产品差异化下合谋、价格战的理论模型及应用

新经验产业组织理论是研究企业行为策略的重要方法,本文全面介绍了产品差异化下市场均衡模型,研究了如何利用该理论模型对厂商合谋、价格战等竞争格局进行分析和检验。     

独立董事合谋与监督的经济学分析

独立董事制度在上市公司中的地位日益重要,但是其监督作用并未很好的发挥作用。从经济学的基本理论出发,试图寻求独立董事和内部董事合谋的经济学动因。通过研究合谋和监督的博弈过程,得出在独立董事对内部董事由合谋转向监督博弈过程中,激励机制起了决定性的作用。     

独立董事合谍与监督的经济学分析

独立董事制度在上市公司中的地位日益重要，但是其监督作用并未很好的发挥作用。从经济学的基本理论出发，试图寻求独立董事和内部董事合谋的经济学动因。通过研究合谋和监督的博弈过程，得出在独立董事对内部董事由合谋转向监督博弈过程中，激励机制起了决定性的作用。     

对我国房地产价格持续上涨的一种解释——价格合谋

中国房地产价格的持续上涨，引发了学者对于房地产商价格合谋的思索，笔者从经济学市场竞争结构入手，得出价格合谋的市场条件：房地产业区域性寡头垄断竞争结构，以及在区域性寡头垄断下有利于合谋的6大条件，并在此基础上运用产业组织理论博弈论模型分析价格合谋的过程。     

政府、税务人员与纳税人的税收合谋博弈分析

税收合谋是各方利益主体追求自身利益最大化的最终选择。通过构建政府、税务人员与纳税人三方的博弈模型系统,分析其博弈情况,发现税收合谋的产生与政府的稽查效率、稽查成本、对合谋的处罚力度之间有很大的相关性。要瓦解和防范税收合谋的形成,政府应加快完善网络化的信息共享系统,降低合谋的稽查成本;加快推进法制建设,加大对合谋的处罚力度;组建专家级的稽查队伍,提高合谋的查实率,以有效地防止税款人为的流失,将税收合谋对国家和社会产生的危害控制在最低程度,确保国家税收的安全完整。     

税收征管中的联盟行为及其瓦解机制

税收征管体系是一个复杂的多方参与系统,可以采用n人博弈模型进行分析。由于税收监管和激励的不完全性就必然会产生参与人之间的合谋与勾结问题。税收博弈分析通过对联盟形成的动机、条件以及联盟收益的分析,表明参与人之间的有效沟通、不合理的制度、较低的结盟成本都有利于联盟的形成;同时对于预测可能的合谋勾结,确定联盟形成中的关键人,以及如何阻止参与人之间的合谋勾结,建立科学的税收征管体系提供了理论基础和政策措施。     

上市公司审计合谋的环境分析

本文站在上市公司的立场,从审计合谋需求的产生、发出审计合谋的内部环境分析、达成合谋协议的外部环境三个方面分析了其与审计师达成合谋的过程。从而希望为防止审计合谋提供一些帮助。     

审计合谋的成因及对策探讨

审计合谋这一不正常的经济现象的存在,使得财务报告舞弊的防范体系失去了最后的屏障。因此,防范和治理审计合谋已经刻不容缓。从审计合谋的需求和供给两方面分析了合谋形成的原因,并提出了审计合谋的防范和治理措施。     

官员任期与工业企业实际税负:基于动态合谋理论视角的分析

在当前全球经济不确定性增加、中国经济步入新常态的背景下,为企业减税降费、增加实体经济活力成为经济工作的重点.本文从动态合谋理论的角度为理解中国企业的实际税负提供了一个新的视角.首先,本文使用关系契约的基本思路将传统合谋理论扩展到动态形式.在均衡下,随着地方政府官员任期的增加,政企合谋也随之增加.其次,本文使用1998—2013年中国工业企业数据库数据以及1998—2013年中国地级市市委书记数据对官员任期与企业实际税负之间的关系进行了实证检验.研究发现,市委书记任期越长,政企合谋就越严重,企业实际税负就越低.本文的研究结论对我国进一步推进企业减税降费工作具有重要意义.     

控股股东和经营者合谋的博弈分析

在现代企业中,控股股东和经营者拥有相当程度的控制权,作为有限理性的经济人,当合谋的净收益大于不合谋的净收益时,控股股东和经营者便会合谋,以攫取控制权私人收益,损害小股东的利益。通过控股股东和经营者的博弈模型论证了控股股东和经营者存在合谋的可能,以及合谋的影响因素。     

Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets with Quantity Competition

This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (Int Econ Rev 44:299–312, 2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing.     

