managers behave more (less) aggressively and produce more (less) than profit-maximizers if the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs are larger (smaller) than the actual response.     

Rivalry Restraint as Equilibrium Behavior

Rivalry restraint has received a lot of attention as a theory of profits in recent research on business strategy. Its economic rationale is explained as the consequences of either exogenous or endogenous anticompetitive forces present in different industries. In this paper, we use a dynamic oligopolistic industry model and show that rivalry restraint emerges as equilibrium behavior among firm owners who delegate decisions to managers. In the corresponding two‐stage game, managers choose optimal production rates in a dynamic Cournot market and owners set incentives for managers, acting sequentially rational. Equilibrium incentives correspond to rivalry restraint, that is, managers are less aggressive in the product market with lower outputs and increasing profits for all firms in the industry.     

基于伯川德推测变差的有限理性动态寡头博弈的复杂性

本文在具有伯川德推测变差的推测变差模型的基础上,引入参与人的基本有限理性的动态产量调整行为,构建出动态调整系统,论证了企业调整速度在稳定域内时,静态伯川德推测变差均衡仍可作为稳定的动态均衡而实现。并用数值仿真的方法说明了当企业的产量调整速度不在稳定域内时,经济系统将会出现倍周期分岔或混沌等复杂动态。     

Macroeconomic policy and the pricing behavior of imperfectly competitive firms

This paper develops theoretical models of the effect of expansionary macroeconomic policy on the pricing behavior of pure monopolist and oligopolist firms. A number of factors are identified which affect the magnitude of the price change chosen by an imperfectly competitive firm in response to macro policy action. The behavior of oligopolistic firms in response to macro policy changes is found to be influenced by the fact that expansionary macro policy initially impacts on industry demand rather than firm demand, and that the oligopolist's consequent pricing behavior will affect the share of the industry demand increase which it is able to appropriate.     

Wage bargaining,productivity growth and long-run industry structure

This paper studies the innovation dynamics of an oligopolistic industry. The firms compete not only in the output market but also by engaging in productivity enhancing innovations to reduce labor costs. Rent sharing may generate productivity dependent wage differentials. Productivity growth creates intertemporal spillover effects, which affect the incentives for innovation at subsequent dates. Over time the industry equilibrium approaches a steady state. The paper characterizes the evolution of the industry's innovation behavior and its market structure on the adjustment path.     

Advertising conjectures and the nature of advertising competition in an oligopoly

We estimate advertising conjectural variations within a simultaneous system that includes advertising and demand equations for cigarette manufacturers. This allows insight into advertising decisions in an oligopoly. The advertising conjectures are positive and statistically significant, indicating that firms do not hold Cournot conjectures as is usually assumed in theoretical models. Instead, firms perceive that their rivals will respond directly to their own advertising. We also find evidence that, while cigarette advertising rearranges market share by increasing firm-level demand relative to rivals' demand, it also increases market demand for cigarettes. Hence there are positive spillovers from advertising in the cigarette industry.     

Revisiting Oligopolistic Reaction: Are Decisions on Foreign Direct Investment Strategic Complements?

Knickerbocker (1973) introduced the notion of oligopolistic reaction to explain why firms follow rivals into foreign markets. We develop a model that incorporates central features of Knickerbocker's story—oligopoly, uncertainty, and risk aversion—to establish the conditions required to generate follow-the-leader behavior. We find that rival foreign investment will make risk-neutral firms less inclined to move abroad once its rivals have done so. We show that Knickerbocker's prediction relies on risk aversion and derive an expression for the minimum amount of risk aversion needed to generate oligopolistic reaction.     

Tariffs and location specific income redistribution

Distributional impacts of a specific tariff are examined when domestic consumers are spatially distributed, domestic and foreign transportation costs are significant, and spatial discrimination is practiced by oligopolistically interdependent domestic and foreign producers. Perhaps the most significant implication of the model is that the degree to which freight absorption occurs is an important consideration in the evaluation of protection. Whether firms adopt L.o.b or discriminatory charges for shipments critically affects the distributional outcome of commercial policy. In fact, freight absorption proves to be qualitatively as important as demand function shapes and sellers' conjectural variations to the results.     

Trade barriers and japanese foreign direct investment in the colour television industry

This paper examines the penetration by Japanese firms of the US and West European colour television markets, initially by exports and then, predominantly, by local production. It is demonstrated that Japanese foreign direct investment was basically a defensive response to trade barriers erected in these markets to re-locate Japanese plant from Japan and other Asian locations. A strategic oligopolistic imitative behaviour, rather than an orchestrated strategy, is identified, and a comparison is made of the effect of trade barriers in each region on industry structure and plant size.     

Infrastructure provision and international market share rivalry

The paper examines a model of strategic infrastructure investment. Two oligopolistic firms compete on home and foreign product markets for market shares. The national governments support the firms in the market rivalry by providing cost reducing public infrastructure services that are financed out of taxing an input used in the production process. It is shown, that infrastructure policy can be used as an instrument for strategic trade policy. However, governments are facing the problem of balancing the burden of taxation and the benefits of infrastructures. The theoretical model also raises some critical issues with respect to the policy relevance of recent empirical infrastructure research.     

Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly: A correction

This paper shows that there is no interior solution in Mai–Hwang's 1992 oligopolistic location model with free entry when the production function exhibits constant or decreasing returns to scale. The comparative static results of the impact of a demand change on the location decision only apply to the case where the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale. It re-examines the impact of a demand change on the location decision of an oligopolistic firm and corrects the propositions derived by [C.C. Mai, H. Hwang, Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly, Journal of Urban Economics 33 (1992) 252–271. Reprinted in: M.L. Greenhut, G. Norman (Eds.), The Economics of Location, vol. I: Location Theory, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1995].     

Markup Pricing and the Auto Industry: A Partial Explanation of Stagflation in an Oligopolistic Economy

A bstract . Price leadership firms and especially wage leadership unions frequently are not operating at points of maximization in the neoclassical sense, because contrived high level demand has brought low price consciousness or elasticity of demand for their commodities or services. Accordingly, they can get higher profits or wages anytime they choose to raise their price except during severe recession. If output falls as a consequence, goveniment and the central hank have stood ready to expand total spending. The contrived high demand has interacted with oligopolistic practices to obviate the distinction between elasticity for the firm and that of its industry, with empirical studies showing demand elasticity commonly not much above unity. The automobile industry is the focus of attention in this study. It appears that stable and high employment market capitalism no longer is possible, because at a minimum t requires generalized maximization behavior, which involves operation against constraining supply and demand parameters.     

Integration, Complementary Products, and Variety

This paper examines the incentives for integration when the market for consumer durables (hardware) is oligopolistic and the market for complementary services (software) is monopolistically competitive. We find that the equilibrium industry structure will depend on the magnitude of the fixed costs of software development. If the software development costs are relatively large, the equilibrium industry structure is unintegrated, that is, neither hardware firm integrates; if the software development costs are relatively small, the equilibrium industry structure is integrated, that is, both hardware firms integrate. Under the integrated industry structure, hardware profits are lower, less varieties are provided, and hardware prices are lower than under the unintegrated industry structure. The game has a prisoners' dilemma structure when the software development costs are relatively small because of a foreclosure effect. Strategically increasing the number of software varieties provides an avenue for an integrated hardware firm to increase its market share and profits by reducing the number of software varieties available for an unintegrated rival technology. Although consumer surplus is higher under an integrated industry structure, the total surplus associated with the unintegrated industry structure exceeds that of the integrated industry structure.     

A Method for the estimation of limit prices without entry data

Estimates of limit pricing values are useful to researchers studying princing strategies and oligopolistic behavior. Previous studies have demonstrated that limit prices (profits) can be estimated with the use of data on the entry of new firms. Unfortunately, entry data are scarce. The current study presents a methodology based on a property of dynamic-stochastic theories of limit pricing wherein limit prices can be estimated without entry data. This methodology requires the use of price elasticity of demand values which are more readily available than entry data. Following the methodology section, an application of this method is presented with a cross-section sample of consumer goods industries.     