Asymmetric Collusion with Growing Demand

We characterize collusion sustainability in markets where demand growth triggers the entry of a new firm whose efficiency may be different from the efficiency of the incumbents. We find that the profit-sharing rule that firms adopt to divide the cartel profit after entry is a key determinant of the incentives for collusion (before and after entry). In particular, if the incumbents and the entrant are very asymmetric, collusion without side-payments cannot be sustained. However, if firms divide joint profits through bargaining and are sufficiently patient, collusion is sustainable even if firms are very asymmetric.     

Export Cartels and Domestic Markets

This paper considers the effect of monopoly-promoting export cartels on domestic production. It is argued that export cartels facilitate tacit collusion by monitoring defections more efficiently. This slackens the incentive constraint of tacit collusion. Optimizing firms competing both in the domestic and export markets will often use the increased possibility for collusion in both markets. If the markets are not too different or there is constant returns to scale this is the case.     

The Coordinated Effect of a Merger with Balanced Sharing of Collusive Profits

It is hard to assess the coordinated effect of mergers in solid and convincing fashion, in part because economic theory deals mainly with the sustainability of tacit collusion and generally does not explore the conditions that foster collusion in the first place. Also the most popular schemes of collusion (Joint profit maximization and Nash Bargaining) proposed by the economic literature seem at odds with the evidence recorded on cartels and with the practical attitude of entrepreneurs. In this scenario the recent version of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines contained the interesting suggestion to pay attention to the process - parallel behaviour – which leads to collusive equilibria. Working on the same intuition we propose an approach based on the idea that firms can always find a feasible collusive agreement, for every possible value of the factor which discounts future profits. Assuming that in order to collude, firms demand the fair sharing of collusive gains, we exploit the egalitarian property of grim trigger strategies when all incentive compatibility constraints are binding. This approach suggests using three indicators to determine whether and how a merger affects the probability of collusion. An application of this approach to a real-world case (the AT&T/T-Mobile merger) is provided.     

企业价格串谋识别的博弈分析及模拟

原料成本的上升经常促使企业联合起来集体涨价,如何识别成本冲击下企业涨价是否存在价格串谋行为成为《反垄断法》的重要课题。研究并利用推测变差理论,给出一种识别成本冲击下的企业串谋行为的方法,并利用数值模拟方法得出了一种经验判断,旨在为我国反垄断执法提供一种理论上的帮助。     

Colluding on a Price Increase

Adopting a general spatial framework, we analyse collusion concerning a price increase between two firms. We find that any variable affects the sustainability of collusion in the same way it affects the competitive profits.     

Nothing so Certain as your Anchors? A Consumer Bias that may Lower Prices and Prevent Cartels

In this paper, we investigate the effect of reference prices on oligopolistic firms’ behavior. Specifically, we analyze pricing strategies and equilibrium outcomes when differentiated firms compete in Bertrand fashion and reference prices act as anchors. We show that anchoring may lower the prices charged in the long run. Furthermore, we claim that the existence of anchoring makes collusion less stable. This might have implications on the optimal allocation of regulatory resources.     

Conscious Parallelism in Asymmetric Oligopoly

Conscious parallelism refers to collusive forms of parallel pricing in oligopoly. In this paper, four distinct pricing methods which all impose some form of parallel conduct are analysed. The pricing methods maximize joint profits if, and only if, firms are symmetric. With asymmetries in cost, total gains from collusion are reduced and absolute and relative collusive gains differ between firms. For many collusive optima, low‐cost firms have only little to gain from conscious parallelism. This is particularly the case when the degree of product homogeneity is high.     

Exchange of threat between multinational firms as an infinitely repeated noncooperative game

This study addresses the issue of under what circumstances intra-industry direct foreign investment could lead to anticompetitive behavior. Specifically, conditions under which (a) duopolists each operating in two national markets might agree jointly to maximize profits in the two markets and (b) such an agreement could have the properties of a Nash equilibrium are explored. If firms maximize profits “myopically”—that is, in the current market period only without regard to effects of their actions on profits in future periods-then such an agreement cannot be a Nash equilibrium. But if firms attempt to maximize the net present value of profits both in the current market period and in future periods, then theorems from the theory of infinitely repeated noncooperative games can be invoked to show that arrangements requiring tacit collusion can be a Nash equilibrium.     

Strategic Investment Decisions under Uncertainty,Tacit Collusion and Product Differentiation

This paper examines the effects of uncertainty, tacit collusion and product differentiation on strategic investment policy. The model demonstrates the equilibrium under competitive investments and under cooperative investments. In competitive investments, two firms compete by investing to preempt each other, and ultimately one firm invests earlier than its rival. In cooperative investments, two firms invest simultaneously and collude on their outputs. Cooperative investments are likely to be sustainable only under conditions of high volatility of future demand, low probability of market extinction and high degree of product differentiation, while competitive investments are sustainable for any set of these parametric values.