The determinants of foreign direct investment: An analysis of US manufacturing industries

This study explores the determinants of foreign direct investment by analyzing the variation across US manufacturing industries in the extent of outward foreign direct investment. Three types of industry characteristics are hypothesized to explain this variation. Empirical support is found for four sources of ownership-specific advantages favoring foreign direct investment, new technology created through research and development, marketing abilities, organizational techniques and capital cost advantages. Support is found for the role of production scale economies in favoring centralization and hindering foreign direct investment, but results suggest only a weak role for transport costs in favoring decentralization and foreign direct investment. Producer concentration, perhaps reflecting oligopolistic competition, is positively related to foreign direct investment.     

Econometric Analysisof Collusive Behaviorin a Soft-Drink Market

This paper proposes an empirical methodology for studying various (implicit or explicit) collusive behaviors on two strategic variables, which are price and advertising, in a differentiated market dominated by a duopoly. In addition to Nash or Stackelberg behaviors, we consider collusion on both variables, collusion on one variable and competition on the other, etc. Using data on the Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola markets from 1968 to 1986, full information maximum likelihood estimation of cost and demand functions are obtained allowing for various collusive behaviors. The collusive hypothesis is not rejected, and the best form of collusive behavior is selected via nonnested testing procedures. Using the best model, Lerner indices are computed for both duopolists to provide summary measures of market power. Finally, our approach is contrasted with the conjectural variation approach and is shown to give superior results.     

Oligopsony/oligopoly power and factor market performance

This paper is concerned with the economic performance of factor markets in an oligopsony/ oligopoly setting. Firm arid industry indexes are developed to measure factor market price distortions caused by exerted oligopsony/oligopoly power. These measures indicate that the elasticity of output demand, the elasticity of input supply, and the input and output conjectural elasticities determine the degree of non-competitive performance in factor markets. It is also shown that under special conditions the firm index equals the Lerner index and the industry index equals the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.     

Options Compensation as a Commitment Mechanism in Oligopoly Competition

We analyze how CEO stock options compensation can be used as a commitment device in oligopolistic competition. We develop a two‐stage model where shareholders choose managerial compensation to commit their managers to being aggressive in equilibrium. Our results may explain why some shareholders appear to incentivize ‘excessive’ risk taking through stock options compensation. We analyze how our results are impacted by product quality, marginal cost, product differentiation, and industry concentration. As motivation for our research, we show that there exists positive empirical correlation between industry concentration and options compensation vega within a sample of firms, as suggested by our model. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Transportation rates, market structure and the production-location decision : A note

This note examines the effects of market structure on production and location decisions of an oligopolistic firm. It shows that if transportation rates are a function of quantity shipped and distance traveled, a linearly homogeneous production function is not sufficient to ensure independence between the optimum location and market structure unless (i) the elasticities of transportation rates with respect to quantity shipped are constant and identical, and (ii) the ratios of marginal products to the marginal transportation costs are equal for each input. This results is significantly different from Hwang and Mai's in the constant transportation rates case.     

Inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty

The implications of different information patterns for firms in oligopolistic resource markets are considered. The traditional open-loop Nash equilibrium with static information sets is one of many possible Nash equilibria and is not suitable for stochastic environments. When shocks to resource growth are serially uncorrelated, there are no gains from conditioning the harvest on past stock levels and the feedback or credible Nash equilibrium is the appropriate Nash equilibrium concept. This credible equilibrium assumes that firms have knowledge of current stocks of reserves, which typically leads to more rapid extraction of the resource and possibly extinction. Since the open-loop Nash equilibrium is efficient when demand is iso-elastic and extraction costs are zero, it is clear that an increase in information can be detrimental to firms in the industry.